McCreadie v Thomson & MacIntyre (Patternmakers) Limited [1971] UKHL 5

House of Lords
Between
McCreadieAppellantThomson & MacIntyre (Patternmakers) LimitedRespondent
Before
Lord ReidLord Morris of Borthy-GestLord GuestLord WilberforceLord Simon of Glaisdale
[1]The appellant was formerly employed by the respondents as a pattern maker in their premises in Argyll Street, Glasgow. In 1969 the respondents moved their premises to Livingstone Street, Clydebank, and this change of premises constituted a dismissal under the provisions of the Redundancy Payments Act, 1965 which would, apart from the provisions of section 2 of the Act, have entitled the appellant to a redundancy payment under the Act. Section 2(4) of the 1965 Act provides:
"An employee shall not be entitled to a redundancy payment by reason of dismissal if before the relevant date the employer has made to him an offer in writing to renew his contract of employment, or to re-engage him under a new contract, so that in accordance with the particulars specified in the offer the provisions of the contract as renewed, or of the new contract, as the case may be, as to the capacity and place in which he would be employed, and as to the other terms and conditions of his employment, would differ (wholly or in part) from the corresponding provisions of the contract as in force immediately before his dismissal. ..."
Before the relevant date a notice was posted on the notice board in the respondents' premises, the notice headed "Notice to Employees" and in the following terms:
"All employees of Thomson & Maclntyre to report for work at our new premises at Livingstone Street, Clydebank on Monday 4th August, 1969, at 7.45 a.m. M. S. Macdonald, 14/7/69"
. The respondents maintain that they have complied with the terms of section 2(4) and that the appellant is not entitled to a redundancy payment. The matter first came before the industrial tribunal who held that the appellant was entitled to a redundancy payment as there had been no compliance with the terms of section 2(4). Their view was that the notice posted on the notice board of the respondents' premises was not an offer in writing within the terms of the section. An appeal by the respondents to the Court of Session succeeded and the First Division unanimously reversed the decision of the tribunal and remitted back to the tribunal. In my opinion, the Inner House were clearly right. The appellant argued that the notice posted was not an offer in writing to him. According to his counsel's argument what was required was a written offer given to the appellant individually - a document, in other words, which he could take away and study for himself. There is an air of unreality about this argument, because the appellant must have read the notice, understood it, and in fact wrote a letter to a director of the respondents refusing the offer. In my view, the section is not to be read too strictly. The Act is intended to work between industrial employers and employees and should not be construed so as to defeat the purposes of the Act. The words of the section must be given their ordinary meaning as understood by those who have to work to it. Read in that way the notice posted in this way was, in my view, an offer in writing to the appellant. Contrast is made between an "offer in writing" in section 2(4) and notices, referred to in other sections of the Act, for which special provision is made by section 53. As a matter of contract if an employee turned up at Livingstone Street, Clydebank, at 7.45 a.m. on Monday, 4th August, 1969, then the respondents would, in my opinion, be bound to employ him at his old job and at his former pay. There may be cases where questions arise as to the circumstances in which an offer is capable of being understood by a particular employee. But so long as the offer is in writing, brought to the notice of the employee, capable of being understood by him and in fact read by him then, in my view, this part of the section has been complied with. The appellant had a second argument which also had an air of artificiality and technicality about it which is out of place in the construction of this particular statue. He argued that the words - "... so that in acordance with particulars specified in the offer the provisions of the contract as renewed, or of the new contract, as the case may be, as to the capacity and place in which he would be employed, and as to the other terms and conditions of his employment, would differ (wholly or in part) from the corresponding provisions of the contract as in force immediately before his dismissal" required that in the offer not only the points of difference between the new contract and the previous employment must be specified but also the points of similarity. I do not so read the section. The section is not happily expressed, but the sense is that if the contract as renewed differs from the previous contract the terms and conditions of the contract including capacity and place of employment so far as differing must be specified in the particulars. Subsection (4) makes provision where the contract as renewed does differ from the previous contract of employment and is to be contrasted with subsection (3). The only difference between the new contract and the previous contract was the place of work which is specified in the offer:
"All employees of Thomson & Maclntyre to report for work at our new premises at Livingstone Street Clydebank"
