Rainey v Greater Glasgow [1986] UKHL 8

House of Lords
Between
RaineyAppellantGreater GlasgowRespondent
Before
Lord Keith of KinkelLord Brandon of OakbrookLord GriffithsLord Mackay of ClashfernLord Goff of ChieveleyDate 27 November 1986

LORD BRANDON OF OAKBROOK

My Lords,This appeal from an interlocutor of the First Division of the Inner House, which affirmed the decisions of an industrial tribunal and of the Employment Appeal Tribunal, is concerned with the proper construction of certain provisions of the Equal Pay Act 1970.The appellant, a woman, has since 1 October 1980 been employed by the respondent board at the Belvidere Hospital, Glasgow, as a prosthetist. A prosthetist is one who is concerned with the fitting of artificial limbs. Before 1980 no prosthetist was directly employed by any health authority in Scotland. The requisite services were provided by private contractors themselves employing qualified prosthetists who worked in a number of hospitals, including Belvidere Hospital. One of these was a Mr. Alan Crumlin. In 1979 the Secretary of State for Scotland decided to establish a prosthetic fitting service within the National Health Service in Scotland, and to discontinue the arrangement under which the service was provided by private contractors. To achieve this object it was necessary that a sufficient number of qualified prosthetists should be recruited to the National Health Service en bloc. The only prosthetists then available were those employed by the private contractors. The remuneration of employees of the National Health Service is determined by negotiation and agreement in the Whitley Councils for the Health Services. It was decided by the Scottish Home and Health Department that, in general, the remuneration of employees in the new prosthetic service should be related to the Whitley Council scale, and that the appropriate scale for them would be that for medical physics technicians. Since, however, it was appreciated this might not be attractive to the prosthetists in the employment of private contractors, whom it was desired to recruit en bloc, it was decided to offer them an option. That option, as set out in a letter from the department to Mr. Crumlin dated 11 January 1980, was either to come into the National Health Service on National Health Service rates of pay and conditions of service or to remain on the rates of pay and conditions of service which he presently received, subject to future changes as negotiated by his trade union, A.S.T.M.S., for the prosthetists employed by contractors. It is to be observed that in England prosthetic services were to continue to be provided through private contractors. Mr. Crumlin and all the other prosthetists who received the offer (about 20 in number who all happened to be men) opted for the second alternative. This meant that they retained their existing salaries, and that future increases were to be negotiated with A.S.T.M.S. and not the Whitley Council. Mr. Crumlin commenced employment with the National Health Service at Belvidere Hospital in July 1980 at the salary of £6,680 per annum, the same as he had been receiving from his former employer. At the time of the hearing before the industrial tribunal, on 23 March 1983, it had increased to £10,085 per annum.The appellant entered the employment of the National Health Service as a prosthetist working at Belvidere Hospital on 1 October 1980. She did so directly, not having been previously employed by a private contractor. Her qualifications and experience were broadly similar to those of Mr. Crumlin. The rates of pay and conditions of service offered to and accepted by her corresponded to those of a medical physics technician at the appropriate point on the Whitley Council scale. Her starting salary was £4,773, and at the time of the hearing before the industrial tribunal it had increased to £7,295. A male prosthetist, Mr. Davey, was engaged at the same time and on the same conditions. He has since left his employment.No prosthetists have since 1980 transferred from private employment to National Health Service employment, and no such transfers on special terms will be permitted in the future. Any prosthetists engaged by the respondents in the future, whether male or female, will do so on the National Health Service scale of remuneration. No arrangements have been made for phasing out the disparity between the prosthetists who transferred from the private sector in 1980, such as Mr. Crumlin, and those who entered the National Health Service employment directly, such as the appellant.In these circumstances, the appellant applied to an industrial tribunal, under the Act of 1970, for a declaration that she was entitled to the same pay as Mr. Crumlin.The appellant founded upon section 1(1) and (2)(a) of the Act of 1970 which provide (as substituted by section 8(T) of and Schedule 1 to the Sex Discrimination Act 1975):
"(1) If the terms of a contract under which a woman is employed at an establishment in Great Britain do not include (directly or by reference to a collective agreement or otherwise) an equality clause they shall be deemed to include one. (2) . . . (a) where the woman is employed on like work with a man in the same employment - (i) if, (apart from the equality clause) any term of the woman's contract is or becomes less favourable to the woman than a term of a similar kind in the contract under which that man is employed, that term of the woman's contract shall be treated as so modified as not to be less favourable, and (ii) if (apart from the equality clause) at any time the woman's contract does not include a term corresponding to a term benefiting that man included in the contract under which he is employed, the woman's contract shall be treated as including such a term; . . ."
The board did not dispute that the appellant was employed on like work with Mr. Crumlin, nor that the term of her contract as regards remuneration was less favourable than the corresponding term of Mr. Crumlin's contract. They founded on section 1(3) of the Act and undertook the burden of satisfying its provisions, which at the material time were in these terms:
