Dhalomal Kishore (t/a Movil 2000) V The Commissioners for HMRC [2026] UKFTT 987 (TC)

[2026] UKFTT 00987 (TC)Case No TC 09936
FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL
TAX CHAMBER
Hearing Heard on: 11 February 2026Date Judgment date: 01 July 2026
[Taylor House]
Appeal reference: TC/2025/00227
PROCEDURE – application for permission to make a late appeal – misdeclaration penalties charged under s 63 of the Value Added Tax Act 1994 – delay serious and significant – no good reason – previous litigation in respect of the same decision – appeal against the same decision previously withdrawn in the absence of an application for reinstatement – Martland considered and applied – application refused
JUDGE NATSAI MANYARARADHALOMAL KISHORE (T/A MOVIL 2000)AppellantTHE COMMISSIONERS FOR HIS MAJESTY’S REVENUE AND CUSTOMSRespondentMr Albert Fox, Accountant for AppellantMr Christopher Foulkes of Counsel, instructed by the General Counsel and Solicitor to HM Revenue and Customs for RespondentsDECISION

Introduction

[1]By a Notice of Appeal dated 3 January 2025, the Appellant seeks permission to make a late appeal against two notices of assessment in relation to misdeclaration penalties (“the Misdeclaration Penalties”), dated 3 August 2017. The Misdeclaration Penalties were issued pursuant to s 63 of the Value Added Tax Act 1994 (“VATA”), and relate to the 03/06 and 06/06 VAT periods. The penalty in relation to the period 03/06 is in the sum of £1,707,846; and the penalty in relation to the period 06/06 is in the sum of £811,340 (reduced to £200,870 by a letter dated 8 December 2022).[2]In general, where a taxable person wishes to appeal on a question relating to VAT, an appeal is to be made before the end of the period of 30 days from the date of notification of the decision in which to do so; or, if there is a review by HMRC, 30 days from the conclusion of the review: s 83 G (1) and (3)(b) VATA. But the First-tier Tribunal (“FtT”) has a statutory discretion to extend time. That discretion is contained in s 83G (6) VATA. There are other taxing provisions which include the same power.[3]HMRC object to the late appeal. I am not concerned with the underlying tax dispute in these proceedings, save briefly in relation to Stage-3 of the Martland test.[4]Having considered all of the evidence, together with the submissions, I decided not to admit the late appeal. In this Decision, the legislation and case law are cited so far as is relevant to the issues under consideration.

The documents

[5]The documents to which I was referred included the following:(1) the Hearing Bundle consisting of 620 pages;(2) the Authorities Bundle consisting of 1269 pages;(3) the Appellant’s written submissions dated 13 January 2026; and(4) HMRC’s response dated 3 February 2026.

Background facts

[6]There is a lengthy history to these proceedings; which is necessary to set out in full in light of the Appellant’s assertions as regards the timing of the appeal.[7]Between 2000 and 2006, the Appellant bought and sold wholesale consignments of mobile telephones from UK and EU suppliers, and then exported them to persons outside of the EU. In the majority of the transactions, the Appellant purchased the phones as agent of a company in Singapore called “Dhalomal Ramchand Pte Limited” (“DRPL”); which was owned by the Appellant’s brother, “Lal Nanwani” (“Lal”) and nephew, “Manoj Nanwani” (“Manoj”) (“the DRPL Agency”). The Appellant also bought mobile phones and sold them to third-parties on his own account (“the Third-Party Trades”).[8]In relation to the Third-Party Trades, the Appellant built up a number of supplier and customer contacts as a result of acting as DRPL’s agent. In relation to both the DRPL Agency and the Third-Party Trades, the Appellant claimed repaymentsof input VAT incurred on purchasing the phones.[9]The Appellant paid the suppliers in his name from the UK bank account in the name of “Movil 2000”. The funds in the account were provided by DRPL. The Appellant also sold the phones, and issued invoices, in the name of Movil 2000, to DRPL. DRPL sold the phones to its customers. The Appellant sold the phones to DRPL at the same price as he had paid the suppliers, but without VAT as DRPL’s customers were outside of the EU. As such, DRPL funded the cost of the VAT from the time of the payment to the supplier until HMRC made a repayment of the VAT to the Appellant. When the VAT repayment was received, it was either passed to DRPL, or retained by the Appellant and used towards the next purchase of mobile phones.[10]During the first quarter of 2006, the Appellant claimed input tax, in the sum of £22,392,775.10, for the periods 03/06 and 06/06. In June 2006, the Appellant asked HMRC why he had not been repaid for period 03/06 when others in the supply-chain had been repaid. This gave rise to a Kittel denial (which I will return to later).

The loss relief claim and the previous Closure Notice

[11]In July 2010, the Appellant submitted tax returns for the 2004-05, 2005-06 and 2006-07 tax years. In the return for the 2006-07 tax year, the Appellant claimed “terminal loss relief” under s 89 of the Income Tax Act 2007 (“ITA 2007”), in the sum of £24,234,078. The Appellant claimed that he had suffered a trading loss as a result of HMRC’s refusal to refund the input tax in the year 2006-07, when he permanently ceased to carry on a trade. The effect of the claim was to relieve profits self-assessed by the Appellant for earlier years from the charge to tax.[12]HMRC enquired into the return for the 2006-07 tax year, and issued a closure notice (“the Closure Notice”) on 15 July 2011. The Closure Notice denied the terminal loss relief claim.[13]On 4 August 2011, the Appellant appealed against the Closure Notice. The Appellant subsequently said that from 2006 onwards, he had no intention to carry on trading in mobile phones.[14]On 8 and 9 July 2013, the FtT (Judge Sinfield) heard the Appellant’s appeal against the Closure Notice. The preliminary issues were whether the Appellant carried on a single trade or two separate trades and, if he carried on a single trade, whether it ceased in the 2006-07 tax year.[15]By a decision dated 3 September 2013, Judge Sinfield decided that the Appellant carried on a single trade, and that the trade did not cease in 2006-07.

