Denaby and Cadeby Main Collieries, Ltd v. Yorkshire Miners' Association and Others [1906] UKHL 596

UKHL
Denaby and Cadeby Main Collieries, Ltd v. Yorkshire Miners' Association and Others
[1906] UKHL 596 · 1905-05-19
(Before the Lord Chancellor (Loreburn) , Lords Macnaghten , James of Hereford , Davey , Robertson , and Atkinson .)44 SLR 596Denaby and Cadeby Main Collieries, Limited v. Yorkshire Miners' Association and Others.Subject_ Trade Union — Principal and Agent — Liability of Trade Union for Illegal Actions of Officials of Branch.Trade Union — Grant of Strike Pay Contrary to Rules of Union — Title of Employers to Sue for Damages. Facts:Where, in breach of existing contracts between employers and employees, the officials of a branch of a trade union brought about a strike contrary to the rules and regulations of the trade union as a whole, held that the latter was not liable in damages to the employers for the wrongful actings of the officials of the branch.The central council of a trade union, in contravention of the rules and regulations of the union, granted strike pay to miners out on strike.Held that the employers of the miners had no title to sue the trade union for damages, the wrong committed by the central council being one committed against its own members in dissipating their funds, and not against the employer, who had no interest in the funds.as agents of the association and for its benefit?—(A) Yes. (5) Did the defendant association, by its executive council or by its officials, ratify the acts of Nolan and Humphries, or of the members of the committees, in so procuring the men to break their contracts?—(A) Yes. (6) Did the defendant association by its officials or by the members of the committees of Denaby and Cadeby branches maintain or assist in maintaining the strike by unlawful means, that is to say—( a ) By molesting or intimidating men who were working for the plaintiffs with a view of inducing them to cease from so working?—(A) Yes. ( b ) By inducing or attempting to induce men who were willing to enter into contracts of service with the plaintiffs or to work for them, to refrain from so doing?—(A) Yes. ( c ) By the grant of strike pay against the rules of the association?—(A) Yes. (7) Did the defendants Wadsworth, Parrott, Frith, and Hall, or any and which of them, maintain or assist in maintaining the strike by unlawful means—that is to say, by any and which of the above means?—(A) Not personally, but as servants of the association. (8) Did the defendants or any and which of them conspire with each other, or with workmen in the employ of the plaintiffs, to do any and which of the matters mentioned in question 6?—(A) Yes. (9) Did the defendants or any and which of them unlawfully and maliciously conspire together, and with workmen formerly in the employ of the plaintiffs, to molest and injure the plaintiffs in the carrying on of their business, and were the plaintiffs so molested and injured?—(A) Yes.Appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeal ( Collins, M.R., Mathew and Cozens-Hardy, L.JJ., Collins, M.R. , in part dissenting), dated the 19th May 1905, which set aside the verdict of a special jury, dated the 8th February 1904, and the judgment of Lawrance, J ., dated the 13th February 1904.The appellants, plaintiffs in this action, were extensive colliery owners in Yorkshire.The Yorkshire Miners' Association was a trade union, registered under the Trade Union Act 1871.The defendants Cragg and Kaye were trustees of the association; and Wadsworth was the vice-president, and Hall the treasurer; other defendants were officials of the association or of one of the branches.In June 1902 a strike began at the appellants' collieries under circumstances which are fully set out in the judgment of the Lord Chancellor, and it lasted till March 1903.In the present action the plaintiffs claimed(1) Damages for illegally paying away the funds of the defendant association in contravention of its rules, to the injury of the plaintiffs, for the purpose of wrongfully and maliciously procuring and inducing workmen employed or formerly employed by the plaintiffs to break contracts with the plaintiffs, and not to enter into contracts with them, and unlawfully to remain in possession of the plaintiffs' houses, and to prevent the plaintiffs from carrying on their business of colliery proprietors, and for other illegal purposes, and for carrying on by unlawful means a strike of the plaintiffs' workmen;(2) damages for wrongfully and maliciously conspiring with workmen formerly employed by the plaintiffs to do and cause the acts aforesaid;(3) an injunction to restrain the defendants from unlawfully paying away the funds of the defendant association in contravention of the rules of the defendant association, and from the commission of the acts aforesaid.The questions left to the jury at the trial and their answers thereto were as follows—(1) Did the defendants Nolan and Humphries, or either of and which of them, unlawfully and maliciously procure the men to break their contracts of employment by going out on strike on the 29th June without giving notice?—(A) Yes. (2) If you answer the first question in the affirmative, then were Nolan and Humphries, or either and which of them, in so doing purporting to act as agents of the association and for its benefit?—(A) Yes. (3) Did the members of the committees of the Denaby and Cadeby branches, or any of them, unlawfully and maliciously procure the men to break their contracts of employment by going out on strike on the 29th June without giving notice?—(A) Yes. (4) If you answer the third question in the affirmative, then were the members of the committees in so doing purporting to act

