James Hall v The Commissioners for HMRC [2026] UKFTT 1228 (TC)

[2026] UKFTT 01228 (TC)

Case No TC 09997

FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL

TAX CHAMBER

Hearing Heard on: 5 August 2026

Date Judgment date: 24 August 2026

By remote video hearing

Appeal reference: TC/2024/05049

PROCEDURE – application to stay proceedings/suspend directions pending resolution of appeal on preliminary issues to Upper Tribunal – application granted

Before

JUDGE ASHLEY GREENBANK

Between

JAMES HALLAppellant

THE COMMISSIONERS FOR HIS MAJESTY’S REVENUE AND CUSTOMSRespondent

Howard Watkinson, of counsel, instructed by ASW Solicitors for Appellant

Matthew Lindsay, of counsel, instructed by the General Counsel and Solicitor to HM Revenue and Customs for Respondents

DECISION

Introduction

[1]With the consent of the parties, the form of the hearing was V (video). For the purpose of the hearing, I was provided with a bundle of documents of 387 pages.

[2]This decision concerns an application by the Commissioners for His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (“HMRC”) to stay these proceedings or suspend the existing directions governing this appeal pending the determination of HMRC’s appeal to the Upper Tribunal (“UT”) against a decision of this tribunal released on 13 January 2026 (the “January 2026 Decision”) concerning certain preliminary matters relating to the appeal. (I will refer to this tribunal as the “First-tier Tribunal” or “FTT” when referring to the January 2026 Decision and consequential matters.)

[3]The substantive appeal concerns a joint and several liability notice (“JSLN”) issued to Mr Hall on 2 April 2024 under paragraph 3 of Schedule 13 Finance Act 2020 (“FA 2020”).

[4]In the January 2026 Decision, the FTT determined a number of preliminary issues concerning the conduct of the appeal. The FTT also refused to strike out certain of Mr Hall’s grounds of appeal either on the grounds that the FTT had no jurisdiction in relation to the proceedings or on the grounds that Mr Hall’s case had no reasonable prospect of success. Following the January 2026 Decision, the FTT issued revised directions (the “February 2026 Directions”) for the future conduct of the appeal consistent with the January 2026 Decision.

[5]The FTT also granted permission for HMRC to appeal the January 2026 Decision to the UT. HMRC appealed to the UT.

[6]The issue before this tribunal is whether these proceedings should now be stayed (or the February 2026 Directions suspended) pending the determination of that appeal.

Background facts and procedural history

[7]Background facts and procedural history On 2 April 2024, HMRC issued a JSLN to Mr Hall under paragraph 3(1) of Schedule 13 Finance Act 2020. The notice asserted joint and several liability in the sum of £1,687,010.04 in respect of tax liabilities of Peach Building Solutions Ltd, Manchester Construction Group Ltd and Intra City Construction Group Ltd. Mr Hall had been a director of each of those companies. By the time the notice was issued, Manchester Construction Group Ltd and Intra City Construction Group Ltd had entered insolvency procedures. Peach Building Solutions Ltd subsequently also entered insolvency proceedings.

[8]Following a review, which upheld the issue of the JSLN, Mr Hall appealed the JSLN by notice to this tribunal on 13 August 2024. By his notice of appeal, Mr Hall raised five grounds of appeal:(1) Ground 1: HMRC have not proved that Condition D in para 3(6) Schedule 13 FA 2020 is met.

(2) Ground 2: It is not necessary for the protection of the revenue for the JSLN to continue to have effect (paragraph 14(1)(a)(ii) Schedule 13 FA 2020).

(3) Ground 3: Schedule 13 FA 2020 and its application in this case breaches the principle of proportionality which might justify a breach of Mr Hall’s rights under Article 1 Protocol 1 to the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”).

(4) Ground 4: The decision to issue the JSLN to Mr Hall was irrational because HMRC failed to consider relevant factors.

(5) Ground 5: HMRC failed to follow their own guidance when deciding to issue the JSLN.

[9]Following resolution of issues relating to the notice of appeal, HMRC served its statement of case on 31 January 2025.

[10]On 14 March 2025, the FTT issued standard directions for the future conduct of the appeal. Those directions included directions for the exchange of lists of documents, the exchange of witness evidence, the provision of listing information, the preparation of bundles for a hearing, and the preparation and exchange of skeleton arguments. In particular, those directions required Mr Hall to provide his witness statements to HMRC before HMRC were required to provide their witness statements to Mr Hall and to provide his skeleton argument to HMRC before HMRC were required to provide their skeleton argument to HMRC.

[11]On 23 April 2025, Mr Hall applied to set aside those directions. HMRC responded to that application on 16 May 2025. Separately, on 25 July 2025, HMRC applied to strike out Grounds 3 to 5 of Mr Hall’s grounds of appeal. Mr Hall responded to the strike-out application on 11 August 2025.

[12]The applications were heard together at a preliminary hearing on 16 December 2025. In the January 2026 Decision, the FTT allowed Mr Hall’s application, refused HMRC’s strike-out application and gave consequential directions for the future conduct of the appeal. In summary, the FTT concluded:(1) that the JSLN involved the determination of a criminal charge for the purposes of

Article 6 ECHR

;

(2) that HMRC bore the burden of proving that the conditions for the issue of the JSLN were met and that the JSLN was necessary for the continued protection of the revenue; and

(3) that the FTT had jurisdiction to hear Grounds 3 to 5 based on public law arguments.

[13]On 6 February 2026, the FTT issued revised directions (the “February 2026 Directions”) for the future conduct of the appeal consistent with the January 2026 Decision. In particular, the revised directions require HMRC to provide their witness statements to Mr Hall before Mr Hall is required to provide his witness statements to HMRC and to provide their skeleton argument to Mr Hall before Mr Hall is required to provide his skeleton argument to HMRC.

[14]On 10 March 2026, HMRC applied for permission to appeal the January 2026 Decision. In summary, HMRC’s grounds of appeal were as follows:(1) Ground 1: the FTT erred in law in concluding that a JSLN issued under paragraph 3 of Schedule 13 to the Finance Act 2020 constitutes a criminal charge for the purposes of

Article 6 ECHR

;

(2) Ground 2: the FTT also erred in holding that the burden of proof lay on HMRC, that public law arguments were admissible, and that Grounds 4 and 5 of Mr Hall’s grounds of appeal had reasonable prospects of success;

(3) Ground 3: the FTT erred in its construction of paragraph 14 of Schedule 13 by holding that the statutory language supports the burden of proof resting on HMRC;

(4) Ground 4: the FTT erred in concluding that paragraph 14 confers jurisdiction to determine public law challenges, including proportionality and rationality;

(5) Ground 5: the FTT’s conclusion that certain grounds of appeal had reasonable prospects of success was infected by its erroneous conclusions on jurisdiction.

[15]On 18 March 2026, the FTT granted permission to appeal on all grounds advanced by HMRC.

[16]On 15 April 2026, HMRC applied to suspend the February 2026 Directions pending the final determination of their appeal to the UT. On 23 April 2026, Mr Hall filed his objections to that application. On 11 May 2026, HMRC served a response to Mr Hall’s objections.

[17]On 15 June 2026, the UT issued directions for the hearing of HMRC’s appeal against the January 2026 Decision and listed the appeal for a one-day hearing in a three-day window between 20 and 22 January 2027.

The issue before the Tribunal

[18]The issue before the Tribunal This tribunal is not concerned with the substantive merits of the appeal against the JSLN. The sole issue for determination is whether the proceedings should be stayed, or the February 2026 Directions should be suspended, pending the determination of HMRC’s appeal to the UT.

Summary of the parties’ arguments

[19]Summary of the parties’ arguments Both parties agreed that the applicable test is whether the UT’s decision is likely to provide material assistance in resolving issues arising in this appeal and, if so, whether it is expedient in all the circumstances to grant a stay (HMRC v RBS Deutschland Holdings GmbH

[2007] STC 814

(“RBS Deutschland”) at [21]).

[20]For HMRC, Mr Lindsay submits that the UT appeal concerns issues which are central to the future conduct and determination of this appeal. The appeal will determine whether the FTT was correct to conclude that

Article 6 ECHR

applies, that HMRC bear the burden of proof, and that Mr Hall may pursue public law grounds of challenge. The UT’s decision will therefore be of direct and material assistance irrespective of the outcome.

[21]Mr Lindsay also submits that any delay caused by a stay will be limited and proportionate. He notes that the appeal to the UT is already listed for hearing in January 2027 and contends that there is little realistic prospect that the substantive appeal would be heard before then in any event. He says that refusing a stay may result in wasted costs and effort because the scope of the appeal, the evidence required and the order in which evidence is served may all change depending upon the outcome of the UT proceedings.

[22]Mr Watkinson, for Mr Hall, accepts that the UT’s decision will be of direct and material assistance. He submits that HMRC have not demonstrated that it is expedient to stay the proceedings and that there is a strong public interest in litigation progressing without unnecessary delay. He notes that, although the arguments have focussed on the suspension of the February 2026 Directions pending the decision of the UT, the draft of the proposed direction attached to HMRC’s application could potentially stay the substantive proceedings until the preliminary matters were finally resolved by the Supreme Court.

[23]Mr Watkinson emphasises the seriousness of the allegations underlying the JSLN and the very substantial financial liability which remains in issue. He submits that a stay carries a real risk of prejudice to Mr Hall. The proceedings have already been ongoing for more than two years since the issue of the JSLN. The witness evidence will become increasingly stale if there is any further delay. He says that HMRC overstate the extent to which work undertaken pursuant to the February 2026 Directions before the UT appeal will prove unnecessary and contends that this tribunal is able to continue case preparation whilst the appellate proceedings are ongoing.

[24]Mr Watkinson also submits that, if

Article 6 ECHR

is engaged, further delay is also relevant to the requirement that the determination of a criminal charge should take place within a reasonable time.

Discussion

[25]Discussion The procedural rules The tribunal has broad case management powers in the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Tax Chamber) Rules 2009 (“FTRs”). Those powers are set out in FTR rule 5. They include powers to give directions in relation to the conduct or disposal of proceedings, including a direction “amending, suspending or setting aside an earlier direction” (in FTR rule 5(2)). The tribunal has specific power to stay proceedings (in FTR rule 5(3)(j)).

[26]Under FTR rule 2(1), the tribunal must seek to give effect to the overriding objective, of dealing with cases “fairly and justly”, when it exercises any power under the FTRs. FTR rule 2(2) provides that that, amongst other factors, dealing with cases fairly and justly includes: “dealing with the case in ways which are proportionate to the importance of the case, the complexity of the issues, the anticipated costs and the resources of the parties” (FTR rule 2(2)(a)); and “avoiding delay, so far as compatible with proper consideration of the issues” (FTR rule 2(2)(e)).

Relevant case law principles

[27]Relevant case law principles As I have mentioned above, the parties have presented their arguments by reference to the case law governing stays of proceedings pending a decision in another case.

[28]The parties are agreed that the principles set out by the Court of Session (Inner House) in RBS Deutschland are the relevant principles in this case: that is, whether the decision is likely to provide material assistance in resolving issues arising in this appeal and, if so, whether it is expedient in all the circumstances to grant a stay.

[29]The parties also acknowledge that they share an inherent interest in the case proceeding.

Application to this case

[30]Application to this case Although the parties have argued their respective positions by reference to case law concerning applications for a stay of proceedings pending the decision of a court or tribunal in another case, the material difference in this case is that the relevant proceedings are proceedings before the UT in relation to preliminary matters that concern this appeal. The resolution of those matters will clearly be of material assistance to the tribunal in resolving the issues in this appeal. Mr Watkinson did not seek to challenge that assertion.

[31]As regards the question of whether it is expedient in all the circumstances to grant the application (and so suspend the February 2026 Directions), I do not regard that requirement – or indeed that requirement in conjunction with consideration of whether the decision in other proceedings is likely to provide material assistance in resolving issues arising in this appeal – as dictating any different form of enquiry from the requirement under the FTRs to give effect to the overriding objective in FTR rule 2(1) when exercising a power to stay proceedings or suspend an existing direction.

[32]That requirement – to deal with cases “fairly and justly” – requires me to consider all the facts and circumstances of the case and have regard to the factors listed in FTR rule 2(2). As I have mentioned above, those factors include dealing with the case in ways which are proportionate…” and “avoiding delay, so far as compatible with proper consideration of the issues” (FTR rule 2(2)(a) and (e)).

[33]Having heard the arguments of the parties and considered the facts and circumstances of this case, I have concluded that it is appropriate and in accordance with the overriding objective to suspend the February 2026 Directions pending the appeal to the UT.

[34]My reasons are set out below.

[35]For the reasons that I have given above, the circumstances of this case are materially different from many of the authorities to which I have been referred. In this case, the proceedings in this appeal will, irrespective of whether I grant this application, be continuing – albeit before the UT and not before this tribunal.

[36]The decision of the UT will plainly be materially relevant to the proceedings before this tribunal: it will determine whether this tribunal has jurisdiction in relation to some of the grounds of appeal; it may strike out other grounds of appeal if the UT considers that they have no reasonable prospect of success; and it may determine where the burden of proof falls in relation to the matters which are the subject of this appeal. Mr Watkinson did not seek to argue otherwise.

[37]That decision will affect the manner in which the appeal before this tribunal is and should be conducted.

[38]It was Mr Hall who made an application to this tribunal to set aside the standard directions that had been issued by this tribunal. He did so on the basis that the burden of proof in these proceedings should fall on HMRC and so HMRC should serve their statements first and provide their skeleton argument first. The FTT concluded in the January 2026 Decision that the burden did indeed fall on HMRC. It was on the basis of that conclusion that the FTT issued the February 2026 Directions, which reversed the order for the exchange of witness statements and skeleton arguments.

[39]That conclusion is now the subject of an appeal to the UT. If I were to refuse the application and allow the February 2026 Directions to take effect whilst matters were proceeding towards a hearing of the preliminary issues before the UT, Mr Hall would obtain the benefit of the February 2026 Directions – in terms of the perceived advantage of being able to respond to HMRC’s witness statements and (possibly) skeleton arguments – irrespective of the decision of the UT on the appeal. That advantage was obtained on the basis that the burden of proof in relation to the imposition of the JSLN fell on HMRC (January 2026 Decision [78]). This tribunal would not have the opportunity to reconsider the suitability of that change in the light of a decision from the UT. Mr Watkinson suggested that there would be no material prejudice to HMRC if it had to serve their witness statements and skeleton arguments first. But if Mr Hall believes that there is advantage in being able to serve his witness statements and skeleton argument second – which I assume he must do, given his application to set aside the standard directions – to my mind, it does not appear “fair and just” that he should be able effectively to preserve that advantage if it was based on a false premise in circumstances where that question is before the UT.

[40]The other aspects of the preliminary matters that are before the UT will determine the grounds of appeal on which Mr Hall is permitted to rely before this tribunal. The UT will determine whether this tribunal has jurisdiction to hear Grounds 3 to 5 of Mr Hall’s grounds of appeal and whether Grounds 4 and 5 have any reasonable prospect of success.

[41]The UT’s conclusions on those matters will determine the scope of proceedings before this tribunal. If I were to refuse the application now and allow the February 2026 Directions to take effect, the parties would be required to prepare their cases on the assumption that all Mr Hall’s grounds of appeal would proceed. That would risk the parties expending time and expense on grounds of appeal that may never form part of the proceedings before this tribunal.

[42]Mr Watkinson sought to persuade me that the time and expense that might be incurred by the parties in preparation of their cases in relation to grounds of appeal that may never form part of the proceedings before this tribunal (i.e. Grounds 3 to 5) would not be material. That is, of course, difficult to assess at a limited case management hearing. However, the efficient management of proceedings and ensuring that this appeal is dealt with at proportionate cost suggest that the tribunal should not, in these circumstances, continue with directions that impose obligations and costs on the parties that may prove unnecessary.

[43]Mr Watkinson points out that the parties would in any event have to incur time and expense on the other grounds of appeal (Grounds 1 and 2). These grounds will turn on findings of fact to be made by the tribunal. He emphasises the risk of evidence becoming stale and memories of potential witnesses fading if the parties do not take steps now to record and preserve the evidence on which those findings might be based.

[44]I agree with Mr Watkinson’s concern. It is, of course, incumbent upon the parties in any event to assist the tribunal to further the overriding objective (FTR rule 5(4)). In my view, that would extend to the parties taking steps to preserve and record potentially relevant evidence. But, I accept that it is preferable for evidence to be put before a tribunal and tested in cross-examination sooner rather than later so that the tribunal can make relevant findings of fact.

[45]That having been said, the tribunal, at the instigation of the parties, has embarked upon a process of resolving the preliminary issues on the basis that it is preferable for them to be resolved in advance. That process assumes that the hearing of the substantive appeal will be deferred pending the resolution of the preliminary issues. In my view, it would not be in accordance with the overriding objective to depart from that process now and risk this tribunal and the parties undertaking steps that may prove inconsistent with the approach that is taken by the UT.

[46]I have also considered the potential delay in the context of the right to a hearing within a reasonable time within

Article 6(1) ECHR

. The threshold for proving a breach of the reasonable time requirement in

Article 6 ECHR

is high. It is not breached simply because a delay is less than ideal. The delay must be “excessive” in the context of the circumstances of the particular case (Dyer v Watson

[2004] 1 AC 379

at [52]). The hearing of the appeal is already listed for January 2027. There are reasonable prospects that the UT decision will be issued in the first half of 2027. Even on the assumption that the imposition of a JSLN is a criminal charge and Article 6 is potentially engaged, in my view, the likely potential delay awaiting the decision of the UT is reasonable and proportionate and not excessive. It is simply part of the process of resolving the issues that are before the tribunal on this appeal.

[47]I reach these conclusions on the assumption that the preliminary matters will be resolved by the decision of the UT. I acknowledge Mr Watkinson’s point that there is potential for those issues to be litigated further. Mr Lindsay suggested that that possibility can be accommodated by providing for any suspension of the February 2026 Directions to be lifted when the UT has issued its decision. I propose to accept his suggestion.

Disposition

[48]Disposition For the reasons that I have set out above, I grant HMRC’s application to suspend the February 2026 Directions pending the decision of the UT on the appeal against the January 2026 Decision. I will circulate directions to that effect to the parties following the issue of this decision.

Right to apply for permission to appeal

[49]Right to apply for permission to appeal This document contains full findings of fact and reasons for the decision. Any party dissatisfied with this decision has a right to apply for permission to appeal against it pursuant to Rule 39 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Tax Chamber) Rules 2009. The application must be received by this Tribunal not later than 56 days after this decision is sent to that party. The parties are referred to “Guidance to accompany a Decision from the First-tier Tribunal (Tax Chamber)” which accompanies and forms part of this decision notice. Release date: 24 August 2026