“Further evidence will not be admitted after13 October 2023 , unless the Tribunal gives permission. In the light of the length of time which has already elapsed, and the extensive evidence already filed and served by the Appellant, permission will only be given if there were to be an exceptionally good reason why it had not previously been filed and served, and if its late service did not prejudice the other party’s preparation for the hearing.”
“…it is the duty of a court to form its own opinion on the basis of the evidence placed before it; and that it would not be proper for the court in forming that opinion to be influenced by the opinion of someone else, however reliable that person's opinion is likely to be. In so far as the evidence before the later court is the same as the evidence before the earlier court, the later court is in as good a position to draw inferences and conclusions from the evidence. In so far as the evidence is different, the opinion of the earlier court does not assist the court's task.”
“As in the case of the rule which excludes opinion evidence generally, therefore, the true justification for the rule in Hollington v Hewthorn, as I see it, is not that the opinion of an earlier court is irrelevant but lies in the requirements for a fair trial. The responsibility of a judge to make his or her own independent assessment of the evidence entails that weight ought not to be attached to conclusions reached by another judge – all the more so where the party to whose interests the conclusions are adverse was not a party to the earlier proceedings. That, I think, was the principle which the Court of Appeal was expounding in Hollington v Hewthorn.”
“We reject Qualcomm’s submission that the rule in Hollington v Hewthorn, if it applies, is binding on this Tribunal. No cogent basis has been made out as to why a High Court rule of evidence should necessarily bind this Tribunal and we accept [the Consumer’s Association’s] submission that the discretion given to this Tribunal as to the evidence to be admitted is broad.”
“The principal reason for this is the reason given by Christopher Clarke LJ in Rogers v Hoyle, being that it is for this Tribunal to assess the evidence and make primary findings of fact. Relying upon the evaluative judgments of other decision-makers necessarily circumvents that role. To place weight on their findings, however distinguished or authoritative, risks the decision being made at least in part on evidence which is not before the Tribunal.”
“[Mr Bartlett] confirmed he had received the CDF and said that he thought one might have been issued earlier. He has met with his clients and said that there was clearly a lot of cash flying about, including a suitcase of cash apparently brought in from Dubai. He was planning on making a voluntary disclosure if he hadn’t heard from me.”
“[Mr Bartlett] has outlined [to Mr Mohammed] what will be required by HMRC, including sight of all statements for all bank accounts. The brothers are apparently reluctant to provide all accounts although [Mr Bartlett] has advised them that HMRC can use formal powers to make the banks provide the required information. The brothers have also indicated that they may notattend a meeting with HMRC and [will] only conduct the enquiry through correspondence. [Mr Vickers] said that whilst there was nothing to say that the brothers had to meet HMRC this wasn’t what was expected if co-operation was being offered and started to erode the abatements awarded for penalty purposes.”
“The legal structure of the business in respect of the Happy Chip is a matter of discussion with HMRC as it has been an ongoing dispute. Save the client avers it is a partnership in which Mr T Mohammed has a 10% interest. The return has been represented for ease under the self-employment section but with only the 10% being return [sic], until the matter is finally adjudicated by the First Tier Tax Tribunal.”
“the legal structure in respect of income from property in this return has been reported as income from properties, save it is a partnership in which Mr T Mohammed owns 60% and this is also an ongoing issue with HMRC. The same approach as supra has been adopted in respect of income from property.”
“(1) An assessment on any person (in this section referred to as “the person in default”) for the purpose of making good to the Crown a loss of income tax or capital gains tax attributable to his fraudulent or negligent conduct or the fraudulent or negligent conduct of a person acting on his behalf may be made at any time not later than 20 years after the 31st January next following the year of assessment to which it relates. (2) … (3) If the person on whom the assessment is made so requires, in determining the amount of the tax to be charged for any chargeable period in any assessment made in a case mentioned in subsection (1) or (1A) above, effect shall be given to any relief or allowance to which he would have been entitled for that chargeable period on a claim or application made within the time allowed by the Taxes Acts.”
“Section 36(1A)(b) and (c) of TMA 1970 (fraudulent and negligent conduct) shall not apply where the year of assessment is 2008-09 or earlier, except where the assessment on the person (“P”) is for the purposes of making good to the Crown a loss of tax attributable to P’s negligent conduct or the negligent conduct of a person acting on P’s behalf.”
