Colin Sagar v The Commissioners for HMRC [2026] UKFTT 1247 (TC)

[2026] UKFTT 01247 (TC)Case No TC 09999
FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL
TAX CHAMBER
Hearing Heard on: 15 June 2026Date Judgment date: 27 August 2026
[Location/By remote video hearing]
Appeal references: TC/2024/03145
TC/2024/05097
COSTS – Tribunal Procedure Rule 10(1)(b) – HMRC withdrawal of decisions under appeal – Whether HMRC acted unreasonably in conducting proceedings – Material documents already within HMRC's possession – Whether HMRC failed to undertake adequate review following notification of appeal – Costs awarded in one appeal – Costs refused in second appeal – Indemnity costs – Wasted costs – Refused
Before
TRIBUNAL JUDGE KIM SUKUL
Between
COLIN SAGARAppellantTHE COMMISSIONERS FOR HIS MAJESTY’S REVENUE AND CUSTOMSRespondentColin Sagar, the Appellant for AppellantHamza Khan, litigator of HM Revenue and Customs’ Solicitor’s Office for RespondentsDECISION

Introduction

[1]This decision concerns applications made by Mr Colin Sagar for costs under rule 10 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Tax Chamber) Rules 2009 ("the Tribunal Rules") in relation to appeal references TC/2024/03145 ("the Input Tax Appeal") and TC/2024/05097 ("the Penalties Appeal"). Both appeals were ultimately resolved following HMRC's withdrawal of the decisions under appeal. Mr Sagar thereafter applied for costs, contending that HMRC had acted unreasonably in their conduct of the proceedings. He also sought indemnity costs and a wasted costs order.[2]The hearing was conducted by video using the Microsoft Teams platform. Prior notice of the hearing had been published on the gov.uk website, with information about how representatives of the media or members of the public could apply to join the hearing remotely in order to observe the proceedings. As such, the hearing was held in public.[3]The documents to which I was referred were contained within the 1,336-page document bundle, the parties' skeleton arguments, and further submissions made by both parties following the hearing.[4]The applications were heard together because they arose from related factual circumstances and involved a number of overlapping issues regarding HMRC's conduct following notification of the appeals. Although the applications were heard together, different conclusions arise in each appeal.[5]In the Input Tax Appeal, I have concluded that HMRC acted unreasonably in the conduct of the proceedings. The evidence establishes that Mr Sagar had previously provided HMRC with material documents and information during the course of the underlying enquiry and that those documents were already within HMRC's possession. The evidence also demonstrates that HMRC officers had previously referred to that material in correspondence. In those circumstances, once HMRC were notified of the appeal and undertook a review of the case, they ought reasonably to have appreciated that the information had already been provided. Nevertheless, HMRC continued to seek production of material already within its possession and continued to defend the appeal on the basis that relevant information had not been supplied. In my judgment, that conduct fell outside the range of conduct reasonably to be expected of a litigant conducting proceedings before this Tribunal. I therefore conclude that HMRC acted unreasonably for the purposes of rule 10(1)(b) of the Tribunal Rules and that Mr Sagar is entitled to a costs order in that appeal.[6]A different conclusion applies in the Penalties Appeal. Following receipt of the Notice of Appeal, HMRC undertook a review of the matter, identified that the penalties had been issued in error and withdrew from the proceedings before serving a Statement of Case. While Mr Sagar criticised HMRC's actions leading to the issue of the penalties, those matters largely concern conduct before the commencement of the appeal proceedings. Having regard to HMRC's conduct of the proceedings themselves, I am not satisfied that HMRC acted unreasonably in defending or conducting that appeal.[7]It follows that Mr Sagar succeeds in his application for costs in the Input Tax Appeal but not in the Penalties Appeal. I am not satisfied that the circumstances of either appeal justify an award of indemnity costs. Nor am I satisfied that the requirements for a wasted costs order are met. My reasons for reaching those conclusions are set out below.

