Liam Henry v The Commissioners for HMRC [2026] UKFTT 921 (TC)

[2026] UKFTT 00921 (TC)Case No TC 09925
FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL
TAX CHAMBER
Hearing Heard on: 8 June 2026Date Judgment date: 18 June 2026
By remote video hearing
Appeal reference: TC/2024/03212
Stamp duty land tax ––multiple dwellings relief ––appeal dismissed
Before
TRIBUNAL JUDGE STAPENHURSTMR LESLIE BROWN
Between
LIAM HENRYAppellantTHE COMMISSIONERS FOR HIS MAJESTY’S REVENUE AND CUSTOMSRespondentMr Meetan Nathwani of Hillier Hopkins LLP (although the Appellant made the vast majority of the submissions). for AppellantMs Fiona Man, litigator of HM Revenue and Customs’ Solicitor’s Office for RespondentsDECISION

Introduction

[1]This appeal concerns the availability of multiple dwellings relief (“MDR”) for Stamp Duty Land Tax (“SDLT”) purposes on the purchase of a property at The Drive, Rickmansworth (the “Property”)[2]On 20 January 2025, this Tribunal (Judge Greenbank) gave permission for the Appellant to notify his appeal outside of the statutory time limit.[3]We have been provided with a hearing bundle of 482 pages. In addition, we have a skeleton argument from HMRC, a skeleton argument from the Appellant and two witness statements that the Appellant sought permission to admit on 3 June 2026.[4]We considered the application to admit the two witness statements and decided to grant it on the basis that they repeated, with the addition of a statement of truth, what was already contained in the documentary evidence in the bundle.[5]Mr Liam Henry, the Appellant, gave oral evidence at the hearing.

background

[6]On 10 July 2020, the Appellant, Mr Liam Henry, and his partner, Mrs Trisha Henry (together, “the Purchasers”), acquired the freehold interest in the Property for £1,175,000. That date was the effective date of the transaction for the purposes of the Finance Act 2003 (“FA 2003”).[7]On 11 July 2020, the Purchasers filed a land transaction return. In that return they claimed MDR using relief code 33, applied the rates set out in Table A in section 55 of the FA 2003, and paid SDLT in the sum of £44,000.[8]On 17 March 2021, HM Revenue and Customs (“HMRC”), by Officer Luu, opened an enquiry into the return pursuant to paragraph 12 of Schedule 10 to the Finance Act 2003. The notice of enquiry was issued within the statutory time limit to both the Purchasers and their agent, Hillier Hopkins LLP.[9]On 20 July 2022, HMRC, by Officer Foster, issued closure notices under paragraph 23 of Schedule 10 to the FA 2003. Copies of the closure notices were sent to the Purchasers and their agent.[10]In those closure notices, HMRC concluded that the Property comprised a single dwelling at the effective date of the transaction, with the consequence that MDR was not available.[11]On 17 October 2022, the Purchasers, through their agent, appealed against the closure notices.[12]On 25 January 2023, HMRC issued its View of the Matter, maintaining its position that the Property consisted of one dwelling at the effective date.[13]On 23 February 2023, the Purchasers requested a statutory review of HMRC’s decision.[14]On 5 April 2023, HMRC issued the conclusions of that review, upholding the closure notices on the basis that the Property comprised a single dwelling at completion.[15]On 22 May 2024, the Appellant notified his appeal to the Tribunal.[16]By a decision dated 20 January 2025, Judge Greenbank granted permission for the late notification of the appeal.