“If, on an appeal notified to the tribunal, the tribunal decides (a) that the appellant is overcharged by a self-assessment; (b) that any amounts contained in a partnership statement are excessive; or (c) that the appellant is overcharged by an assessment other than a self-assessment, the assessment or amounts shall be reduced accordingly, but otherwise the assessment or statement shall stand good.” (2) Section 36(1A) provides that a 20 year time limit applies where there is (his emphasis) “an assessment on a person in a case involving a loss of income tax or capital gains tax brought about deliberately”
“1 . Bys 36 (1) of the Taxes Management Act 1970 an assessment to income tax can be made on a person outside the normal six years period (but subject to a maximum 20 years cut-oft) "for the purpose of making good to the Crown a loss of tax attributable to his fraudulent or negligent conduct". 2. This requires the Revenue to show: (1) fraudulent or negligent conduct by the taxpayer; and (2) a loss of tax attributable to it. 3. On appeal to the commissioners the burden rests on the Revenue of establishing 2(1) and (2). If they do not discharge the burden the appeal should be allowed…I will call this "the s 36 burden". 4. The burden does not rest on the Revenue to any greater extent than the s 36 burden. If they establish some fraudulent and negligent conduct and some loss of tax attributable to it they have satisfied s 36. From then on s 50(6) takes over and applies as it does for in-date assessments: that is to say, thereafter the burden rests on the taxpayer to establish that the assessment is wrong...”
“[46] Mr Goldberg submits that the power to make a DA [discovery assessment] is penal in its effect. He submits that, if the taxpayer makes a small mistake, the door is open to HMRC to reopen the computation of all tax for the relevant period. This is because ‘the situation mentioned in subsection (1) above’ (used in sub-ss (2) and (5)) is that ‘any income which ought to have been assessed to income tax’ has not been assessed. Thus, if the taxpayer had treated income of£100 as not liable to tax, and HMRC assesses the full£100 to tax but HMRC can show that the conduct condition is met only in respect of£50 , then on a literal reading of s 29 it would appear to follow that the whole of the assessment meets the conduct/officer condition and is validly made. This is a startling conclusion. [47] I do not consider that this difficulty exists. I accept the submission of Mr Nawbatt that, once HMRC have shown that the conduct/officer condition is met, the taxpayer can show that the amount assessed is excessive. The position under s 29 is analogous to that where an assessment is made under s 36 TMA on the grounds of the taxpayer’s fraudulent or negligent conduct: see per Aldous LJ in Hurley v Taylor (Inspector of Taxes)[1999] STC 1 at 8.”
“We reach a similar conclusion in respect of the Capital Allowance Insufficiency and the Deductible Expenditure Insufficiency in tax years 2009/10 – 2011/12. Those tax years require the extended [20 year] time limit provided for in section 36(1A). As the Appellant has demonstrated, on the evidence, that the conduct giving rise to these Insufficiencies was careless and not deliberate we consider to effectively assess on the basis that the errors were deliberate is to overcharge the Appellant. Plainly however, the 6-year time limit in section 36(1) TMA applies to these Insufficiencies.”
“After the notice of any such assessment has been served on the person assessed, the assessment shall not be altered except in accordance with the express provisions of the Taxes Acts.”
“(1) It is critical to determine (objectively) whether the parties intended to create a partnership (Tiffin v Lester Alridge LLP[2012] EWCA Civ 35 at [21]; (2) In determining their intention all the features of their agreement must be considered, regard is to be given to the “substance of the relationship, not the words used by the parties to describe it” (Sotheby’s v Mark Weis Ltd[2020] EWCA Civ 1570 at [84]; (3) It is not conclusive that someone is held out to the outside world as a partner, “one must in every case look at the terms of the relationship to ascertain whether or not it creates a true partnership” (Stekel v Ellice[1973] 1 WLR 191 at 473); (4) Although it may provide “some evidence” their business is a partnership business, the terms used by the parties to describe their relationship will not be conclusive (Patel v Barlows Solicitors (a firm)[2021] 4 WLR 6 at [107]; (5) While a fixed remuneration does not preclude a finding of a partnership, it is in most cases a strongly negative indication of one (Mohammed Young Legal Associates Ltd v Zahid Solicitors (a firm)[2006] 1 WLR 2562 at [33]); (6) Althoughs 1(1) of the Partnership Act 1890 refers to the aim of making a profit, it “studiously abstain[s] from reference to any necessity that it be shared.”