Background Facts

[8]Background Facts Having considered all of the evidence and submissions before me, I find the relevant background facts to be as follows.[9]The first appeal, the Input Tax Appeal, concerned HMRC's decision to deny Mr Sagar's claim for input tax relating to VAT periods ending in March 2021, April 2021 and May 2021. The decision followed a lengthy compliance check during which HMRC sought information and documentation concerning Mr Sagar's business activities and entitlement to recover input tax.[10]During the enquiry, Mr Sagar provided HMRC with a range of documents and information. In particular, on 20 February 2022 he emailed HMRC’s officer attaching sales invoices, customer agreements and related correspondence on which he later relied in the appeal. The officer who conducted the compliance check had left the department by the time the appeal was commenced.[11]Following the conclusion of separate proceedings concerning HMRC's request for unredacted bank statements, Mr Sagar provided those statements to HMRC in June 2024. HMRC maintained its position and, following an internal review, upheld its decision to deny the repayment claim. Mr Sagar appealed that decision to the Tribunal.[12]On receipt of the Notice of Appeal, HMRC reviewed the matter and filed a Statement of Case on 19 August 2024. HMRC continued to contend that Mr Sagar was not entitled to the input tax claimed and that the evidence provided was insufficient to establish the relevant business activity and taxable supplies.[13]During the course of the proceedings, Mr Sagar maintained that the relevant documents had already been provided during the original enquiry. HMRC maintained that a number of documents could not be located and sought copies of those materials during the appeal proceedings.[14]The parties continued to prepare for a substantive hearing. Mr Sagar served his hearing bundle on 20 December 2024. On 7 February 2025 HMRC notified the Tribunal that it no longer intended to defend the appeal and withdrew the decision under appeal. The Tribunal subsequently struck out the appeal following the withdrawal, whilst preserving Mr Sagar's entitlement to apply for costs.[15]The second appeal, the Penalties Appeal, concerned two Personal Liability Notices and associated penalties issued to Mr Sagar in September 2024. Mr Sagar appealed those notices to the Tribunal on 22 September 2024.[16]Following receipt of the Notice of Appeal in the Penalties Appeal, HMRC undertook a review of the matter. That review led HMRC to conclude that the penalties had been issued in error. On 7 January 2025, HMRC informed the Tribunal that it did not intend to defend the appeal and, by letter dated 8 January 2025, notified Mr Sagar that the penalties would be withdrawn.[17]The Tribunal thereafter closed that appeal. Mr Sagar subsequently made an application for costs in relation to the Penalties Appeal. As the application was made outside the time limit prescribed by rule 10(4) of the Tribunal Rules, an issue initially arose regarding whether the late application should be admitted. HMRC withdrew its objection to the late application during the hearing before me.[18]The present proceedings concern Mr Sagar's applications for costs arising from both appeals.

Legal Principles

[19]Legal Principles The Tribunal's jurisdiction to make an order for costs derives from section 29 of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007. In this Chamber, costs do not generally follow the event. Rule 10 of the Tribunal Rules provides limited circumstances in which a costs order may be made.[20]So far as relevant, rule 10 provides:
"10(1) The Tribunal may only make an order in respect of costs ... (a) under section 29(4) of the 2007 Act (wasted costs) and costs incurred in applying for such costs; (b) if the Tribunal considers that a party or their representative has acted unreasonably in bringing, defending or conducting the proceedings"
[21]It is well established that the power to award costs under rule 10(1)(b) should be exercised with restraint. Costs orders are the exception rather than the rule and should not become a back-door method of costs shifting merely because one party ultimately succeeds and the other does not.[22]The meaning of "acted unreasonably" has been considered in a number of authorities, including Market & Opinion Research International Ltd v HMRC [2015] UKUT 12 (TCC) and Distinctive Care Ltd v HMRC [2018] UKUT 155 (TCC). Those authorities establish that the question is whether the conduct complained of was unreasonable in all the circumstances. The Tribunal must focus on the conduct of the proceedings rather than the correctness of the underlying decision. The fact that a party is ultimately unsuccessful does not, without more, establish unreasonable conduct and there may be a range of conduct reasonably open to a litigant. A failure to carry out a sufficiently rigorous review of a case after proceedings have commenced may, however, amount to unreasonable conduct.[23]In Tarafdar v HMRC [2014] UKUT 362 (TCC), the Upper Tribunal considered applications for costs where proceedings had ended following withdrawal. It identified three questions which will commonly arise:(1) What was the reason for the withdrawal?(2) Having regard to that reason, could the party have withdrawn at an earlier stage?(3) Was it unreasonable not to have withdrawn at an earlier stage?[24]Those questions provide a useful framework in cases where a costs application follows the withdrawal of an appeal or of the decision under appeal. They are not, however, a substitute for the ultimate question required by rule 10(1)(b), namely whether the party's conduct in bringing, defending or conducting the proceedings was unreasonable.[25]Mr Sagar also seeks a wasted costs order. A wasted costs order is materially different from an order under rule 10(1)(b). It is an order directed against a representative rather than a party. The relevant principles are summarised in Bedale v HMRC [2014] UKUT 99 (TCC), applying Ridehalgh v Horsefield [1994] Ch 205. Such orders require the Tribunal to be satisfied that costs have been incurred as a result of any improper, unreasonable or negligent act or omission on the part of any legal or other representative, or which, in the light of any such act or omission occurring after they were incurred, the Tribunal considers it is unreasonable to expect that party to pay.[26]Finally, even where the threshold for rule 10(1)(b) is met, the Tribunal retains a discretion as to whether a costs order should be made and, if so, the extent of any such order. That discretion must be exercised judicially having regard to the Tribunal's overriding objective to deal with cases fairly and justly and all relevant circumstances of the particular case.