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Thereupon judgment was entered on the 13th February 1904 for the appellants, with costs, the inquiry as to damages being stayed by consent of all parties.This decision was reversed by the Court of Appeal. But Collins, M.R ., held that Lawrance J. , was justified in leaving the matter to the jury, and that it was impossible to enter judgment for the defendant association. In his opinion there was no misdirection, and the plaintiffs were entitled to retain their verdict in respect of the causes of action dealt with in question 6 and the following questions.The plaintiffs appealed to the House of Lords.At the conclusion of the arguments their Lordships took time to consider their judgment.

On May 14 their Lordships gave judgment as follows:—

Lord Chancellor (Loreburn ) — The litigation out of which this appeal comes relates to a strike at the Denaby and Cadeby Collieries which began on the 29th June 1902 and ended about the month of March 1903. It will be convenient to summarise at the outset the main facts which led to this dispute. For some years before 1902 there had been a controversy between employers and workmen at these collieries in regard to the rate of payment for removing what is called bag dirt. The controversy related to the price list obtaining in these particular collieries and not elsewhere, though the men had the sympathy of the defendant association and of their secretary the late Mr Pickard, who assisted them in negotiating for a settlement. In fact, however, no satisfactory settlement was reached. On the 14th June 1902 another dispute, not confined to these collieries, but applying to all the collieries in the defendant association, was for the time ended by the casting vote of Lord James of Hereford after a meeting of the Conciliation Board. Lord James awarded, to use a phrase sufficiently accurate for the present purpose, a reduction in wages of 10 per cent. It is said that the men at the two collieries were dissatisfied with this award. In that condition of things, when some bitterness undoubtedly existed, on Saturday the 28th June certain officials of the Denaby and Cadeby branches of the defendant association summoned a meeting of the men in both collieries for the morning of Sunday the 29th June. Only 400 or fewer out of 5000 attended the meeting. It was addressed by officials of both branches, and they advocated an immediate strike. Unhappily the men followed this advice and passed a resolution to stop the wheels. Pickets were placed, and on the night shift of that Sunday, the 29th June, all except four refused to work. On Tuesday the 2nd July one of the four was assaulted in a cowardly fashion and then the other three ceased working also. Few, if any, of the others worked from the 29th June until the end of the strike in the following March. Inasmuch as the men were all working under contracts which could not be terminated except after fourteen days' notice, it is manifest that the abrupt cessation of work on the 29th June involved a breach of contract and was unlawful. This was fully recognised by the council of the defendant association, to which many of the strikers belonged. I shall discuss later on the relations between the Denaby and Cadeby branches of the association and the association at large. At present it is enough to say that the council of the association constituted its supreme governing body and controlled its funds. At this stage the council refused to maintain the strike by giving strike pay. Further, they sent representatives at once to the two collieries and they told the men that they had acted illegally in breaking their contracts and must return to work, and that they could take a ballot according to the rules of the association to decide whether they should resume the strike after working out their fourteen days of contract service. The men consented, and but for an accident would have resumed work. In August 1901 the Home Secretary had issued some new regulations in regard to timbering which, rightly or wrongly, were by some persons supposed to be ultra vires . Those who had been employed in these two collieries before August of 1901 had signed contracts which left them free to contest the legality of these regulations because the regulations were not embodied in their contracts and therefore had no contractual force upon them. When on

