Dr John Reynolds v The Commissioners for HMRC [2026] UKFTT 1099 (TC)

[2026] UKFTT 01099 (TC)Case No TC 09966
FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL
TAX CHAMBER
Hearing Heard on 24 July 2026Date Judgment date: 28 July 2026
By remote video hearing
Appeal reference: TC/2023/09737
INCOME TAX and PROCEDURE – reinstatement application – Tribunal Judge allowed application – that decision set aside by a different Judge – whether that Judge had the jurisdiction to set aside the earlier decision – held, yes – TMA s 54 considered and applied – application refused
Before
TRIBUNAL JUDGE ANNE REDSTON
Between
DR JOHN REYNOLDSAppellantTHE COMMISSIONERS FORRespondentHIS MAJESTY’S REVENUE AND CUSTOMSRespondentThe Appellant in person for in personMs Victoria Halfpenny, litigator of HM Revenue and Customs’ Solicitor’s Office for RespondentsDECISION

Introduction

[1]On 28 November 2024, Dr Reynolds applied to reinstate his appeal (“the Application”). A Tribunal judge (“Judge A”) allowed the Application, but that decision was subsequently set aside by a second Judge (“Judge B”), who went on to direct that the Application be decided at a hearing.[2]Ms Halfpenny, who represented HMRC, agreed with Judge B. She also submitted that the Application should be refused, because(a) the conditions in Taxes Management Act 1970 (“TMA”), s 54(4) were not met, and(b) those provisions took priority over Rule 17 read with Rule 5 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Tax Chamber) Rules 2009 (“the Tribunal Rules”).[3]Dr Reynolds’ position was that I had no jurisdiction to decide the Application, because it had already been decided by Judge A. If he was wrong in that submission, TMA s 54 did not apply and the Application should be allowed.[4]For the reasons set out in the main body of this judgment, I found I had jurisdiction to decide the Application, and went on to refuse to reinstate Dr Reynolds’ appeal.[5]In this decision, the Tribunal Rules and legislation are cited so far as relevant to the issues in the case, and any emphasis is mine.

The Evidence

[6]HMRC filed and served a bundle of documents, which included the correspondence between the parties, and between the Tribunal and the parties. The Tribunal Service provided me with the grounds of appeal set out in Dr Reynolds’ Notice of Appeal to the Tribunal, and the parties confirmed that they also had a copy of that document. In addition, Dr Reynolds gave oral evidence about what had happened.

Findings of fact

[7]On the basis of the evidence before me, I make the following findings of fact.