The Input Tax Appeal

[27]The Input Tax Appeal Mr Sagar submits that HMRC acted unreasonably in defending and conducting these proceedings. In broad terms, he contends that HMRC already possessed the material documents required to determine the substantive dispute but nevertheless continued to seek those documents, maintained its opposition to the appeal and only withdrew shortly before the substantive hearing was due to take place. HMRC rejects that submission. It contends that it acted reasonably throughout the proceedings and withdrew promptly once it had sufficient visibility of the relevant material.[28]Applying the guidance in Tarafdar, I begin by considering the reason why HMRC withdrew the decision under appeal. HMRC's position was that the decision to withdraw was taken following its review of documents relied upon by Mr Sagar, including material that came to its attention during the course of the appeal proceedings. HMRC's case was that, once those materials had been reviewed, it concluded that its prospects of success were lower than previously thought and it therefore withdrew the decision. I accept that this was the reason for the withdrawal. However, that does not determine the costs application. The second and third Tarafdar questions require consideration of whether HMRC could reasonably have reached that position earlier and, if so, whether its failure to do so amounted to unreasonable conduct in the proceedings.[29]In considering those questions, I accept the evidence concerning the documents provided by Mr Sagar during the underlying enquiry. The evidence before me establishes that, on 20 February 2022, Mr Sagar provided HMRC with emails, sales invoices, customer agreements and related correspondence which he relied upon as demonstrating trading activity and onward supplies. Those documents formed part of the material later relied upon by Mr Sagar during the appeal. I find that those documents had previously been supplied to HMRC during the enquiry process. HMRC accepted that at least some of the documents had been provided to the officer conducting the enquiry, although they could not later be located by those responsible for the appeal.[30]In my judgment, the critical point is not whether individual litigators or officers were personally aware of the documents, nor whether those documents could readily be located at a particular point in time. The relevant question is whether HMRC, as a litigant, acted reasonably in defending the proceedings after notification of the appeal. Upon receipt of the Notice of Appeal, HMRC was required to undertake a proper and rigorous review of the dispute. That obligation forms part of the ordinary standard of conduct expected of a public authority engaged in litigation and is reflected in the authorities concerning unreasonable conduct under rule 10. In my judgment, a reasonable review of the case following notification of the appeal ought to have revealed that the material documents had already been supplied during the enquiry process.[31]I have considered HMRC's submission that it was entitled to seek copies of documents that could not be located on its systems. Whilst there is nothing inherently unreasonable in requesting replacement copies of missing documents, that does not answer the wider point. The issue is not merely that HMRC sought copies of documents. The issue is that HMRC continued to defend the appeal on the basis that relevant evidence had not been provided when, as a matter of fact, that evidence had previously been supplied, whether or not it could readily be located.[32]Further, I have considered HMRC's submission that the decision to withdraw was not based solely upon documents supplied during the enquiry process but also upon documents first provided during the appeal proceedings in November 2024. I accept that certain documents relied upon by Mr Sagar were first provided during the appeal and had not previously been available to HMRC. However, I do not consider that this alters the essential position. The documents which HMRC repeatedly identified as being missing and which became the subject of disclosure requests, applications and correspondence during the proceedings included documents which had already been supplied by Mr Sagar during the enquiry process. The existence of additional documents first produced during the appeal does not alter the central point that HMRC continued to defend the appeal notwithstanding that the material documentation had already been supplied during the enquiry process.[33]I have also considered HMRC's submission that Mr Sagar contributed to the continuation of the proceedings by declining to provide further copies of documents, resisting disclosure applications and maintaining that HMRC already held the material requested. I accept that Mr Sagar contributed to difficulties in the management of the appeal and that HMRC were entitled to seek copies of documents referred to in his List of Documents. I also accept that Mr Sagar's approach to disclosure was not always conducive to the efficient progress of the appeal and that it contributed to procedural disputes between the parties. Nevertheless, I do not consider that this submission answers the central issue. The material documents had already been supplied to HMRC during the enquiry process. Although Mr Sagar's conduct may have complicated matters, it did not relieve HMRC of its obligation to undertake a proper review of the case and of its own records when notified of the appeal. On the facts of this case, the primary cause of the continued defence of the appeal was HMRC's failure to identify and properly evaluate information already available to it.[34]A comparison with the Penalties Appeal is instructive. In that appeal, upon notification of the proceedings, HMRC reviewed the matter, identified that the underlying decision was erroneous and withdrew before serving a Statement of Case. In the present appeal, HMRC received notification of the appeal but continued to defend the proceedings notwithstanding the fact that the material documents had already been supplied during the enquiry. In my judgment, the difference in outcome resulted not from any difference in principle but from a failure adequately to review the material already available to HMRC in the Input Tax Appeal.[35]Having regard to all of the circumstances, I am satisfied that HMRC could and should have recognised at a materially earlier stage that the evidential basis upon which it continued to defend the appeal was unsustainable. Instead, the proceedings continued through the service of a Statement of Case, disclosure applications, witness evidence and hearing preparation before HMRC ultimately withdrew the decision shortly before the substantive hearing.[36]I emphasise that my conclusion is not based upon HMRC having reached an incorrect decision. It is based upon HMRC's conduct of the appeal proceedings after notification of the appeal and, in particular, its failure adequately to review material previously supplied during the enquiry process. In those circumstances, I conclude that HMRC acted unreasonably in defending and conducting the Input Tax Appeal for the purposes of rule 10(1)(b) of the Tribunal Rules.[37]Having concluded that the threshold in rule 10(1)(b) is satisfied, I must consider whether it is appropriate to exercise my discretion to make a costs order. In my judgment, it is. The unreasonable conduct identified above caused the appeal to continue substantially beyond the point at which a proper review should have resulted in the withdrawal of the decision under appeal. Mr Sagar was consequently required to continue preparing and conducting proceedings which ought not reasonably to have been defended. I have taken account of Mr Sagar's own conduct during the disclosure process, but do not consider that it justifies refusing a costs order in circumstances where the primary cause of the continued proceedings was HMRC's conduct.