“When an Asian family goes into business, it is essentially a partnership from the first moment it begins…As for who runs the business, the eldest, is seen by the younger siblings as being in charge. Traditionally, the eldest male child.”
“We had always used each other's bank accounts and we were happy to maintain this state of affairs. Sajit said he did not want to incur business charges so I was happy for my accounts to be used. He used the business accounts….”
“We decided to pay money into my bank accounts because l was the one paying the suppliers and all the bills of Happy Chippy. We did not have a business bank account, because business banking is expensive and at times restrictive. We did not see that it would be a problem to use my account as Sajit had a bank card and could make withdrawals as and when he needed to.”
“the claimants have conceded the loss of profits and disturbance claims of CS and E4Y, the claim for severance and injurious affection to 4 W St and their claim for compensation for loss of light to 4 W St. They had already conceded, following the Tribunal’s interim decision, their claims for the open market value of the purported leasehold interests in the reference property and for losses arising from a second move to Unit 2 at 4 W St.”
“In calculating the profits of a trade, no deduction is allowed for items of acapital nature.”
“To ascertain whether the money was expended to serve the purposes of the taxpayer’s business it is necessary to discover the taxpayer’s “object” in making the expenditure: see Morgan v Tate & LyleLtd.[1955] AC 21 , 37, 47. As the taxpayer’s “object” in making the expenditure has to be found, it inevitably follows that (save in obvious cases which speak for themselves) the commissioners need to look into the taxpayer’s mind at the moment when the expenditure is made. After events are irrelevant to the application of section 130 except as a reflection of the taxpayer’s state of mind at the time of the expenditure. If it appears that the object of the taxpayer at the time of the expenditure was to serve two purposes, the purposes of his business and other purposes, it is immaterial to the application of section 130 (a) that the business purposes are the predominant purposes intended to be served. The object of the taxpayer in making the expenditure must be distinguished from the effect of the expenditure. An expenditure may be made exclusively to serve the purposes of the business, but it may have a private advantage. The existence of that private advantage does not necessarily preclude the exclusivity of the business purposes.”
“I reject the notion that the object of a taxpayer is inevitably limited to the particular conscious motive in mind at the moment of expenditure. Of course the motive of which the taxpayer is conscious is of a vital significance, but it is not inevitably the only object which the commissioners are entitled to find to exist.”
“a) Save in “obvious” cases, ascertaining the object or purpose of something involves an inquiry into the subjective intentions of the relevant actor. b) Object or purpose must be distinguished from effect. Effects or consequences, even if inevitable, are not necessarily the same as objects or purposes. c) Subjective intentions are not limited to conscious motives. d) Further, motives are not necessarily the same as objects or purposes. e) “Some” results or consequences are “so inevitably and inextricably involved” in an activity that, unless they are merely incidental, they must be a purpose for it. f) It is for the fact finding tribunal to determine the object or purpose sought to be achieved, and that question is not answered simply by asking the decision maker.”
“Sajit and 1 decided to initiate legal proceedings against Newcastle City Council as we felt that the compensation we had received for the loss of the property and the business was but a drop in the ocean next to the money the Council was earning from their land grab. The land was transferred for nearly£10,500,000 . I exhibit as TM1 a copy of the lease between Newcastle City Council and the developer. And that figure is the land price, not the value that can be realised out of the subsequent development. That is what annoyed Sajit and I, the fact that we felt cheated. It was not as if the Council were building a structure or undertaking the development. Instead I lost my property and Sajit his livelihood so that a private company could develop land that until the compulsory purchase was not available to them [to] develop. Additionally, rather than try and buy each property singly they effectively got the council to do their dirty work for them. Whilst individuals may have acted within the law, the corruption of society, that such a thing can happen is outrageous.”
