Shahada Rahman Joli v The Commissioners for HMRC [2026] UKFTT 1204 (TC)

[2026] UKFTT 01204 (TC)Case No TC 09987
FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL
TAX CHAMBER
Hearing Heard on: 22 May 2026Date Judgment date: 12 August 2026
Hybrid hearing
Appeal reference: TC/2024/04085
Application for permission to make a late appeal to the Tribunal pursuant to section s83G(4)(c) of the Value Added Tax Act 1994 – three stage approach in Martland applied – permission granted
Before
TRIBUNAL JUDGE ROSA PETTIFERNOEL BARRETT
Between
MS SHAHADA RAHMAN JOLIAppellantTHE COMMISSIONERS FOR HIS MAJESTY’S REVENUE AND CUSTOMSRespondentThe Appellant did not attend for AppellantMs Harry Jones litigator of HM Revenue and Customs’ Solicitor’s Office for RespondentsDECISION

Introduction

[1]The form of the hearing was hybrid. The Tribunal attended at Taylor House and HMRC attended remotely. The remote platform was Microsoft Teams. A face to face hearing was not held because, in the circumstances, it was not expedient to do so. The documents to which we were referred were: a skeleton argument from the Appellant of 8 pages; a skeleton argument from HMRC of 9 pages; a revised documents bundle of 198 pages; the Tribunal directions referred to below; and the Tribunal’s correspondence with the parties.[2]Prior notice of the hearing had been published on the gov.uk website, with information about how representatives of the media or members of the public could apply to join the hearing remotely in order to observe the proceedings. As such, the hearing was held in public.

introduction

[3]introduction This appeal relates to a personal liability notice issued as a consequence of the Appellant being a director of a company called Extensive Enterprise Ltd (previously called Shan Consultancy Limited) with Company Number 10997872 (the “Company”). It is not in dispute that at times the Appellant was a director of the Company.[4]On 27 August 2021 HMRC wrote to the Company saying that it was going to check the Company’s VAT returns and records. The reason given was that HMRC were concerned that the Company was at risk of involvement with supply chains connected to fraud.[5]HMRC went on to issue the Company with:(1) A VAT assessment on 17 December 2021 for £2,215,899 for the periods 10/19 – 01/21 pursuant to s73 Value Added Tax Act 1994 (the “Company Assessment”).(2) An inaccuracy penalty of £1,551,129.30 on 2 May 2022 pursuant to Schedule 24 Finance Act 2007 (“Schedule 24”) on the basis that the under-declaration had been deliberate (the “Company Penalty”).[6]HMRC issued a Personal Liability Notice to the Appellant on 2 May 2022 for £1,551,129.30 pursuant to paragraph 19 Schedule 24 (the “PLN”).[7]The deadline for requesting a review of or notifying an appeal against the PLN was 1 June 2022.[8]The Appellant’s Notice of Appeal was filed on 19 July 2024. It contained an application for permission to bring a late appeal (the “Late Appeal Application”).

preliminary points

[9]preliminary points It is necessary to rehearse in some detail both the factual and procedural background to the Late Appeal Application.[10]The majority of our findings of fact are set out in the 'Background' part of our decision. A significant proportion of our findings of fact are from the documents supplied. Consequently, most of them require no discussion as they were not in dispute. Where they were in dispute or require further discussion, we provide the reasons for our findings below.[11]We are grateful to the parties for their skeleton arguments. We are grateful to Ms Jones for her submissions, willingness to engage with our questions and particularly for her efforts in assisting us to understand the Appellant’s position. We set out below our summary of the parties’ positions on the law and the facts. The parties should, however, be assured that when preparing this decision, the terms of the skeletons were reread and our notes of the hearing reviewed. Because we do not deal specifically with any point it does not mean that it was not considered in the round when reaching our decision.

background

[12]background Factual Background These facts follow on from those set out in the introduction above.[13]On 18 July 2022 Richardson Lissack emailed HMRC confirming they were instructed by the Appellant. Richardson Lissack chased HMRC for an acknowledgement of this email on 22 August 2022. Officer Begg replied on 23 August 2022 explaining why he had not replied and that HMRC’s debt management may be trying to contact the Appellant.[14]On 16 September 2022 Richardson Lissack indicated to HMRC in an email that a request for an out of time statutory review of the PLN would be made as soon as the Appellant was well enough to give instructions.[15]On 6 January 2023 HMRC wrote to the Appellant in relation to publishing the details of deliberate tax defaulters. The Company’s name appeared in the subject line.[16]On 10 February 2023 Richardson Lissack wrote to HMRC in response to the letter of 6 January 2023 as follows: I refer to your letter dated 6 January 2023 and the Penalty letter dated 28/03/2022. Whilst our client was registered as a director of the company from 13/0919 to 15/05/2022, at all times the company was ran by Jarrkkp Lahderante up to and including his ultimate appointment as director on 9/03/2020 and our client’s resignation. She has no knowledge or experience of the type of business Mr Lahderante was doing and at the time was experiencing severe mental health issues and was in the middle of a very nasty divorce. She is an NHS nurse; she has no commercial business experience. She suffers from depression, and been diagnosed with a brain tumour, and because of this she has been unable to properly address this matter with HMRC. She has clearly been taken advantage of by Mr Lahderante, who quite properly should be the recipient of the PLR, furthermore the period of tax loss of the PLR begins before and extends beyond her time as a director. Whilst not fully recovered, she now feels able to engage with HMRC with our assistance and help you understand the series of events which prevailed during the relevant time. For these reasons, I request that this matter is reviewed and that you delay any decision on publishing her name pending that review. I appreciate normal time limits have been missed by some margin but given our clients health and family issues and the circumstances of this matter, I consider it only fair she is given a chance to clear this up.[17]On 13 February 2023 HMRC wrote to Richardson Lissack acknowledging receipt of their email of 10 February 2023.[18]On 14 February 2023 HMRC wrote to the Appellant in material part as follows: In response to our letter to you of 6 January 2023, we have received an e-mail from Richardson Lissack Ltd who have made a representation on your behalf against the publication of your name as a deliberate defaulter. For the avoidance of doubt, it is not HMRC’s intention to publish your name, but that of the company.[19]The Notice of Appeal was filed on 19 July 2024. In the ‘Reason for late appeal’ box it said: The original decision in this matter was by letter dated 28/03/22, the appellant was ill with long covid at the time and unable to deal with a request for review. Richardson Lissack were instructed in September 2022 to assist in the appeal, and HMRC were written on 16/09/22 stating our client was unwell and was unable to give proper instructions. Following an improvement in our client's health we sent HMRC a request for a review of the decision on 10/03/23. This was acknowledged on the same day but we did not receive a reply. Following a warning of bankruptcy letter received in January this year, we reiterated our request for a review on 22/01/24. No reply was again forthcoming and no communication was received until the receipt a stat demand dated 2/07/24.[20]On 19 December 2024 HMRC:(1) Made an application to strike out the appeal for lack of jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 8(2)(a) The Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Tax Chamber) Rules 2009 (any reference to a Rule in this decision is to these rules). The basis for this application was that the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction in consequence of s83G(4)(a)(i) Value Added Tax Act (“VATA”) ie following a late request for a statutory review HMRC had not notified the Appellant whether or not a statutory review would be undertaken.(2) Or in the alternative, objected to the Appellant’s Late Appeal Application. (the “Jurisdiction Application” and the “Objection” respectively).[21]The Jurisdiction Application and the Late Appeal Application were listed for a case management hearing on 13 October 2025 (the “October Hearing”).