"An equality clause shall not operate in relation to a variation between the woman's contract and the man's contract if the employer proves that the variation is genuinely due to a material difference (other than the difference of sex) between her case and his."
The industrial tribunal dismissed the appellant's application. Having narrated the facts of the case as found by them and the contentions of the parties they stated:
"Having considered the evidence the tribunal is satisfied that what has caused the difference in the salary scale of the applicant and Mr. Crumlin is not market forces but is the fact that Mr. Crumlin is paid on a scale negotiated and agreed between his trade union and the Scottish Home and Health Department whereas the applicant is paid according to a different scale. The scale upon which the applicant is paid is an ad hoc scale and not one which has been negotiated between her trade union and the Scottish Home and Health Department. There was clear evidence that any male employees recruited at the same time as or after the recruitment of the applicant would be paid the same rate as the applicant was and subject to the same scale. We had no doubt on the evidence that had any of the prosthetists employed by the private contractors been female they would have been paid the same higher rate of pay as the male prosthetists transferred from the private contractor. The tribunal were therefore forced to the conclusion that the difference had nothing to do with the fact that the applicant was female. We were satisfied that the reason for the difference was because of the different method of entry and had nothing to do with sex. The application must therefore be dismissed."
The appellant appealed to the Employment Appeal Tribunal which, by a majority, dismissed the appeal. A further appeal to the Court of Session was also dismissed by the First Division of the Inner House (Lord President Emslie and Lord Cameron, Lord Grieve dissenting).The facts found by the industrial tribunal make it clear that the Secretary of State for Scotland decided, as a matter of general policy, that the Whitley Council scale of remuneration and negotiating machinery, which applied throughout the National Health Service in Scotland, was appropriate for employees in the prosthetic service. It was also decided that the appropriate part of the scale for such employees was that applicable to medical physics technicians, presumably because the nature of their work was considered comparable to that of the prosthetists. So all direct entrants to the service, whether male or female, were to be placed on that part of the scale and made subject to Whitley Council negotiations. But it was apparent that the new service would not get off the ground unless a sufficient number of the prosthetists in the employment of the private contractors could be attracted into it. So the further policy decision was taken to offer these prosthetists the option of entering the service at their existing salaries and subject to the A.S.T.M.S. negotiating machinery. As it happened, all the prosthetists privately employed were male. In the result, Mr. Crumlin had the benefit of the offer and so emerged with a higher salary and better prospects for an increase than did the appellant, who did not have that benefit.The main question at issue in the appeal is whether those circumstances are capable in law of constituting, within the meaning of section 1(3) of the Act of 1970, "a material difference (other than the difference of sex) between her case and his."Counsel for the appellant argued that nothing can constitute such a difference which is not related to the personal circumstances of the two employees, such as their respective skills, experience or training. Reliance was placed upon the decision of the Court of Appeal in Clay Cross (Quarry Services) Ltd. v. Fletcher [1978] 1 W.L.R. 1429. In that case a woman sales clerk was employed at a lower wage than a male sales clerk who had been engaged at a later date. The employers relied, as being the material difference between her case and his, on the circumstance that the male clerk had been the only suitable applicant for the post and that he had refused to accept it unless he was paid the same wage as he had received in his previous job. The Employment Appeal Tribunal had accepted this as discharging the onus on the employers under section 1(3) of the Act of 1970, but their decision was reversed by the Court of Appeal. Lord Denning M.R. said, at p. 1433:
"The issue depends on whether there is a material difference (other than sex) between her case and his. Take heed to the words 'between her case and his.' They show that the tribunal is to have regard to her and to him - to the personal equation of the woman as compared to that of the man - irrespective of any extrinsic forces which led to the variation in pay. As I said in Shields v. E. Coomes (Holdings) Ltd. [1978] 1 W.L.R. 1408; 1418E, section 1(3) applies when 'the personal equation of the man is such that he deserves to be paid at a higher rate than the woman.' Thus the personal equation of the man may warrant a wage differential if he has much longer length of service, or has superior skill or qualifications; or gives bigger output or productivity; or has been placed, owing to downgrading, in a protected pay category, vividly described as 'red-circled'; or to other circumstances personal to him in doing his job. But the tribunal is not to have regard to any extrinsic forces which have led to the man being paid more. An employer cannot avoid his obligations under the Act by saying:
'I paid him more because he asked for more,' or '
I paid her less because she was willing to come for less.' If any such excuse were permitted, the Act would be a dead letter. Those are the very reasons why there was unequal pay before the statute. They are the very circumstances in which the statute was intended to operate.Nor can the employer avoid his obligations by giving the reasons why he submitted to the extrinsic forces. As for instance by saying:
'He asked for that sum because it was what he was getting in his previous job,' or, '
He was the only applicant for the job, so I had no option.' In such cases the employer may beat his breast, and say:
'I did not pay him more because he was a man. I paid it because he was the only suitable person who applied for the job. Man or woman made no difference to me.'
