Kammac Limited v The Commissioners for HMRC [2026] UKFTT 397 (TC)

[2026] UKFTT 00397 (TC)Case No TC 09819
FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL
TAX CHAMBER
Hearing Heard on: 23 February 2026Date Judgment date: 13 March 2026
By remote video hearing
Appeal reference: TC/2016/00675
PROCEDURE – disclosure – whether Tribunal should exercise discretion to order specific disclosure – Tribunal Rules – application refused.
Before
TRIBUNAL JUDGE ANNE SCOTT
Between
KAMMAC LIMITEDAppellant(formerly KAMMAC PLC)AppellantTHE COMMISSIONERS FOR HIS MAJESTY’S REVENUE AND CUSTOMSRespondentJames K Pickup, KC, instructed by Kennedys Law LLP for AppellantHoward Watkinson of Counsel, instructed by the General Counsel and Solicitor to HM Revenue and Customs for RespondentsDECISION

Introduction

[1]The substantive appeal in this matter is an appeal against three assessments to excise duty and a linked excise wrongdoing penalty notified to the appellant as an authorised warehouse keeper and occupier of three excise warehouses. It carried on the business of storing and repackaging alcohol and other goods such as food.[2]The authorisation was as a “general storage and distribution warehouse”.[3]The appeals are brought pursuant to section 16(1)(b) Finance Act 1994 and paragraph 17 Schedule 41 Finance Act 2008.[4]On 3 May 2024, the appellant applied for a Direction that the respondents (“HMRC”) “disclose all identified and particularised material relevant to the substantive issues in the Appeal being:-(1) whether an earlier duty point(s) occurred prior to the appellant’s holding of the assessed goods and, if so, the person(s) who caused that duty point(s) to occur. [This relates to Ground 1 of the appellant’s Amended Consolidated and Amended Grounds of Appeal (“the Grounds of Appeal”)];(2) whether as HMRC allege there has been a breach of Regulation 39 of the Excise Goods (Holding, Movement and Duty Point) Regulations 2010 (“HMDP Regs”). [This relates to Ground 2 of the appellant’s Grounds of Appeal]; and(3) whether as HMRC allege, the appellant has been in breach of Regulations 9 and 17 of the Warehouse Keepers and Owners of Warehoused Goods Regulations 1999 (“WOWGR”).” [This relates to Ground 3 of the appellant’s Grounds of Appeal]. (1) whether an earlier duty point(s) occurred prior to the appellant’s holding of the assessed goods and, if so, the person(s) who caused that duty point(s) to occur. [This relates to Ground 1 of the appellant’s Amended Consolidated and Amended Grounds of Appeal (“the Grounds of Appeal”)]; (2) whether as HMRC allege there has been a breach of Regulation 39 of the Excise Goods (Holding, Movement and Duty Point) Regulations 2010 (“HMDP Regs”). [This relates to Ground 2 of the appellant’s Grounds of Appeal]; and (3) whether as HMRC allege, the appellant has been in breach of Regulations 9 and 17 of the Warehouse Keepers and Owners of Warehoused Goods Regulations 1999 (“WOWGR”).” [This relates to Ground 3 of the appellant’s Grounds of Appeal].[5]That application then set out what was described as the “Legal Principle” which summarised paragraphs 59 - 82 in Addo v HMRC [2018] UKFTT 530 (TC) (“Addo”).[6]Under the heading “Specific Disclosure” the appellant applied for a wide-ranging Specific Disclosure Direction which included 12 categories. In each category the appellant narrated the request and then set out its reasoning and, as appropriate, clarified the category of document requested.[7]On 13 June 2024, HMRC filed a Response setting out its position in relation to each category. HMRC has made extensive disclosure in relation to eight of the categories although, in HMRC’s view, some of the disclosure sought was too broad. I annex at Appendix 1 the detail of the disclosure sought, ie what the appellant describes as the 12 requests and HMRC’s response.[8]As can be seen, HMRC objected to disclosure in relation to four of the categories (numbers v, x, xi and xii) on the basis that what was sought was “far too broad and includes requests for irrelevant material.”.[9]Ultimately, after correspondence had ensued and disclosure made, on 4 September 2025 the appellant filed and served its Amended Application for Specific Disclosure (“the Application”) in relation to the outstanding four categories. For ease of reference, I have italicised the amendments made to the original request for specific disclosure in these categories.