Previous appeal against the Kittel denial – 03/06 & 06/06

[16]By decision letters dated 13 July 2007 (in respect of the period 03/06) and 28 March 2008 (in respect of the period 06/06) (“the Kittel denial”), HMRC denied claims by the Appellant to deduct a total of £22,392,775 of input tax in respect of 373 transactions involving mobile telephones during the 03/06 and 06/06 periods. HMRC refused repayment on the grounds that the Appellant “knew or ought to have known” that his transactions in those periods were “connected with the fraudulent evasion of VAT”. Therefore, the principles established in the decision of the European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) in the Joined Cases C-439/04 and C-440/04: Kittel v Belgium; Belgium v Recolta Recycling SPRL [2008] STC 1537 (‘Kittel’) applied (i.e., the Kittel denial).[17]On 8 August 2007 and 24 April 2008, the Appellant appealed against HMRC’s decisions (“the Kittel appeals”).[18]On 16 October 2014, the FtT issued “Fairford Directions”, pursuant to the guidance given in R & C Comrs v Fairford Group plc [2014] UKUT 329 (TCC); [2015] STC 156 (‘Fairford’).[19]On 22 June 2015, HMRC informed the Appellant’s agents (Dickinson Hill LLP) that the Appellant had until 17 June 2015 to provide his list of issues, in accordance with the Fairford Directions.[20]On 8 July 2015, HMRC applied for an order that the appeals be struck out unless the Appellant complied with the Directions (“the Unless Order”).[21]On 29 July 2015, the FtT made the Unless Order requiring the Appellant to comply with the Directions within 21 days.[22]On 9 September 2015, the appeals were struck out because the Appellant had failed to comply with the Unless Order, which had required him, as is standard practice in Kittel appeals, to specify what issues were in contention.[23]On 24 May 2016, the Appellant sent an email to the FtT, which the FtT treated as an application to reinstate the proceedings out of time.[24]On 2 November 2016, the Appellant’s out of time application for reinstatement was dismissed by the FtT (Judge Richards).[25]On 22 December 2016, the Appellant emailed the FtT to say that he wished to appeal to the Upper Tribunal (“UT”), but without providing any Grounds of Appeal. Accordingly, the email was not treated as an application for permission to appeal because it did not comply with rules 39(5)(b) or (c) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Tax Chamber) Rules 2009 SI 2009/273 (“the Procedure Rules”).[26]On 4 January 2017, the FtT wrote to the Appellant to acknowledge receipt of his email of 22 December 2016, and also provided information on the correct way to apply for permission to appeal.[27]On 26 September 2017, the Appellant’s application for permission to appeal was refused by Judge Richards because it was late (“the reinstatement decision”).[28]By a decision dated 2 November 2017, the UT (Judge Sinfield) refused the Appellant’s application for permission to appeal against the reinstatement decision, indicating that had the application been admitted, permission to appeal would have been refused.

Previous appeal against the Misdeclaration Penalties – 03/06 & 06/06

[29]On 3 August 2017, HMRC charged the Misdeclaration Penalties under s 63 VATA, as a result of inaccuracies in the Appellant’s 03/06 and 06/06 returns. By a Notice of Appeal dated 13 September 2017, the Appellant appealed against the Misdeclaration Penalties. The appeal was lodged out of time but HMRC raised no objection and the FtT admitted the appeal (TC/2017/06848).[30]On 7 December 2017, HMRC applied to have the appeal struck out. This was because the Appellant’s Grounds of Appeal sought to re-open the Kittel issues, and sought to impugn the Misdeclaration Penalties on the grounds that there had been a breach of art. 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”). The Appellant applied to have a number of matters determined as preliminary issues at the substantive hearing.[31]On 4 to 5 June and 31 July 2018, the applications were heard by the FtT (Judge Mosedale). Judge Mosedale considered that the Appellant did not have a reasonable prospect of:(1) showing either that it would not be an abuse of process for him to be allowed to re-open issues in the Kittelappeals; or(2) impugning the penalty assessment on the basis that there had been a breach of art. 6 of the ECHR.[32]By a decision dated 20 December 2018, Judge Mosedale found that the Appellant’s case that he was prejudiced by nine to ten years of delay, and that it is a breach of the ECHR for a penalty to be determined after liability for it has been established, did not have a reasonable prospect of success (as the penalty was assessed within a reasonable time of the determination). Judge Mosedale dismissed a number of preliminary arguments raised by the Appellant, including the submission that the assessments were made out of time, and allowed HMRC’s application to strike out the appeal, save in one respect - proportionality. The Appellant appealed to the UT against this decision.[33]By a decision dated 22 July 2020, the UT (Zacaroli J and Judge Swami Raghavan) dismissed four of the Appellant’s grounds (including that the penalty assessments were made out of time) but allowed the Appellant’s appeal on two grounds; namely that the FtT erred in concluding:(1) that there was no arguable case that the Appellant’s art. 6 ECHR rights were breached as a result of delay; and(2) that there was no more than a fanciful defence to the claim that it was abusive for the Appellant to re-litigate in the penalty appeal issues that were live in the Kittel appeal.[34]The matter was remitted to the FtT for directions in order to progress it towards a substantive hearing of the appeal against the Misdeclaration Penalties.[35]HMRC appealed to the Court of Appeal and the Appellant cross-appealed. In its judgment of 28 October 2021, the Court of Appeal (King, Newey and Nugee LJJ):(1) dismissed HMRC’s ground that the UT had adopted the wrong approach in considering whether there was an abuse of process; and(2) dismissed the Appellant’s grounds: (i) that the penalties should be set aside on art. 6 ECHR grounds without full examination of the facts; and (ii) that it was an abuse to raise the penalty assessment(s) later than the time at which the Kittel decision was made.[36]In response to agreed Directions, the Appellant provided amended Grounds of Appeal, dated 15 July 2022 (in order to take account of the decision of the UT) and HMRC provided a Statement of Case, dated 16 September 2022, based upon the amended Grounds.[37]On 8 December 2022 (“the December 2022 letter”), HMRC reduced the amount of the Misdeclaration Penalty for the 06/06 period from £811,340 to £200,870. This was because of:(i) a mis-apportionment when originally calculating the penalties; and(ii) the amounts of input VAT denied in the Kittel decisions as between the 03/06 period and the 06/06 period. Whereas the correct overall figure for denied input tax in the 03/06 and 06/06 periods had been used to calculate the penalty, the penalty for the 03/06 period should have been higher and the penalty for the 06/06 period lower. In the circumstances, HMRC did not increase the 03/06 penalty amount but did decrease the 06/06 penalty amount. This had the effect of reducing the overall penalty figure to £1,908,716.[38]By an email to HMRC and the FtT on 15 August 2023, the Appellant confirmed his intention to withdraw his appeal against the Misdeclaration Penalties (“the Withdrawal Notice”).[39]By a letter dated 19 September 2023, the FtT asked the Appellant to confirm that he wished to withdraw his appeal. In the absence of a response within 14 days, the FtT would assume that the Appellant did wish to withdraw his appeal.[40]On 5 December 2023, the FtT endorsed an agreed Consent Order made between the parties on 22 November 2023 (“the Consent Order”). This acknowledged that the Appellant had withdrawn the penalty appeal, and provided that no further costs were due as between the parties.[41]By a Notice of Appeal dated 2 January 2025 (i.e., this late appeal), the Appellant sought to appeal against the Misdeclaration Penalties dated 3 August 2017, in relation to the 03/06 and 06/06 periods. The issue raised on the Appellant’s behalf is that concerning whether the actual date decision under appeal was 3 August 2017, or whether it was the date of the December 2022 letter (which varied the 2017 decision).