relevant legislation

[17]The legislative framework for SDLT is largely contained in FA 2003. Unless otherwise stated, references to sections and schedules are to FA 2003.[18]SDLT is a tax on ‘chargeable transactions’, that is ‘land transactions’ being the acquisition of a ‘chargeable interest’ which is not exempt (ss. 42(1), 43(1), 48(1) and s. 49(1)).[19]Except as otherwise provided, the effective date of a land transaction for SDLT purposes is the date of completion (s. 119).[20]Section 55 provides for the applicable rates of SDLT, in accordance with the land transaction in question, by reference to factors such as residential or non-residential, whether as a transaction in a number of linked transactions, or any relevant relief is due.[21]Schedule 6B provides for MDR – reducing the SDLT payable on chargeable transactions if the main subject-matter consists of an interest in at least two dwellings. Paragraph 2 of Schedule 6B provides so far as relevant: 2(1) This Schedule applies to a chargeable transaction that is–(a) within sub-paragraph (2) or sub-paragraph (3), and(b) not excluded by sub-paragraph (4). 2(2) A transaction is within this sub-paragraph if its main subject-matter consists of– (a) an interest in at least two dwellings, or (b) an interest in at least two dwellings and other property.[22]Paragraph 4 of Schedule 6B provides for the calculation of the relief. There is no dispute between the parties in terms of the quantification of the relief.[23]Paragraph 7 of Schedule 6B defines what amounts to a dwelling for the purposes of schedule 6B: (2) A building or part of a building counts as a dwelling, if- (a)It is used or suitable for use as a single dwelling, or (b)It is in the process of being constructed or adapted for such use.[24]Section 83 provides HMRC with the power in relation to the formal requirements as to assessments, penalty determinations etc, with further provisions in this respect being contained in Schedule 10. Paragraph 12 in relation to the 'Notice of enquiry' provides, inter alia, for the time limit for opening an enquiry being nine months of the 'relevant date' of:(a) the filing date,(b) the date of return being delivered if after the filing date, or(c) the date amendment made to a filed return. Paragraph 23 provides for the completion of enquiry by the issue of a closure notice.

Case law

[25]The leading authority on the application of MDR is Fiander and Brower v HMRC [2021] UKUT 0156 ("Fiander") in which the Upper Tribunal at [47- 48] said as follows: "47. The HMRC internal manuals on SDLT contain various statements relating to the meaning of "dwelling" and "suitable for use as a single dwelling", but these merely record HMRC's views and do not inform the proper construction of the statute. 48. We must therefore interpret the phrase giving the language used its normal meaning and taking into account its context. Adopting that approach, we make the following observations as to the meaning of "suitable for use as a single dwelling":(1) The word " suitable " implies that the property must be appropriate or fit for use as a single dwelling. It is not enough if it is capable of being made appropriate or fit for such use by adaptations or alterations. That conclusion follows in our view from the natural meaning of the word "suitable", but also finds contextual support in two respects. First, paragraph 7(2)(b) provides that a dwelling is also a single dwelling if "it is in the process of being constructed or adapted" for use as single dwelling. So, the draftsman has contemplated a situation where a property requires change, and has extended the definition (only) to a situation where the process of such construction or adaption has already begun. This strongly implies that a property is not suitable for use within paragraph 7(2)(a) if it merely has the capacity or potential with adaptations to achieve that status. Second, SDLT being a tax on chargeable transactions, the status of a property must be ascertained at the effective date of the transaction, defined in most cases (by section 119 FA 2003 ) as completion. So, the question of whether the property is suitable for use as a single dwelling falls to be determined by the physical attributes of the property as they exist at the effective date, not as they might or could be. A caveat to the preceding analysis is that a property may be in a state of disrepair and nevertheless be suitable for use as either a dwelling or a single dwelling if it requires some repair or renovation; that is a question of degree for assessment by the FTT.(2) The word " dwelling " describes a place suitable for residential accommodation which can provide the occupant with facilities for basic domestic living needs. Those basic needs include the need to sleep and to attend to personal and hygiene needs. The question of the extent to which they necessarily include the need to prepare food should be dealt with in an appeal where that issue is material.(3) The word " single " emphasises that the dwelling must comprise a separate self-contained living unit.(4) The test is objective. The motives or intentions of particular buyers or occupants of the property are not relevant.(5) Suitability for use as a single dwelling is to be assessed by reference to suitability for occupants generally. It is not sufficient if the property would satisfy the test only for a particular type of occupant such as a relative or squatter.(6) The test is not "one size fits all": a development of flats in a city centre may raise different issues to an annex of a country property. What matters is that the occupant's basic living needs must be capable of being satisfied with a degree of privacy, self-sufficiency and security consistent with the concept of a single dwelling. How that is achieved in terms of bricks and mortar may vary.(7) The question of whether or not a property satisfies the above criteria is a multi-factorial assessment, which should take into account all the facts and circumstances. Relevant facts and circumstances will obviously include the physical attributes of and access to the property, but there is no exhaustive list which can be reliably laid out of relevant factors. Ultimately, the assessment must be made by the FTT as the fact-finding tribunal, applying the principles set out above".[26]Consideration must be given as to how many dwellings an objective observer would consider there to be and ‘objective observer’ was defined at [51] of this Tribunal’s decision in Fiander: “51. We approach “suitability for use” as an objective determination to be made on the basis of the physical attributes of the property at the relevant time. Suitability for a given use is to be adjudged from the perspective of a reasonable person observing the physical attributes of the property at the time of the transaction”.[27]This summary of the test was endorsed by the Upper Tribunal in Fiander: “62. We agree with the FTT’s statement at [51] of its decision that suitability for use as single dwelling is an objective determination to be made on the basis of the physical attributes of the property at the relevant time, namely completion. It therefore follows that the property’s past history - which is the subject-matter of the additional evidence - is of limited relevance to suitability for use as at completion”