The Penalties Appeal

[38]The Penalties Appeal I turn next to Mr Sagar's application for costs in the Penalties Appeal. This appeal concerned two Personal Liability Notices and associated penalties issued to Mr Sagar in September 2024. Mr Sagar appealed those decisions on 22 September 2024.[39]Following receipt of the Notice of Appeal, HMRC reviewed the matter and concluded that the penalties had been issued in error. By letter dated 7 January 2025, HMRC informed the Tribunal that it did not intend to defend the appeal and requested that the Tribunal close its file. Mr Sagar was notified of that position and, on 8 January 2025, HMRC confirmed that the penalties would be withdrawn. HMRC withdrew before serving a Statement of Case and before undertaking any substantive defence of the appeal. Mr Sagar submits that HMRC acted unreasonably because the penalties should never have been issued. He also relies upon HMRC's conduct before the appeal was commenced, including its communications with him and the steps taken to pursue recovery of the disputed amounts.[40]I accept that HMRC ultimately concluded that the penalties had been issued incorrectly and withdrew them. However, it does not follow that HMRC acted unreasonably in the conduct of the appeal proceedings. As the authorities make clear, the relevant question under rule 10(1)(b) is not whether the original decision was wrong, but whether a party acted unreasonably in bringing, defending or conducting the proceedings before the Tribunal. In considering that question, I place weight on the fact that HMRC undertook a review of the decision shortly after receipt of the Notice of Appeal. That review resulted in HMRC accepting that the penalties had been issued in error. Having reached that conclusion, HMRC withdrew from the proceedings before filing a Statement of Case and before putting Mr Sagar to the burden of meeting a substantive defence. In my judgment, that conduct falls within the range of conduct reasonably open to a litigant. A party who, upon receipt of an appeal, reviews its position, identifies an error and withdraws before defending the proceedings cannot ordinarily be said to have acted unreasonably merely because the original decision was subsequently accepted to be wrong.[41]This conclusion is reinforced when the Penalties Appeal is contrasted with the Input Tax Appeal. In that appeal, I have found that HMRC continued to defend proceedings notwithstanding information already available within its own possession and records. In the present appeal, HMRC did not continue to defend the proceedings. Rather, upon review of the appeal, it withdrew the impugned decision at an early stage.[42]I have also considered the parties' post-hearing submissions concerning HMRC's objection to the lateness of the costs application. Mr Sagar submits that HMRC had been aware since April 2025 of the explanation for the delay because it was set out in the costs application itself and that it was therefore unreasonable for HMRC to maintain its objection until the hearing. HMRC submits that, whilst it was aware of the explanation advanced by Mr Sagar, it had not been provided with evidence concerning the extent of the circumstances relied upon and was entitled to maintain its objection until the matter was explored during the hearing.[43]I do not consider it necessary to resolve every aspect of that disagreement and I do not regard the parties' differing accounts of what HMRC knew prior to the hearing as giving rise to any issue of misconduct. The dispute was essentially directed to the adequacy of the information available to HMRC concerning the explanation for the delay. The application was made outside the time limit prescribed by rule 10(4) and the Tribunal exercised its discretion during the hearing to admit the late application. However, HMRC was entitled to make submissions regarding whether the Tribunal should exercise its discretion to admit the late application. Although HMRC ultimately withdrew its objection during the hearing, I am not satisfied that the maintenance of that objection amounted to unreasonable conduct for the purposes of rule 10(1)(b). The objection concerned a procedural issue which the Tribunal was required to determine before considering the substance of the application. In the circumstances, I attach little weight to this matter when assessing HMRC's conduct of the proceedings as a whole.[44]Taking all matters into account, I am not satisfied that HMRC acted unreasonably in defending or conducting the Penalties Appeal proceedings within the meaning of rule 10(1)(b). It follows that Mr Sagar's application for costs in the Penalties Appeal is refused.