Those are reasons personal to the employer. If any such reasons were permitted as an excuse, the door would be wide open. Every employer who wished to avoid the statute would walk straight through it."Lawton L.J. said, at p. 1437:
"What does section 1(3) in its context in both the Equal Pay Act 1970 and the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 mean? The context is important. The overall object of both Acts is to ensure that women are treated no less favourably than men. If a woman is treated less favourably than a man there is a presumption of discrimination which can only be rebutted in the sphere of employment if the employer brings himself within section 1(3). He cannot do so merely by proving that he did not intend to discriminate. There are more ways of discriminating against women than by deliberately setting out to do so: see section 1(1)(b) of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975. If lack of intention had provided a lawful excuse for variation, section 1(3) would surely have been worded differently. The variation must have been genuinely due to (that is, caused by) a material difference (that is, one which was relevant and real) between - and now come the important words - her case and his. What is her case? And what is his? In my judgment, her case embraces what appertains to her in her job, such as the qualifications she brought to it, the length of time she has been in it, the skill she has acquired, the responsibilities she has undertaken and where and under what conditions she has to do it. It is on this kind of basis that her case is to be compared with that of the man's. What does not appertain to her job or to his are the circumstances in which they came to be employed. These are collateral to the jobs as such."
In my opinion these statements are unduly restrictive of the proper interpretation of section 1(3). The difference must be "material," which I would construe as meaning "significant and relevant," and it must be between "her case and his." Consideration of a person's case must necessarily involve consideration of all the circumstances of that case. These may well go beyond what is not very happily described as "the personal equation," i.e. the personal qualities by way of skill, experience or training which the individual brings to the job. Some circumstances may on examination prove to be not significant or not relevant, but others may do so, though not relating to the personal qualities of the employee. In particular, where there is no question of intentional sex discrimination whether direct or indirect (and there is none here) a difference which is connected with economic factors affecting the efficient carrying on of the employer's business or other activity may well be relevant.This view is supported by two decisions of the European Court of Justice upon the interpretation of article 119 of the Treaty of Rome, requiring the application "of the principle that men and women should receive equal pay for equal work," and to the implementation of which the Equal Pay Act 1970 is directed. The first of these decisions is Jenkins v Kingsgate (Clothing Productions) Ltd. (Case 96/80) [1981] 1 WLR 972 , which originated in the Employment Appeal Tribunal in England. A company employed full-time and part-time workers on like work, but paid the latter, almost all of whom were female, less than the former, who were predominantly male. The company claimed that it did so in order to encourage full-time work and hence achieve fuller utilisation of machinery, and this was accepted by an industrial tribunal as discharging the onus under section 1(3). The Employment Appeal Tribunal referred to the European Court questions directed to ascertaining whether the employers' policy constituted a contravention of article 119. The court's answer was at pp. 982-983:
"9. It appears from the first three questions and the reasons stated in the order making the reference that the national court is principally concerned to know whether a difference in the level of pay for work carried out part-time and the same work carried out full-time may amount to discrimination of a kind prohibited by article 119 of the Treaty when the category of part-time workers is exclusively or predominantly comprised of women. 10. The answer to the questions thus understood is that the purpose of article 119 is to ensure the application of the principle of equal pay for men and women for the same work. The differences in pay prohibited by that provision are therefore exclusively those based on the difference of the sex of the workers. Consequently the fact that part-time work is paid at an hourly rate lower than pay for full-time work does not amount per se to discrimination prohibited by article 119 provided that the hourly rates are applied to workers belonging to either category without distinction based on sex. 11. If there is no such distinction, therefore, the fact that work paid at time rates is remunerated at an hourly rate which varies according to the number of hours worked per week does not offend against the principle of equal pay laid down in article 119 of the Treaty in so far as the difference in pay between part-time work and full-time work . is attributable to factors which are objectively justified and are in no way related to any discrimination based on sex. 12. Such may be the case, in particular, when by giving hourly rates of pay which are lower for part-time work than those for full-time work the employer is endeavouring, on economic grounds which may be objectively justified, to encourage full-time work irrespective of the sex of the worker. 13. By contrast, if it is established that a considerably smaller percentage of women than of men perform the minimum number of weekly working hours required in order to be able to claim the full-time hourly rate of pay, the inequality in pay will be contrary to article 119 of the Treaty where, regard being had to the difficulties encountered by women in arranging to work that minimum number of hours per week, the pay policy of the undertaking in question cannot be explained by factors other than discrimination based on sex. 14. Where the hourly rate of pay differs according to whether the work is part-time or full-time it is for the national courts to decide in each individual case whether, regard being had to the facts of the case, its history and the employer's intention, a pay policy such as that which is at issue in the main proceedings although represented as a difference based on weekly working hours is or is not in reality discrimination based on the sex of the worker. 15. The reply to the first three questions must therefore be that a difference in pay between full-time workers and part-time workers does not amount to discrimination prohibited by article 119 of the Treaty unless it is in reality merely an indirect way of reducing the level of pay of part-time workers on the ground that that group of workers is composed exclusively or predominantly of women."