The appeal, the withdrawal and the Application

[8]At some point before April 2023, HMRC issued discovery assessments to Dr Reynolds for the tax years 2012-13 to 2019-20, on the basis that he was liable to the High Income Child Benefit Charge (“HICBC”) but had not paid it; HMRC also issued penalties.[9]On 5 April 2023, Dr Reynolds appealed to HMRC against the discovery assessments and related penalties. His appeal was made after Parliament had retrospectively changed the law by Finance Act 2022, s 97. That provision gave HMRC the power to issue HICBC discovery assessments (apart from certain assessments which had been appealed by 30 June 2021).[10]Dr Reynolds subsequently notified his appeal to the Tribunal. His grounds of appeal against the assessments were that HMRC could not use discovery assessments to collect HICBC. As is the Tribunal’s normal practice, the parties were directed to copy each other on their correspondence with the Tribunal.[11]On 12 September 2024, HMRC informed Dr Reynolds that they had reviewed his case, and were cancelling the penalties on the basis that he had a reasonable excuse; they were also cancelling the assessments for the years 2012-13 to 2017-18 because they were out of time. The penalties totalled £1,308 and the assessments totalled £4,388. The only two assessments which remained were those for 2018-19 and 2019-20.[12]Dr Reynolds replied by return, saying:
“Further to your email below, I am writing to inform you and the tribunal that I willing to withdraw my appeal ‘John Reynolds – TC/2023/09737’, due to the fact that HMRC are to accept that I do have a Reasonable Excuse for my failure to notify liability for the High Income Child Benefit Charge (HICBC).Please ensure that my account is updated to reflect the penalties of £1,308.00 and the assessments for 2013/14, 2014/15, 2015/16, 2016/17 and 2017/18 totalling £4,388.00 are both cancelled.”
[13]On 8 November 2024, a Tribunal clerk wrote to Dr Reynolds saying: “Thank you for notifying the Tribunal of your withdrawal of your appeal in this case, which has been referred to the respondent. The effect of your withdrawal is that your appeal has failed and any hearing date is cancelled. You have the right to apply in writing within 28 days from the date of this letter for reinstatement of your appeal. If the Tribunal hears nothing to the contrary within 28 days, the file will be closed.[14]On the same date, the Tribunal sent a similar but not identical letter to HMRC, which read:
“The appellant has informed the Tribunal that it has withdrawn its appeal in this case (copy letter enclosed). The effect is that the appeal has failed and any hearing date is cancelled. If you have any further application with regards to this appeal it should be made within 28 days from the date of this letter, in the absence of which the file will be closed.”
[15]On 28 November 2024, Dr Reynolds sent the Application to the Tribunal, but he did not copy HMRC, and the Tribunal did not forward his email. It said:
“Further to your letter dated 8th November 2024 (copy enclosed), I am writing to inform you that I would like to reinstate my appeal to a First Tier Tribunal (Reference number TC/2024/09737) with regard to payment of the HICBT [sic] for Period End April 2019 and April 2020.”

What happened next

[16]On 11 February 2025, a Tribunal clerk sent a letter to Dr Reynolds, which said:
“The Tribunal acknowledges receipt of your application. Please find enclosed copy of letter [sic] today sent to the other party.”
[17]The copy letter there referred to was addressed to “HMRC” without an address. That is because the Tribunal usually sends HMRC correspondence by email to their “Clearing House” rather than to a specific individual. The letter was similarly dated 11 February 2025, and it read:
“The Tribunal refers to the application from the other party dated 28 November 2024. Please let the Tribunal have your representations on this application within 14 days, after which time the application will be referred to a judge.”
[18]Ms Halfpenny provided evidence by way of an email from the Clearing House that this letter was never received. The email read:
“I have checked and am unable to find any directions sent to us in February . Our records show we received correspondence for this case on 8 May 2025, 1 July 2025 & 6 Aug 2025.”
[19]Dr Reynolds said that it was “very convenient” that HMRC were now saying they had never received the letter of 11 February 2025. However, I accepted the evidence. The Clearing House was able to specify correctly the exact dates on which correspondence had been received, and that did not include the letter of 11 February 2025. I find as a fact that this letter was not received by HMRC.[20]It follows that HMRC were unaware of the Application, because Dr Reynolds had not sent them a copy and the Tribunal’s related letter did not reach them.

The Tribunal’s decision

[21]On 8 May a Tribunal Judge (“Judge A”) considered and allowed the Application (“Judge A’s decision”). She said:
“I have considered the Application by the Appellant dated 28 November 2024 to reinstate this appeal. The Appellant notified the Tribunal on 12 September 2024 that he wished to withdraw his appeal. The Tribunal acknowledged the withdrawal on 8 November 2024 and gave the Appellant 28 days to apply for the appeal to be reinstated which he did within the 28 days. On 11 February 2025 the Tribunal invited the Respondents to make representations on the Application within 14 days. To date the Tribunal has not received any representations from the Respondents. I consider it appropriate to make the following Directions. DIRECTIONS IT IS DIRECTED that 1. The Appeal TC/2023/09737 is reinstated…”
DIRECTIONS

IT IS DIRECTED that

[22]Other Directions then followed for the parties to provide listing information and bundles for the reinstated appeal. HMRC were copied on Judge A’s decision and the related Directions.[23]On 27 May 2025, Dr Reynolds applied for the Directions to be set aside on the basis that HMRC had not provided representations in response to the letter dated 8 February 2025. In terms, this was an application for the newly reinstated appeal to be decided in his favour, without the need for a new hearing in which HMRC would participate. Dr Reynolds did not copy that application to HMRC either. On 1 July 2025, Judge A refused his application; HMRC were copied on that refusal decision.[24]On 10 July 2025, HMRC sent a document to the Tribunal headed “Respondent’s Notice of Objection to Reinstatement” (“HMRC’s Notice”). The main body said that:(1) Judge A had made her decision without HMRC being aware of the Application and the decision was thus inconsistent with the overriding objective; and(2) Judge A’s decision was wrong, because TMA s 54 takes priority over the Tribunal Rules. If a taxpayer such as Dr Reynolds does not inform HMRC within 30 days of a withdrawal that he wants to reverse that decision, the withdrawal is binding..[25]Another Judge (“Judge B”) considered HMRC’s Notice and the related correspondence. She set aside Judge A’s decision on the basis that(a) HMRC “did not…previously have an opportunity to comment” and(b) that procedural error mattered because Judge A had not been provided with HMRC’s submissions on TMA s 54. Dr Reynolds was informed of Judge B’s set aside decision and her reasoning in two letters dated 6 August and 11 September 2025.[26]A hearing was then listed to decide the Application, but was postponed following the appeal to the Upper Tribunal (“UT”) by another taxpayer, see Hosie v HMRC [2025] UKFTT 00327 (TC), but that appeal was subsequently settled and Dr Reynold’s case was relisted.

The parties’ submissions

[27]Dr Reynolds submitted that I had no jurisdiction to decide the Application, because it had already been decided by Judge A. He found it “confusing and concerning” that one judge could cancel a decision made by another, and said “I cannot see any legal grounds for [Judge B’s] decision”. He went on to say that it was “very unfair” for HMRC now to have “another opportunity” to comment on the Application when they had failed to respond to the letter of 11 February 2025. If he were wrong on that point, and I did have jurisdiction, Dr Reynolds submitted that TMA s 54 did not apply and the Application should be allowed.[28]Ms Halfpenny agreed with Judge B, and she submitted that the Application should be refused for the reasons given later in this judgment.[29]Judge A’s decision is set out in full at §21. Its legal basis can be found in Rule 17 of the Tribunal Rules, read together with Rule 5.[30]Rule 17 reads:
“(1) Subject to any provision in an enactment relating to withdrawal or settlement of particular proceedings, a party may give notice to the Tribunal of the withdrawal of the case made by it in the Tribunal proceedings, or any part of that case— (a) by sending or delivering to the Tribunal a written notice of withdrawal;… (2) The Tribunal must notify each party in writing of its receipt of a withdrawal under this rule. (3) A party who has withdrawn their case may apply to the Tribunal for the case to be reinstated.

(a) ;…”

