Williams and Others v. North's Navigation Collieries, Ltd [1906] UKHL 881

UKHL
Williams and Others v. North's Navigation Collieries, Ltd
[1906] UKHL 881 · 1904-01-30
(Before the Lord Chancellor (Loreburn), Lords Macnaghten , Davey , Robertson , and Atkinson .)43 SLR 881Williams and Others v. North's Navigation Collieries, Limited.Subject_ Master and Servant — Wages — Deductions — Deduction of Fine Due by Workman — Truck Act — 1831 (1 and 2 Will. IV, c. 37), sec. 3. Facts:Held that under the Truck Act 1831 an employer was not entitled to deduct from a workman's wages the amount of a fine due by the workman to the master under an order of a court of summary jurisdiction. The only deductions he can make are those expressly sanctioned by the statute (see sections 23 and 24).Appeal from a judgment of the Court of Appeal ( Collins, M.R., Romer and Mathew, L.JJ .), who had reversed a decision of Bucknill , J.The facts of the case are narrated in the judgments of their Lordships infra.Section 3 of the Truck Act 1831 provides as follows—“And be it further enacted that the entire amount of the wages earned by or payable to any artificer in any of the trades hereinafter enumerated, in respect of any labour by him done in any such trade, shall be actually paid to such artificer in the current coin of the realm and not otherwise, and every payment made to any such artificer by his employer, of or in respect of any such wages, by the delivering to him of goods or otherwise than in the current coin aforesaid except as hereinafter mentioned, shall be and is hereby declared illegal, null and void.”

At delivering judgment—

Lord Chancellor ( Loreburn )—I do not propose to enter upon a consideration of the authorities that were cited to us in the course of argument or dealt with in the Court of Appeal, as I understand that Lord Davey intends to refer to them, but I have come to the conclusion that the judgment appealed from ought to be reversed and a declaration given in the sense asked for by the plaintiffs. The facts lie in narrowest compass. Certain workmen in the service of the defendant company were entitled to wages payable on the 30th January 1904. A fortnight earlier each of them had been ordered by magistrates in petty sessions to pay a fine to the defendant company, of which 10s. was due on the 30th January. On that date the defendant company made out an account with each of them, in which, apart from other items which were not complained of, the sum of 10s. for fines was deducted from the wages and the balance alone was paid. In the case of the plaintiff Jacob Williams, whose case is typical of the rest, he had earned £3, 13s. 2d. and received £3, 2s.; the difference consisted of an agreed deduction of Is. 2d. for doctor and the 10s. fine which was not agreed. Upon this the workman commenced an action for damages and an injunction and a declaration that the deduction of 10s. was illegal. It was agreed in the Court of Appeal that the relief sought should be limited to a declaration, and on that footing the case came here. The question is whether the employers when they paid the wages on the 30th January were in law bound to pay in coin the total sum due for wages, or were entitled in law to deduct 10s. due from the workmen to the employers and pay merely the balance in coin. This turns upon the true construction of sec. 3 of the Truck Act 1831. Now I find in that section an explicit enactment that “the entire amount of the wages earned by or payable to a workman” shall be “actually paid” to him in the current coin of this realm, “and not otherwise.” The section does not say when it is to be paid, for the common law will settle that as soon as the agreement of service is ascertained. The section does say that when paid it shall be paid in coin of the realm and not otherwise. I cannot think that this means that it shall be paid as to part in coin and as to the remainder in account. Our attention was directed in argument to the word “payable”; we were invited to hold that the obligation to pay in coin applied only to the entire amount of wages payable after deducting cross claims. In this case it was argued that only £3,2s. was payable, because on striking an account that was the balance due. A reference to sec. 23 shows to my mind that this would be a wrong interpretation even