The formal ruling of the court was, at p. 984:
"1. A difference in pay between full-time workers and part-time workers does not amount to discrimination prohibited by article 119 of the Treaty unless it is in reality merely an indirect way of reducing the pay of part-time workers on the ground that that group of workers is composed exclusively or predominantly of women.
2. Where the national court is able, using the criteria of equal work and equal pay, without the operation of Community or national measures, to establish that the payment of lower hourly rates of remuneration for part-time work than for full-time work represents discrimination based on difference of sex the provisions of article 119 of the Treaty apply directly to such a situation."When the case was again before the Employment Appeal Tribunal, Browne-Wilkinson J., delivering judgment, accepted [1981] 1 WLR 1485 , 1492 that the ruling of the European Court established that a differential in pay between part-time workers, who are predominantly women, and full-time male workers can be justified as being a material difference by showing that the pay differential does in fact achieve economic advantages for the employer. He found difficulty, however, in elucidating whether the judgment and ruling of the European Court meant that it was sufficient for the employer to show that he had no intention of discriminating because his pay practice was directed to some legitimate economic objective, or that he must show that the practice was in fact reasonably necessary in order to achieve that objective. In the result, he took the view that if article 119 as construed by the European Court was satisfied if the employer met the less demanding criterion, nevertheless section 1(3) of the Act of 1970 went further than that and required the employer to meet the more demanding one. This view is encapsulated in this passage, at p. 1495:
"(4) If the industrial tribunal finds that the employer intended to discriminate against women by paying part-time workers less, the employer cannot succeed under section 1(3). (5) Even if the employers had no such intention, for section 1(3) to apply the employer must show that the difference in pay between full-time and part-time workers is reasonably necessary in order to obtain some result (other than cheap female labour) which the employer desires for economic or other reasons."
In the result, the case was remitted to the industrial tribunal to find whether the lower rate of pay for part-time workers was in fact reasonably necessary in order to enable the employers to reduce absenteeism and to obtain the maximum utilisation of their plant.The European Court had occasion to consider the question afresh in Bilka-Kaufhaus G.m.b.H. v. Weber von Hartz (Case 170/84) [1986] IRLR 317 . A German department store operated an occupational pension scheme for its employees, under which part-time employees were eligible for pensions only if they had worked full-time for at least 15 years over a total period of 20 years. That provision affected disproportionately more women than men. A female part-time employee claimed that the provision contravened article 119 of the Treaty. The employers contended that it was based upon objectively justified economic grounds, in that it encouraged full-time work which resulted in lower ancillary costs and the utilisation of staff throughout opening hours. The European Court by its decision made it clear that it was not sufficient for the employers merely to show absence of any intention to discriminate, saying, at pp. 320-321:
"It is for the national court, which has sole jurisdiction to make findings of fact, to determine whether and to what extent the grounds put forward by an employer to explain the adoption of a pay practice which applies independently of a worker's sex but in fact affects more women than men may be regarded as objectively justified economic grounds. If the national court finds that the measures chosen by Bilka correspond to a real need on the part of the undertaking, are appropriate with a view to achieving the objectives pursued and are necessary to that end, the fact that the measures affect a far greater number of women than men is not sufficient to show that they constitute an infringement of article 119. The answer to question 2(a) must therefore be that under article 119 a department store company may justify the adoption of a pay policy excluding part-time workers, irrespective of their sex, from its occupational pension scheme on the ground that it seeks to employ as few part-time workers as possible, where it is found that the means chosen for achieving that objective correspond to a real need on the part of the undertaking, are appropriate with a view to achieving the objective in question and are necessary to that end."