. To require "specification of differences and affirmation of similarity" in the offer, as counsel for the appellant suggested, would tend to confuse the person to whom the offer was made. The present offer makes it clear that the only change in employment was the place of work. This is all the section requires. I would for these reasons dismiss the appeal. Lord Wilberforce : My Lords, For the reasons given by my noble and learned friend, Lord Guest, I would dismiss this appeal. Lord Simon of Glaisdale : My Lords, For the reasons given by my noble and learned friend, Lord Guest, I would dismiss this appeal. Appeal dismissed with costs The appellant was formerly employed by the respondents as a pattern maker in their premises in Argyll Street, Glasgow. In 1969 the respondents moved their premises to Livingstone Street, Clydebank, and this change of premises constituted a dismissal under the provisions of the Redundancy Payments Act, 1965 which would, apart from the provisions of section 2 of the Act, have entitled the appellant to a redundancy payment under the Act. Section 2(4) of the 1965 Act provides:
"An employee shall not be entitled to a redundancy payment by reason of dismissal if before the relevant date the employer has made to him an offer in writing to renew his contract of employment, or to re-engage him under a new contract, so that in accordance with the particulars specified in the offer the provisions of the contract as renewed, or of the new contract, as the case may be, as to the capacity and place in which he would be employed, and as to the other terms and conditions of his employment, would differ (wholly or in part) from the corresponding provisions of the contract as in force immediately before his dismissal. ..."
[2]Before the relevant date a notice was posted on the notice board in the respondents' premises, the notice headed "Notice to Employees" and in the following terms: "All employees of Thomson & Maclntyre to report for work at our new premises at Livingstone Street, Clydebank on Monday 4th August, 1969, at 7.45 a.m. M. S. Macdonald, 14/7/69".[3]The respondents maintain that they have complied with the terms of section 2(4) and that the appellant is not entitled to a redundancy payment.[4]The matter first came before the industrial tribunal who held that the appellant was entitled to a redundancy payment as there had been no compliance with the terms of section 2(4). Their view was that the notice posted on the notice board of the respondents' premises was not an offer in writing within the terms of the section. An appeal by the respondents to the Court of Session succeeded and the First Division unanimously reversed the decision of the tribunal and remitted back to the tribunal.[5]In my opinion, the Inner House were clearly right. The appellant argued that the notice posted was not an offer in writing to him. According to his counsel's argument what was required was a written offer given to the appellant individually - a document, in other words, which he could take away and study for himself. There is an air of unreality about this argument, because the appellant must have read the notice, understood it, and in fact wrote a letter to a director of the respondents refusing the offer. In my view, the section is not to be read too strictly. The Act is intended to work between industrial employers and employees and should not be construed so as to defeat the purposes of the Act. The words of the section must be given their ordinary meaning as understood by those who have to work to it. Read in that way the notice posted in this way was, in my view, an offer in writing to the appellant. Contrast is made between an "offer in writing" in section 2(4) and notices, referred to in other sections of the Act, for which special provision is made by section 53. As a matter of contract if an employee turned up at Livingstone Street, Clydebank, at 7.45 a.m. on Monday, 4th August, 1969, then the respondents would, in my opinion, be bound to employ him at his old job and at his former pay. There may be cases where questions arise as to the circumstances in which an offer is capable of being understood by a particular employee. But so long as the offer is in writing, brought to the notice of the employee, capable of being understood by him and in fact read by him then, in my view, this part of the section has been complied with.[6]The appellant had a second argument which also had an air of artificiality and technicality about it which is out of place in the construction of this particular statue. He argued that the words - "... so that in acordance with particulars specified in the offer the provisions of the contract as renewed, or of the new contract, as the case may be, as to the capacity and place in which he would be employed, and as to the other terms and conditions of his employment, would differ (wholly or in part) from the corresponding provisions of the contract as in force immediately before his dismissal" required that in the offer not only the points of difference between the new contract and the previous employment must be specified but also the points of similarity. I do not so read the section. The section is not happily expressed, but the sense is that if the contract as renewed differs from the previous contract the terms and conditions of the contract including capacity and place of employment so far as differing must be specified in the particulars. Subsection (4) makes provision where the contract as renewed does differ from the previous contract of employment and is to be contrasted with subsection (3). The only difference between the new contract and the previous contract was the place of work which is specified in the offer: "All employees of Thomson & Maclntyre to report for work at our new premises at Livingstone Street Clydebank".[7]To require "specification of differences and affirmation of similarity" in the offer, as counsel for the appellant suggested, would tend to confuse the person to whom the offer was made. The present offer makes it clear that the only change in employment was the place of work. This is all the section requires.[8]I would for these reasons dismiss the appeal.

Lord Wilberforce :

[10]My Lords,[11]For the reasons given by my noble and learned friend, Lord Guest, I would dismiss this appeal.

Lord Simon of Glaisdale :

[13]My Lords,[14]For the reasons given by my noble and learned friend, Lord Guest, I would dismiss this appeal.[15]Appeal dismissed with costs