The relevant law and the procedure rules

[42]In order to put the parties’ respective contentions into context, I start with the relevant statutory provisions:[43]Section 83 VATA provides that: “83G Bringing of appeals(1) An appeal under section 83 is to be made to the tribunal before— (a) the end of the period of 30 days beginning with— (i) in a case where P is the appellant, the date of the document notifying the decision to which the appeal relates, or (ii) in a case where a person other than P is the appellant, the date that person becomes aware of the decision, or (b) if later, the end of the relevant period (within the meaning of section 83D).(2) But that is subject to subsections (3) to (5).(3) In a case where HMRC are required to undertake a review under section 83C— (a) an appeal may not be made until the conclusion date, and (b) any appeal is to be made within the period of 30 days beginning with the conclusion date.(4) In a case where HMRC are requested to undertake a review in accordance with section 83E— (a) an appeal may not be made— (i) unless HMRC have notified P, or the other person, as to whether or not a review will be undertaken, and (ii) if HMRC have notified P, or the other person, that a review will be undertaken, until the conclusion date; (b) any appeal where paragraph (a)(ii) applies is to be made within the period of 30 days beginning with the conclusion date; (c) if HMRC have notified P, or the other person, that a review will not be undertaken, an appeal may be made only if the tribunal gives permission to do so.(5) In a case where section 83F(8) applies, an appeal may be made at any time from the end of the period specified in section 83F(6) to the date 30 days after the conclusion date.(6) An appeal may be made after the end of the period specified in subsection (1), (3)(b), (4)(b) or (5) if the tribunal gives permission to do so.(7) In this section “conclusion date” means the date of the document notifying the conclusions of the review.” (a) the end of the period of 30 days beginning with— (i) in a case where P is the appellant, the date of the document notifying the decision to which the appeal relates, or (ii) in a case where a person other than P is the appellant, the date that person becomes aware of the decision, or (b) if later, the end of the relevant period (within the meaning of section 83D). (a) an appeal may not be made until the conclusion date, and (b) any appeal is to be made within the period of 30 days beginning with the conclusion date. (a) an appeal may not be made— (i) unless HMRC have notified P, or the other person, as to whether or not a review will be undertaken, and (ii) if HMRC have notified P, or the other person, that a review will be undertaken, until the conclusion date; (b) any appeal where paragraph (a)(ii) applies is to be made within the period of 30 days beginning with the conclusion date; (c) if HMRC have notified P, or the other person, that a review will not be undertaken, an appeal may be made only if the tribunal gives permission to do so.[44]The Procedure Rules provide the procedural framework for proceedings within the FtT. The case management powers of the FtT are provided for at Rule 5, as follows:
“Case management powers 5. —(1) Subject to the provisions of the 2007 Act and any other enactment, the Tribunal may regulate its own procedure. … (3) In particular, and without restricting the general powers in paragraphs (1) and (2), the Tribunal may by direction— … (e) deal with an issue in the proceedings as a preliminary issue; …”
[45]Rule 20 (4) of the Procedure Rules provides that:
“(4) If the notice of appeal is provided after the end of any period specified in an enactment referred to in paragraph (1) but the enactment provides that an appeal may be made or notified after that period with the permission of the Tribunal— (a) the notice of appeal must include a request for such permission and the reason why the notice of appeal was not provided in time; and (b) unless the Tribunal gives such permission, the Tribunal must not admit the appeal.”

[Emphasis added]

The evidence and the key submissions[46]The documents for the hearing, are set out at [5] above.

Appellant’s submissions

[47]Mr Fox’s submissions (as set out in the Appellant’s written submissions) can be summarised as follows:(1) The appeal concerns how the original Misdirection Penalties, of 3 August 2017, became retrospectively invalidated through attempted revisions by email on 8 December 2022 and 9 February 2023. The Appellant is challenging a new decision and not re-litigating a decided matter. The December 2022 letter and February 2023 email constituted new appealable matters. To the best of the Appellant's knowledge, the attempted revisions to the Misdeclaration Penalties have not been appealed previously and are, accordingly, being appealed now for the very first time.(2) The Misdeclaration Penalties are invalid. The Appellant had a legitimate expectation that HMRC would follow statutory procedures. There has been a miscalculation of the penalties by HMRC. The revised emails retrospectively confirmed the invalidity of the original Misdirection Penalties as both were incorrect, in the following amounts: (i) period 03/06 penalty understated by £614,811.61; and (ii) period 06/06 penalty overstated by £609,085.63. The revising emails (even if they had been mathematically correct) were not issued in time; being five years after issuance of the original flawed Misdirection Penalties. The revising email purporting to amend the original Misdirection Penalties was not issued in accordance with HMRC's own Code of Practice, which shows a precisely worded Template to be used when issuing or increasing the misdirection penalties (Ref: VCP10812) and when withdrawing or reducing the Misdirection Penalties (Ref: VCP10813).(3) The decision is in breach of art. 6 of the ECHR. The service of penalty assessments eleven years after the submission of the VAT returns upon which they are based (and five years after the issuing of the penalties and 16 years after the triggering event) amounts to excessive delay and, therefore, is in breach of art. 6 of the ECHR. Furthermore, that the delay is (i) oppressive in the sense of being disproportionate; and (ii) undermines the Appellant’s ability to properly defend himself due to the passage of time and is, to that extent, a breach of art. 6 (including art. 6(3) of the ECHR) and ought properly to be discharged on that basis; and/or is an abuse of the process of the Tribunal. Had penalty assessments been raised ‘promptly’ and around the same time as the refusal of the input tax claims in the underlying appeals (as required by art. 6 of the ECHR and HMRC’s own internal guidance under the new penalty regime), the Appellant could have addressed the overlapping issues of absence of “constructive knowledge” and “reasonable excuse”, concurrently. The penalties are disproportionate.(4) By 2023, the Appellant was unrepresented and faced with the prospect of very large Misdirection Penalties. Despite the complexities and legalities surrounding the appeals, he decided to relinquish the appeals. To allow the penalty assessments to stand, in the circumstances is, procedurally and substantively, a wholly unfair denial of natural justice because the Appellant will be severely restricted and, thus, prejudiced by being able to defend these penalties. This includes being unable to avail himself of the defence of reasonable excuse to the imposition of these penalties as important evidence on which such a defence would be based is no longer available given that the Appellant’s former legal representative, Colin Gibbons (who was the Partner in charge of the Appellant’s case when he was represented by Hill Dickinson LLP) died suddenly in 2012.(5) The Martland line of authorities relied on by HMRC are not applicable.