[10]In the Application, the appellant now seeks a direction for specific disclosure of:(1) “Request 1: Copies of all documents, records, notes, correspondence, emails and any other material (recorded or stored in any format) held by the Respondents relating to the revocation of Seabrook’s Warehousing Limited’s (“Seabrook”) UK duty representative status and any challenge brought by Seabrook against the decision of HMRC. As a minimum the appellant requests and expects disclosure of all documents relevant to Seabrook’s application for judicial review (Case Reference: CO/3626/2017)”. In its reasoning, the Application states that the request is limited to those documents relating to HMRC’s decision dated 20 June 2017 “to revoke Seabrooks’s UK duty representative status to the extent that they are relevant to these appeal proceedings. The Appellant understands that the revocation of Seabrook’s Duty Representative status related to its dealings with Panache Trading Co Ltd (“Panache”) whom the Respondents allege was the owner of the assessed goods…which goods were previously held in the tax warehouse of Seabrook.”. That limitation is not incorporated into the request.(2) “Request 2: Copies and/or details of all decisions made relating to the warehouse approvals of all parties associated with the storage of the assessed goods (including, but not limited to, the parties listed at Annex A) including the dates on which such decisions were made.” Annex A consists of two parties associated with ownership of the assessed goods being Seabrook and BWA Logistics Limited (“Belvedere”).(3) “Request 3: Copies and/or details of all decisions made in relation to the UK duty representative status of all other parties associated with ownership, movement or storage of the assessed goods (including, but not limited to, the parties listed at Annex B) including the dates on which such decisions were made. Annex B consists of 12 parties said to be associated with ownership, movement or storage of the assessed goods being the warehouses Seabrook and Belvedere, previous owners of the assessed goods being Danco International Trading PLC, Ultrafocus UK Limited, Swiss Brainstore India PV Limited, Millenium Cash and Carry Ltd and hauliers being James E McCabe Limited (“McCabe”), Scott Hire Limited (“Scott”), Heritage International Limited (“Heritage”), Woodside Haulage Limited (“Woodside”), Ewals Cargo Care Limited (“Ewals”), Abbey Logistics Group Ltd (“Abbey”) and McGregor Logistics Ltd (“McGregor”).(4) Request 4: Copies and/or details of any decisions made in relation to the revocation or amendments of movement guarantees of all other parties associated with movement or storage of the assessed goods (including, but not limited to, the parties listed at Annex C) including the dates on which such decisions were made. Annex C consists of 11 parties said to be associated with storage or movement of the assessed goods being Seabrook, Belvedere, McCabe, Scott, Heritage, IVI-Trans Bourgas, Nelu 2 Trans Concept SRL, Woodside, Ewals, Abbey and McGregor.[11]However, whilst the appellant is seeking a Direction for the specific disclosure requests within these four categories, the Skeleton Argument for the appellant has an overarching request that HMRC “…undertake reasonable searches for any material relevant to the identified substantive issues.”.[12]HMRC make the point that, in adjudicating on the Application, the Tribunal should limit their attention to the “identified and particularised material” being that which is specifically set out in the Application rather than a general Direction.[13]I had a hearing bundle extending to 222 pages, HMRC’s authorities bundle extending to 416 pages and the appellant’s authorities bundle which, in addition to authorities relied upon by HMRC, included two further cases. I had Skeleton Arguments for both parties.[14]With the consent of the parties, the hearing was conducted by MS Teams. Prior notice of the hearing had been published on the gov.uk website, with information about how representatives of the media or members of the public could apply to join the hearing remotely in order to observe the proceedings. As such, the hearing was held in public.

