“In respect that Viscount Tarbet's eldest son, elected one of the commissioners for the shire of Ross, by reason that his father is nobilitated, cannot now represent that shire, warrant was given to the freeholders of that shire to meet and elect another person in his place.”
“Edinburgh,18th March 1689 . The Meeting of Estates having heard the report of the committee for elections, bearing that in the controverted election for the burgh of Linlithgow in favour of Lord Livingston and Wm. Higgins, it is the opinion of the committee that Wm. Higgins' commission ought to be preferred; first, in regard to Lord Livingstone's incapacity to represent a burgh, being the eldest son of a peer; secondly, in respect that Wm. Higgins was more regularly and formally elected by the plurality of the votes of the burgesses: They have approven and approve of the said report in both the heads thereof, and interpone their authority thereto.”
“Sustain the objection to the appellant's claim for enrolment; find the freeholders did wrong in enrolling him in the roll of freeholders for the Stewartry of Kirkcudbright, and grant warrant to and ordain the Stewart clerk to expunge his name from the roll.
“I refer you to the proceedings in parliament of Scotland, which had been founded on by the respondents in the case of the Master of Tarbet in 1685, and of Lord Livingstone in 1689, as well as to the decision of the House of Commons of Great Britain in 1708; the two first of which cases, I maintain, do not apply to the precise case in question; and, at all events, as none of them had been sanctioned by any enactment of the legislature, they could not be considered to constitute law, so as to bind either the Court of Session or your Lordships as a Court of appeal. He had heard it laid down, upon the decision of an appeal from Scotland respecting nominal and fictitious votes, by a noble and learned Lord (Thurlow), to whose judgment and abilities the greatest deference was due, that a train of decisions even in the Court of last appeal, were not binding as precedents, if such decisions appeared palpably erroneous; and in that sentiment, expressed in so guarded a manner, I perfectly concur. In the present instance, the judgment of the Court of Session did not appear to him to be founded on any principle of sound reason; and, unacquainted as he was with legal knowledge, he would not have presumed to deliver his sentiments in this House, on a point of this kind, if the acts of parliament on the subject had not appeared to him so clear as to be obvious to every person.” (His Lordship then entered into a detail of the acts of parliament 1727 downwards, and concluded by moving) “That the freeholders had done right in ordering Lord Daer to be enrolled, and that the Court of Session had done wrong in altering their judgment.”