HMRC’s submissions

[48]Mr Foulkes’ submissions can be summarised as follows:(1) The appeal was filed out of time. HMRC’s actions in notifying the Appellant, in the December 2022 letter, of a reduction in the amount of the penalty that they sought to charge for period 06/06 was neither subsequent to the Appellant’s withdrawal, nor unlawful. The Appellant makes erroneous assertions as to the content of the December 2022 letter and does not explain how, if the letter did not comply with the statutory requirements for an assessment, this is relevant to his appeal. Whether viewed as an assessment or a notification that HMRC would not seek to recover, or dispute in the ongoing appeal the larger figure originally imposed, the effect of the letter was the same. It did not affect the Appellant’s liability to penalties. The Appellant’s assertion that this demonstrates that the “quantum of the penalty has never been conclusively or correctly determined” is unsustainable. The quantum of the penalties had been identified in 2022, reiterated in early 2023 and further reiterated during the course of the correspondence in respect of the Appellant’s withdrawal of his appeal later in 2023.(2) The Notice of Appeal is dated 2 January 2025. Even on the Appellant’s current case that the December 2022 letter is the decision being appealed, the Notice of Appeal was filed almost three years late. The Appellant has advanced no, or no sufficient, explanation for the delay in bringing this appeal. Whether regarded as an appeal against the imposition of the penalties, or an appeal against the December 2022 letter, the Appellant challenges his liability for the penalties imposed in 2017, as well as the amount of the penalties. These are the same issues that the Appellant previously appealed. It follows that issue estoppel applies because, contrary to the principle in Cafoor v Income Tax Commissioner [1961] AC 584 (described by Newey LJ in HMRC v Kishore [2021] EWCA Civ 1565 (‘Kishore CoA’) at [15] onwards, the basis upon which the authorities suggest that issue estoppel may not apply in some tax cases is not present in this case. The appeal relates to the samepenalty that has already been the subject of an appeal that was determined (by virtue of s 85 VATA). Further, and in the alternative, the appeal is an abuse of the process of the Tribunal. Furthermore, most of the pointsor grounds raised in support of the Appellant’s appeal were relied upon by him in the previous appeal.(3) The question of the amount of the 06/06 penalty was raised as a Ground of Appeal by the Appellant in his amended Grounds for Appeal, dated 15 July 2022, submitted upon the return of the case to the FtT following the judgment of the Court of Appeal in Kishore CoA. The Appellant has not applied to reinstate the previous appeal, which he withdrew, as he argues that this appeal is a different one. The December 2022 letter, which gave notice of the reduction in the amount of the 06/06 penalty, arose many months before that withdrawal. It was not a “new action” subsequent to the withdrawal. The application to bring a late reinstatement application should, similarly, fail.(4) The appeal is bound to fail through issue estoppel and / or as an abuse of the Tribunal’s process; the Tribunal being deemed, by virtue of s 85 VATA, to have already determined an appeal against the penalties, both in respect of the liability for the penalties, and the amount of those penalties. Section 85 applies to all appeals brought by virtue of s 83 VATA that are then withdrawn. The relevant date for “finality” or estoppel relied upon by HMRC is in late 2023 - when the previous appeal was determined by virtue of the Appellant’s withdrawal. This post-dated the actions that the Appellant seeks to characterise as “subsequent unlawful actions”; namely the December 2022 letter and the email in response to the Appellant’s query, on 9 February 2023. The “finality” afforded by s 85 related to the issues which were the subject of that appeal; namely the liability for, and amount of, the two penalties.(5) The email of 8 February 2023 from Officer Dhillon was not a further notification of any kind. It was an email in response to the Appellant’s email request for clarification sent to her and Officer Stock.[49]At the conclusion of the hearing, I reserved my decision, which I now give with reasons.

Findings of fact

[50]The “Background Facts” are not in issue between the parties, save that the parties differ in view as to the conclusions that I should reach as a result. I, therefore, adopt the Background Facts, at [6] to [41] above, as my “Findings of Fact”, and do not repeat these here.

Discussion

[51]This is the Appellant’s application for permission to make a late appeal against Misdeclaration Penalties.[52]It is well established that the Tribunal must take all relevant matters into account when exercising its discretion to admit a late appeal. There are no fetters given in the legislation on the exercise of discretion by the Tribunal. While this means that the Tribunal might, in appropriate circumstances, grant leave to appeal out of time to a taxpayer without a reasonable excuse, it also means that the Tribunal will take all matters into account, and so a taxpayer with a reasonable excuse will not necessarily be granted permission to appeal out of time.[53]In light of the case law that has arisen both before and during these proceedings, and in consideration of Mr Fox’s submissions on the inapplicability of the Martland test, it is helpful to set out the case law, before proceeding to apply the principles established in relation to the approach to this application.

The authorities and the martland three-stage test

[54]The approach to delay and relief from sanctions has been the subject of much adjudication and consideration. The case law that has emerged is set out as follows:

Data Select

[55]In Data Select Ltd v R & C Comrs [2012] UKUT 187 (TCC), [2012] STC 2195 (‘Data Select’), Morgan J described the approach to applications for extensions of time limits in the following way:
“34. … Applications for extensions of time limits of various kinds are commonplace and the approach to be adopted is well established. As a general rule, when a court or tribunal is asked to extend a relevant time limit, the court or tribunal asks itself the following questions: (1) what is the purpose of the time limit? (2) how long was the delay? (3) is there a good explanation for the delay? (4) what will be the consequences for the parties of an extension of time? and (5) what will be the consequences for the parties of a refusal to extend time? The court or tribunal then makes its decision in the light of the answers to those questions. … 37. …The general comments in the above cases will also be found helpful in many other cases. Some of the above cases stress the importance of finality in litigation. Those remarks are of particular relevance where the application concerns an intended appeal against a judicial decision. The particular comments about finality in litigation are not directly applicable where the application concerns an intended appeal against a determination by HMRC, where there has been no judicial decision as to the position. None the less, those comments stress the desirability of not re-opening matters after a lengthy interval where one or both parties were entitled to assume that matters had been finally fixed and settled and that point applies to an appeal against a determination by HMRC as it does to appeal against a judicial decision.”
[56]In the context of an application to make a late appeal, the obligation is simply to take into account of all of the relevant circumstances, and to disregard factors that are irrelevant.

Denton

[57]Helpful guidance can also be derived from the three-stage process set out by the Court of Appeal in Denton,for aclear exposition of how the provisions of rule 3.9(1) of the Civil Procedure Rules (“the CPR”) should be given effect. CPR rule 3.9 is concerned with the grant of relief against sanctions. There is no equivalent in the Procedure Rules to rule 3.9 of the CPR; a point which was previously relevant because of the dispute that arose in Medpro Healthcare Ltd & Anor v HMRC [2025] UKUT 255 (TCC), [2025] STC 1343 (‘Medpro UT’), which I will turn to later.[58]In Denton & Ors v TH White Ltd & Ors [2014] EWCA Civ 906 (‘Denton’), the majority in the Court of Appeal described the three-stage approach in the following terms, at [24]:
“…A judge should address an application for relief from sanctions in three stages. The first stage is to identify and assess the seriousness and significance of the “failure to comply with any rule, practice direction or court order” which engages rule 3.9(1). If the breach is neither serious nor significant, the court is unlikely to need to spend much time on the second and third stages. The second stage is to consider why the default occurred. The third stage is to evaluate “all the circumstances of the case, so as to enable [the court] to deal justly with the application including [factors (a) and (b)]”. …”
[59]That approach is no different, in principle, to that set out in Data Select. The seriousness and significance of the relevant failure has always been one of the factors relevant to the court or tribunal’s determination. The reason for the delay is a common factor in both Denton and Data Select, as is the need to evaluate the circumstances of the case so as to enable the court or tribunal to deal with the matter justly. BPP[60]In the Court of Appeal decision in BPP Holdings Ltd v HMRC [2016] EWCA Civ 121; [2016] 1 WLR 1915 (‘BPP CoA’), a direction had been made by the FtT indicating that HMRC would be barred from participating in proceedings if the direction was not adhered to. This was the relevance of the strict approach in adhering to time limits. At [37], Ryder LJ (with whom Richards and Moore-Bick LJJ agreed) said this:
“There is nothing in the wording of the overriding objective of the tax tribunal rules that is inconsistent with the general legal policy described in Mitchell and Denton. As to that policy, I can detect no justification for a more relaxed approach to compliance with rules and directions in the tribunals and while I might commend the Civil Procedure Rule Committee for setting out the policy in such clear terms, it need hardly be said that the terms of the overriding objective in the tribunal rules likewise incorporate proportionality, cost and timeliness. It should not need to be said that a tribunal's orders, rules and practice directions are to be complied with in like manner to a courts. If it needs to be said, I have now said it.”
[61]The Court of Appeal, ultimately, endorsed the approach described by Morgan J in Data Select.[62]In the Supreme Court decision in BPP Holdings v R & C Comrs [2017] UKSC 55; [2017] 1 WLR 2945 (‘BPP SC’), Lord Neuberger PSC observed, at [24] to [26], that whilst rule 3.9 of the CPR - and the authorities relating to it - were only strictly applicable to the courts, they became applicable to the tribunal when adopted by the UT (Judge Sinfield) in McCarthy & Stone (Developments) Ltd [2014] STC 973 (‘McCarthy’). At [43], after referring to differences and similarities between the CPR and the Procedure Rules (in that case the Tribunals Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008 SI 2008/2698),

Judge Sinfield accepted that “the CPR do not apply to tribunals” but added that he did not:

“accept that the UT should adopt a different, i.e., more relaxed, approach to compliance with rules, directions and orders than the courts that are subject to the CPR.”
[63]The same view was expressed by Ryder LJ at [37] and [38] in BPP CoA:
“I can detect no justification for a more relaxed approach to compliance with rules and directions in the tribunals… [i]t should not need to be said that a tribunal’s orders, rules and practice directions are to be complied with in like manner to a court’s”
[64]In BPP SC, Lord Neuberger summarised the position thus:
“In a nutshell, the cases on time limits and sanctions in the CPR do not apply directly, but the Tribunals should generally follow a similar approach.”
[65]The Supreme Court acknowledge that guidance that was approved was guidance attaching significant weight to certain factors.

Martland

[66]The approach to the consideration of an application to extend time was adequately set out by the UT in William Martland v HMRC [2018] UKUT 0178 (TCC) (“Martland”)(Judges Berner and Poole). Martland concerned a late appeal to the FtT, such as that which is before us. The approach adopted followed from a consideration of authorities, including BPP. The UT held that the principle of fairness and justice is applicable, as a general matter, to any exercise of a judicial discretion. The UT concluded that the changes to rule 3.9 of the CPR, and the evolving approach to applications for relief from sanctions under that rule, also apply to applications for permissions to appeal to the FtT outside the relevant statutory time-limit. The UT said this, at [43]:
“43. ... Whether considering an application which is made directly under rule 3.9 (or under the FTT Rules, which the Supreme Court in BPP clearly considered analogous) or an application to notify an appeal to the FTT outside the statutory time limit, it is clear that the judge will be exercising a judicial discretion. The consequences of the judge's decision in agreeing (or refusing) to admit a late appeal are often no different in practical terms from the consequences of allowing (or refusing) to grant relief from sanctions - especially where the sanction in question is the striking out of an appeal (or, as in BPP, the barring of a party from further participation in it). The clear message emerging from the cases - particularised in Denton and similar cases and implicitly endorsed in BPP - is that in exercising judicial discretions generally, particular importance is to be given to the need for "litigation to be conducted efficiently and at proportionate cost", and "to enforce compliance with rules, practice directions and orders". We see no reason why the principles embodied in this message should not apply to applications to admit late appeals just as much as to applications for relief from sanctions, though of course this does not detract from the general injunction which continues to appear in CPR rule 3.9 to "consider all the circumstances of the case.”
[67]Applying the “three-stage approach” adopted in Denton, the UT in Martland set out the following approach, at [44] and [45]:
“44. When the FTT is considering applications for permission to appeal out of time, therefore, it must be remembered that the starting point is that permission should not be granted unless the FTT is satisfied on balance that it should be. In considering that question, we consider the FTT can usefully follow the three- stage process set out in Denton: (1) Establish the length of the delay. If it was very short (which would, in the absence of unusual circumstances equate to the breach being “neither serious nor significant”), then the tribunal is unlikely to need to spend much time on the second and third stages – though this cannot be taken to mean that applications can be granted for very short delays without moving on to a consideration of those stages. (2) The reason (or reasons) why the default occurred should be established. (3) The tribunal can then move onto its evaluation of all the circumstances of the case. This will involve a balancing exercise which will essentially assess the merits of the reasons given for the delay and the prejudice which would be caused to both parties by granting or refusing the extension of time.” (1) Establish the length of the delay. If it was very short (which would, in the absence of unusual circumstances equate to the breach being “neither serious nor significant”), then the tribunal is unlikely to need to spend much time on the second and third stages – though this cannot be taken to mean that applications can be granted for very short delays without moving on to a consideration of those stages. (2) The reason (or reasons) why the default occurred should be established. (3) The tribunal can then move onto its evaluation of all the circumstances of the case. This will involve a balancing exercise which will essentially assess the merits of the reasons given for the delay and the prejudice which would be caused to both parties by granting or refusing the extension of time.”
[68]At [45], the UT said this concerning the “balancing exercise” at ‘Stage-3’:
“That balancing exercise should take into account the particular importance of the need for litigation to be conducted efficiently and at proportionate cost, and for statutory time limits to be respected.”
[69]At [46], the UT went on to say this:
“In doing so, the FTT can have regard to any obvious strength or weakness of the applicant's case; this goes to the question of prejudice – there is obviously much greater prejudice for an applicant to lose the opportunity of putting forward a really strong case than a very weak one. It is important however that this should not descend into a detailed analysis of the underlying merits of the appeal.”
[70]The guidance in Martland was approved by the UT in HMRC v Katib [2019] UKUT 189 (TCC), [2019] STC 2106 (‘Katib’) (Mann J and Judge Richards). The point at [45] in Martland was reiterated in Katib, where the UT said this, at [17]:
“We have, however, concluded that the FTT did make an error of law in failing to acknowledge or give proper force to the position that, as a matter of principle, the need for statutory time limits to be respected was a matter of particular importance to the exercise of its discretion.”
[71]The decision of the UT in Romasave (Property Services) Ltd v HMRC [2015] UKUT 254 (TCC), [2016] STC 1 (‘Romasave’) (Judge Roger Berner and

Judge Sarah Falk (as she then was)) made the same point, at [96]:

“The exercise of a discretion to allow a late appeal is a matter of material import, since it gives the tribunal a jurisdiction it would not otherwise have. Time limits imposed by law should generally be respected.”
[72]The three- stage test described in Martland plainly requires the FtT to consider all the circumstances of the case. That expressly recognises that there is a judicial discretion to be exercised. The UT observed that rule 3.9 of the CPR represents the main point of connection between the previous authorities specific to the exercise of the discretion to admit late tax appeals, and the well-known wider stream of authority on relief from sanctions and extensions of time in connection with the procedural rules of the courts and tribunals; the key cases from the latter being Denton and BPP.[73]The approach in Martland was also confirmed by the UT in Websons (8) Ltd v HMRC [2020] UKUT 0154 (TCC) (‘Websons’).

Medpro UT

[74]Returning to Medpro UT, the issue raised by HMRC was not whether the guidance in Martland is flawed, but whether it was permissible for the UT to formulate guidelines for the exercise of discretion by the FtT, attaching particular significance to certain factors.The appellants in Medpro UT had argued that the UT’s previous decisions in the line of authority following Martland was impermissible because it amounted to “imposing a fetter on the broad statutory discretion” afforded by, in that instance, s 83G of the Value Added Tax Act 1994 (‘VATA’). In Medpro UT, there was a divergence of views between the two judges sitting in the UT (Marcus Smith J and Judge Jonathan Cannan) about whether Martland should be followed.It was, however, common ground between the judges that the three-stage test set out in Martland was correct.[75]At [88], Marcus Smith J said this:
“we consider the three stage structure of the discretion at [44] of Martland … to represent an unimpeachable approach.”
[76]And at [94] to [95], he said this:
“94. …At [44] of Martland, the Upper Tribunal set out the three-stage test. That paragraph says nothing about the ex-ante weight to be attached to the factors being weighed and is unimpeachable. “95. The question is whether [45] of Martland … goes further and in referring to the “particular importance of the need for litigation to be conducted efficiently and at proportionate cost, and for statutory time limits to be respected” was doing what the Court of Appeal did in Denton, and according these factors particular weight. Read on its own, it must be doubted whether Martland was doing this. Martland at [45] is not unequivocally clear, and can be read as merely stressing that these factors matter, as indeed they do. But there can be no doubt that the Upper Tribunal has subsequently followed the Denton approach not merely as to the structure of the discretion (ie the three-stage test) but also as to the (additional, extra) weight to be accorded to the CPR 3.9(a) and (b) factors (ie the “top table” point) ...”
[77]Marcus Smith J said that he did not consider this to be a permissible approach in the case of extensions of time under s 83G(6) VATA. This was because the change to rule 3.9 of the CPR enabled the Court of Appeal to take the approach it did in Denton. The UT, therefore, approved the three-stage approach set out at [44] of Martland, but disapproved of the first sentence of [45] of the decision, concluding that in construing s 83G(6) VATA no “ex ante weight” should be given to the factors set out in CPR rule 3.9(1(a) and (b) (regarding the “particular importance of the need for litigation to be conducted efficiently and at proportionate cost, and for statutory time limits to be respected”).

Pawar

[78]In Tajinder Pawar v HMRC [2025] UKUT 309 (TCC) (‘Pawar’) (Judges Swami Raghavan and Nicholas Paines KC) (a case which concerned s 83G(6) VATA), the UT followed the Marcus Smith J judgment in Medpro UT (i.e., that at the third stage particular weight need not be given to the importance of complying with directions, time limits and the need for effective litigation). The UT said this, at [91]:
“91. …In summary, Marcus Smith J concluded that paragraph [45] of Martland was clearly wrong in glossing section 83G of VATA 1994 so as to include the factors contained in the current version of CPR 3.9, which are absent from the statutory test in section 83G. Judge Cannan did not consider Martland to be clearly wrong in this respect, concluding that Parliament had envisaged that the Upper Tribunal would give guidance on the exercise of the discretion in section 83G, which could extend to drawing an analogy with the CPR and giving guidance on the weight to be attributed to particular factors.”
[79]At [92] to [93], the UT said this:
“92. The Appellant submits that as a matter of judicial comity we should follow the decision in Medpro UT unless we consider it to be clearly wrong. The difficulty for us here is the existence of two previous decisions of the Upper Tribunal, one of which holds the other to be clearly wrong. 93. We find ourselves unable to conclude that either decision is clearly wrong or, conversely, clearly right. We note that HMRC are contemplating an appeal so it is possible the conflict may be resolved at a higher level, but we cannot delay this decision on that account. In the circumstances, we consider that we should follow Medpro UT on the grounds that it is the more recent decision and expressly considers the correctness of the earlier decision.”
[80]And, at [95]: “95. …In remaking the decision we shall follow the three stage approach in Martland save that when we perform the balancing exercise at paragraph 44 of Martland we shall do so without giving special weight to the “particular importance of the need for litigation to be conducted efficiently and at proportionate cost, and for statutory time limits to be respected”.[81]Therefore, as the UT panel could not determine thateither Medpro UT or Martland were obviously wrong, the later judgment Medpro UT was followed. That re-made decision however again refused the admission of the appeal. HMRC appealed to the Court of Appeal. We shall turn to the Court of Appeal’s decision in HMRC v Medpro & Ors [2026] EWCA Civ 14 (‘Medpro CoA’) shortly.

Lands Luo

[82]In Lands Luo Limited v HMRC [2025] UKFTT 01207 (TC)(‘Lands Luo’)(Dingemans LJ, Judge Snelders and Member Shearer) (which is a decision of the FtT and concerned s 83G(4)(c) VATA), after careful analysis of both the Court of Appeal and Supreme Court judgments in BPP, the FtT concluded that the correct approach is that set out in Martland. The FtT noted that in doing so, they were relying on higher authority than Martland or Medpro UT.The FtT concluded that the approach in Martland is consistent with the approach of the Court of Appeal in BPP CoA; which was affirmed by the Supreme Court in BPP SC.

Medpro CoA

[83]In Medpro CoA, Lewison LJ (with whom Whipple and Miles LJJ agreed) said this, at [44] and [45]:
“44. I also consider that Marcus Smith J’s characterisation of the Martland guidance (as interpreted in Katib) as amounting to a fetter on discretion is overblown. The three- stage test described in Martland plainly requires the FTT to consider all the circumstances of the case. That expressly recognises that there is a judicial discretion to be exercised. 45. In my judgment, therefore, Marcus Smith J was wrong, and Judge Cannan was right…First, guidance is just that: guidance. Where a superior court or tribunal gives guidance to an inferior court or tribunal, the inferior court or tribunal may depart from it if it gives sound reasons for doing so. That is reflected in Lady Rose’s reference to the absence of special circumstances. Second, as Lady Rose made clear, it is appropriate for an appellate court to lay down guidance even where a discretion appears to be unfettered. Third, in BPP the Supreme Court specifically approved the giving of guidance where non-compliance with time limits is in issue.”
[84]The Court of Appeal concluded thus, at [59]:
“…The Martland guidance (as amplified by Katib) is appropriate.”
[85]The Supreme Court therefore affirmed the Court of Appeal’s decision.[86]With those principles in mind, and applying the Martland three-stage test as amplified in Katib and Medpro, I turn to the circumstances of this application.

The length of the delay

[87]The length of the delay is to be considered by reference to the time-limit for submitting an appeal. This was confirmed in Romasave, at [96]. There, the UT held that:
“In the context of an appeal right which must be exercised within 30 days from the date of the document notifying the decision, a delay of more than three months cannot be described as anything but serious and significant.”
[88]The Misdeclaration Penalties were issued on 3 August 2017. The letter is set out in the following terms:
“NOTICE OFASSESSMENT OF MIS DECLARATION PENALTY … As the Value Added Tax return for this period contained an inaccuracy that resulted in an overstatement of your entitlement to a repayment, the Commissioners for HM Revenue and Customs, using their statutory powers under Section 63 of the VAT Act 1994, have made an assessment of misdeclaration penalty: … If you disagree with our decision. you need to write to us within 30 days of the date of this notice, telling us why you think our decision was wrong and we will look at it again. If you prefer, we will arrange for a review by a person-not previously involved in the matter. You will then have the right to appeal to an independent tribunal. Alternatively you can appeal direct to the tribunal within 30 days of this notice.”

[Emphasis added]

[89]The Notice of Appeal in these proceedings is dated 3 January 2025. The delay in making an appeal in the circumstances of this application is eight years from the date of issue of the Misdeclaration Penalties in 2017. Even if I were to accept the Appellant’s argument that the December 2022 letter was the relevant date for the purposes of calculation of time, the delay in appealing would still be three years. Materially, Mr Fox accepted that the Appellant’s appeal was, indeed, late (on any interpretation of the relevant decision in this application). This matter is not in issue between the parties.[90]In respect of the first stage therefore, there can, in my view, be no argument but that the delay in making an appeal was serious and significant. In Secretary of State for the Home Department v SS (Congo) & Ors [2015] EWCA Civ 387, the Court of Appeal, at [105], has described exceeding a time-limit of 28 days for applying to that court for permission to appeal by 24 days as significant and a delay of more than three months as serious.