Procedural background

[22]Procedural background Following the October Hearing case management directions were made (the “October Directions”). They are set out in full at the end of this decision. From the October Directions it appears that the:(1) Jurisdiction Application no longer needed to be determined (see further on this below); and(2) Late Appeal Application remained to be determined.[23]Following/during the October Hearing the parties’ common position appeared to be that the 14 February 2023 letter was a refusal to accept a request for a late statutory review (and this was the basis on which the October Directions were made). Our observations on this are:(1) That proceeding on this basis: (a) meant that the Jurisdiction Application would fall away ie HMRC would no longer be seeking to strike out the Appellant’s appeal; and (b) meant that the 30 day limit for appealing the PLN remained 1 June 2022 pursuant to s83G(1)(a) VATA.(2) If the parties had not proceeded on this basis then it would have been for the Tribunal to decide whether to grant the Jurisdiction Application ie whether to strike out the Appellant’s appeal. If it had then the position then would have been that HMRC would have had to consider whether the conditions in s83E(2) VATA were met ie whether they were obliged to carry out a statutory review out of time.[24]The hearing of the Late Appeal Application was listed for a full day on 10 February 2026 before this Tribunal panel (the “February Hearing”).[25]In the course of preparing for the February Hearing there was correspondence between the Tribunal (directed by Judge Pettifer) and the parties. In relation to the October Directions and that correspondence, relevantly:(1) On 20 November 2025 the Appellant’s solicitor confirmed that the Appellant would not be providing any further evidence. However, that the Appellant would be ‘available to be in attendance at the scheduled hearing’.(2) Skeleton arguments were due on 12 December 2025. After correspondence from the Tribunal: (a) HMRC filed their skeleton argument on 28 January 2026. They explained that their position had not materially changed since the October Hearing. (b) The Appellant filed her skeleton argument on 9 February 2026.(3) On 5 February 2026 both parties indicated that they would attend the February Hearing by video. The Tribunal responded: The directions following the hearing on 13 October 2025 stated: Following the hearing on 13 October 2025, the Tribunal proposes to conduct the hearing of this application for permission to make a late appeal, and the Respondents objection thereto, as a one day hybrid hearing, at which the Appellant and her representatives and the Respondents’ representative shall attend in person; and the Respondents shall participate either in person or by video link. There have been no applications to amend these directions in particular to convert the hearing listed for Tuesday 10 February 2026 to a fully remote hearing (which is the cumulative effect of the correspondence from the parties attached to this email). Therefore, without further direction it remains that ‘the Appellant and her representatives and the Respondents’ representative shall attend in person’. Any application to alter these directions must, as usual, provide full reasons. Further, in this case given previous issues with attending remotely any application would benefit from an explanation of how remote attendance will be supported/facilitated.[26]The February Hearing was attended:(1) In person by HMRC's representatives (Officer Begg, the officer in the appeal attended remotely).(2) In person by the Appellant’s solicitor (Mr Lynch of Richardson Lissack) and counsel (Mr Benn Sheridan);(3) Remotely by the Appellant.[27]Upon:(1) hearing counsel for that hearing, Mr Sheridan, for the Appellant and litigator, Ms Jones, for the Respondents;(2) the Appellant attending remotely, while not being in a position to give evidence or be cross-examined;(3) noting the directions dated 15 October 2025 requiring the Appellant to attend in person and to file a witness statement in support of the Application (neither of which were done). The February Hearing was also adjourned and relisted for another day’s hearing before the same panel on 22 May 2026 (the “May Hearing”).[28]Subsequent to the adjournment of the 10 February 2026 hearing, Judge Pettifer made further case management directions on 25 February 2026 (the “February Directions”). They are set out in full at the end of this decision. Relevantly, pursuant to those directions:(1) On 24 March 2026 the Appellant’s solicitor confirmed that the Appellant had no further evidence to serve.(2) On 8 May 2026 the Appellant’s solicitor served the skeleton argument for the relisted hearing of the Application.(3) On 14 May 2026 HMRC filed their skeleton argument.[29]On 15 May 2026 the Tribunal received an email from the Appellant’s solicitor as follows: We respectfully request the adjournment of the hearing listed for 22 May as our [sic] has had to travel to Bangladesh following the death of her Grandmother and will not be able to attend the hearing as directed. We apologise for any inconvenience however these very sad and unforeseen circumstances that our client finds herself in. Below the Appellant’s solicitor’s email was the email from the Appellant: My grandmother passed away last night. We have to go bangladesh [sic] today. Not sure when I'm going to be back. Maybe it will be a month if we can pass the message to the judge apology from me The Appellant did not provide any evidence of travel eg plane tickets, or booking confirmation of plane tickets.[30]Also on 15 May 2026 HMRC objected to the May Hearing being postponed.[31]The Appellant’s email and HMRC’s response was referred to the Duty Judge. On 18 May 2026 the Duty Judge (Judge Fairpo) who responded in the following terms: The application to postpone the hearing made by the appellant has been refused because the appellant’s representatives are able to attend and no indication has been received that the appellant’s presence is required. The hearing will therefore take place but the application may be renewed at the start of the hearing[32]On 21 May 2026 the Appellant’s solicitor emailed the Tribunal to advise that they were no longer acting for the Appellant.[33]In light of the above the May Hearing commenced with HMRC making submissions on what should happen in the absence of the Appellant and her [former] representatives. HMRC said that that the hearing should proceed under Rule 33.

Decision to proceed with the May Hearing in the Appellant’s absence

[34]Decision to proceed with the May Hearing in the Appellant’s absence We decided to proceed with the May Hearing on the basis that:(1) We were satisfied that the Appellant had been notified of the hearing. That is clear from the email of 15 May 2026 from the Appellant’s then solicitor.(2) We considered that in was in the interests of justice to proceed in all the circumstances, including those set out above, and in particular: (a) Cognisant of the fact that the decision to proceed in the absence of a party is a case management power which must be exercised in accordance with Rule 2 which is to enable the Tribunal to deal with cases fairly and justly. Further that fairly and justly includes avoiding delay so far as compatible with proper consideration of the issues see Rule 2(2)(e). (b) Insofar as whether avoiding delay is compatible with a proper consideration of the issues we noted: the Appellant’s evidence that is fundamental to the Late Appeal Application is her medical evidence and HMRC confirmed that they would not challenge it and would not have cross examined her on it (they would only make submissions on the temporal importance of it); the Appellant had been given two opportunities to provide further evidence but has not done so; we had the Appellant’s skeleton argument filed on 8 May 2026 which set out the Appellant’s position (which was largely the same as that prepared for the February Hearing). (c) The Appellant had not expressly indicated that she wanted to postpone the hearing. Nor had she provided any evidence of travel. (d) This was the third full day listed for a hearing of the Application.

the issue to be determined

[35]The issue to be determined is whether the Appellant should be given permission to bring a late appeal ie to notify an appeal on 19 July 2024 777 days after the 30 day time limit for appealing had expired.

the law

[36]the law Legislation – time limits for appealing As set out above the PLN is pursuant to paragraph 19 Schedule 24. Paragraph 16 Schedule 24 provides: (1) An appeal [against a paragraph 19 Schedule 24 personal liability notice] shall be treated in the same way as an appeal against an assessment to the tax concerned (including by the application of any provision about bringing the appeal by notice to HMRC, about HMRC review of the decision or about determination of the appeal by the First-tier Tribunal or Upper Tribunal).[37]The tax concerned is VAT and so the relevant appeal provisions are in VATA. It was common ground that a request for a review out of time had been made pursuant to s83E VATA.[38]Section 83G(4)(c) VATA provides that where HMRC are requested to undertake a statutory review in accordance with s83E VATA (Review out of time) but HMRC have notified that such review will not be undertaken then an appeal may only be made if this Tribunal gives permission. This is a broad discretion.[39]Section 83E(2) VATA provides: (2) HMRC must review the decision under section 83C if—(a) after the time allowed, P, or the other person, notifies HMRC in writing requesting a review out of time,(b) HMRC are satisfied that P, or the other person, had a reasonable excuse for not accepting the offer or requiring review within the time allowed, and(c) HMRC are satisfied that P, or the other person, made the request without unreasonable delay after the excuse had ceased to apply. Case law on permission for late appeals Martland v HMRC [2018] UKUT 178 (TCC)

Case law on permission for late appeals

[40]The Upper Tribunal provided guidance on the correct test for the First-tier Tribunal to apply when considering an application for a permission to make a late appeal in Martland v HMRC [2018] UKUT 178 (TCC) at [23] – [47] (“Martland”). In HMRC v Medpro Healthcare Limited and others [2026] EWCA Civ 14 the Court of Appeal confirmed that the Martland approach was correct. The key passage is at [44] of Martland: When the FTT is considering applications for permission to appeal out of time, therefore, it must be remembered that the starting point is that permission should not be granted unless the FTT is satisfied on balance that it should be. In considering that question, we consider the FTT can usefully follow the three-stage process set out in Denton:(1) Establish the length of the delay. If it was very short (which would, in the absence of unusual circumstances, equate to the breach being “neither serious nor significant”), then the FTT “is unlikely to need to spend much time on the second and third stages” – though this should not be taken to mean that applications can be granted for very short delays without even moving on to a consideration of those stages.(2) The reason (or reasons) why the default occurred should be established.(3) The FTT can then move onto its evaluation of “all the circumstances of the case”. This will involve a balancing exercise which will essentially assess the merits of the reason(s) given for the delay and the prejudice which would be caused to both parties by granting or refusing permission.[41]The Upper Tribunal goes on at paragraph [45] of Martland to highlight the need for the balancing exercise to take into account the particular importance of the need for litigation to be conducted efficiently and at proportionate cost, and for statutory time limits to be respected. In HMRC v Katib [2019] UKUT 189 (TCC) (“Katib”) the Upper Tribunalat [17] emphasised that the need to respect statutory time limits is a matter of particular importance to the exercise of the First-tier Tribunal’s discretion as to whether to admit a late appeal. This approach has recently been confirmed as correct by the Court of Appeal in HMRC v Medpro Healthcare Ltd [2026] EWCA Civ 14.[42]The Upper Tribunal in Martland at [46] is discussing the role that the merits of an appeal may have when conducting the balancing act or ‘third stage’: In doing so, the FTT can have regard to any obvious strength or weakness of the applicant’s case; this goes to the question of prejudice – there is obviously much greater prejudice for an applicant to lose the opportunity of putting forward a really strong case than a very weak one. It is important however that this should not descend into a detailed analysis of the underlying merits of the appeal. In Hysaj [R (Hysaj) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2015] 1 WLR 2472], Moore-Bick LJ said this at [46]:
“If applications for extensions of time are allowed to develop into disputes about the merits of the substantive appeal, they will occupy a great deal of time and lead to the parties’ incurring substantial costs. In most cases the merits of the appeal will have little to do with whether it is appropriate to grant an extension of time. Only in those cases where the court can see without much investigation that the grounds of appeal are either very strong or very weak will the merits have a significant part to play when it comes to balancing the various factors that have to be considered at stage three of the process. In most cases the court should decline to embark on an investigation of the merits and firmly discourage argument directed to them.”
Hysaj was in fact three cases, all concerned with compliance with time limits laid down by rules of the court in the context of existing proceedings. It was therefore different in an important respect from the present appeal, which concerns an application for permission to notify an appeal out of time – permission which, if granted, founds the very jurisdiction of the FTT to consider the appeal (see [18] above). It is clear that if an applicant’s appeal is hopeless in any event, then it would not be in the interests of justice for permission to be granted so that the FTT’s time is then wasted on an appeal which is doomed to fail. However, that is rarely the case. More often, the appeal will have some merit. Where that is the case, it is important that the FTT at least considers in outline the arguments which the applicant wishes to put forward and the respondents’ reply to them. This is not so that it can carry out a detailed evaluation of the case, but so that it can form a general impression of its strength or weakness to weigh in the balance. To that limited extent, an applicant should be afforded the opportunity to persuade the FTT that the merits of the appeal are on the face of it overwhelmingly in his/her favour and the respondents the corresponding opportunity to point out the weakness of the applicant’s case. In considering this point, the FTT should be very wary of taking into account evidence which is in dispute and should not do so unless there are exceptional circumstances.

The rule in Katib

[43]In PBS Wholesale Limited and others v HMRC [2025] UKFTT 210 (TC) (“PBS”) Judge Sinfield relevantly discussed and applied the Upper Tribunal’s decision in Katib: 19. First, as recognised by Mr White, I am bound by the UT's decision in HMRC v Katib [2019] UKUT 189 ('Katib'). At [49], the UT stated (emphasis in original):
"We accept HMRC's general point that, in most cases, when the FTT is considering an application for permission to make a late appeal, failings by a litigant's advisers should be regarded as failings of the litigant … Therefore, in most cases, a litigant seeking permission to make a late appeal on the grounds that previous advisers were deficient will face an uphill task and should expect to provide a full account of exchanges and communications with those advisers. It will often be impossible to give the requisite full account without waiving privilege." [49] 20. The UT stated in [54] that "when considering applications for permission to make a late appeal, failures by a litigant's adviser should generally be treated as failures by the litigant"
. In Katib, the UT had to consider the extent to which reliance on an adviser was a justifiable reason for failing to make an appeal in time. In that case, the adviser did not provide competent advice to Mr Katib, misled him as to what steps were being taken to appeal and failed to appeal on Mr Katib's behalf. On the facts of the case, the UT concluded that failings by the appellant's agent could not be relied upon by the appellant at any stage in the Martland analysis. The UT observed at [56] that: "… the correct approach in this case is to start with the general rule that the failure of [the adviser] to advise Mr Katib of the deadlines for making appeals, or to submit timely appeals on Mr Katib's behalf, is unlikely to amount to a 'good reason' for missing those deadlines when considering the second stage of the evaluation required by Martland. However, when considering the third stage of the evaluation required by Martland, we should recognise that exceptions to the general rule are possible and that, if Mr Katib was misled by his advisers, that is a relevant consideration." 21. In [58] and [59], the UT said: "… the core of Mr Katib's complaint is that [the adviser] was incompetent, did not give proper advice, failed to appeal on time and told Mr Katib that matters were in hand when they were not. In other words, he did not do his job. That core complaint is, unfortunately, not as uncommon as it should be. It may be that the nature of the incompetence is rather more striking, if not spectacular, than one normally sees, but that makes no difference in these circumstances. It cannot be the case that a greater degree of adviser incompetence improves one's chances of an appeal, either by enabling the client to distance himself from the activity or otherwise." 59. [Counsel for Mr Katib] urged us to give particular weight to the FTT's finding, at [15], that Mr Katib did not have the expertise to deal with the dispute with HMRC himself, but that does not weigh greatly in the balance since most people who instruct a representative to deal with litigation do so because of their own lack of expertise in this arena. We do not consider that, given the particular importance of respecting statutory time limits, Mr Katib's complaints against [the adviser] or his own lack of experience in tax matters are sufficient to displace the general rule that Mr Katib should bear the consequences of [the adviser's] failings and, if he wishes, pursue a claim in damages against him or [the adviser's firm] for any loss he suffers as a result." 22. Following Katib, if the failure to appeal within the time limits were due to KMB not carrying out instructions (and I make no finding as to that), that would not constitute a good reason for the delay in appealing. That is because I would have expected the Appellants, notwithstanding that English is not their first language, to have taken steps, either themselves or through their tax adviser, to assure themselves that all the assessments, penalties and liability notices were being properly challenged. In his witness statement, Mr Baczmaga says that the sums of money that are the subject of the late appeals are, in his view, incredibly large and the Appellants do not have those amounts to pay HMRC. In that case, it is inexplicable, and to my mind not credible, that the Appellants did not monitor carefully what KMB was doing but were content to take a 'hands off' approach to the appeals. I was not shown what communications there were between the Appellants and KMB and, of course, those were almost certainly privileged as noted in Katib, but it would probably not have made any difference. If the Appellants did not monitor what KMB were doing then that would, in my view, be blameworthy and not a good reason for the failure to appeal in time. If the Appellants did regularly check what KMB were doing then they should have known that the appeals had not been made and done something about it. It would only be in the unlikely event that KMB actively misled the Appellants about the state of the proceedings that the Appellants might establish that they had a good reason for the delay. There is, however, no evidence to support that in this case and, for that reason, I do not consider the possibility further when weighing up all the circumstances of the case in the third stage of the Martland approach. the parties’ positions The Appellant’s position

the parties’ positions

[44]The Appellant’s position set out in Mr Sheridan’s skeleton argument is that:(1) Although she was the sole director of the Company for approximately six months, she says that she had only limited involvement in the business. The business was in fact controlled by another individual and that the underpayment was not the result of any deliberate inaccuracy attributable to her. Consequently, any personal liability notice should have been issued to the person who exercised actual control of the business rather than to her.(2) She relies on her serious mental health difficulties. In these circumstances, it is inappropriate for HMRC to enforce a personal liability notice against the Appellant and that this is not a case of deliberate misconduct on the Appellant’s part.[45]Mr Sheridan’s skeleton argument goes on to illustrate that part of the Appellant’s case that the Appellant was not a director of the Company for all the periods associated with the Company Penalty and PLN. Mr Sheridan provided the following helpful table: Period PLR Penalty 01 July 2019 to 31 October 2019 £1,401.00 £980.70 13 September 2019 A appointed director of EEL 01 November 2019 to 31 January 2020 £151,882.00 £106,317.40 01 February 2020 to 30 April 2020 £453,297.00 £317,307.90 15 March 2020 A’s appointment as director of EEL is terminated 01 May 2020 to 31 July 2020 £625,814.00 £438,069.80 01 August 2020 to 31 October 2020 £584,435.00 £409,104.50 01 November 2020 to 31 January 2021 £399,070.00 £279,349.00 6 September 2021 Companies House notified of A’s termination as director TOTAL £2,215,899.00 £1,551,129.30[46]The Appellant’s witness statement explains: At the time of receipt of the PLN I was unwell and suffering from severe mental health issues which are detailed in my medical notes from that time [refers to exhibits] I simply wasn’t able to deal with affairs during this time, and it was only when I recovered sufficiently could I effectively deal with my affairs and therefore instructed RL to represent me.[47]In relation to the Appellant’s mental health difficulties Mr Sheridan’s skeleton argument highlights the following exhibits to her witness statements:(1) In a letter from her GP (Dr Hossain) dated 26 August 2021: (a) Miss Rahman Joli has a longstanding history of anxiety and depression (b) Miss Rahman Joli is certainly not mental[ly] fit and would not be fit to attend any court proceedings. I hope that you can use this information to support this lady.(2) In a Debt and Mental Health Evidence Form dated 26 January 2022 and completed by Dr Hossain: (a) anxiety and depression since 2017; (b) a reference to an acrimonious relationship which had broken down.[48]We also note in an email to the Romford Family County Court dated 29 November 2021 the Appellant explained that she had taken unpaid leave from work because of her current (mental) health and would not be attending a hearing listed for 15 December. That email had attachments but we do not know what they are. Nor do we know the detail of what that hearing was about.[49]Exhibited to the Appellant’s witness statement are fit notes covering various periods and various illnesses including: covid-19; long covid; recent pyelonephritis (which Mr Sheridan explains is a serious infection); anxiety and depression. In broad terms they cover the period 9 January 2021 to 21 August 2022 albeit there are some periods of time that they do not cover.

HMRC’s position

[50]HMRC’s position HMRC note that much of the Appellant’s position focussed on the substantive appeal as opposed to the Late Appeal Application. In relation to that HMRC make clear a number of facts are in dispute. These include: when the Appellant ceased to be a director of the Company (HMRC note that the Appellant’s resignation is significantly backdated); the sales and transfer documents associated with the Company do not appear to be contemporaneous; HMRC cannot trace the other person said to be involved in the Company; Companies House entries suggest that the Appellant was running the Company after the time the Appellant says that she resigned as a director. Given the number of disputed facts HMRC submit that the Appellant does not have an overwhelmingly strong case.[51]In the May Hearing HMRC confirmed that notwithstanding there were some gaps in the medical evidence they accepted that the Appellant had had a period of bad health. However, even if we accepted that the Appellant was unwell until February 2023 (which at one point during the May Hearing HMRC appeared to accept but later resiled from pointing out the medical evidence expired at the end of August 2022) there was still a period of over 500 days from 14 February 2023 until the Appellant’s Notice of Appeal was filed on 19 July 2024. During which time the Appellant’s solicitor had not chased for a response at all.[52]HMRC also explained that at the October Hearing the Appellant had agreed that the 22 January 2024 (the repeat for the request of an out of time statutory review) correspondence did not exist. We have no reason to disbelieve HMRC and therefore we do not consider this letter further.

discussion and findings

[53]discussion and findings Applying the three-stage approach required by Martland, we first consider the seriousness and significance of the failure to comply with the original time limit. The relevant time limit is 30 days from the date of the PLN. In this case, the appeal was 777 days late which was significantly outside the 30-day time limit. In our view, such a delay cannot be described as anything other than serious and significant which Mr Sheridan’s skeleton argument rightly accepted.[54]The second stage of Martland is to consider the reason why the time limit was not respected.(1) We understood that it was common ground, and we accept, that the Appellant faced a number of health and personal issues (which affected in particular her mental health) from January 2021 ie before the PLN was issued until at least 21 August 2022 (which is when the last fit note expires). We also accept that these issues persisted to some extent beyond 21 August 2022. Whilst there is no formal medical evidence of this, Richardson Lissack indicated in their email of 16 September 2022, and explain that this is the reason why they are indicating an intention to request an out of time statutory review (rather than just ask for one). Richardson Lissack go on to explain in their email of 10 February 2023 that the Appellant was at a point where she is well enough to engage with HMRC. We accept that in the period from September 2022 – February 2023 the reason for the delay was that the Appellant’s health was still recovering.(2) For the period after 14 February 2023 the Appellant says HMRC’s letter of 14 February 2023 (which is now common ground) was a rejection of the Appellant’s request for a statutory review out of time, was not clear, we agree. The Appellant’s Notice of Appeal says that there was a warning of bankruptcy letter in January 2024 and a statutory demand on 2 July 2024. We do not have copies of either of these letters in the bundle but HMRC do not deny their existence. We therefore accept that there was some sort of enforcement action in January 2024 and July 2024 (it appears that it is the latter that prompted the Appellant to file a Notice of Appeal).[55]We move on to the third stage of Martland ie our evaluation of “all the circumstances of the case”. This involves a balancing exercise which will essentially assess the merits of the reason(s) given for the delay and the prejudice which would be caused to both parties by granting or refusing permission. We have considered all the relevant factors, and set out those of particular relevance as follows:(1) We accept that the Appellant had a good reason for delay until at least 14 February 2023. That is on the basis of the Appellant’s health.(2) For the period after Richardson Lissack made the request for an out of time statutory review HMRC, in our view rightfully, accepted that a further short delay may not have prevented there from being a good reason for delay. However HMRC said that there could not be a good reason for the delay until July 2024 (approximately 18 months). If those were all the relevant considerations we may have concluded that the general rule in Katib (which can be subject to exceptions) should apply (see above and in particular Judge Sinfield’s comments in PBS applying the rule in Katib) and that there was no good reason for the delay. However, this is not a case where the sole issue is whether Richardson Lissack were sufficiently proactive. In our view it is a relevant consideration that HMRC themselves were cognisant of the bankruptcy action in January 2024 and July 2024 and that did not prevent them from making the Jurisdiction Application in these proceedings in December 2024. That is, HMRC maintained that there had been no decision on whether to conduct a statutory review out of time from February 2023 until the October Hearing (in 2025) which is of course after the Notice of Appeal was filed. In our view that is because the wording of the 14 February 2023 letter is particularly obtuse. This fact adds material weight to the proposition that the status of the out of time request for a statutory review was very unclear. Therefore, on the very specific facts of this case including its procedural history we are satisfied that there is a good reason for delay.(3) Reviewing the information that we have in relation to the Appellant’s substantive appeal it is clear that the central issue is the extent of the Appellant’s involvement with the Company. That will turn on the evidence of the Appellant. HMRC have also been clear that they challenge the veracity of some of the documents in relation to the Appellant’s involvement with the company. That will turn on the evidence of both parties. It is patently clear that the parties will test the other parties’ evidence in both respects. There is some evidence available in relation to these issues however we do not understand that to be the parties’ final evidence and in any event evidence should only be considered in the balancing exercise exceptionally. Consequently, we have no basis on which we can safely and easily conclude that the Appellant’s case in the substantive appeal is particularly strong or weak and therefore the merits of the Appellant’s challenge to the PLN does not militate in favour of the granting or refusing the Late Appeal Application.(4) Although we accept that HMRC will need to file evidence in any final determination of the Appellant’s appeal, it does not appear to us and HMRC made no particular point that the preparation of that evidence will be hampered by the passage of time.(5) There is obvious prejudice to the Appellant if we refuse to grant her permission to make the appeal late because she will be unable to put forward her case at a hearing and, if successful, no longer be subject to the PLN which is a substantial sum of money.(6) We are cognisant of the need to take into account the particular importance of the need for litigation to be conducted efficiently and at proportionate cost, and for statutory time limits to be respected. Further that HMRC are entitled to consider a matter closed once the relevant time limit has passed, so reflecting the principle of finality in tax proceedings.[56]In balancing all of the relevant factors, we have concluded that the Appellant ought to be permitted to make an appeal out of time.

conclusion

[57]conclusion For the reasons given above we allow the Late Appeal Application.

Right to apply for permission to appeal

[58]Right to apply for permission to appeal This document contains full findings of fact and reasons for the decision. Any party dissatisfied with this decision has a right to apply for permission to appeal against it pursuant to Rule 39 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Tax Chamber) Rules 2009. The application must be received by this Tribunal not later than 56 days after this decision is sent to that party. The parties are referred to “Guidance to accompany a Decision from the First-tier Tribunal (Tax Chamber)” which accompanies and forms part of this decision notice.[1]Release date: 12 August 2026 appendix 1 the october directions59. DIRECTIONS60. Following the hearing on 13 October 2025, the Tribunal proposes to conduct the hearing of this application for permission to make a late appeal, and the Respondents objection thereto, as a one day hybrid hearing, at which the Appellant and her representatives and the Respondents’ representative shall attend in person; and the Respondents shall participate either in person or by video link.61. IT IS DIRECTED that:62. LIST OF DOCUMENTS AND WITNESS STATEMENTS Not later than 7 November 2025, the Appellant shall send or deliver to the Respondents a witness statement of the Appellant in support of the application for permission to make a late appeal.[2]Not later than 21 November 2025:[3](1). Both parties shall send or deliver to the other party and the Tribunal a list of documents in their possession or control on which they intend to rely in connection with the application; (2). Each party shall send or deliver to the other party copies of any documents on that party’s above-mentioned documents list which have not already been provided to the other party and confirm to the Tribunal that they have done so; and (3). Where a party intends to rely on the evidence of a witness (other than the Appellant), that party may provide a witness statement if they wish to do so. Any witness statement must be sent to the other party by no later than 21 November 2025. Any failure to provide the other party with copies of documents or statements of witnesses relied upon, as set out above, may result in the non-compliant party not being allowed to refer to those documents or call those witnesses in the hearing. LISTING INFORMATION Not later than 7 November 2025 both parties shall provide to the Tribunal and each other the following information to enable the Tribunal to arrange a hybrid hearing of the application:[4](1). The parties shall complete and send to the Tribunal, and the other party, the enclosed Video Hearing Attendance Form giving contact information for anyone they want to be able to join the hybrid hearing by video; (2). If a party has appointed counsel to act in this matter; (3). If the estimate of one day for the hearing is not agreed, an estimate of long the hearing is expected to last; and (4). dates to avoid for the hearing in the period beginning 1 January 2026 and ending 30 June 2026. Shortly after 7 November 2025, the Tribunal will fix the date of the hearing even if a party did not provide their dates to avoid or the video attendance form. A request for postponement on the grounds that the date of the hearing is inconvenient is unlikely to succeed if the party did not provide their dates to avoid or attendance form. BUNDLE FOR HEARING Not later than 5 December 2025, the Respondents shall provide to the Appellant and the Tribunal by email or electronic transfer an electronic bundle of documents and authorities which complies with the Tribunal’s guidance at Tax Chamber PDF bundles guidance (June 2021) (“the PDF Bundle”).[5]The PDF Bundle shall include all documents on the Lists of Documents provided by the parties and, if not already included, the following:[6](1). The notice of application; (2). All relevant correspondence between the parties; (3). Any other documents on which the Respondents rely in relation to this application; (4). Any documents the Appellant notifies the Respondents that she relies on in relation to this application; (5). Witness statements provided by either party; (6). Any legislation or case law on which the Respondents rely or on which the Appellant has notified that she relies (arranged in chronological order). Not later than 12 December 2025, the Appellant may notify the Respondents and the Tribunal that the Appellant requires a paper copy of the PDF Bundle to use during the hearing instead of the electronic bundle described above.[7]Where the Appellant requires a paper bundle of documents under the direction above, the Respondents shall provide a printed and bound paper copy of the bundle of documents to the Appellant (whilst still providing an electronic bundle to the Tribunal) not later than 14 days before the hearing. The Respondents shall ensure that the page numbering in any paper copy of the bundle matches the page numbering in the PDF Bundle.

SKELETON ARGUMENTS

[8]SKELETON ARGUMENTS Not later than 12 December 2025, the Appellant (or her representatives) shall send or deliver to the Respondents and the Tribunal an outline of the case that she will put to the Tribunal (a skeleton argument) including the details of any legislation and case law authorities to which it is intended to refer at the hearing.[9]Not later than 19 December 2025, the Respondents shall send or deliver to the Appellants and the Tribunal an outline of the case that they will put to the Tribunal (a skeleton argument) including the details of any legislation and case law authorities to which they intend to refer at the hearing.

STATEMENT OF AUTHORITIES

[10]STATEMENT OF AUTHORITIES Not later than 14 days before the date of hearing the Appellant shall provide to the Respondents and the Tribunal copies of any legislation and case law (if possible contained in a single bookmarked PDF) which are not already contained in the hearing bundle and on which the Appellant intends to rely at the hearing.

RIGHT TO REQUEST NEW DIRECTIONS

[11]RIGHT TO REQUEST NEW DIRECTIONS Any party may apply at any time for these Directions to be amended, suspended or set aside.[1]LEGAL OFFICER RELEASE DATE: 15 OCTOBER 2025 appendix 2 the february directions87. Sitting in public at Taylor House, London on 10 February 202688. DIRECTIONS89. We heard Mr Benn Sheridan of Counsel for the Appellant and Ms Harry Jones, Litigator of HM Revenue and Customs’ Solicitor’s Office for the Respondents.90. IT IS DIRECTED as follows The Appellant’s hearing on 10 February 2026 of the application for permission to make a late appeal (the “Application”) is adjourned.

FURTHER WITNESS EVIDENCE AND DOCUMENTS FROM THE APPELLANT

[2]FURTHER WITNESS EVIDENCE AND DOCUMENTS FROM THE APPELLANT Not later than 24 March 2026, the Appellant shall send or deliver to the Respondents any supplementary witness statement of the Appellant in support of the Application.[3]Not later than 24 March 2026:[4](1). The Appellant shall send or deliver to the Respondent and the Tribunal a list of documents in her possession or control on which she intends to rely in connection with the Application; and (2). The Appellant shall send or deliver to the Respondents copies of any documents on the Appellant’s documents list which have not already been provided to the Respondents and confirm to the Tribunal that she has done so. Where the Appellant intends to rely on the evidence of a witness (other than the Appellant), the Appellant may provide a witness statement if she wishes to do so. Any witness statement must be sent by the Appellant to the Respondents by no later than 24 March 2026.[5]UNLESS the Appellant provides the Respondents with copies of documents or statements of witnesses relied upon, as set out above, or (alternatively) a written indication that no supplemental written/documentary evidence is to be relied upon, then the Appellant’s appeal will be struck out without further direction from the Tribunal.

FURTHER DOCUMENTS FROM THE RESPONDENTS

[6]FURTHER DOCUMENTS FROM THE RESPONDENTS Not later than 7 April 2026:

THE RELISTED HEARING

[7](1). The Respondents shall send or deliver to the Appellant and the Tribunal a list of any further documents in their possession or control on which they intend to rely in connection with the Application; and (2). The Respondents shall send or deliver to the Appellant copies of any documents on the Respondents’ above-mentioned further documents list which have not already been provided to the Appellant and confirm to the Tribunal that they have done so. THE RELISTED HEARING The hearing of the Application is relisted for one day on 22 May 2026 before Judge Rosa Pettifer and Mr Noel Barrett.[8]The hearing shall be in person for all parties, save that the Respondents’ investigating officer, Mr Kevin Begg, and Mr Jazz Blount an officer of the Respondents have permission to attend via video-link. If the Appellant does not attend in person, the hearing of the Application is likely to proceed in her absence.[9]Not later than 14 days after the date of these directions the Respondents shall complete and send to the Tribunal, and the other party, the enclosed Video Hearing Attendance Form giving contact information for Mr Kevin Begg and Mr Jazz Blount so that they are able ( in accordance with direction 8) to join the hybrid hearing by video.

REASONABLE ADJUSTMENTS

[10]REASONABLE ADJUSTMENTS The Appellant shall notify the Tribunal and the Respondents of her proposed reasonable adjustments (if any) no later than 8 May 2026 in respect of the hearing itself, including the process of cross-examination.[11]Where possible, any notification of proposed reasonable adjustments shall be supported by medical evidence in the form of a letter from a relevant health professional.[12]The parties will use best endeavours to keep under review any proposed reasonable adjustments in the lead-up to and during the hearing.

BUNDLE FOR HEARING

[13]BUNDLE FOR HEARING Not later than 22 April 2026, the Respondents shall provide to the Appellant’s legal representative and the Tribunal by email or electronic transfer an electronic bundle of documents and authorities which complies with the Tribunal’s guidance at Tax Chamber PDF bundles guidance (June 2021) (“the PDF Bundle”).[14]The PDF Bundle shall include all documents on the Lists of Documents provided by the parties and, if not already included, the following:[15](1). The notice of application; (2). All relevant correspondence between the parties; (3). Any other documents on which the Respondents rely in relation to the Application; (4). Any documents the Appellant notifies the Respondents that she relies on in relation to the Application; (5). Witness statements provided by either party; (6). Any legislation or case law on which the Respondents rely or on which the Appellant has notified that she relies (arranged in chronological order). SKELETON ARGUMENTS Not later than 8 May 2026, the Appellant shall send or deliver to the Respondents and the Tribunal an outline of the case that she will put to the Tribunal (a skeleton argument) including the details of any legislation and case law authorities to which it is intended to refer at the hearing.[16]UNLESS the Appellant sends or delivers a skeleton argument to the Respondents and Tribunal, or indicates that she proposes to rely on the skeleton argument prepared for the hearing on 10 February 2026, by 8 May 2026, the Appellant’s appeal shall be struck out.[17]Not later than 15 May 2025, the Respondents shall send or deliver to the Appellants and the Tribunal an outline of the case that they will put to the Tribunal (a skeleton argument) including the details of any legislation and case law authorities to which they intend to refer at the hearing.

STATEMENT OF AUTHORITIES

[18]STATEMENT OF AUTHORITIES Not later than 15 May 2025 the Respondents shall provide to the Appellant and the Tribunal copies of any legislation and case law (if possible contained in a single bookmarked PDF) which are not already contained in the hearing bundle and on which the parties intend to rely at the hearing.

RIGHT TO REQUEST NEW DIRECTIONS

[19]RIGHT TO REQUEST NEW DIRECTIONS Any party may apply at any time for these directions to be amended, suspended or set aside.

REASONS

[20]REASONS UPON:[21](1). hearing counsel, Mr Sheridan, for the Appellant and litigator, Ms Jones, for the Respondents; (2). the Appellant attending remotely, while not being in a position to give evidence or be cross-examined; (3). noting the directions dated 15 October 2025 requiring the Appellant to attend in person and to file a witness statement in support of the Application (neither of which were done); the hearing of the Application on 10 February 2026 was adjourned. Following the adjournment of the hearing on 10 February 2026 the hearing of the Application requires further case management directions. Rule 5(2) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Tax Chamber) Rules 2009 (the “FTT Rules”) provides that the Tribunal may give a direction in relation to the conduct or disposal of the proceedings at any time. The use of the word “may” in Rule 5(2) of the FTT Rules means that it is a matter of judicial discretion what directions to make in relation to the conduct or disposal of proceedings. The power is a case management power which must be exercised in accordance with the overriding objective in Rule 2 of the FTT Rules which is to enable the Tribunal to deal with cases fairly and justly. Accordingly, I must carry out a balancing exercise and decide what directions, in all the circumstances, it is fair and just to make.[22]Save for the addition of the UNLESS order at paragraph 16 and the removal of an UNLESS order regarding the Appellant’s attendance at the relisted hearing (which I deal with separately) these directions were agreed by the parties and in all the circumstances I consider that it is fair and just to make them.[23]In all the circumstances, I do not consider it fair and just to make the following direction notwithstanding it was agreed by the parties: The Appellant shall attend the relisted hearing in person. Unless the Appellant does so attend, the Appellant’s application for permission to bring a late appeal will continue in her absence. Instead I make direction 8 which explains that even if the Appellant does not attend then the hearing is likely to proceed in her absence.[24]The Appellant has not complied with a number of Tribunal directions. The Appellant did not comply: at all with the direction to attend the hearing on 10 February 2026 in person, direction 1 (witness statements) or direction 10 (statement of authorities) of the Tribunal’s directions dated 15 October 2025; in time with direction 8 (skeleton arguments) of the Tribunal’s directions dated 15 October 2025; or in time with the Tribunal’s directions prior to the hearing on 10 February 2026 dated 29 January 2026. In all the circumstances, including the Appellant’s previous non-compliance and to ensure that the hearing of the Application listed for 22 May 2026 is effective I consider it is fair and just to make the UNLESS order at paragraph 16. ROSA PETTIFER TRIBUNAL JUDGE Release date: 25 February 2026 SCHEDULE – Solicitor Undertaking The Appellant's firm of solicitors, Richardson Lissack, undertakes to the Tribunal that, upon receipt of the PDF bundle (as defined in Paragraph 12-13 [13 - 14] of the Directions), it will deliver a hardcopy version to the Appellant (in person) within seven business days. The individual with responsibility for this matter is Mr Andy Lynch, whose email address is andylynch@richardsonlissack.co.uk.