Rhondda Urban District Council v. Taff Yale Railway Co. [1909] UKHL 1037
(Before the Lord Chancellor (Loreburn) , the Earl of Halsbury , Lords Ashbourne and Macnaghten .)46 SLR 1037Rhondda Urban District Council v. Taff Yale Railway Company.(On Appeal from the Court of Appeal in England.)
Subject_ Railway — Construction and Maintenance — Road Crossing Railway — Width of Bridge and Approaches — Duty on Railway to Widen — Railways Clauses Consolidation Act 1845 (8 and 9 Vict. c. 20), sec. 51 (cf. 8 and 9 Vict. c. 33, sec. 44). Facts:The Railways Clauses Consolidation Act 1845 provides, by section 51, as to roads crossing a railway by bridges, that where a bridge has been built to the original width of the road but not up to the maximum prescribed by the Act, when the road is subsequently widened the railway is bound to widen the bridge.Held that the liability of the railway company under the section extended only to the bridge actually intersecting the railway line and not to the approaches thereto.In an action by the District Council (appellants) against the Railway Company to have the extent ascertained of the Railway's liability to widen a road-bridge over their line and the approaches to the bridge, under the Railways Clauses Consolidation Act 1845 (8 and 9 Vict. c. 20), sec. 51, it was held by Phillimore , J., that the liability of the Railway extended only to the bridge itself and not to the approaches to the bridge. This was reversed by the Court of Appeal upon the ground (not here reported) that the Railway Company were relieved by the terms of their private Act from any duty of widening the bridge itself or the approaches.The District Council appealed.The terms of sections 46, 49, 50, and 51, cited in their Lordships' judgments, are identical with those of the Railways Clauses Consolidation (Scotland) Act 1845 (8 and 9 Vict. c. 33), secs. 39, 42, 43, and 44.Their Lordships gave considered judgment as follows
Lord Chancellor (Loreburn) —Your Lordships have already disposed of the first point raised in the argument of this appeal ( not here reported ). The second point, now to be resolved, is whether the duty of widening a bridge imposed in certain contingencies upon a railway company by sec. 51 of the Railways Clauses Act 1845, relates to the entire structure erected to carry a road over a railway, or relates only to that part of it which actually crosses the railway line. It is true that sec. 51 is framed as a proviso upon preceding sections. But it is also true that the latter half of it, though in form a proviso, is in substance a fresh enactment, adding to and not merely qualifying that which goes before. So the question really turns upon sec. 51 itself. But it must be read in the light of what goes before and with a close regard to the purpose of the group of sections to which it belongs—namely, to provide for the dimensions of roads and not for the dimensions of railway works except so far as they affect roads. It is very loosely expressed, and in order to be readily understood some explanatory words must be read into it, deriving the sense from secs. 46, 49, and 50. [ cf. 8 and 9 Vict. c. 33, secs. 39, 42, and 43.] In sec. 51, lines 2 and 3, “Roads within fifty yards of the points of crossing the same” must mean “roads within fifty yards of the points where road and railway cross each other.” The words preceding sec. 46, and governing this group of sections, speak of “the crossing of roads,” and, as secs. 46, 49, and 50 show, relate both to the case where a railway is carried by a bridge over the road and to the case where the road is carried by a bridge over a railway. The term “crossing of roads” is applicable whichever is uppermost, and means the intersection of road and railway, either on a level-crossing or by means of a bridge carrying either road or railway. Points of crossing mean points where the intersection commences. So again in sec. 51, lines 3 and 4, “the width hereinbefore prescribed for bridges over or under the railway,” must mean “the width hereinbefore required for the road, whether over or under the railway, when there is a bridge.” It cannot mean the width of the bridge on a cross section of the bridge where the railway is carried over the road by a bridge. Nothing in these sections concerns itself with the width of the railway bridge in that sense. Where the railway crosses the road on a bridge, sec. 49 requires that the “width of the arch” shall be such as to leave thereunder a clear space of 35 ft., or 25 ft., or 12 ft. for the road beneath. It is the width of the road which alone is aimed