[31]As regards the provision highlighted above, Dr Reynolds had withdrawn his appeal on 12 September 2024; the Tribunal acknowledged the withdrawal on 8 November 2024 and told him he had 28 days to apply for the appeal to be reinstated. However, as the HMRC Notice identified, Rule 17(4)(a) required Dr Reynolds to make the Application within 28 days of the withdrawal, not within 28 days of the FTT letter, so the Application was made some 29 days later than Rule 17(4)(a) requires..[32]Rule 5(3)(a) gives the Tribunal power to “extend…the time for complying with any rule…”. Because Judge A allowed the Application, I infer that she either considered that the Tribunal had already extended the time for compliance (by the wording of the letter sent on 8 November 2024), or if not, that it was appropriate to exercise her discretion and allow the Application to be made late, see Martland v HMRC [2018] UKUT 0178 (TCC) and the law there cited.[33]As already recorded above, HMRC’s Notice said that:(1) Judge A had made her decision without HMRC being aware of the Application and the decision was thus inconsistent with the overriding objective; and(2) Judge A’s decision was wrong, because TMA s 54 takes priority over the Tribunal Rules.[34]Although HMRC’s Notice was headed “Notice of Objection to Reinstatement”, when it was filed, the Application had already been allowed. In substance, HMRC’s Notice was instead an application for the Tribunal to change Judge A’s decision and allow the Application: in other words, it was an application for permission to appeal (“PTA”).[35]Judge B agreed with HMRC that it was a procedural error of law for the Tribunal to allow the Application when HMRC had received no notice that the Application had been made or decided. Judge B also recognised that Judge A, who did not have the benefit of the submissions in HMRC’s Note, had arguably made a substantive error of law in allowing the Application, and the procedural error was therefore significant. As a result, Judge B set aside Judge A’s decision and directed a hearing of the Application.[36]The question I have to decide, posed by Dr Reynolds, is whether Judge B had the power to set aside Judge A’s decision.[37]I begin by saying that Judge B was plainly right that it was an error of law for the Tribunal to allow the Application when HMRC knew nothing about it – they had not received either the Application itself (because Dr Reynolds had not sent it to them) and HMRC had not received the letter from the Tribunal dated 11 February 2025. Of course, Judge A was unaware that HMRC knew nothing of the Application: she only knew, as she recorded in her decision, that “to date the Tribunal has not received any representations from the Respondents”.[38]I next considered whether Judge B, having identified an error of law, was able to set aside Judge B’s reinstatement decision, or whether she had no power to do so, as Dr Reynolds submitted.[39]Like Judge A, Judge B did not refer to specific Tribunal Rules when she communicated her decision. That is understandable, as both judges were writing in informal terms to a litigant in person. I thus considered for myself Part 4 of the Tribunal Rules, which is entitled “Correcting, Setting Aside, Reviewing and Appealing Tribunal Decisions”.

Different judges

[40]One of Dr Reynolds’s submissions was that one judge could not set aside a decision made by another. However, Part 4 contains nothing which restricts the Tribunal’s powers to correct, set aside or amend to the judge who made the decision in question, and they can therefore be exercised by a different judge. As I said during the hearing, in some Chambers of the First-tier Tribunal (such as Social Entitlement), which have almost identical rules to this Chamber, it is standard practice for decisions of one judge to be corrected, set aside etc by a different judge, who can take a fresh look at the issue being challenged. In this Chamber, a different judge might act if, for example, the first judge was unwell or absent, or simply because it is more efficient or otherwise in the interests of justice for the second judge to take on that role.

Rule 38

[41]I first considered Rule 38, which sits within Part 4. It is headed “Setting aside a decision which disposes of proceedings”, and reads:
“(1) The Tribunal may on the application of a party or on its own initiative, set aside a decision which disposes of proceedings, or part of such a decision, and re-make the decision, or the relevant part of it, if— (a) the Tribunal considers that it is in the interests of justice to do so; and (b) one or more of the conditions in paragraph (2) is satisfied. (2) The conditions are— (a) a document relating to the proceedings was not sent to, or was not received at an appropriate time by, a party or a party's representative; (b) a document relating to the proceedings was not sent to the Tribunal at an appropriate time; (c) there has been some other procedural irregularity in the proceedings; (d) a party, or a party's representative, was not present at a hearing related to the proceedings…” (a) the Tribunal considers that it is in the interests of justice to do so; and (b) one or more of the conditions in paragraph (2) is satisfied. (a) a document relating to the proceedings was not sent to, or was not received at an appropriate time by, a party or a party's representative; (b) a document relating to the proceedings was not sent to the Tribunal at an appropriate time; (c) there has been some other procedural irregularity in the proceedings; (d) a party, or a party's representative, was not present at a hearing related to the proceedings…”
[42]Rule 38 thus makes it clear that a Tribunal can set aside a decision if there have been procedural errors, providing it is in the interests of justice to do so. There is no doubt that there were procedural irregularities in this case: HMRC were not sent the Application, and did not receive the letter of 11 February 2025, so were unaware of the proceedings. As a result of those errors, Judge A did not receive significant submissions on the law from HMRC before she made her decision, so the “interests of justice” test is also met.[43]However, Rule 38 is headed “Setting aside a decision which disposes of proceedings” and this is repeated at para (1). It thus applies to decisions which bring an appeal to an end. Judge A’s decision did not bring Dr Reynolds’ appeal to an end, but instead reinstated it. Although helpful in showing that procedural errors are a basis for setting aside a decision, on these facts, Rule 38 does not apply directly.