Indemnity Costs

[45]Indemnity Costs Mr Sagar submits that, if a costs order is made in his favour, those costs should be assessed on the indemnity basis. An award of indemnity costs is reserved for cases in which the conduct of the paying party is unreasonable to a high degree and takes the case outside the ordinary run of cases (Kiam v MGN Ltd (No 2) [2002] EWCA Civ 66 at [12]; Bowcombe Shoot Ltd v HMRC [2011] UKFTT 64 (TC) at [43]). Mere error, poor judgment or even unreasonable conduct for the purposes of rule 10(1)(b) will not, without more, justify an award of indemnity costs. Nor is it generally sufficient that a party advances a weak case or ultimately proves to be wrong (Arcadia Group Brands Ltd v Visa Inc [2015] EWCA Civ 883 at [83]).[46]I accept that HMRC acted unreasonably in the conduct of the Input Tax Appeal. For the reasons already given, HMRC ought reasonably to have identified, following notification of the appeal and a proper review of the case, that the material documents upon which the dispute substantially depended had already been provided by Mr Sagar and were within HMRC's possession. Instead, HMRC continued to seek those documents and continued to defend the proceedings before ultimately withdrawing the decision. This conduct was sufficient to satisfy the threshold in rule 10(1)(b). However, I am not satisfied that HMRC's conduct was unreasonable to a high degree or otherwise so exceptional as to justify an award of indemnity costs. I accept that HMRC's position arose from a failure properly to identify and evaluate information already available within its records rather than from bad faith, deliberate disregard of the evidence, abuse of process or any improper ulterior motive.[47]I have considered Mr Sagar's reliance on Governance Ministries v HMRC [2026] UKFTT 371 (TC)(“Governance Ministries”). I consider that case turned on its own particular facts. There, HMRC withdrew from a complex appeal listed for a nine-day hearing only 14 minutes before the deadline for service of its skeleton argument and provided no meaningful explanation capable of justifying the very late withdrawal. Judge McNall concluded that HMRC had possessed the information necessary to assess its prospects for a considerable period before withdrawing and that the resulting conduct was sufficiently out of the norm to justify indemnity costs. In the present appeals, although I have found HMRC acted unreasonably in the Input Tax Appeal, I have not found conduct of that character or degree. Accordingly, Governance Ministries does not lead me to conclude that indemnity costs are appropriate in this case.[48]I also take into account that once HMRC ultimately reconsidered the position, it withdrew the Input Tax Appeal decision rather than requiring Mr Sagar to proceed to a full substantive hearing. Whilst that withdrawal occurred later than it should have done, it does not of itself render the conduct exceptional. In relation to the Penalties Appeal, I have found that HMRC did not act unreasonably in defending or conducting the proceedings. It necessarily follows that there is no basis upon which indemnity costs could arise in that appeal.[49]Taking all of the circumstances into consideration, I do not consider that either appeal discloses conduct taking the case outside the ordinary range of cases in which costs issues arise before this Tribunal. The requirements for an indemnity costs order have therefore not been established. Accordingly, whilst I have determined that a costs order should be made in favour of Mr Sagar in the Input Tax Appeal, those costs shall be assessed on the standard basis.

