“Find no sufficient cause yet shown for removing John M'Nair from the office of trustee, which he at present holds, in consequence of having been elected by a majority of the creditors, in terms of the statute. They also find, that no sufficient cause has yet been shown for discontinuing Alexander Learmonth, who was chosen by the same majority, as one of the commissioners: Find, That Thomas Allan and James Haig were not duly chosen, as the other two commissioners, in respect that they do not reside in the town of Greenock, where the business must be chiefly conducted, and where the trustee himself resides; and, before further answer, allow the complainers, on or before Tuesday next, to put in a condescendence, in terms of the act of sederunt, specifying the charges which they mean still to insist on against the said John M'Nair and the said Alexander Learmonth, or either of them, and the mode of proof by which they propose to substantiate the same. And, lastly, appoint a meeting of the creditors to be held at Greenock, upon the 15th day of March next, in order to name two commissioners, in place of Thomas Allan and James Haig; and, in the meantime, ordain John M'Nair to proceed, as trustee in the execution of his office, in terms of the act of Parliament, without any advice or interference of commissioners, until the said nomination of new commissioners, in place of the two who have been found disqualified, shall take place.”
“Of new ordain, and hereby authorize the said John M'Nair to proceed in the meantime as trustee in the execution of his office, in terms of the act of Parliament, in manner mentioned in the interlocutor reclaimed against, and in so far refuse the desire of these petitions, but quoad ultra appoint answers to be given in to said two petitions and condescendence, the same to be printed and boxed.”
“My Lords,
“But if the Court shall be of opinion,” &c.
“Meaning to say, that if, according to the forms of proceeding of the Court of Session, the time is gone by when the original appointments could be objected to, and the time is now come, when the question about removing those persons, must be a question upon their subsequent conduct, and not upon the capacity, that, in that case, the interlocutor should be affirmed; because, in that case, the ground of removing them, with regard to such subsequent conduct, must be alleged and proved. It appears, therefore, that this way of putting the case will open those questions to discussion, if their forms of proceeding will permit them to be opened; and if those forms will not permit, then to decide that the interlocutor ought not to be reversed. Thus, opportunity will be given to review the interlocutor, with regard to the particulars, as well as with regard to the particular facts alleged, upon which proof has been proposed.”