The Grounds of Appeal

[15]Although there are now extant five Grounds of Appeal, only three are relevant in relation to the Application.

Ground 1

[16]HMRC have wrongly raised the three excise duty assessments when they had the evidence and the ability to assess person(s) who caused a previous duty point to occur. All the goods which are the subject matter of the first and second assessments were held in the warehouses of either Seabrook or Belvedere prior to release for removal to the appellant.

Ground 2

[17]HMRC have wrongly concluded that, in the case of the first and third assessments, there is a liability to pay excise duty on the assessed goods because the appellant was in breach of regulation 39 HMDP Regs. The appellant did have in place an approved guarantee for movement of duty suspended excise goods which covered the dispatch of goods from their warehouse. In any event, Panache had arranged the dispatch of the assessed goods from the appellant’s warehouse and engaged hauliers to transport the goods to Italy. HMRC would hold on EMCS, (see Appendix) or elsewhere, evidence as to which trader/haulier provided the movement guarantee on dispatch.

Ground 3

[18]At the relevant time, the assessed goods may have been owned by UK resident excise traders awaiting payment by Panache and with the benefit of a retention of title clause until such time as payment was received. Therefore, there was no requirement for a UK duty representative. The Background The assessments and penalties

The Background

[19]On 8 January 2016, following HMRC’s visit to one of the appellant’s excise warehouses on 9 July 2015 and subsequent checks, HMRC issued two excise duty assessments and intimated that they intended to issue an excise wrongdoing penalty. In fact, the penalty in the sum of £71,863.80 relating to the alleged default which triggered the second assessment was not ultimately assessed.[20]The two excise duty assessments relate to the appellant’s trade with a Hong Kong based customer without a UK establishment. That customer had first approached the appellant on 24 April 2015 requesting short-term storage and distribution of goods.[21]I asked that the identity of the customer be clarified as there was no consistent nomenclature. It was confirmed at the end of the hearing that the correct name was Panache Trading Co Limited (“Panache”).[22]Following HMRC’s visit to Law Distribution Ltd (“Law”) on 17 November 2015, the third assessment and the penalty relating thereto were issued on 15 and 22 January 2016. The third assessment and penalty relate to the appellant’s trade with Spendrups Bryggeri AB (“Spendrups”), a Swedish customer, without a UK establishment. Panache The first assessment

Panache

[23]The first assessment is in the sum of £4,274,226 and was issued because HMRC allege that duty suspended goods:(a) were held in Panache’s account for longer than the permitted period (72 hours), in circumstances where there was no UK duty representative acting for Panache, as was required by the legislation,(b) were purportedly sent to La Cave SRL, Italy and, in the case of wine, to Valux Logistics in Luxembourg between 5 June and 8 July 2015 when there was no UK duty representative acting for Panache,(c) were dispatched to Luxembourg without a valid movement guarantee being in place.[24]I use the word purportedly since paragraph 18 of HMRC’s Amended Statement of Case avers that:
“HMRC later received evidence that the Panache dispatches to La Cave were part of a large scale outward diversion fraud involving false receipts being entered onto the EMCS at the purported receiving warehouses. The goods never arrived at La Cave. The Italian authorities have confirmed that no Excise goods ever arrived at La Cave.”
That does not appear to have been disputed.[25]The technical position is that in relation to the first assessment, HMRC concluded that there were contraventions of regulations 17(2)(a) and (b) WOWGR and duty points had arisen under regulation 20(3) WOWGR. As far as the dispatch of the wine is concerned, because HMRC took the view that there was no valid movement guarantee, there was a breach of regulation 39(1) of the HMDP Regs and the dispatch gave rise to a duty point under regulations 6(1)(a) and 7(1)(a) of the HMDP Regs.

The second assessment

[26]The second assessment is in the sum of £359,318 and was issued in respect of other duty suspended goods held in Panache’s account for longer than the permitted period in circumstances where there was no UK duty representative. The alcohol was seized.[27]The technical position is that in relation to the second assessment HMRC concluded that:(a) having deposited goods in its excise warehouse into the account of Panache without a UK duty representative acting on their behalf there were breaches of regulations 9(2)(d) and 17(2)(a) and (b) WOWGR, and(b) the goods stored in the warehouse at the time of the visit were seized as liable to forfeiture under regulation 22(1) WOWGR because a duty point had arisen under regulation 20(3) WOWGR. Spendrups

The third assessment

[28]The third assessment in the sum of £45,301 was issued on 15 January 2016.[29]In summary, the assessment was issued because HMRC allege that duty suspended goods were:(a) held in Spendrup’s account for longer than the permitted period (72 hours), in circumstances where there was no UK duty representative acting for Spendrups,(b) entered in their account for removal from the appellant’s warehouse to the distributor when there was no UK duty representative acting for Spendrups,(c) dispatched to Law for the account of Proof Drinks Ltd (“Proof”), without a valid movement guarantee being in place.[30]As with Panache, in the absence of both a UK duty representative, and a valid movement guarantee, HMRC concluded that there were breaches of regulations 9(2)(d) and 17(2)(a) and (b) WOWGR and regulation 39 HMDP Regs respectively. The dispatch gave rise to a duty point under regulations 6(1)(a) and 7(1)(a) of the HMDP Regs. The penalty[31]This penalty is in the sum of £9,060 and was issued on 22 January 2016. It relates to the alleged default which triggered the third assessment.