The reasons why the default occurred

[91]The grounds advanced for the late filing of the Notice of Appeal are as follows (at Section 5.1 of the Notice of Appeal):
“Given the extensive history of litigation and disputes as to tax owed there has been a very large volume of documentation generated over the course of many years which has had to be considered by the taxpayers professional advisors. The Appeal is being lodged against a background of a considerable degree of pressure being exerted by HMRC via County Court proceedings [Claim no. 9WD03777] and we reserve the right to amend and/or add to these Grounds of Appeal as the taxpayer has not been able (in spite of the considerable volume of documentation in his possession) to provide us with a complete set of records.”
[92]The Notice of Appeal refers to the “extensive history of litigation and disputes as to tax”. I have already set out the relevant procedural history in this application above. The Appellant has been represented and he has referred to his representatives in the Notice of Appeal which is the subject of this application. Materially, the Appellant had previously appealed. He is, therefore, aware of the need to make an appeal.[93]Whilst Mr Fox does not dispute that the penalty notice was received, he submits that the Misdeclaration Penalties were revised by HMRC in the December 2022 letter, and that this is the date that any delay should be calculated from. This point is, therefore, advanced as a reason for the default. I find that Mr Fox’s arguments, in this respect, are misconceived. This is because following the issuing of the Misdeclaration Penalties in 2017, the Appellant submitted a Notice of Appeal and HMRC did not object to the late appeal on that occasion. The Appellant subsequently withdrew his appeal against the very same penalties which are the subject of this application. I will return to consider the December 2022 letter later.[94]The Appellant withdrew his appeal against the only penalties that have ever been issued by HMRC in respect of the periods 03/06 and 06/06. The Procedure Rules clearly provide that: “Withdrawal 17. —(1) Subject to any provision in an enactment relating to withdrawal or settlement of particular proceedings, a party may give notice to the Tribunal of the withdrawal of the case made by it in the Tribunal proceedings, or any part of that case—(a) by sending or delivering to the Tribunal a written notice of withdrawal; or(b) orally at a hearing. (2) The Tribunal must notify each party in writing of its receipt of a withdrawal under this rule. (3) A party who has withdrawn their case may apply to the Tribunal for the case to be reinstated.” (a) by sending or delivering to the Tribunal a written notice of withdrawal; or (b) orally at a hearing.[95]The proceedings were, therefore, no longer regarded by the Tribunal as pending. The effect of the Tribunal’s letter, dated 19 September 2023, seeking confirmation of the withdrawal within 14 days (failing which withdrawal would be assumed) is that the FtT would view the withdrawal as taking formal effect on 3 October 2023. Pursuant to rule 17(4) of the Procedure Rules, the Appellant had 28 days within which to apply to reinstate the appeal. There has been no application to reinstate the appeal. Even if the Tribunal were to treat the Notice of Appeal dated 2 January 2025 as the application to reinstate the appeal, the delay is still more than one year over the time-limit specified in the Procedure Rules.[96]Returning to the December 2022 letter, whilst the Appellant suggests that time to appeal started from the date of the December 2022 letter, the Appellant has failed to consider the statutory requirements giving rise to an appeal. An appeal only lies against an appealable decision. Pursuant to s 83(1) VATA, an appeal shall lie to the tribunal in respect of:(1) Any liability to a penalty by virtue of s 63 (s 83(1)(n); and(2) The amount of any penalty specified in an assessment under s 76 (s 83(1)(q) (which by virtue of s 76(1)(b) includes penalties under s 63.[97]There is no suggestion that the December 2022 letter was an appealable decision. The December 2022 letter did not seek to charge a new penalty for the 03/06 and 06/06 periods. The letter simply reduced the amount for the 06/06 period. The Appellant had already been notified that he was liable to a penalty on 3 August 2017, and he appealed against that decision, before withdrawing his appeal. The reason for the reduction in the amount of the penalty was explained in the December 2022 letter. That was the only purpose of the letter and the letter did not purport to charge a new penalty. If the Appellant had continued with his appeal (as opposed to withdrawing it), the variation of the amounts would have meant that the FtT would be in a position to exercise its power to vary the penalty when issuing its decision.[98]The Appellant does not suggest that he was wrongly advised, or that his representatives were incompetent. In any event, the authorities show that the duty remains on the Appellant to ensure that his tax obligations are adhered to.[99]I hold that the Appellant has not provided a good reason for the failure to make a timely appeal.

Evaluating all of the circumstances

[100]I turn to the third stage in the process; that of having regard to all the circumstances and the respective prejudice to the Appellant, and to HMRC. The UT in Martland made clear, as is apparent from the authorities, that the balancing exercise at this stage should take into account the particular importance of the need for litigation to be conducted efficiently and at a proportionate cost, and for statutory time limits to be respected. The case of Global Torch Ltd v Apex Global Management Ltd & Ors (No 2) [2014] 1 WLR 4495, at [29], referred to the merits of the underlying case generally being irrelevant. As Moore-Bick LJ said in Hysaj, at [46], only where the court (or tribunal) can see without much investigation that the grounds of appeal are either very strong or very weak that the merits will have any significant part to play when it comes to balancing the various factors at stage-three of the process. That should not involve any detailed analysis of the underlying merits.[101]Whilst HMRC’s principal submission is that the Appellant has failed to provide a good reason for the delay in making an appeal, HMRC have further raised issue estoppel as being a relevant consideration to ‘Stage 3’ of Martland. This is because the Appellant’s Grounds of Appeal have developed and have incorporated arguments that were raised during the Kittel appeal. HMRC are not, however, making these submissions in the context of a strike out application. As already considered, the Appellant’s appeal against the Kittel denial was struck out and has never been reinstated. The time-limit for applying for an appeal which has been struck out to be reinstated is 28 days. The Misdeclaration Penalties are tied to this decision, and an appeal against the Misdeclaration Penalties has (as mentioned earlier) been withdrawn by the Appellant in the past.[102]The courts and tribunals have consistently emphasised the public interest in the finality of litigation, and the purpose of a time-limit being to bring finality: see, for example, Advocate General for Scotland v General Commissioners for Aberdeen City [2006] STC 1218 and Data Select. It is important that time limits are observed, and so leave to appeal out of time should therefore only be exceptionally granted. HMRC, and therefore the public in general, have the right to finality in tax affairs. Where a taxpayer does not observe the time limits, that should ordinarily be the end of any dispute over liability. As the UT in Romasave, held, at [96]:
“permission to appeal out of time should only be granted exceptionally, meaning that it should be the exception rather than the rule and not granted routinely.”
[103]This was also so in Martland, at [34]:
“… the purpose of the time limit is to bring finality, and that is a matter of public interest, both from the point of view of the taxpayer in question and that of the wider body of taxpayers.”
[104]In Katib, the UT concluded that the hardship that is likely to be suffered was not sufficient to displace the responsibility on the appellant to adhere to time limits.[105]Having considered all of the evidence, I am satisfied that the balance between the prejudice to the Appellant, the prejudice to HMRC and the administration of justice through the finality of litigation falls firmly on the side of an extension of time being refused. I have balanced the competing interests and the arguments presented by the parties.[106]Accordingly, therefore, the application to make a late appeal is REFUSED.

Right to apply for permission to appeal

[107]This document contains full findings of fact and reasons for the decision. Any party dissatisfied with this decision has a right to apply for permission to appeal against it pursuant to Rule 39 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Tax Chamber) Rules 2009. The application must be received by this Tribunal not later than 56 days after this decision is sent to that party. The parties are referred to “Guidance to accompany a Decision from the First-tier Tribunal (Tax Chamber)” which accompanies and forms part of this decision notice. Release date: 01 July 2026