Wasted Costs

[50]Wasted Costs Mr Sagar also seeks a wasted costs order pursuant to rule 10(1)(a) of the Tribunal Rules. Whereas rule 10(1)(b) concerns the conduct of a party, a wasted costs order is directed against a legal representative personally. The relevant principles were summarised by the Upper Tribunal in Bedale Golf Club Ltd v HMRC [2014] UKUT 99 (TCC) at [23] to [27] which sets out that a wasted costs order requires a finding of an improper, unreasonable or negligent act or omission on the part of a legal representative. In this context, "improper" conduct includes significant breaches of professional duties, "unreasonable" conduct denotes conduct which is vexatious or designed to harass rather than advance the resolution of the proceedings, and "negligent" conduct refers to a failure to act with the competence reasonably expected of ordinary members of the profession.[51]I have found HMRC's conduct in the Input Tax Appeal to be unreasonable for the purposes of rule 10(1)(b). However, it does not follow that the requirements for a wasted costs order are met. The evidence does not satisfy me that any individual representative acting on behalf of HMRC acted improperly, unreasonably or negligently. Rather, the unreasonable conduct identified arose from HMRC's failure adequately to identify and evaluate material already in its possession and to carry out a sufficiently rigorous review of the case following receipt of the appeal. That finding is directed to HMRC's conduct as a litigant and does not of itself establish personal fault on the part of any legal representative. I am not satisfied that any conduct of HMRC's representatives was vexatious, abusive, undertaken for an ulterior purpose, or otherwise outside the range of conduct ordinarily encountered in litigation. Whilst I have concluded that HMRC should have appreciated the position considerably earlier than it did, I am not persuaded that the conduct of its representatives amounted to the kind of serious professional failing that would warrant such an order.[52]In relation to the Penalties Appeal, I have already concluded that HMRC did not act unreasonably in their conduct of the proceedings. It necessarily follows that there is no basis for the making of a wasted costs order in that appeal. Considering the matter as a whole, I am not satisfied that the requirements for a wasted costs order have been established in either appeal. Accordingly, Mr Sagar's application for a wasted costs order is refused.

Disposition

[53]Disposition For the reasons set out above, I conclude that HMRC acted unreasonably in defending and conducting the Input Tax Appeal.[54]I make no findings at this stage regarding quantum. The costs claimed relate to multiple appeals and issues, only some of which have succeeded. In those circumstances, I am not satisfied that the material before me permits a fair summary assessment of the costs recoverable in respect of the Input Tax Appeal. All issues concerning the amount recoverable are reserved for any subsequent assessment should the parties be unable to agree costs.[55]Accordingly:(1) the Appellant's application for costs in appeal TC/2024/03145 (Input Tax Appeal) is allowed;(2) HMRC shall pay the Appellant's costs of and occasioned by appeal TC/2024/03145 (Input Tax Appeal) on a standard basis, to be assessed if not agreed;(3) the Appellant's application for costs in appeal TC/2024/05097 (the Penalties Appeal) is dismissed;(4) the Appellant's application for indemnity costs is dismissed; and(5) the Appellant's application for a wasted costs order is dismissed.

Right to apply for permission to appeal

[56]This document contains full findings of fact and reasons for the decision. Any party dissatisfied with this decision has a right to apply for permission to appeal against it pursuant to Rule 39 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Tax Chamber) Rules 2009. The application must be received by this Tribunal not later than 56 days after this decision is sent to that party. The parties are referred to “Guidance to accompany a Decision from the First-tier Tribunal (Tax Chamber)” which accompanies and forms part of this decision notice. Release date: 27 August 2026