'Is a Constable who has reasonable cause to suspect that an offence has been committed under theImmigration Act 1971 a person lawfully acting in the execution of the Act when questioning in furtherance of his investigation? '
'if on any such examination [sc an examination under Sch 2 to the Act] or otherwise he makes or causes to be made to an immigration officer or other person lawfully acting in the execution of this Act a return, statement or representation which he knows to be false or does not believe to be true.'
'The argument for the Crown is that since Pc Roberts had, as he did have, reasonable cause to suspect the appellant of having contravened s 24(1)(a), Pc Roberts had power to arrest without warrant, and it is a necessary parallel of that power, and is implicit in s 24(2), that Pc Roberts should be able to ascertain facts which could form the basis of having reasonable cause to suspect--which in turn could form the basis of an arrest. Therefore counsel for the Crown argues that if the position was that Pc Roberts was asking questions regarding immigration matters which might found that basis of suspecting that the appellant had committed the offence, then he was acting in the execution of the 1971 Act although the precise action of arrest, which the Act gave him power to perform, had not yet taken place. It is argued that it would be unduly restrictive if we interpreted s 24(2) as meaning that a constable was acting in the execution of the 1971 Act only when he was in fact effecting the arrest, or doing something that was a necessary result of the arrest, and did not extend to preliminary questioning . . .'
'One can understand that decision. All that need be said is that the facts are wholly different. In this particular case McCarthy [a police officer] and the woman police constable went specifically to the premises to find Osman. They were thereby lawfully acting in the execution of the Act from the moment they went into the premises, and the argument which has been addressed to this court that the power, as it were, only descended on the police officers under the Immigration Act once they had effected the arrest is an argument which is not appealing. It appears to this court that the officers were certainly lawfully acting in the execution of the Act once they went to the premises and made inquiries regarding Mr Osman.'
'In accordance with the authorities, therefore, I ask myself whether, in the present case, at the time when the respondent made the false statement with which he was later charged, the appellant police officer was proceeding to arrest the respondent. In my judgment, he was not. On the contrary, the appellant was at the time simply interviewing the respondent at the police station with regard to his status in this country and it was not until after the conclusion of that interview that the police officer proceeded to arrest him. In those circumstances I am satisfied, in agreement with the appeals committee [of the Inner London Crown Court], that the respondent then committed no offence under s 26(1)(c) of the Act.'
'The fact that the ejusdem generis rule is not applicable does not, however, necessarily mean that where the expression ''other'' appears in a statute preceded by only one expression of greater specificity its generality may not be cut down if to give it its wide prima facie meaning would lead to results that would be contrary to the manifest policy of the Act looked at as a whole, or would conflict with the evidence purpose for which it was enacted.'