the issues in this appeal

[28]The issue that we need to determine is whether the Property was one or two dwellings for SDLT purposes, at the time of completion, within the meaning of paragraph 7(2)(a) Schedule 6B of FA 2003.

Evidence and submissions

[29]We have structured this section of the decision as follows:(1) The parties’ submissions on living facilities and layout(2) The parties’ submissions on privacy and security(3) The parties’ submissions on historic use(4) The parties’ submissions on utilities and services(5) The cross examination of the Appellant[30]We have structured this section of the decision in this way as it allows us to assess and give weight to the multiple factors identified in multifactorial test set out in Fiander.

Living facilities and layout

[31]The floor plan contained within the marketing materials for the Property ( the “Marketing Floorplan”) differs materially from the floor plan prepared by the Appellant and submitted to HMRC by their agent (the “Appellant Floorplan”). Whilst both purport to represent the layout of the Property at or around the relevant time, they present inconsistent depictions of the arrangement of rooms, the existence and positioning of facilities, and the overall configuration of the space.[32]In particular, the Marketing Floorplan depicts a layout focused on conventional residential use, whereas the Appellant Floorplan reconfigures the same areas so as to suggest the presence of additional living accommodation and facilities associated with the purported subsidiary dwelling. These differences are not superficial, but instead relate to fundamental aspects of the Property’s composition, including the identification of rooms, the presence of a bathroom, the presence of an additional kitchen, and points of access.[33]The Marketing Floorplan and the Appellant Floorplan are appended to this decision.[34]The Marketing Floorplan aligns with the floor plans subsequently prepared by JPB Architects (“JPB”), a contractor engaged by the Purchasers.[35]JPB were instructed in connection with a planning application submitted on 10 August 2020, approximately one month after the completion date, seeking permission to demolish the Property and construct a replacement dwelling with accommodation in the roof space and a basement.