It therefore appears that the European Court has resolved the doubts expressed by Browne-Wilkinson J. in Jenkins v. Kingsgate (Clothing Productions) Ltd. [1981] 1 WLR 1485 and established that the true meaning and effect of article 119 in this particular context is the same as that there attributed to section 1(3) of the Act of 1970 by the Employment Appeal Tribunal. Although the European Court at one point refers to "economic" grounds objectively justified, whereas Browne-Wilkinson J. speaks of "economic or other reasons," I consider that read as a whole the ruling of the European Court would not exclude objectively justified grounds which are other than economic, such as administrative efficiency in a concern not engaged in commerce or business.The decision of the European Court on article 119 must be accepted as authoritative and the judgment of the Employment Appeal Tribunal on section 1(3) of the Act of 1970, which in my opinion is correct, is in harmony with it. There is now no reason to construe section 1(3) as conferring greater rights on a worker in this context than does article 119 of the Treaty. It follows that a relevant difference for purposes of section 1(3) may relate to circumstances other than the personal qualifications or merits of the male and female workers who are the subject of comparison.In the present case the difference between the case of the appellant and that of Mr. Crumlin is that the former is a person who entered the National Health Service at Belvidere Hospital directly while the latter is a person who entered it from employment with a private contractor. The fact that one is a woman and the other a man is an accident. The findings of the industrial tribunal make it clear that the new prosthetic service could never have been established within a reasonable time if Mr. Crumlin and others like him had not been offered a scale of remuneration no less favourable than that which they were then enjoying. That was undoubtedly a good and objectively justified ground for offering him that scale of remuneration. But it was argued for the appellant that it did not constitute a good and objectively justified reason for paying the appellant and other direct entrants a lower scale of remuneration. This aspect does not appear to have been specifically considered by either of the tribunals or by their Lordships of the First Division, apart from Lord Grieve who said [1985] I.R.L.R. 414, 425:
"I accept that the facts which provided the evidence before both tribunals were sufficient to explain why Mr. Crumlin (and his colleagues) were paid on a scale equivalent to that which they had been receiving while employed in the private sector, but in my opinion that evidence is not sufficient to explain why, when the National [Health] Service door was opened to the appellant (and other prosthetists not previously employed in the private sector) the appellant (and her fellow prosthetists) were paid on a lower scale. In the absence of a reasonable explanation as to why the appellant was paid on a lower scale than Mr. Crumlin I am of opinion that the respondents have not discharged the onus placed upon them by section 1(3) of the Act of 1970, and that the majority of the Employment Appeal Tribunal were not entitled on the facts before them to conclude that they had."
The position in 1980 was that all National Health Service employees were paid on the Whitley Council scale, and that the Whitley Council negotiating machinery applied to them. The prosthetic service was intended to be a branch of the National Health Service. It is therefore easy to see that from the administrative point of view it would have been highly anomalous and inconvenient if prosthetists alone, over the whole tract of future time for which the prosthetic service would endure, were to have been subject to a different salary scale and different negotiating machinery. It is significant that a large part of the difference which has opened up between the appellant's salary and Mr. Crumlin's is due to the different negotiating machinery. Accordingly, there were sound objectively justified administrative reasons, in my view, for placing prosthetists in general, men and women alike, on the Whitley Council scale and subjecting them to its negotiating machinery. There is no suggestion that it was unreasonable to place them on the particular point on the Whitley Council scale which was in fact selected, ascertained by reference to the position of medical physics technicians and entirely regardless of sex. It is in any event the fact that the general scale of remuneration for prosthetists was laid down accordingly by the Secretary of State. It was not a question of the appellant being paid less than the norm but of Mr. Crumlin being paid more. He was paid more because of the necessity to attract him and other privately employed prosthetists into forming the nucleus of the new service.I am therefore of the opinion that the grounds founded on by the board as constituting the material difference between the appellant's case and that of Mr. Crumlin were capable in law of constituting a relevant difference for purposes of section 1(3) of the Act of 1970, and that on the facts found by the industrial tribunal they were objectively justified.Counsel for the appellant put forward an argument based on section 1(1)(b) of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 (with which the Act of 1970 is to be read as one: Shields v. E. Coomes (Holdings) Ltd. [1978] 1 W.L.R. 1408, 1416), which is in these terms:
"(1) A person discriminates against a woman in any circumstances relevant for the purposes of any provision of this Act if -... (b) he applies to her a requirement or condition which he applies or would apply equally to a man but - (i) which is such that the proportion of women who can comply with it is considerably smaller than the proportion of men who can comply with it, and (ii) which he cannot show to be justifiable irrespective of the sex of the person to whom it is applied, and (iii) which is to her detriment because she cannot comply with it."
This provision has the effect of prohibiting indirect discrimination between women and men. In my opinion it does not, for present purposes, add anything to section 1(3) of the Act of 1970, since, upon the view which I have taken as to the proper construction of the latter, a difference which demonstrated unjustified indirect discrimination would not discharge the onus placed on the employer. Further, there would not appear to be any material distinction in principle between the need to demonstrate objectively justified grounds of difference for purposes of section 1(3) and the need to justify a requirement or condition under section l(l)(b)(ii) of the Act of 1975. It is therefore unnecessary to consider the argument further.My Lords,for these reasons I would dismiss the appeal with costs.