Rules 40 and 41

[44]Rule 40 is headed “Tribunal’s consideration of application for permission to appeal” and subsection (1) reads:
“On receiving an application for permission to appeal the Tribunal must first consider, taking into account the overriding objective in rule 2, whether to review the decision in accordance with rule 41 (review of a decision).”
[45]Rule 41(1) then reads:
“The Tribunal may only undertake a review of a decision— (a) pursuant to rule 40(1) (review on an application for permission to appeal); and (b) if it is satisfied that there was an error of law in the decision.”
[46]The term “review” in Part 4 of the Tribunal Rules is defined by Rule 36 as meaning “the review of a decision by the Tribunal under section 9 of the 2007 Act”. The “2007 Act” is defined by Rule 1(3) as the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 (“TCEA”).[47]TCEA s 9 begins:
“(1) The First-tier Tribunal may review a decision made by it on a matter in a case… (2) The First-tier Tribunal's power under subsection (1) in relation to a decision is exercisable— (a) of its own initiative, or (b) on application by a person who…has a right of appeal in respect of the decision.” (a) of its own initiative, or (b) on application by a person who…has a right of appeal in respect of the decision.”
[48]Subsection (1) thus allows the Tribunal to review “a decision made by it on a matter in a case” so the power is not restricted to decisions which dispose of an appeal, but encompasses reinstatements.[49]Subsection (3) then provides that the Tribunal Rules may limit the exercise of the review power in various ways. In this Chamber, the power can only be exercised in relation to PTA applications where there is an error of law in the decision.[50]Section 9 continues:
“(4) Where the First-tier Tribunal has under subsection (1) reviewed a decision, the First-tier Tribunal may in the light of the review do any of the following— (a) correct accidental errors in the decision or in a record of the decision; (b) amend reasons given for the decision; (c) set the decision aside. (5) Where under subsection (4)(c) the First-tier Tribunal sets a decision aside, the First-tier Tribunal must either— (a) re-decide the matter concerned, or (b) refer that matter to the Upper Tribunal.” (a) correct accidental errors in the decision or in a record of the decision; (b) amend reasons given for the decision; (c) set the decision aside. (a) re-decide the matter concerned, or (b) refer that matter to the Upper Tribunal.”

Discussion

[51]Applying the Tribunal Rules and TCEA s 9 to the facts of this case:(1) HMRC’s Notice was in substance a PTA Application.(2) Judge B was therefore correct to consider whether to review Judge A’s as required by Rule 40(1).(3) Judge B was satisfied that there was an error of law in Judge A’s decision, and she therefore had the power under Rule 41(1) to review that decision.(4) Having done so, she had the power under TCEA s 9(4)(c) to set the decision aside.[52]I then considered whether the requirement at TCEA s 9(5)(a) had been met, namely that after setting a decision aside, the Tribunal must either “redecide the matter” or refer it to the UT. Judge B did not redecide the matter, but instead directed that it be redecided at the hearing. However, the TCEA s 9 requirements are placed on the Tribunal, not on an individual. In my judgment, the requirement at TCEA s 9(5)(a) will be satisfied once I have re-decided the Application. That reading reflects the obvious purpose of the provision: once a decision has been set aside, it must either be re-decided by the Tribunal, or decided by the UT, otherwise the appellant will have a live appeal with no outcome.[53]It follows from the above that Judge B had the power to set Judge A’s decision aside and direct a new hearing.