Appellant’s submissions

[36]Mr Henry’s principal submission was that at the relevant date, the Property layout was as per the Appellant Floorplan.[37]Mr Henry submitted two pieces of documentary evidence in support of his case that the Property was properly depicted by the Appellant Floorplan at the relevant date:(1) JPB were instructed to submit the planning permission application during the Coronavirus pandemic. As such they never attended the Property in person and simply worked off the Marketing Floorplan as the internal configuration of the property was irrelevant to the proposed plans.(2) The builder, Michael Corridan, director of Zone Recovery Global Limited (“Zone Recovery”), who demolished the Property confirmed, in writing, that the layout of the Property they demolished matched the Appellant Floorplan.[38]JPB sent a letter dated 31 July 2025 stating that:
“In relation to the accuracy of the existing layouts they should not be relied upon to reflect an accurate representation of the internal layouts, we did not visit the property due to the Covid restrictions. In any event an accurate representation of the layouts was not critical in respect of a planning application for the demolition of the existing building.”
[39]Michael Corridan sent a letter dated 8 August 2025, on headed notepaper – ZR Global – stating that:
“Re: [the Property] Further to our recent conversation, I can confirm that the attached floor plan for the building at [the Property] is the same footprint of the building that was demolished”
The document appended to this letter is the Appellant Floorplan.[40]Mr Henry did not provide a formal witness statement but gave oral evidence at the hearing. He also applied to submit witness statements from Mr Broderick, Director of JPB, and Mr Corridan, director of Zone Recovery, each containing a statement of truth. Although these statements were submitted only two clear working days before the hearing, we admitted them as they largely repeated documentary evidence already contained in the bundle. Neither witness attended for cross-examination.[41]Mr Henry accepted that the witnesses were not available for cross-examination and that the documents had been produced several years after the transaction. However, he submitted that both came from reputable third parties and that what mattered was the substance of their evidence, namely that neither suggested the Appellant Floorplan was inaccurate. He also submitted that HMRC’s focus on the Appellant’s requests to those third parties was not material; what mattered was the content of the responses received.[42]Mr Henry submitted that the Marketing Floorplan depicted the Property as a single dwelling because the estate agents were seeking to market the Property in the most commercially attractive manner. He argued that estate agents’ plans are produced for marketing purposes rather than to record the precise condition of the Property at completion.He rejected HMRC’s suggestion that the Property would have been more attractive if marketed as containing additional living accommodation, submitting that, in the relevant area, split living arrangements would not have appealed to prospective purchasers.[43]Mr Henry referred in particular to Ladson Preston Ltd and AKA Developments Greenview Ltd v HMRC [2022] UKUT 0031 (TCC), submitting that the relevant question was the state of the Property at the effective date of the transaction, and that the Appellant had provided factual evidence addressing that issue. Mr Henry submitted that the Tribunal should prefer the Appellant’s evidence as to the layout of the Property at the effective date. He argued that no evidence had been produced establishing that the Marketing Floorplan accurately reflected the condition of the Property at that date and submitted that the Marketing Floorplan had in any event been prepared prior to the effective date of the transaction.[44]Mr Henry submitted that the Appellant Floorplan showed two separate dwellings, each containing the facilities necessary for independent residential occupation, including facilities for sleeping, cooking, and bathing. He also relied on photographic evidence showing a bathroom, kitchen facilities, and lockable interconnecting doors between the two parts of the Property.[45]Mr Henry further submitted that the architects’ plans relied upon by HMRC were of limited weight because JPB had confirmed that they had not inspected the Property internally and had instead copied the estate agents’ plans during the coronavirus pandemic. He submitted that the architects were concerned only with the external footprint of the Property because demolition and redevelopment were intended from the outset.[46]By way of conclusion, Mr Henry submitted that HMRC’s case relied primarily on marketing materials and plans derived from them, despite those materials expressly stating that they should not be relied upon. By contrast, the Appellant had produced photographic evidence, third-party evidence, and formal witness statements supporting the Appellant Floorplan.[47]Mr Nathwani adopted and supplemented Mr Henry’s submissions both in opening and in reply. He referred to the disclaimers contained within the Marketing Floorplan indicating that the plans should not be relied upon.[48]Mr Nathwani further submitted that the Appellant had been aware of the requirements for MDR at the effective date and had therefore sought to preserve the best available evidence, including contemporaneous photographs taken by Mr Henry at or around completion to record the layout of the Property at the relevant time.[49]Mr Nathwani accepted that the present case may only just satisfy the relevant tests identified in Fiander. Nevertheless, he submitted that the Property was capable of functioning as two separate dwellings at the effective date of the transaction and invited the Tribunal to uphold the appeal.

HMRC’s submissions

[50]HMRC submitted that the Marketing Floorplan accurately portrays the layout of the Property at the relevant date. Ms Mann submitted that, although the Marketing Floorplan contained a disclaimer stating that it was for illustrative purposes only, HMRC’s position was that the plans nonetheless broadly reflected the layout of the Property, including the approximate location of rooms, doors, windows, and facilities.[51]HMRC submitted that both the Marketing Floorplan and the plans produced by JPB depicted the Property as a single dwelling and did not support the Appellant’s contention that, at completion, the Property comprised two separate self-contained units capable of independent occupation. HMRC further submitted that the photographs relied upon by the Appellant did not establish that the Property was configured in accordance with the Appellant Floorplan at the effective date of the transaction.[52]HMRC relied on the planning application documents prepared shortly after completion. In particular, the Design and Access Statement described the proposal as a “one for one replacement dwelling”. Ms Mann submitted that, if the Property had comprised two dwellings at the relevant date, the planning documents would have referred either to two existing dwellings or to an annexe. The planning assessment similarly referred to the existing property as a detached house and described it as containing four bedrooms, which aligned with the Marketing Floorplan rather than the Appellant Floorplan. Further references throughout the planning documents referred consistently to a single replacement house rather than multiple dwellings.[53]In relation to the witness evidence, Ms Mann submitted that limited weight should be attached to the statements provided by JPB and the demolition contractor. She noted that the Appellant had not disclosed the communications or instructions sent to those witnesses and therefore the Tribunal could not assess what information, assumptions, or proposed layouts had been put to them before their statements were provided. Further, neither witness attended the hearing for cross-examination, depriving the Tribunal of the opportunity to test the reliability and basis of their evidence. Ms Mann also emphasised that the demolition had occurred several years earlier and that there was no contemporaneous documentation demonstrating whether the witnesses were relying on independent records, personal recollection, or documents supplied subsequently by the Appellant.[54]HMRC’s principal submission is that the Marketing Floorplan is to be preferred over the Appellant Floorplan and therefore that the Tribunal should conclude that the Property comprised a single dwelling at the relevant time and that the purported subsidiary dwelling was not suitable for use as a separate dwelling at completion.