LORD BRANDON OF OAKBROOK

My Lords,I have had the advantage of reading in draft the speech prepared by my noble and learned friend, Lord Keith of Kinkel. I agree with it, and for the reasons which he gives I would dismiss the appeal.

LORD GRIFFITHS

My Lords,I have had the advantage of reading in draft the speech prepared by my noble and learned friend, Lord Keith of Kinkel. I agree with it, and for the reasons which he gives I would dismiss the appeal.

LORD MACKAY OF CLASHFERN

My Lords,I have had the advantage of reading in draft the speech prepared by my noble and learned friend, Lord Keith of Kinkel. I agree with it, and for the reasons which he gives I would dismiss the appeal.

LORD GOFF OF CHIEVELEY

My Lords,I have had the advantage of reading in draft the speech prepared by my noble and learned friend, Lord Keith of Kinkel. I agree with it, and for the reasons which he gives I would dismiss the appeal.

Rainey (Appellant) v. Greater Glasgow Health Board (Respondents) (Scotland)

JUDGMENT

Die Jovis 27° Novembris 1986

Upon Report from the Appellate Committee to whom was referred the Cause Rainey against Greater Glasgow Health Board, That the Committee had heard Counsel on Monday the 6th and Tuesday the 7th days of October last upon the Petition and Appeal of Elizabeth Anne Rainey, of 14 Lamont Avenue, Bishopton, Renfrewshire, praying that the matter of the Interlocutors set forth in the Schedule thereto, namely Interlocutors of the First Division of Her Majesty's Court of Session in Scotland of 3rd July 1985, might be reviewed before Her Majesty the Queen in Her Court of Parliament and that the said Interlocutors might be reversed, varied or altered or that the Petitioner might have such other relief in the premises as to Her Majesty the Queen in Her Court of Parliament might seem meet; as upon the case of Greater Glasgow Health Board, lodged in answer to the said Appeal; and due consideration had this day of what was offered on either side in this Cause:It is Ordered and Adjudged , by the Lords Spiritual and Temporal in the Court of Parliament of Her Majesty the Queen assembled, That the said Interlocutors of the 3rd day of July 1985 complained of in the said Appeal be, and the same are hereby, Affirmed and that the said Petition and Appeal be, and the same is hereby, dismissed this House: And it is further Ordered , That- the Appellant do pay or cause to be paid to the said Respondents the Costs incurred by them in respect of the said Appeal, the amount thereof to be certified by the Clerk of the Parliaments if not agreed between the parties: And it is also further Ordered , That unless the Costs certified as aforesaid shall be paid to the Respondents entitled to the same within one calendar month from the date of the Certificate thereof the Cause shall be, and the same is hereby, remitted back to the Court of Session in Scotland or to the Judge acting as Vacation Judge to issue such Summary Process or Diligence for the recovery of such Costs as shall be lawful and necessary.Cler: Parliamentor: