Visu Tech Limited v The Commissioners for HMRC [2026] UKFTT 1136 (TC)

[2026] UKFTT 01136 (TC)

Case No TC 09977

FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL

TAX CHAMBER

Hearing Heard on: 31 July 2026

Date Judgment date: 06 August 2026

By remote video hearing

Appeal reference: TC/2025/01155

Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme grants – appeal almost two years late – application for permission to bring late appeal dismissed

Before

TRIBUNAL JUDGE MATTHEW DONMALL

GILL HUNTER

Between

VISU TECH LIMITEDAppellant

THE COMMISSIONERS FOR HIS MAJESTY’S REVENUE AND CUSTOMSRespondent

Mr Rajith Chidurala, Director for Appellant

Mr Mian Chaudhry, litigator of HM Revenue and Customs’ Solicitor’s Office for Respondents

DECISION

Introduction

[1]This is an application for permission to make a late appeal against assessments in the amount of £36,035.84 (‘the Assessments’) issued by HMRC on 24 February 2023 to recover overpaid Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme (‘CJRS’) grant payments in the tax years 2020-21 and 2021-22. The appeal should have been made to HMRC within 30 days, so by 26 March 2023. In fact, the Appellant sought to appeal the Assessments to HMRC on 25 February 2025, 702 days later; HMRC having refused permission for a late appeal, the Appellant sought to appeal to the Tribunal on 12 March 2025.

Legal background

[2]Schedule 16 of the Finance Act 2020 provided for the taxation of CJRS payments. Paragraph 9 provides that if an officer considers that a person has received an amount in CJRS payment to which the person is not entitled, he may make an assessment in that amount, and further provides that parts 4 to 6 of the Taxes Management Act 1970 (‘TMA 1970’)contain provisions relevant to appealing such an assessment.

[3]Under s.31A TMA 1970, a notice of appeal must be given in writing to HMRC within 30 days of the date on which the notice of assessment was issued. Under s.49(2), notice of appeal may be given after this time limit if HMRC agree, or if the tribunal gives permission.

[4]The principles applicable to whether the Tribunal should give permission for a late appeal were set out by the Upper Tribunal in the case of Martland v HMRC

[2018] UKUT 178 (TCC)

("Martland"), at [44] - [47]. In summary:(1) It must be remembered that the starting point is that permission should not be granted unless the Tribunal is satisfied on balance that it should be.

(2) In considering that question, the Tribunal can usefully follow a three-stage process: (i) Establish the length of the delay. If it was very short (which would, in the absence of unusual circumstances, equate to the breach being 'neither serious nor significant'), then the Tribunal 'is unlikely to need to spend much time on the second and third stages'; (ii) Establish the reason (or reasons) why the default occurred; and (iii) Evaluate 'all the circumstances of the case'. This will involve a balancing exercise which will essentially assess the merits of the reason(s) given for the delay and the prejudice which would be caused to both parties by granting or refusing permission.

(3) The balancing exercise should take into account the particular importance of the need for litigation to be conducted efficiently and at proportionate cost, and for statutory time limits to be respected.

(4) In carrying out the balancing exercise the Tribunal can have regard to any obvious strength or weakness of the applicant's case; this goes to the question of prejudice. There is obviously much greater prejudice for an applicant to lose the opportunity of putting forward a really strong case than a very weak one. It is important however that this should not descend into a detailed analysis of the underlying merits of the appeal.

(5) Neither shortage of funds (and consequent inability to instruct a professional adviser) nor the fact that the applicant is self-represented should generally carry any weight in the Tribunal's consideration of the reasonableness of the applicant's explanation of the delay.

[5]This approach has recently been confirmed as correct by the Court of Appeal in HMRC v Medpro Healthcare Ltd

[2026] EWCA Civ 14

[6]In Katib v HMRC

[2019] UKUT 189 (TCC)

at [49], the UT observed, as regards the consequences of Mr Katib not being able to appeal: We have considered this factor anxiously for ourselves. However, again, when properly analysed, we do not think that this factor is as weighty as the FTT said it was. The core point is that (on the evidence available to the FTT) Mr Katib would suffer hardship if he (in effect) lost the appeal for procedural reasons. However, that again is a common feature which could be propounded by large numbers of appellants, and in the circumstances we do not give it sufficient weight to overcome the difficulties posed by the fact that the delays were very significant, and there was no good reason for them.

Factual background

[7]By way of background, we find the following facts.

[8]The Appellant has been trading since 2013. Mr Chidurala is its sole director. The Appellant is an IT company developing products and providing IT consultancy services.

[9]From July 2021, the Appellant’s registered office has been 4 Ambassador Place, Stockport Road, Altrincham WA15 8DB (‘the Appellant’s office’)

[10]On 30 June 2022, HMRC (Nabila Hafeez) wrote a letter to the Appellant at Ambassador Place informing it that it was opening a compliance check of the CJRS payments made to it, and requesting information.

[11]On 14 July 2022, the Appellant (Mr Chidurala) replied to HMRC, attaching documents and evidence.

[12]On 11 August 2022, HMRC sent a further letter, asking for further documentation and advising that the HMRC officer currently had concerns about whether one of the Appellant’s employees had been eligible under the CJRS.

[13]On 25 August 2022, the Appellant (Mr Chidurala) replied to the 11 August 2022 letter, with further information.

[14]On 6 September 2022, there was a telephone meeting between Mr Chidurala, and two HMRC officers (‘the September Meeting’).

[15]On 15 September 2022, HMRC wrote to the Appellant with a note of the September Meeting for agreement.

[16]On 29 September 2022, Mr Chidurala signed the note of the September Meeting and returned it to HMRC. It was stamped received by HMRC on 6 October 2022.

[17]On 3 October 2022, HMRC wrote to the Appellant explaining HMRC’s position that as a Real Time Information submission had not been made before the cut-off date under the legislation, the employee did not qualify for CJRS payments; further, HMRC disagreed with the amounts claimed by the Appellant for employees under the CJRS. A schedule was provided re-calculating the CJRS claims at £37,700 rather than £75,882.18 as claimed, resulting in an overclaim of £38,112.18. HMRC asked for comments and for a signed copy of the September Meeting note by 2 November 2022.

[18]On 18 January 2023, a new HMRC officer, David Crowe, wrote to the Appellant. He provided a phone number and his email address. He explained that HMRC had not received a response to their letter of 3 October 2022. He set out one amendment to the calculations, in the light of which he intended to raise an assessment in the amount of £36,035.84. He further stated that if he did not hear from the Appellant by 17 February 2023, he would take this to mean that the Appellant agreed with the calculation, and he would then send an assessment. He stated that if the Appellant disagreed with the assessment, it would have the right to appeal the decision, and how to do so would be explained in the assessment letter.

[19]On 24 February 2023, HMRC (Mr Crowe) wrote four letters to the Appellant:(1) A cover letter that started: “I do not appear to have received a response to the letter dated 18th January 2023. As detailed in that letter as I have not received a response, I will take this to mean you agree with the calculations included. Please see attached three assessment letters for the total overclaimed amount of £36,035.84.”

(2) A notice of assessment for £13,737.95 (Notice of Assessment 1).

(3) A notice of further assessment for £21,141.39 (Notice of Assessment 2).

(4) A notice of further assessment for £1,156.50 (Notice of Assessment 3).

[20]All three notices of assessments of 24 February 2023 set out information about the Appellant’s appeal rights as follows: What to do if you disagree If you disagree with this notice of assessment, you can appeal. To do this, you need to write to us within 30 days of the date of our assessment, telling us why you think our decision was wrong. We will contact you to try to settle the matter. If we cannot come to an agreement, we will write to you and tell you why. You can then (do either of the following):• have the matter reviewed by an HMRC officer who has not previously been involved in the case

• ask an independent tribunal to decide the matter If you choose a review, you can still go to the tribunal if you are not happy with the outcome. To find more information about appeals and reviews, go to www.gov.uk and search for ‘HM Revenue and Customs decisions – what to do if you disagree’.

[21]On 24 March 2023, HMRC (Mr Crowe) wrote to the Appellant. He stated that he did not appear to have received a response to the letter dated 24 February 2023. He explained that he had to consider whether any penalty is chargeable and asked for a response to a list of penalty questions; if there was no response, he would proceed to make a penalty decision using the information available.

[22]On 3 May 2023, HMRC (Mr Crowe) wrote. He reiterated that what he referred to as “an assessment” had been issued on 24 February 2023, stated that he would not be charging a penalty and that the compliance check started on 30 June 2022 was now completed.

[23]In or around October 2024, an employee or agent on behalf of HMRC attended the Appellant’s office to demand payment of the outstanding monies due. Mr Chidurala then instructed Chris Calder of Calder Compliance and Consulting.

[24]On 21 October 2024, it appears that an attempt was made by the Appellant to appeal direct to the Tribunal. We do not have papers relating to that before us, but HMRC explained, in March 2025, that this “was withdrawn as you did not utilise the appeal process at HMRC in the first instance.”.

[25]On 25 February 2025, Mr Calder wrote to HMRC requesting a late appeal of the Assessments, contending that the CJRS grants were correctly claimed. The explanation for the lateness of the appeal was asserted to be that at the time of the assessments “our client and staff” were working remotely and so post to the Appellant’s office was not addressed when received: We would request this is accepted as a late appeal the ground for this is during this period the assessment were sent to our client's business premises and under government guidance our client and staff where working remotely from home. This has meant post going to the business address was not addressed when received. This was a very difficult time for our client as it was for many others and we would hope HMRC can accept this late appeal.

[26]On 6 March 2025, HMRC responded to Mr Calder by email, rejecting the late appeal request: The assessments were posted to your clients’ business address on 24 February 2023. At this time, the covid pandemic was over and any government guidance relating to that, such as working from home and isolating, had ceased. A period of nearly 20 months had elapsed from the date of the assessments to the date of your appeal to the tribunal. I find that even if your client and their staff were working from home, I find it unreasonable that no one would frequently check post sent to the business address within this period. The business address is the registered office of the company and is on the record with HMRC and companies house. No other address was specified for correspondence relating to the compliance check, and I note that correspondence was sent to the business address, and these were responded to. I therefore refuse your late appeal.

[27]This refusal was repeated in a letter from HMRC dated 11 March 2025.

[28]On 12 March 2025, Mr Calder submitted the Appellant’s Notice of Appeal online. The Grounds of Appeal stated: Our client made a claim under the Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme for two employees. Our client due to Government restrictions put in place was working from home. It would appear HMRC had raised part assessments in relation to this claim during the period when our client could not attend oﬃce due to contacting Covid on several occasions. The Notice of Assessment were issued on 23/02/2023 during a period when our client had contacted Covid 19 and was self isolated and therefore never had the opportunity to review these assessments. The assessments only came to light when enforcement oﬃcer attended our client's premises and demanding monies due. Our client would like the tribunal to allow this late appeal as our client has Covid during this period. Our client asserts that he qualiﬁes for these claims and can produce further information.

[29]There were five pdf attachments to the Notice of Appeal:(1) A T239 form to authorise Mr Calder as the Appellant’s representative.

(2) “VisuTechRefusalof LateAppeal.pdf”, which was a copy of HMRC’s letter of 11 March 2025.

(3) “VisutechLtd.Assessmentletter1PDF.pdf”, which was the Notice of Assessment 1.

(4) “VisutechLtd.Assessmentletter2PDF.pdf”, which was the Notice of Assessment 2.

(5) “VisutechLtd.Assessmentletter3PDF.pdf”, which was the Notice of Assessment 3.

[30]On 7 July 2025, HMRC served its Notice of Objection to the late appeal. HMRC submitted that there was no proper reason for delay as claimed in the Notice of Appeal:69. It is submitted that all Covid-19 restrictions and/or self-isolation requirements had ceased in March 2022. The grounds provided for the late appeal by the Appellant without any evidence of their constant illness for nearly two years failed to meet the requirements for a reasonable excuse. It is further submitted that it is unreasonable that no one would frequently check post sent to the business address within this period.

70. The Respondents submit that the Appellant deliberately disregarded the assessments in the hope that the matter would be overlooked, and has only taken action once Debt Management attended the Appellant’s premises.

[31]On 25 September 2025, the Tribunal issued directions for the hearing, that stated that if a party intended to rely on the evidence of a witness, that party may (not must) provide a witness statement. No witness statement was provided by the Appellant.

[32]We would additionally note that HMRC’s Notice of Objection referred to at least three demand letters having been sent to the Appellant. However we have not been provided with copies of any such, nor any details of the dates of the same, and so for avoidance of doubt make no findings in that regard.

Hearing and Evidence

[33]Mr Chidurala was the sole attendee of the hearing on behalf of the Appellant. He stated that Mr Calder was not able to make the hearing. The Tribunal ensured that he had a copy of the hearing bundle. Mr Chidurala indicated that he had not read HMRC’s Notice of Objection so we adjourned the hearing to allow Mr Chidurala the opportunity to read and consider it. Mr Chidurala confirmed thereafter that he was happy to proceed with the hearing.

[34]Mr Chidurala then gave evidence over video link in respect of the reasons why the appeal was late. In summary, that evidence was to the following effect:(1) To his knowledge, the Appellant had not received the Notices of Assessment, nor the letters of 3 October 2022, 18 January 2023, 24 March 2023, 3 May 2023 nor any subsequent debt collection letters.

(2) In 2022 and 2023, there were employees working in the Appellant’s Office, although there was a policy allowing a proportion of time working from home.

(3) In February 2023, he had just come back from a trip to India and thought he might have Covid-19 so isolated for about a month.

(4) Letters addressed to the Appellant at the Appellant’s Office would be received by reception staff at the building, then sorted and then provided to him as director when he next attended the Office.

(5) When he returned to the Office he did not see the Notices of Assessment nor the earlier letters of 3 October 2022 or 18 January 2023.

(6) In April 2023, he contacted HMRC via a helpline to find out what was happening in respect of the CJRS compliance check and was told that there was no balance owing and so thought the CJRS claim was resolved. He did not try directly to contact the HMRC officer dealing with the case by telephone nor by email.

(7) The first he knew of the Assessments was when an enforcement officer came to the Office, after which he instructed Mr Calder in October 2024.

(8) He did not know why Mr Calder had explained the reason for the late appeal in his email of 25 February 2025 and the Notice of Appeal as he had.

(9) He could not explain why Mr Calder was able to attach pdf copies of the Notices of Assessment to the Notice of Appeal if, as he claimed, these had not been received. He stated he did not know how Mr Calder obtained copies of them. He suggested, without any evidential basis, that Mr Calder may have sought copies of them at some point from October 2024 or thereafter from HMRC.

[35]There was no witness from HMRC. However, given the Appellant’s changed case asserted for the first time at the hearing, the Tribunal gave HMRC an opportunity to take instructions as to whether Mr Calder had contacted HMRC to obtain copies of the Notices of Assessment. Mr Chaudhry informed us that there was no evidence of his having done so.

Discussion

[36]We address the application for late appeal according to the Martland approach set out above. i. Length of the delay

[37]The lengthy delay in this case is plainly significant and serious. The appeal should have been made to HMRC within 30 days, so by 26 March 2023. In fact, the Appellant sought to appeal to HMRC on 25 February 2025, 702 days later; HMRC refused permission to appeal late, and the Appellant sought to appeal to the Tribunal on 12 March 2025. ii. Reasons for the delay

[38]Three conflicting reasons for the delay have been put forward on behalf of the Appellant. We are not persuaded by any of them.

[39]The first explanation in Mr Calder’s email to HMRC of 25 February 2025 was that at the time in February 2023, under government guidance, “our client and staff” were working remotely and so post (i.e. including the Notices of Assessment) was not addressed when received. However, HMRC counter that by this date, Covid-19 restrictions and/or self-isolation requirements had ceased. Further, in the hearing before us Mr Chidurala did not support this explanation, saying that there were workers in the Office in the period, even if he himself had been absent due to possible Covid-19 for about a month in February 2023.