Privacy and Security

[55]In Fiander UT, the Tribunal emphasised the importance of a property facilitating a “separate and independent life” and noted that such separation necessarily entails a degree of privacy and security consistent with that expected of a single dwelling. At [106], the Tribunal stated:
“In the context of SDLT, a person buying a property would want and expect that property to contain all the facilities for them to live a separate and independent life, … and they would expect to be able to prevent others from entering their property.”
[56]The Appellant Floorplan illustrates that the subsidiary property had two external access points: one at the front of the Property, through what appears to be a tilt-up garage door located within the reception room (which is not depicted as an external entrance Marketing Floorplan), and a second door providing access to the rear garden from the subsidiary dwelling kitchen/living area.

Appellant’s submissions

[57]Mr Henry submitted that, at the time of completion, there were two interconnecting doors on the ground floor, and that these doors—providing access from the hallway to the subsidiary dwelling kitchen and bedroom—were lockable.[58]Four photographs have been provided, each showing a latch secured by a padlock. HMRC do not accept this evidence and state that the Appellant has failed to demonstrate that the interconnecting doors provided the requisite degree of security and separation at the time of completion.[59]Mr Henry also addressed HMRC’s submissions regarding the reception room and garage area, maintaining that the garage door was lockable and that there was a further lockable door separating the reception room from the remainder of the subsidiary accommodation. He submitted that, even if the reception room itself did not independently satisfy the basic living requirements test because of the nature of the garage-style access, this was not fatal to his case because the remaining accommodation did so.

HMRC’s submissions

[60]HMRC submitted that the Property as per the Appellant Floorplan – whereby a wall of a reception room (the garage door) is effectively used as a point of access—would not be acceptable to occupants generally, as it undermines both the privacy and the functionality expected of a self-contained dwelling.[61]HMRC further submit that the use of a garage door in this manner raises concerns as to the security and structural integrity of the purported unit. The type of garage door shown in the Marketing Floorplan appears unsuited for use as part of a habitable reception room, being typically lightweight, lacking insulation, and not intended to provide the level of security expected in residential accommodation. Even if not used as an access point, its presence would be inadequate for a self-contained dwelling.[62]HMRC also submit that the subsidiary dwelling’s external access via the rear garden infringes upon the privacy and security of both occupants. The Appellant Floorplan indicates that access is provided directly from the kitchen/living area. The marketing materials suggest that this door is a predominantly glazed uPVC door, offering limited privacy.[63]Moreover, the presence of this shared access arrangement would prevent the main house occupants from enjoying exclusive use of the garden, which would be inconsistent with the expectations of occupiers of a property of this nature and value.[64]HMRC submit that, for an interconnecting door to support a finding of genuine separation, it would need to be securely lockable from both sides and incapable of being opened from the opposite side without a key. In the absence of such a mechanism, the privacy and security of both occupiers would be significantly compromised. This is particularly so where the doors do not appear to be fitted with key-operated locks.[65]HMRC further contend that there is no evidence that the interconnecting doors possessed features typically associated with separation between self-contained dwellings, such as soundproofing or fire resistance. The absence of such features further undermines the Appellant’s case.[66]Accordingly, HMRC conclude that the subsidiary dwelling was not suitable for use as a separate dwelling. In any event, even if it were capable of some degree of independent occupation, HMRC submit that it would only be suitable for occupation by family members or close associates of the main house occupants, and therefore does not meet the criteria for a separate, self-contained dwelling.

Historic use

[67]The Appellant asserts that a carer resided in the subsidiary dwelling at the time of the sale. Mr Henry explained that the seller was elderly and experiencing health difficulties, and that the Property had been divided to facilitate care arrangements.[68]HMRC submits that no supporting evidence has been provided to substantiate this claim. Utilities and Services Appellant’s submissions

Utilities and Services

[69]Mr Henry advanced no evidence regarding separation of utilities and services between the main house and the subsidiary dwelling. He submitted in writing that the absence of a separate postal address or council tax banding should not detract from the suitability of the subsidiary dwelling as a separate dwelling.[70]Mr Henry explained that he did not keep any evidence, or take any photographs relating to utilities and services as this was not a particularly important part of the multifactorial test according to the case law and he had sufficient evidence in his Appellant Floorplan and photographs of the layout.

HMRC’s submissions

[71]HMRC submit that the burden of proof rests with the Appellant to demonstrate that the Property comprised two separate dwellings at the time of completion. HMRC acknowledge that utility arrangements are unlikely to be determinative in isolation; however, they form part of the broader multifactorial assessment of whether a property is suitable for use as separate dwellings.[72]In the absence of evidence to the contrary, HMRC submit that, on the balance of probabilities, there was a single boiler serving the entire Property. This is supported by the marketing materials, which refer to a single airing cupboard, indicating a shared heating and hot water system. HMRC contend that such an arrangement is indicative of a single dwelling, as it suggests there was no provision for separate occupants to independently control heating or hot water within distinct parts of the Property.[73]HMRC submit that such factors are relevant indicators of independence. Financial and practical entanglement between occupants in respect of utilities and outgoings (including council tax, gas, electricity, and water) would generally be undesirable between unrelated occupiers.[74]HMRC therefore submit that the absence of evidence of separate services, combined with the apparent sharing of utilities and outgoings, supports the conclusion that the subsidiary dwelling was not a separate dwelling at the time of completion.

Cross examination of Mr Henry

[75]Mr Henry did not provide a formal witness statement but gave oral evidence at the hearing.[76]Ms Mann’s cross-examination of Mr Henry focused on challenging the reliability of the Appellant’s evidence concerning the alleged subsidiary dwelling and contrasting it with the estate agents’ marketing materials.[77]Mr Henry accepted that the Property had been marketed as “an impressive four bed detached house” and that the floorplan matched that description. He also accepted that there was no reference to an annexe in the marketing particulars.[78]Ms Mann questioned Mr Henry about the photographs he had taken of the alleged subsidiary dwelling, including the kitchen, bathroom and interconnecting doors. Mr Henry confirmed that he had taken the photographs, although he accepted that at least one bathroom photograph was taken after completion. Ms Mann put to him that there was therefore no direct contemporaneous evidence establishing that the kitchen and bathroom facilities existed at the effective date of the transaction. Mr Henry responded that he did not understand what further evidence he could realistically have provided.[79]Ms Mann also questioned Mr Henry about the accuracy of the Appellant Floorplan. He accepted that some features shown, including the kitchen fittings, appeared to be in approximately the correct locations, although he could not recall all details such as the direction in which doors opened.[80]Ms Mann challenged the Appellant’s criticism of the estate agents’ plans, noting that neither Mr Henry nor his agent had any involvement in producing them and therefore could not explain any alleged inaccuracies. She suggested that the overall layout and walls shown on both sets of plans were substantially similar. She also challenged the suggestion that estate agents had simply omitted key facilities such as kitchens or bathrooms from their plans.[81]Finally, Ms Mann established that Mr Henry was aware of the MDR requirements at the time of purchase, and suggested that he had failed to take photographs of matters such as the utilities, despite this being relevant to the MDR claim. Mr Henry explained that he had taken photographs of the features identified in the case law as being most relevant to establishing a separate dwelling.

discussion

[82]The burden rests on the Appellant to establish, on the balance of probabilities, that the Property comprised at least two dwellings at the effective date of the transaction and that MDR was therefore available. The relevant question is whether, on the evidence, the Tribunal is satisfied that the Property was physically configured as at least two dwellings at completion.[83]In applying the test in paragraph 7(2)(a) of Schedule 6B, we adopt the approach set out in Fiander. The assessment is objective, fact-sensitive, and directed to the physical attributes of the Property as they existed at the effective date. The Tribunal must therefore determine, from the perspective of a reasonable observer and having regard to all the evidence, whether the Property was suitable for use as at least two separate dwellings at that time.[84]In the present case, the central difficulty for the Appellant is evidential. The Property has since been demolished and there is a substantial dispute between the parties as to its configuration at the effective date. Accordingly, before applying the multi-factorial assessment in Fiander, we must first determine whether the Appellant has established, on the balance of probabilities, that the Property physically existed in the manner depicted in the Appellant Floorplan rather than the Marketing Floorplan.[85]The Appellant submits that the Appellant Floorplan depicted the actual layout of the Property at the relevant date. The Appellant relies on:(1) The witness statement of Mr Roderick, director of JPB, exhibiting the letter dated 31 July 2025, in which JPB stated that the drawings produced for the post-completion planning application should not be relied upon as accurately reflecting the internal layout of the Property.(2) The witness statement of Mr Corridan, director of Zone Global, exhibiting the letter dated 10 November 2025, in which he stated that the Property he demolished corresponded with the Appellant Floorplan.[86]HMRC has submitted that as neither witness was present to be cross examined, the Tribunal should give limited weight to this evidence.[87]The evidence provided by Mr Roderick neither confirms nor denies that the Property reflected the Marketing Floorplan, as he never visited the property. We accept that he did not attend the property. For this reason, we do not attribute significant weight to the use of the Marketing Floorplan in the planning permission application.[88]However, we give limited weight to the positive evidence of Mr Corridan that the property he demolished was as per the Appellant Floorplan. Mr Corridan did not attend the hearing and was therefore not available for cross-examination, such that we were unable to assess the reliability of his evidence. We also note that his evidence was provided at least four years after the demolition took place. Further, we were not provided with the correspondence or instructions that prompted his confirmation, nor any contemporaneous records demonstrating what plans were available to him before demolition or the state of the Property at that stage.[89]We note that the Appellant was unable to confirm whether the Property comprised one or two dwellings at the time the Marketing Floorplan was produced. The Appellant was also unable to recall certain specific features of the Property at the date of completion, including aspects of the internal layout and configuration.[90]We place weight on the fact that the Appellant was aware prior to the demolition of the property that he was going to be making an MDR claim and that this would need to be evidenced. We note the following regarding the photographic evidence:(1) The photograph relied upon by the Appellant as evidence of the kitchen within the alleged subsidiary dwelling appears to be the same photograph used in the estate agents’ marketing materials to depict the main kitchen of the Property.(2) The photographs relied upon by the Appellant as evidence of a bathroom within the internal garage area did not establish where that bathroom was located within the Property. The photographs lacked sufficient context to show the bathroom’s relationship to the surrounding accommodation.(3) The photograph relied upon by the Appellant as evidence of a kitchen within the alleged main part of the Property showed only part of a kitchen and the edge of a window frame. The photograph did not establish where within the Property the kitchen was located. This could readily have been demonstrated, for example, by including in the photograph the view from the window said to overlook the driveway.(4) We accept that the photographs demonstrate the presence of lockable internal doors between parts of the Property. However, the photographs provide limited assistance as to the overall degree of separation, privacy, and security between the alleged dwellings.[91]Having considered the evidence in the round, we are not satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that the Appellant Floorplan accurately reflected the configuration of the Property at the effective date of the transaction. We therefore prefer the Marketing Floorplan as the more reliable evidence of the Property’s layout at the relevant time.[92]In assessing these matters, we do not treat any individual feature as determinative. Rather, the significance of each feature lies in the extent to which it supports or undermines the overall evidential picture of the Property’s configuration and suitability for independent occupation at the effective date. Considering the evidence cumulatively and applying the burden and standard of proof identified above, we are not satisfied that the Appellant has established, on the balance of probabilities, that the Property physically existed in the configuration depicted by the Appellant Floorplan at the effective date.[93]In reaching that conclusion,we place weight on the following matters:(1) The Appellant’s case depended heavily upon the proposition that substantial additional facilities existed within the Property at the relevant date, including an additional kitchen, an additional bathroom, and accommodation capable of constituting a separate dwelling. However, the documentary and photographic evidence produced in support of that proposition was limited and, in several respects, inconclusive.(2) The Appellant was aware, at the time of purchase and prior to demolition, that a claim for MDR would be advanced and that the physical layout of the Property would likely be central to any dispute. In circumstances where the Property was subsequently demolished, thereby permanently removing the opportunity for later inspection, the absence of fuller contemporaneous evidence materially reduces the weight we are able to attach to the Appellant’s account.