Change to directions

[54]I have approached the above analysis on the basis that Judge A issued a “decision” rather than a “direction”, although I recognise that the wording was as follows (see §21):
“I consider it appropriate to make the following Directions. DIRECTIONS IT IS DIRECTED that 1. The Appeal TC/2023/09737 is reinstated…”
DIRECTIONS

IT IS DIRECTED that

[55]The Tribunal normally gives a “direction” when case managing proceedings, so it “directs” the provision of witness statements, listing particulars etc, and when the Tribunal strikes out or reinstates an appeal, that is “a decision”. The Tribunal can of course first make a “decision” and then make a “direction” – for instance, a judge may hear and decide a contested application to join two appeals, and follow that decision with related directions. I have assumed that Judge A here similarly decided the Application and went on to direct the Tribunal clerks to reinstate the appeal.[56]However, were that to be wrong, so that Judge A did not make a decision but instead issued a direction that the appeal be reinstated, the relevant guidance is in Tibbles v SIG PLC [2012] EWCA Civ 518. The Court of Appeal there held at [39(ii)] that a direction could normally only be set aside:
“(a) where there has been a material change of circumstances since the order was made, or (b) where the facts on which the original decision was made were (innocently or otherwise) misstated.”
[57]If Judge A did issue a direction rather than a decision, Judge B would therefore have had the jurisdiction to set that direction aside because the facts known to Judge A (that HMRC knew about the Application but had not provided representations) had been innocently misstated.

Overall conclusion

[58]On the basis of the analyses above, I find that Judge B had the jurisdiction to set aside Judge A’s decision (or direction) and direct a hearing of the Application. It follows that I have the jurisdiction to re-decide the Application.