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Lord Macnaghten —I entirely concur in the judgment of the Lord Chancellor, and I do not think that I can usefully add anything to it.Lord James Of Hereford —[ After going through the facts of the case his Lordship continued as follows .] It should be noted that before any strike pay was voted the contracts of service between the employers and workmen had terminated. The men had absented themselves from their work for a fortnight, and it was proved that an absence of some two or three days was regarded as establishing a discontinuance of service. “The strike” had thus commenced, but this word is of an artificial character, and does not represent any legal definition or description. The legal effect of what had occurred was that the men had wrongfully left their employment without giving the necessary fourteen days' notice; that therefore the contract between them and their employers was broken, and that the latter had the right to treat, and did treat, the different contracts of service as at an end. They also required, as I have said, that if the men sought to return to their work they must do so under fresh contracts of service, which the men refused to recognise, and thus the non-employment and the idleness of the mine continued until January 1903. Now, in respect of the period from the 29th June to the 15th July the members of the Court of Appeal were unanimous in holding that no liability attached to the trade union central body, and in such view I concur. I do so because I think that there is nothing to be found in the rules that makes the officers of the branches the agents of the central body, and also because I can find no evidence from which it can be shown that authority was given to the branches to act between those dates as such agents. But the determination of the case is not yet arrived at. It was further contended on the part of the plaintiffs that the acts of the defendants' union in granting strike pay and some individual acts established liability on account of what was termed maintaining the strike existing at the Denaby and Cadeby Collieries. Importance must be attached to this argument in consequence of the judgment given by Collins, M.R., upon the point thus raised. In relation to it consideration should be given to the meaning of the term “maintaining the strike.” If one assists in procuring the commission of an unlawful act, doubtless liability follows; and so, if the defendants had done anything by assistance or otherwise to induce the branch workmen to break their contracts, the union would have been liable. But no such inducing to break a contract was proved. When the assistance was given—that is, when strike pay was voted—the unlawful acts had, as I have already stated, been committed, all the contracts of employment were terminated, and employers and employed were in respect of contracts entirely unconnected. So that the effect of the grant of strike pay was not to cause or induce the commission of an unlawful act, but to place the workmen in the position of being able to maintain themselves without entering into a new contract of labour with the plaintiffs or with anyone else. This is no more than the subscribing to a strike fund. Within the last few years we have had instances of the public contributing largely towards the maintenance of men who had ceased to work under conditions

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Lord Davey —I had prepared a judgment, but I find myself in such complete agreement with my noble and learned friends who have already addressed the House that it is not necessary for me to say anything more.Lord Robertson — I agree that this appeal should be dismissed, and I shall add a few words on that part of the case on which the Court of Appeal was not unanimous. From the first part of the case, however, I carry forward this, which is my ground of judgment upon it, that the branch officials were not, as such, officers or agents of the respondent association; and this must be kept steadily in view on the question of maintenance, and indeed directly affects it. We start, then, with this—that the respondents were not responsible for the original breach of contract or for those who caused it; and, in fact, although on a somewhat narrow ground, they disapproved of what was done on the 29th June. Now, I do not propose to decide, and have no occasion to decide, more in favour of the respondents than that on the specific questions to which the findings of the jury on maintenance relate the appellants have not established liability. Those findings are in answer to the sixth question and are lettered A, B, and C, and I shall consider C first as it charges the only act which the association is said to have done directly by itself, viz., the grant of strike pay. Now this grant was never made except to men whose contracts were at an end; and the payment was therefore not to induce men to break contracts, but to induce them not to enter into new contracts. So far there is no illegality. Nor do I see how the fact that the payment of this strike pay was held to be a violation of the internal constitution of the association turns it into an invasion of any right of third parties like the appellants. The answer to the charge lettered B (inducing or attempting to induce men who were willing to enter into contracts of service with the appellants, or to work for them, to refrain from so doing) is that it is not a legal wrong. The question lettered A charges the respondents with molesting or intimidating men who were working for the appellants with a view of inducing them to cease from so working. The theory upon which this charge is made can only be that by giving financial support to the strike the respondents made themselves liable for all that was done during the strike by the officers of the branches. I am unable to adopt that view, and I do not find any other valid ground for attaching such liability. The ninth query raises substantially the same question under the form of conspiracy, for the media concludendi are in substance the same. The answers to the seventh and eighth queries are hopelessly ineffective for the reason given by my noble and learned friend the Lord Chancellor.Lord Atkinson —The law and the facts have already been so fully dealt with by my noble and learned friends that I will only say that I fully concur with the judgment of Cozens-Hardy, L.J., in the Court of Appeal.Judgment of the Court of Appeal affirmed, and appeal dismissed.Counsel for the Appellants— Eldon Bankes, K.C.— Lush, K.C.— H. T. Waddy. Agents — Johnson, Weatherall, & Sturt, Solicitors.Counsel for the Respondent Association— R. Isaacs, K.C.— Danckwerts, K.C.— Clement Edwards. For the other Respondents— Atherly Jones, K.C.— S. T. Evans, K.C.— Compston. Agents— Corbin, Greener, & Cook, Solicitors.