The Law

[32]Although both parties quoted the excise duty legislation (and related penalty legislation) at some length, I do not propose to do so here since there was no dispute between the parties about the relevant excise duty legislation.[33]The case law was also not in dispute but I do choose to recite the pertinent passages.[34]In particular, in relation to excise duty, the Court of Appeal in Dawson’s (Wales) Ltd v HMRC [2023] EWCA Civ 332 made it clear at paragraph 55 that: “…since the Upper Tribunal found at [80] of Davison & Robinson [v HMRC [2018] UKUT 437 (TCC)] that the 2008 Directive requires HMRC, as a matter of law, to make an assessment against the first established excise duty point and it does not have a discretion to make an assessment against any other excise duty point that may have arisen in respect of the same goods, [the appellant] has a full merits appeal pursuant to s 16(5) FA 1994…” .[35]Like in Tideswell v HMRC [2024] UKFTT 54 (“Tideswell”) at paragraph 66, the appellant accepts, as it must, that:
“66. …as it was holding the goods, it is the person to be assessed unless an earlier duty point can be identified and that it bears the burden of proof of that.”
Consequently, the burden of discharging the assessments remains on it throughout. Like in Tideswell, the appellant argues thatthe evidential burden on whether there was an earlier excise duty point should shift to HMRC because HMRC is the only party which has access to evidential material on the issue of an earlier duty point available to it.[36]Mr Watkinson very fairly accepts that in those circumstances an application for specific disclosure is appropriate but, as he argued in Tideswell [102],to be successful such an application “must be properly made”.[37]Both parties relied upon McCabe v HMRC [2020] UKUT 255 (TCC) (“McCabe”) which sets out the principles applicable to specific disclosure applications, namely that:(1) “the starting point” in a high-value complex case, which this is, is that a document which is relevant should be disclosed unless there are good reasons to the contrary [22].(2) Dealing with a case fairly and justly includes dealing with it in a way which is proportionate [23].(3) The Civil Procedure Rules (“CPR”) have no application to the approach of the Tribunal to disclosure [24].(4) Relevance is to be assessed by reference to paragraph 40 of the decision of the Court of Appeal in HMRC v Smart Price Midlands and another [2019] 1 WLR 5070 which reads: “Disclosure of documents is not an end in itself but a means to an end, namely to ensure that the tribunal has before it all the information which the parties reasonably require the tribunal to consider in determining the appeal. It is only one step in the overall management of the case which should, as the appeal progresses towards a substantive hearing, identify and if possible narrow the issues between the parties. The scope of the issues in contention at the trial depends in part on the legal test to be applied by the tribunal and in part on the parties’ respective positions as to which elements of that test are in contention.” [25 and 28](5) In considering an application for disclosure the test of whether a document is potentially probative of one of the issues is a sensible approach [33].(6) The extent or degree of relevance is pertinent in terms of disclosure [35].(7) Documents may be relevant but not necessary for the fair disposal of the case.(8) The Tribunal should evaluate and weigh the likely effect on the determination of the case of ordering disclosure of document and in doing so will need to consider the degree of potential relevance and whether there is a need for disclosure in order to enable their determination of the issues to take place [37].(9) A document is capable of being relevant in a broad sense but of low relevance in that it is not potentially adverse but only part of the background, or one capable of leading to a train of enquiry, and therefore one that may not need to be disclosed in order for a fair determination of the issues to take place [38].[38]Rule 5 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Tax Chamber) Rules 2009 (as amended) (“the Rules”) gives the Tribunal, as part of its general case management powers, the power to direct a party to provide documents and information to another party. The Tribunal also has a specific power, under Rule 16, to order a person to “produce any documents in that person’s possession or control which relate to any issue in the proceedings”. When exercising a case management discretion or power, the Tribunal must have due regard to the overriding objective set out in Rule 2 and that means that any decision on disclosure must be proportionate.[39]Judge Staker, at paragraph 26 in Royal Bank of Scotland Group plc v HMRC [2020] UKFTT 321 (TC) (“RBS”), said that: [26]In exercising its discretion under r 5(3)(d) of its Rules, the Tribunal must have regard to the overriding objective in r 2. An exercise of discretion to direct disclosure should be proportionate to the importance of the case, the complexity of the issues, the anticipated costs and the resources of the parties (r 2(2)(a)). The question of proportionality should include an assessment of how focused the request for disclosure is, how difficult or expensive it will be to comply with it, and how relevant the information requested is. (TowerBridge GP Ltd v Revenue and Customs Comrs [2016] UKFTT 54 (TC), at [23](5).)[40]At paragraph 56 he went on to say that:
“[56] In cases where there has been no inadequate compliance with the regime of initial disclosure, or to the extent that an application for specific disclosure seeks disclosure going beyond the requirements of the initial disclosure regime, an applicant for directions for specific disclosure will need to satisfy the Tribunal: (1) that the material in respect of which specific disclosure is sought is necessary to deal with the case justly: this will be the case if the party applying for specific disclosure will suffer an unfair disadvantage (or the other party an unfair advantage) in the litigation as a result of lack of access to the material; that is, it is not enough that the material is merely relevant to the case or that the material would fall to be disclosed under a regime of standard disclosure; (2) that the material is likely to exist, and is likely to be or have been in the other party’s control; (3) that the material has not previously been (or is unlikely previously to have been) disclosed to the applicant for specific disclosure; (4) that the material is likely to be found and disclosed if the order for specific disclosure is made and is complied with (that is, if the order for specific disclosure requires a party to make a reasonable search for material, that the search will likely lead to identification and disclosure of the material sought); and (5) that the proposed order for specific disclosure would be proportionate to the importance of the case, the complexity of the issues, the importance of the material sought to a just determination of the issues in the case, and the anticipated time and costs required to comply with the proposed order.” (1) that the material in respect of which specific disclosure is sought is necessary to deal with the case justly: this will be the case if the party applying for specific disclosure will suffer an unfair disadvantage (or the other party an unfair advantage) in the litigation as a result of lack of access to the material; that is, it is not enough that the material is merely relevant to the case or that the material would fall to be disclosed under a regime of standard disclosure; (2) that the material is likely to exist, and is likely to be or have been in the other party’s control; (3) that the material has not previously been (or is unlikely previously to have been) disclosed to the applicant for specific disclosure; (4) that the material is likely to be found and disclosed if the order for specific disclosure is made and is complied with (that is, if the order for specific disclosure requires a party to make a reasonable search for material, that the search will likely lead to identification and disclosure of the material sought); and (5) that the proposed order for specific disclosure would be proportionate to the importance of the case, the complexity of the issues, the importance of the material sought to a just determination of the issues in the case, and the anticipated time and costs required to comply with the proposed order.”
[41]In their Skeleton Argument, HMRC relied on paragraph 59 (wrongly identified as paragraph 57) where Judge Staker pointed out that: “…the trend in the case law is to ensure that disclosure is more closely related to the issues in dispute in the proceedings (see para [25] above), and that an over-readiness to make orders for specific disclosure could lead to disclosure obligations becoming disproportionately burdensome, especially in large and complex litigation.”.[42]Lastly, I have not narrated the detail of the appellant’s reliance on Addo in the Application, firstly because that case deals specifically with disclosure of documents referenced in a witness statement. Secondly, in oral submissions both parties relied on the cases to which I have referred and the principles enunciated in Addo are encompassed therein.