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Lord Macnaghten —I have had an opportunity of reading the judgment which has just been delivered by the Lord Chancellor , and I entirely agree with it.Lord Davey —I agree with the judgment of the Lord Chancellor , and with the reasons which he has given for his judgment. The learned Judges in the Court of Appeal rested their decision mainly on the ground that it was neither an offence nor a violation of the statute to give effect to a legal right of set-off. Set-off in an action I understand. It is a right given by statute to a man who is sued for a sum of money to defend himself by claiming a debt due to himself from the plaintiff in satisfaction or reduction of the debt for which he is sued. But set-off outside the Court means nothing more than a claim of deduction and retention, and the question comes to be whether the deduction of a cross debt which might be the subject of a set-off in an action is a legitimate deduction, or whether the express enactment that the entire amount of the wages shall be actually paid in current coin can be so qualified. I agree with my noble and learned friend that there can be but one answer to that question. By section 23 certain deductions are permitted to be made, or, to use the language of the marginal note, “particular exceptions to the generality of the law” are made under strictly defined conditions, and no other deductions or particular exceptions are, in my opinion, authorised. The learned counsel for the respondents argued that the employer was not bound by the Act to pay in full, and non-payment was not an offence under the Act. Be it so; but this was not a case of non-payment or repudiation by the master of his debt, but of retention of a part of the workman's admitted wages in payment of a debt to himself, and was intended to be payment or satisfaction pro tanlo of the workman's wages. Bowen, L.J., stated the exact point in Hewlett v. Allen , [1894] AC 383 , [1892] 2 QB 662 , when, commenting on the third section, he said that payment in account will not do, and that the employer cannot for the purpose of compliance with the statute be both payer and payee, while, on the other hand, he held that set-off in an action was only prohibited in the cases mentioned in sec. 5. It is sufficient to look at the account which was handed to one of the appellants to see that this is nothing more than payment in account, which I agree with the Lord Justice will not do. I will only add that I can see very good reasons why the Legislature should not allow a deduction to be made by the employer himself, although it might be the subject of set-off in an action where the amount and propriety of it could be impartially investigated. Mr Lush boldly said that there was a clear and consistent course of authority in favour of the respondents, and that it was too late for this House to revert to the views of the appellants. The exact contrary of this statement appears to me to be nearer the truth. Not a single one of the numerous cases which were cited, in my opinion, supports tin argument of the respondents, and a good deal is to be found in the judgments of the learned Judges which is against them. In Chawner v. Cummings , L.R. 8 Q.B. 311, the plaintiff was presumed to have contracted upon the usual and well-known terms in

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Lord Robertson —I have had an opportunity of reading the judgment which Lord Atkinson is about to deliver, and I concur in it.Lord Atkinson —In this case, in which, by the agreement of the parties arrived at in the Court of Appeal, the relief claimed is limited to a declaration that a sum of 10s. was improperly deducted by the respondents from the wages of certain workmen employed in their service, the question for decision turns upon the construction of sec. 3 of the Truck Act 1831 (1 and 2 Will. IV, c. 37). The case of the appellant Jacob Williams is typical of the others. It is admitted that he had, on the 23rd January 1904, in respect of the fortnight ending on that day, earned wages amounting to £3, 13s. 2d. This sum, according to the practice prevailing in the respondents’ colliery, would be payable on the 30th January. On the 22nd December 1903 the appellant had wrongfully absented himself from his duty, and in respect of that misconduct had, on the 16th January 1904, been fined 30s., payable in three instalments of 10s. each, on the 30th January, the 13th February, and the 27th February respectively. The respondents claim a right to deduct the sum of 10s., the instalment payable on the 30th January 1904, from the aforesaid sum of £3, 13s. 2d. The appellant disputes that right. The third section of the Truck Act 1831 runs as follows:—“… [Quotes section v. supra.] …” Some comment was made on the use in this section of the words “or payable to any artificer.” I think that these words are introduced for the purpose of meeting a case where some deduction or stoppage authorised by sections 23 and 24 of the statute has in fact been made, and the workman is only entitled to receive the balance of his wages remaining due after such deduction. It has been urged on behalf of the respondents that such a deduction as this does not come within the mischief aimed at by the Truck Acts; that those statutes were merely designed to prevent the payment of workmen's wages in equivalents for cash as distinguished from cash itself. It may well be that this was the main purpose and object of this legislation, and that in this section the Legislature has used language which extends beyond the mischief aimed at and reaches harmless transactions or practices not within its spirit. Still there is no ambiguity in the words used in the section. They are precise and clear, and require that the entire amount of the wages earned

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Judgment appealed from reversed.Counsel for the Appellants— Evans, K.C.—Bailhaclie—J. Sankey. Agents— Smith, Rundell, & Dods, Solicitors.Counsel for the Respondents— Eldon Bankes, K.C.—M. Lush, K.C.—A. J. Ashton. Agents— Bell, Brodrick, & Gray, Solicitors.