Whether the Application should be allowed

[59]My starting point is Rule 5, which is headed “Case management powers”. Paragraph (1) reads: “Subject to the provisions of the 2007 Act and any other enactment, the Tribunal may regulate its own procedure”.[60]As discussed earlier in this judgment, Rule 5(3)(a) allows the Tribunal to extend the time for complying with another Rule: the wording is as follows:
“In particular, and without restricting the general powers in paragraphs (1) and (2), the Tribunal may by direction— (a) extend…the time for complying with any rule, practice direction or direction unless such extension or shortening would conflict with a provision of another enactment setting down a time limit,”
[61]Rule 17, which is set out earlier in this judgment and relates to withdrawals and reinstatement, similarly begins at para (1):
“Subject to any provision in an enactment relating to withdrawal or settlement of particular proceedings, a party may give notice to the Tribunal of the withdrawal of the case made by it in the Tribunal proceedings…”
[62]Ms Halfpenny submitted that the relevant enactment in Dr Reynolds’ case was TMA s 54. This is headed “Settling appeals by agreement” and reads: “(1) Subject to the provisions of this section, where a person gives notice of appeal and, before the appeal is determined by the tribunal, the inspector or other proper officer of the Crown and the appellant come to an agreement, whether in writing or otherwise, that the assessment or decision under appeal should be treated as upheld without variation, or as varied in a particular manner or as discharged or cancelled, the like consequences shall ensue for all purposes as would have ensued if, at the time when the agreement was come to, the tribunal had determined the appeal and had upheld the assessment or decision without variation, had varied it in that manner or had discharged or cancelled it, as the case may be. (2) Subsection (1) of this section shall not apply where, within thirty days from the date when the agreement was come to, the appellant gives notice in writing to the inspector or other proper officer of the Crown that he desires to repudiate or resile from the agreement. (3) … (4) Where(a) a person who has given a notice of appeal notifies the inspector or other proper officer of the Crown, whether orally or in writing, that he desires not to proceed with the appeal; and(b) thirty days have elapsedsince the giving of the notification without the inspector or other proper officer giving to the appellant notice in writing indicating that he is unwilling that the appeal should be treated as withdrawn, the preceding provisions of this section shall have effect as if, at the date of the appellant's notification, the appellant and the inspector or other proper officer had come to an agreement, orally or in writing, as the case may be, that the assessment ordecision under appeal should be upheld without variation.” (a) a person who has given a notice of appeal notifies the inspector or other proper officer of the Crown, whether orally or in writing, that he desires not to proceed with the appeal; and (b) thirty days have elapsedsince the giving of the notification without the inspector or other proper officer giving to the appellant notice in writing indicating that he is unwilling that the appeal should be treated as withdrawn,[63]Ms Halfpenny explained the relevance of TMA s 54 to withdrawal/reinstatement cases as follows:
“Section 54(4) of TMA 1970 provides that where a taxpayer has appealed to the Tribunal and then withdraws that Tribunal appeal, then once 30 days has elapsed since the withdrawal, the effect is that the parties are treated as coming to an agreement that settles the appeal and the consequences of that agreement are the same as if it had been decided by the Tribunal.”
[64]She relied on OWD v HMRC [2018] UKFTT 06675 (TC), a decision of Judge Falk (as she then was) which concerned the almost identical provision at VATA s 85. Judge Falk held that once the 30 days have passed, the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to reinstate an appeal, see [30] to [40] of that judgment.[65]As Judge Falk pointed out in OWD, Judge Poole had already come to an identical conclusion in relation to TMA s 54, see Tuncel v HMRC [2014] UKFTT 171 (TC). He said:
“33. Once agreement has been reached in writing (or has been confirmed inwriting), then section 54 TMA is engaged and the only statutorily permissible means of cancelling that agreement is through the “cooling off” provisions of section 54(2) TMA. It is common ground that no notice was given within 30 days under that subsection purporting to repudiate or resile from the agreement and accordingly we find that section 54(1) applies to this agreement. Thus, so far as the income tax and NIC amendment/assessments are concerned, “the like consequences shall ensue for all purposes as would have ensued if, at the time when the agreement was come to, the tribunal had determined the appeal and had… varied it…” in the manner agreed. 34. This means that, for the purposes of the Appellant’s application to “reinstate” the part of his appeal that relates to the income tax and NIC amendment/assessments, we are required to assume that the Tribunal has already determined that part of the appeal on the basis agreed. In such a case, the doctrine of res judicata means that it would be an abuse of the Tribunal’sprocess to permit the appeal to be re-opened, because the Tribunal would thereby be allowing the parties to re-litigate an appeal which had already been deemed by statute to have been determined on an agreed basis.”
[66]Dr Reynolds submitted that TMA s 54 should instead be read as only applying where HMRC have given notice within 30 days that they object to the withdrawal. I agree that this is one situation in which there is no deemed settlement under TMA s 54; this is clear from subsection (4)(b). But it is clear from the wording that the section also extends to cases such as this, where the taxpayer does not give notice within the 30 day period that he wants to repudiate his withdrawal and reinstate the appeal.[67]As a result, the Tribunal cannot reinstate Dr Reynolds’ appeal under Rule 17(1), because that Rule is “[s]ubject to any provision in an enactment relating to withdrawal or settlement of particular proceedings”. The Tribunal can also not rely on Rule 5 to extend the time for Dr Reynolds to make his reinstatement application, because that is precluded both by Rule 5(1), which makes all case management matters “subject to the provisions of…any other enactment” and by Rule 5(3)(a), which bars the Tribunal from giving an extension of time if that “would conflict with a provision of another enactment setting down a time limit”.[68]I therefore agree with Ms Halfpenny that I have no jurisdiction to allow the Application.

Conclusion and appeal rights

[69]For the above reasons, I refuse reinstatement.[70]In the course of the hearing, Dr Reynolds made several complaints about what he saw as failures of the Tribunal’s procedures and those of HMRC. He focused on the letter of 11 February 2025 (which had not been received by HMRC), and on the setting aside of Judge A’s decision. He said these events had had a “combination effect” on him. However, as I pointed out in the hearing, had he copied the Application to HMRC, as he had been directed to do, it is unlikely that any of the subsequent difficulties would have arisen.[71]This document contains full findings of fact and reasons for the decision. Any party dissatisfied with this decision has a right to apply for permission to appeal against it pursuant to Rule 39 of the Tribunal Rules. The application must be received by this Tribunal not later than 56 days after this decision is sent to that party. The parties are referred to "Guidance to accompany a Decision from the First-tier Tribunal (Tax Chamber)" which accompanies and forms part of this decision notice. Release date: 28 July 2026