Discussion

[43]I accept that HMRC have recognised throughout that they should make disclosure of relevant material in their possession, custody or control in order to enable a fair determination of the issues.[44]At the outset of the hearing, Mr Pickup fairly accepted that any application under Rule 5(3)(d) of the Rules would have to establish that the specific disclosure sought was necessary for the fair and just disposal of the appeal because, if disclosure was not granted, the appellant would be disadvantaged by not having access to the material. He subsequently conceded that paragraph 59 of RBS made it explicit that the test for specific disclosure went further.[45]The first and most obvious point is that it is argued for the appellant that the Application is for specific disclosure. That is to say disclosure beyond that which is provided for in terms for Rule 27 of the Rules which is the standard provision in the Rules for disclosure in standard and complex cases. That is the disclosure regime that applies in this case, unless and until, and except to the extent that, the Tribunal directs otherwise.[46]However, as I have indicated at paragraphs 11 and 12 above, the Application is framed more widely than that and I can discern no suggestion that HMRC have made incomplete disclosure in terms of Rule 27.[47]A specific request for disclosure should be precisely that, ie for disclosure of “all identified and particularised material” set out in the Application. I therefore address only the four requests.[48]As I pointed out in the course of the hearing:(a) directions for disclosure would only be granted if, the requests for disclosure met the criteria for specific disclosure and, in summary, were both measurable and deliverable, and(b) although it was repeatedly argued that HMRC “do not give any reasoning, nor do they develop the assertions of ‘too broad’ and/or ‘irrelevant material’”, the onus is entirely on the appellant to establish why the Application is justified and why I should depart from the default regime for disclosure.[49]Simply put, I agree with

Judge Staker at paragraph 45 of RBS when he stated that:

“[45]On general principles, where a party makes an application for directions imposing disclosure obligations on another party, the burden is on the party making the application to persuade the Tribunal that there are sufficient reasons for granting it. It is not for the other party to persuade the Tribunal that the application should not be granted.”
.

Request 1

[50]It is not disputed that the assessed goods had been stored at Seabrook’s and/or Belvedere’s warehouse at some point prior to arrival in the appellant’s warehouse. This request addresses only Seabrook.[51]In oral submissions Mr Pickup confirmed that this request was “freestanding” and did not relate to the assessed goods per se but rather to the trade of Panache and the status of previous holders of the assessed goods.[52]Unlike every other category in the Application (and its predecessor), the Application did not specify the Ground of Appeal for which this request was stated to be relevant. The Skeleton Argument for the appellant stated that it was “highly relevant” to Ground 3 and in oral submissions that it was very relevant to Grounds 1 and 3 and of peripheral relevance to Ground 2. Relevance is not the only test and the argument is that this request for disclosure might shed light on:(a) Ownership of the assessed goods on arrival into and whilst in Seabrook’s warehouse.(b) The then nominated UK duty representative.(c) The movement guarantee relied upon when dispatched from Seabrook.[53]The Judicial Review decision, R (on application of Seabrook Warehousing Ltd) v Revenue and Customs Commissioners [2019] EWCA Civ 1357 was in the Authorities Bundle. It is of note that the hearing was unusual in the sense that it was the first instance hearing, albeit at an appellate level of the judicial review application. I say that because Henderson LJ made it clear at the outset that that unusual procedure was adopted because the case raised important points of principle about the lawfulness of the domestic legislation before an excise duty point has arisen.[54]Mr Pickup argued that the decision itself was irrelevant and did not assist because it focussed on whether the requirement to have a UK duty representative was discriminatory and whether the due diligence requirements were incompatible but shed no light on the revocation. That is accurate.[55]However, I agree with Mr Watkinson when he argued that it was relevant because it made it explicit at paragraph 8(c) that before the revocation of approval, HMRC had reviewed 39 accounts; accordingly, at best for the appellant, information about 38 accounts would be irrelevant.[56]The first point is that, as I have indicated at paragraph 10 above, the Application, as framed, is not limited to Seabrook’s dealings with Panache. Secondly, the explanation from the appellant is that it “understands” that the revocation related to its dealings with Panache. That is a mere unsupported assertion. Mr Watkinson stated that he had made enquiry and had been told that the revocation decision had nothing to do with Panache.[57]It is clear from the Court of Appeal decision that the revocation decision was about alleged failings in due diligence and was not about ownership of goods. I accept that if HMRC were to disclose everything that is requested in this category and if, which certainly has not been established, Panache was one of the 39 accounts reviewed by HMRC, there could conceivably be some tangential relevance.[58]Mr Pickup confirmed in oral submissions that the appellant wanted to know why the approval was revoked and the extent to which it relates, if it does, to Panache. He also argued that it was relevant to understand the status of Seabrook not only at the time they stored the assessed goods but also when approval was revoked. He suggested that it was obvious from the request (and other documents) that the appellant’s interest was focused on the period before June 2017 when the approval was revoked.[59]As HMRC have consistently argued, this request goes far beyond the assessed goods and is extremely wide. For example, as Mr Watkinson pointed out, the appellant has not explained why they require access to HMRC’s internal communications. Furthermore, no limitation as to timing is articulated and the relevant period for the assessed goods is ended on 7 October 2015.[60]In any event, as can be seen from Appendix 1, the extensive disclosure already made such as the EMCSs, the material uplifted from Seabrook, the UK duty representative status and the supply chain checks etc should address, insofar as possible the issues identified as relevant to this request as set out in paragraph 52 above.[61]I have already explained the requirement for the appellant to justify specific disclosure and thus I do not accept the argument that it is for HMRC to establish that Panache did not form part of the Seabrook revocation decision. The appellant has not asked for specific disclosure as to the failings in due diligence by Seabrook, if any, in relation to Panache that may, or may not, have been identified in the revocation decision.[62]In a similar vein, I do not accept the argument, both in regard to this request and the other three (see paragraph 66 below) that HMRC should have responded after the Application was filed asking for further detail and clarification of the breadth of the requests and the time periods covered. In an email dated 31 July 2025, before the Application was filed, HMRC made it clear that “It is not for HMRC to seek to remedy what appears to simply be a fishing expedition by proposing some other formulation". It is not and nor is it the function of the Tribunal. The email had gone on to say that the Application, when filed, would be resisted on the same basis; it has been.

Requests 2, 3 and 4

[63]Broadly, similar issues are raised in all three of these requests. In oral submissions, Mr Pickup argued that the appellant required details of all decisions made by HMRC in relation to the parties associated with storage, ownership and movement of the assessed goods. The appellant needed to know not just about the assessed goods but the status of those parties as that might indicate an earlier duty point.[64]It was argued that HMRC had not said that the documentation requested did not exist and since they had confirmed the existence of other documents when making disclosure, it was “obvious that they must exist”. Accordingly they would be relevant and therefore it was necessary that they be produced.[65]HMRC argue that documentation is only relevant if it is linked to the assessed goods.[66]As with the first request, I have difficulty with the argument that HMRC’s response was “unhelpful” in that HMRC had not specified what they would be prepared to consider disclosing in response to these requests.[67]In a letter to HMRC dated 4 July 2025, Kennedys LLP had stated in relation to each of these requests that the appellant “would agree to limit the scope to…” the parties later named in Annexes A, B and C (see paragraph 10 above). In HMRC’s email of 31 July 2025, in response, HMRC had explained that “The Appellant has not explained why even the narrowed disclosure sought is relevant. HMRC continue to resist disclosure on that basis.” and that the Application would be resisted on that basis.[68]I observe that the Application did not restrict the request only to those named parties.[69]For the reasons set out above, and in particular at paragraph 62, I do not accept that HMRC should have to formulate the requests.[70]HMRC have again argued that none of these requests are time limited. It is argued for the appellant that the requests are limited in time if read in the context of the Skeleton Argument. Firstly, the Tribunal would not issue any Direction which required to be understood if read in the context of another document. Secondly, in any event, there are no specific time limits articulated in the Skeleton Argument but merely reasons given for the requests.[71]I do not accept that any of these requests are time limited.[72]The use of the words “associated with” in each of the requests is very vague indeed.[73]As far as Request 2 is concerned, the request is not limited by warehouse approval type, yet, as HMRC aver, only storage and distribution approvals could be relevant and only during an unspecified materially relevant time.[74]As far as Request 3 is concerned I agree with HMRC that the request is not limited to a period when any party was acting for Panache or Spendrups.[75]Lastly, as far as Request 4 is concerned, as can be seen from Appendix 1, HMRC have already disclosed copies of movement guarantees relating to the assessed goods where those guarantees were actually used during the relevant period, namely 15 June to 7 October 2015. This request is not limited to guarantees that were used in relation to the assessed goods.

Conclusion

[76]The exercise of the Tribunal’s discretion is always a balancing exercise and I have weighed in the balance all of the factors that have been brought to my attention.[77]This is a high value and complex case and I understand why the appellant wishes as wide a disclosure as possible but that is not the test. This is not a situation where there is any suggestion that HMRC have made inadequate disclosure in terms of Rule 27 of the Rules. They have made very extensive voluntary disclosure thereafter. The wording of the Application is very wide and, in my opinion, lacks specification in a number of respects including as regards timing.[78]In HMRC v Citibank and others [2017] EWCA 1416 (Civ), Sir Geoffrey Vos C, in upholding the FTT decision and overturning the Upper Tribunal’s finding that if a reasoned case for wider proportionate disclosure was made, the FTT should not be “troubled by the limited terms of rule 27”, stated:
“It is true that this is an important issue, but the 2009 Rules were made for important cases as well as simple ones. The plain fact is that the procedure is different in the FTT. If fraud or dishonesty had been alleged it would have been different.”
There are no pleadings of fraud or dishonesty in relation to the appellant in this case.[79]Should I depart from Rule 27 of the Rules and direct wider disclosure in the terms specified in the requests in the Application?[80]I agree with HMRC that, as framed, the Application is not sufficiently focussed and lacks specification in terms of both time and relevance.[81]I have difficulty in seeing how it would be proportionate to direct such extensive disclosure. I must be fair and just to both parties.[82]The scope of the requests, as framed, mean that it would be a not inconsiderable exercise, and presumably expensive and resource and time consuming for HMRC were I to make such a direction. Certainly, HMRC cogently argues that that would be the case.[83]I find that, in the words of Judge Staker in RBS, to grant the Application, as framed, would be disproportionately burdensome.

Decision

[84]The Application is refused.

Right to apply for permission to appeal

[85]This document contains full findings of fact and reasons for the decision. Any party dissatisfied with this decision has a right to apply for permission to appeal against it pursuant to Rule 39 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Tax Chamber) Rules 2009. The application must be received by this Tribunal not later than 56 days after this decision is sent to that party. The parties are referred to “Guidance to accompany a Decision from the First-tier Tribunal (Tax Chamber)” which accompanies and forms part of this decision notice. Release date: 13 March 2026 Appendix 1 (i). Copies of the relevant entries in the Excise Movement and Control System (“EMCS”) detailing all prior movements and owners of the goods in respect of which the Appellant has been assessed. HMRC are agreeable to providing documents for movements in the UK in their possession, custody or control, if such entries in EMCS are still in existence, given the passage of time. (ii). Copies of all documents, records, notes, correspondence, emails and any other 88. material (recorded or stored in any format) uplifted by the Respondents from the offices of Seabrook and Belvedere in relation to the assessed goods. As a minimum the Appellant would expect disclosure of the following documents:(a) all communications passing between Seabrook/Belvedere with Panache (or any other excise trader providing instructions and/or communication in relation to the assessed goods) including the initial contact and instructions from the point of product received to dispatch;(b) movement guarantees of the hauliers who delivered into Seabrook/Belvedere and/or collected the goods for onward movement to the Appellant;(c) purchase orders;(d) sales invoices;(e) delivery notes;(f) transaction listings;(g) payment terms;(h) confirmation of the UK duty representative’s status as owner of the goods;(i) details of which entity owned the goods at the relevant time and the account the goods were held in. HMRC are agreeable to disclosing any documents uplifted from Seabrook and Belvedere in their possession, custody or control in relation to the assessed goods. (iii). Copies of all documents, records, notes correspondence, emails and any other material (recorded or stored in any format) in relation to supply chain checks performed by the Respondents in respect of the assessed goods, to include: (a) HMRC spreadsheets tracing the transactions; (b) data obtained from HMRC audit services; (c) HMRC verification reference checks; and (d) checks of HMRC’s Electronic Folder for details of non-compliance. As drafted HMRC’s view is that this category of disclosure is too broad, but HMRC are agreeable to disclosing all documents and any other material in their possession, custody or control recording supply chain checks performed by the Respondents in relation to the assessed goods. (iv). Copies of all documents, records, notes, correspondence, emails and any other 91. material (recorded or stored in any format) held by the Respondents relating to the seizure of goods ostensibly owned by Millennium Cash & Carry Limited (“Millennium”) taken from the Appellant’s warehouse and Millennium’s appeal to the First Tier Tax Tribunal seeking restoration of its goods (Tribunal Reference TC/2016/0031) including details of any restoration granted. HMRC are agreeable to disclosing any such documents in their possession, custody or control. (v). Copies of all documents, records, notes, correspondence, emails and any other 93. material (recorded or stored in any format) held by the Respondents relating to the 94. revocation of Seabrook’s UK duty representative status and any challenge brought by 95. Seabrook against the decision of the Respondents. As a minimum the Appellant requests and expects disclosure of all documents relevant to Seabrook’s application for judicial review (Case Reference: CO/3626/2017) including a copy of the pleadings. HMRC’s view is that this is far too broad and includes requests for irrelevant material. All the material relevant to the assessed goods will already fall under the other requests. (vi). Copies of any terms and conditions of sale and details of any UK duty 97. representatives held by the Respondents relating to entities owning/purchasing the 98. assessed goods, namely Danco International General Trading LLC, Highbury FZE, Spendrups, Ultrafocus HK Limited, Swiss Brainstore India PV Limited, Panache, and Millennium. HMRC are agreeable to disclosing any such documents in their possession, custody or control that relate to the specific goods that have been assessed. (vii). Copies of movement guarantees for the following entities during the relevant 100. period, namely 15 June 2015 to 7 October 2015: (a) J E McCabe; (b) Ewals Colchester; (c) Scott Hire Limited; (d) Heritage International; (e) IVI-Trans Bourgas; and (f) Nelu 2 Trans Concept SRL. HMRC are agreeable to disclosing such documents at (b) – (f) in their possession, custody or control that relate to the specific goods that have been assessed and where the movement guarantee was actually used. (a) is not listed in the amended Grounds of Appeal at [22(f)] and therefore appears to be irrelevant. (viii). Copies of all documents, records, notes, correspondence, emails and any other 102. material (recorded or stored in any format) relating to what is alleged by the Respondents (see §52 of the Amended Statement of Case) to be a “previous irregularity in the movement excised goods which are the subject of Assessment S1”. HMRC are agreeable to disclosing any such documents in their possession, custody or control that relate to the specific goods that have been assessed. (ix). Copies and/or details of all assessments raised, whether primary or joint and 104. several, on any person in relation to the excise duty on the assessed goods including the dates on which such assessments were raised. HMRC are agreeable to disclosing any such documents in their possession, custody or control that relate to the specific goods that have been assessed, and to the extent that they have not already been disclosed (e.g. assessments notified to the Appellant). (x). Copies and/or details of all decisions made relating to the warehouse approvals of all parties associated with the storage of the assessed goods including the dates on which such decisions were made. HMRC’s view is that this is far too broad and includes requests for irrelevant material. (xi). Copies and/or details of all decisions made in relation to the UK duty representative status of all other parties associated with ownership, movement or storage of the assessed goods including the dates on which such decisions were made. HMRC’s view is that this is far too broad and includes requests for irrelevant material. (xii). Copies and/or details of any decisions made in relation to the revocation or 108. amendments of movement guarantees of all other parties associated with movement or storage of the assessed goods including the dates on which such decisions were made. HMRC’s view is that this is far too broad and includes requests for irrelevant material.