at, and a corresponding longitudinal width of arch is prescribed. On the other hand, sec. 50 requires that where the road crosses the railway on a bridge, the “road over the bridge” shall be 35 ft., or 25 ft., or 12 ft. wide. What sec. 51 contemplates is the case of the road within fifty yards of the points of intersection being narrower than the width required to be provided for the road, whether by the span of the arch overhead or by the width of the bridge which carries the road over the railway. In other words, “width” in the sec. 51 means two things—either the width of the arch longitudinally or the width of the road over the bridge, as the case may be. So again in section 51, line 5, “the width of such bridges need not be greater than such average available width of such roads” means “the width of the arch or the width of the road over the bridge, as the case may be, need not be greater than such average I available width of such roads.” ThePage: 1038 ↓
Earl of Halsbury —I am unable to resist the conclusion to which the reasoning of the Lord Chancellor has brought me. Confining myself, and intending to confine myself, simply to the question with which the Lord Chancellor has dealt—namely, whether the word “bridge” in section 51 is to be construed as he has construed it—I agree. I think that it must be so construed. I do not think it is right or desirable to add anything which might give rise to further litigation between the parties. There has been an old controversy, from Magna Charta downwards, as to the divided responsibility where bridge and road and road and bridge come together, and how much of the bridge forms part of the road, so as to throw upon other authorities the responsibility for repair which was supposed to be settled by the Act of Henry VIII, which fixed a distance of 300 ft. from the end of the bridge, and settled the responsibility for such part of the roadway as was 300 ft. from the end of the bridge. But be that as it may, all that I wish to say at present is that I absolutely confine my judgment, at all events, to that question with which the Lord Chancellor has dealt, namely, the use of the word “bridge” in section 51. I think that it is impossible to resist what he has pointed out as a meaning of it in that section, and so far I am prepared to agree with the judgment which he has proposed. As to the consequences which may follow from it, as I have said, I do not think it desirable to say anything more than that I am satisfied that it is the true construction of the word “bridge” as used in section 51.Lord Ashbourne —I agree with my noble and learned friend on the Woolsack.Lord Macnaghten —Your Lordships have already decided that the rights and liabilities of the parties to this controversy must be governed by the Railways Clauses Consolidation Act 1845, and that consequently the bridge which is the subject of the present litigation must be widened. So far the District Council has succeeded. But there remains the more important and more difficult point as to the extent of the obligation imposed on the Railway Company. That depends on the question, What is the meaning of the word “bridge” in section 51 of the Railways Clauses Consolidation Act? Speaking for myself, I rather hesitate to join in the strictures which have been passed on the wording of the section now under consideration. The language is compendious, no doubt; possibly it might have seemed less obscure if brevity had been studied less. But, after all, the meaning is tolerably plain. The difficulty, such as it is, comes, I think, from the circumstance that the draftsman had in his mind the state of things at two different periods of time. There was the state of things when the Bill for the company's Special Act was pending in Parliament, and there was the state of things that would be brought about by the completion of the railway. The draftsman deals with them both in the same breath. The section speaks of “existing roads” and “the points of crossing the same,” using the plural “points” because the roads are spoken of in the plural, for when the Act speaks of a road in the singular, as it does in the next section—section 52—it speaks of “the point of crossing the same.” The point of crossing is, I think, the pointPage: 1039 ↓
Judgment of Phillimore, J., restored.Counsel for Appellants— Upjohn, K.C.— Lush, K.C.— Trevor Lewis. Agents— Smith, Rundell, & Dods, for Morgan, Bruce, & Nicholas, Pontypridd.Counsel for Respondents— Levett, K.C.— P. O. Lawrence, K.C.— J.G. Wood. Agents— Williamson’, Hill, & Company, for Ingledew & Sons, Cardiff.