(3) We attach limited weight to the evidence of Mr Corridan. Although he stated that the Property demolished by his company reflected the Appellant Floorplan, he did not attend the hearing and was therefore unavailable for cross-examination. Further, his evidence was provided several years after the relevant events, and no contemporaneous records or underlying instructions were produced to enable the Tribunal to assess the basis upon which that confirmation was given.(4) We also place weight on the limitations of the photographic evidence identified above. While the photographs demonstrated the existence of certain domestic features within the Property, they did not satisfactorily establish the location, configuration, or degree of separation of the alleged subsidiary accommodation within the Property as a whole.(5) We further note the absence of evidence as to when, or by what means, the Property was alleged to have been divided into two dwellings. Although the Appellant submitted that the arrangements had been implemented to facilitate care for the elderly owner, the alleged additional kitchen and bathroom appeared to us to be substantial and permanent installations rather than temporary or makeshift adaptations. There was no evidence before us explaining when or why these features had been installed, nor any evidence demonstrating that they formed part of a temporary caring arrangement.(6) We also take into account the nature and apparent quality of the alleged subsidiary accommodation. The Appellant’s case was that the Property contained substantial and permanent additional facilities, including a fully fitted kitchen and bathroom capable of supporting independent occupation. However, viewed objectively, we consider it difficult to reconcile the existence of accommodation of that character with the absence of a conventional independent entrance. The alleged subsidiary accommodation was instead said to be accessed principally through a garage-style entrance which, on the evidence before us, did not appear designed or constructed as a conventional residential access point. In particular, the access arrangements appeared more consistent with ancillary accommodation forming part of a single dwelling than with a genuinely separate self-contained unit intended for independent occupation.(7) While the Marketing Floorplan contained a standard disclaimer stating that it was for illustrative purposes only, we do not regard that disclaimer as demonstrating material inaccuracy. The Marketing Floorplan was consistent with the Property being marketed as a single four-bedroom detached dwelling and broadly aligned with the subsequent planning materials describing the Property as a single dwellinghouse.[94]Accordingly, we reject the Appellant’s primary factual contention that the Property was configured in accordance with the Appellant Floorplan at the relevant time[95]We accept Mr Henry’s submission that the layout of the Property and its capacity for use as two separate dwellings are the central and most significant considerations within the multi-factorial assessment. Therefore, in light of our finding of fact that the Property did not, on the balance of probabilities, reflect the Appellant Floorplan at the effective date of the transaction, it is unnecessary for us to undertake an exhaustive consideration of the remaining factors.[96]In any event, had we accepted that the Appellant Floorplan accurately reflected the layout of the Property at the effective date of the transaction, we would still have concluded, applying the multi-factorial assessment in Fiander, that the Property did not comprise two separate dwellings suitable for independent occupation. While the alleged subsidiary accommodation may have contained facilities for sleeping, bathing, and food preparation, the evidence before us suggested only a limited degree of physical and functional separation from the main dwelling. The access arrangements relied upon by the Appellant involved internal interconnecting doors, access through a garage-style entrance, and use of the rear garden connected to the main house. Viewed objectively from the perspective of a reasonable observer, those arrangements appeared more consistent with ancillary accommodation forming part of a single household than with a genuinely self-contained dwelling capable of supporting a separate and independent life with the degree of privacy, autonomy, and security expected by occupants generally.[97]We also note the absence of evidence of separate utilities, services, or other practical arrangements consistent with fully independent occupation. We accept that such matters are not individually determinative and that accommodation suitable for occupation by a relative or dependent family member may, in some circumstances, still constitute a separate dwelling. However, taking the evidence as a whole, we consider that the alleged subsidiary accommodation would have been more suitable for occupation by someone connected to the main household, rather than by an objective occupier seeking genuinely independent residential accommodation. Taking those matters together, we would have had substantial doubt that the alleged subsidiary accommodation satisfied the objective test in Fiander.

Decision

[98]Applying the multi-factorial test in Fiander, and taking into account all the features described above, we find that there was only one single dwelling at the Property at the effective date of the transaction.[99]We therefore find that the purchase of the Property does not fall within Schedule 6B FA 2003 as the main subject-matter consists of an interest in only one dwelling.[100]Accordingly, we dismiss the Appellant’s appeal.

Right to apply for permission to appeal

[101]This document contains full findings of fact and reasons for the decision. Any party dissatisfied with this decision has a right to apply for permission to appeal against it pursuant to Rule 39 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Tax Chamber) Rules 2009. The application must be received by this Tribunal not later than 56 days after this decision is sent to that party. The parties are referred to “Guidance to accompany a Decision from the First-tier Tribunal (Tax Chamber)” which accompanies and forms part of this decision notice. Release date: 18 June 2026 Appendix 1 Marketing Floorplan Appendix 2 Appellant Floorplan