[40]The second explanation in the Notice of Appeal was distinct, as it specifically relied upon a contention that “our client” – i.e. Mr Chidurala – had contracted Covid-19 and self-isolated and never had the opportunity to review the Assessments (rather than the staff as a whole). Mr Chidurala did state that he thought he may have had Covid-19 and so was absent from the Office for about a month in February 2023. But even if we were to accept his evidence on these points, it could not explain the delay in bringing the appeal, because it would not provide any explanation at all for why, having returned to the Office in or around March 2023 thereafter he failed to take any steps to appeal the Assessments. Rather, his case as presented to us at the hearing was that he never saw the Assessments, and that because post directed to the Appellant would be reserved by the receptionist to him, they were never in fact received by the Appellant at the Office at all.

[41]The third explanation, articulated for the first time at the hearing, was that the Notices of Assessment had never been received by the Appellant in the first place. In support of his evidence on this point, Mr Chidurala referred to his engagement with HMRC in 2022 and rhetorically asked why he would then have done nothing on receipt of the Assessments in 2023 had he known of them. However, on the evidence before us, we are not satisfied on the balance of probabilities by his explanation. In particular, HMRC’s case that the Notices of Assessment were sent to the Appellant by post and were received is supported by the fact that Mr Calder was able to attach copies of those Notices of Assessment in pdf form to the Notice of Appeal. Mr Chidurala provided no evidence supporting any alternative explanation of how Mr Calder obtained them. Additionally, the case articulated by Mr Chidurala at the hearing was in stark contrast to the earlier explanations of Mr Calder. These did not suggest that the Notices of Assessment had never been received, and rather impliedly that they had; given that Mr Calder was not involved until October 2024, we infer that his account must have been on the basis of what he had been told by Mr Chidurala, at variance to the oral evidence given to us. We also did not find Mr Chidurala’s evidence of having telephoned a general HMRC helpline about the CJRS check in April 2023 convincing, in circumstances where in 2022 he had been liaising directly with an HMRC officer dealing with the compliance check and had direct email and telephone number for contact purposes. We consider that seeking direct contact with that officer (or a successor) was the more natural thing to do.

[42]Accordingly, we conclude that the Appellant has not established any good reason for the delay. iii. All the circumstances of the case

[43]We remind ourselves that the starting point is that permission should not be granted unless the Tribunal is satisfied on balance that it should be.

[44]As regards the underlying merits of the appeal, while HMRC sought to argue that the Appellant’s case lacked a reasonable prospect of success, that contention was asserted rather than reasoned, and Mr Chaudhry did not press it before us. We therefore make no findings as to the underlying merits of the appeal, and do not weigh them as part of the balancing exercise at this third stage.

[45]In favour of granting permission, we take account of the fact that if permission to bring a late appeal is refused, the Appellant will lose the ability to challenge the Assessments. However, that is not of itself a decisive factor in favour of granting permission. As per Katib, it is a factor present in any application for such permission that, should permission be refused, the appellant cannot maintain its challenge.

[46]Rather, in our judgment, the balance weighs heavily against granting permission for the late appeal in this case. We must take particular note of the need for litigation to be conducted efficiently and for statutory time limits to be respected. The delay in this case is very long, which is a significant and serious breach of the statutory requirement for an appeal to be brought within 30 days, and we are not satisfied that there is any good reason for that delay.

Conclusion

[47]For these reasons, the application for permission to bring a late appeal is dismissed.

Right to apply for permission to appeal

[48]This document contains full findings of fact and reasons for the decision. Any party dissatisfied with this decision has a right to apply for permission to appeal against it pursuant to Rule 39 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Tax Chamber) Rules 2009. The application must be received by this Tribunal not later than 56 days after this decision is sent to that party. The parties are referred to “Guidance to accompany a Decision from the First-tier Tribunal (Tax Chamber)” which accompanies and forms part of this decision notice. Release date: 06 August 2026