“Although the point does not, in view of this finding of primary fact, arise, it must in the nature of things be extremely difficult for any directors of two associated companies in the position of the taxpayer company and JLT to be certain in whose best interests, or, rather, in whose exclusive interests, any step which they take is being taken. Obviously, there is nobody but themselves to say what was in their own minds; and obviously, again, it must require a superhuman effort of mind (of which extremely few persons, if any, are capable) to rule out entirely from consideration the possibility of benefit to one's other company when concentrating on the exclusive requirements of just one of them. In my judgment, commissioners should be extremely slow in coming to any conclusion that the act was done solely for the benefit of the trade of one of the companies concerned, and should in general do so only where there are wholly separate findings of primary fact not depending on the say-so of the directors concerned. I cannot resist the impression that in 99 cases out of 100 the correct primary fact to find will be that which was in fact found in this case; namely that in such a situation as the present the interests of all the companies were considered together. This is in accord with all the probabilities in the present and, indeed, most foreseeable cases.”
“In truth the sum of money was paid to prevent the Fireclay Company obtaining the full benefit of the capital value of that part of the mines which they were prevented from working by the railway company. It appears to me to make no difference whether it be regarded as a sale of the asset out-and-out, or whether it be treated merely as a means of preventing the acquisition of profit that would otherwise be gained. In either case the capital asset of the Company to that extent has been sterilised and destroyed, and it is in respect of that action that the sum of 15,316 was paid. It is unsound to consider the fact that the measure adopted for the purpose of seeing what the amount should be was based on considering what were the profits that would have been earned…there is no relation between the measure that is used for the purpose of calculating a particular result and the quality of the figure that is arrived at by means of the test. I am unable to regard this sum of money as anything but capital money”
“working the asset of 15 Waterloo Street to produce revenue receipts. That asset was taken away from them and they were no longer able to produce trade receipts using that asset.”
“[the taxpayer] used its land as a landfill tipping site. Following service of a Compulsory Purchase Order in respect of part of the site, the taxpayer was kept out of possession of that part for just over three years, between August 1992 and November 1995, when withdrawal of the Order was confirmed.”
“The value of the land depended upon its capacity, as a landfill site, to produce profits from the deposit of waste. That capacity was temporarily interrupted by the service of the CPO. But its capacity was not in any way exhausted… The temporary interruption to the use of the site had no permanent impact on the site as source of profit from the deposit of general waste.”
“…in a case of sole legal ownership the onus is on the party who wishes to show that he has any beneficial interest at all, and if so what that interest is. In a case of joint legal ownership it is on the party who wishes to show that the beneficial interests are divided other than equally.”
“…There is a venerable principle of tax law to the general effect that there is a public interest in taxpayers paying the correct amount of tax, and it is one of the duties of the commissioners in exercise of their statutory functions to have regard to that public interest…For present purposes, however, it is enough to say that the principle still has at least some residual vitality in the context of section 50….”
“Section 50(7) of the Taxes Management Act 1970 , however, preserved the right, and as it seems to me the duty, of the commissioners to increase the assessment on the hearing of the taxpayer's appeal if the evidence shows this to be appropriate.”
“(1) Where a person fraudulently or negligently— (a) delivers any incorrect return of a kind mentioned in section 8 or 8A of this Act (or either of those sections] as extended by section 12 of this Act, or (b) makes any incorrect return, statement, or declaration in connection with any claim for any allowance, deduction or relief in respect of income tax or capital gains tax, or (c) submits to an inspector or the Board or any Commissioners any incorrect accounts in connection with the ascertainment of his liability to income tax or capital gains tax, he shall be liable to a penalty not exceeding the amount of the difference specified in subsection (2) below. (2) The difference is that between— (a) the amount of income tax and capital gains tax payable for the relevant years of assessment by the said person (including any amount of income tax deducted at source and not repayable), and (b) the amount which would have been the amount so payable if the return, statement, declaration or accounts as made or submitted by him had been correct.” (a) delivers any incorrect return of a kind mentioned in section 8 or 8A of this Act (or either of those sections] as extended by section 12 of this Act, or (b) makes any incorrect return, statement, or declaration in connection with any claim for any allowance, deduction or relief in respect of income tax or capital gains tax, or (c) submits to an inspector or the Board or any Commissioners any incorrect accounts in connection with the ascertainment of his liability to income tax or capital gains tax, (a) the amount of income tax and capital gains tax payable for the relevant years of assessment by the said person (including any amount of income tax deducted at source and not repayable), and (b) the amount which would have been the amount so payable if the return, statement, declaration or accounts as made or submitted by him had been correct.”
“Fraud never has been and never will be exhaustively defined, the forms which deceit may take being so many and so various. There is a negative characteristic: it must be something which an honest man would not do; not merely what a logical or clear-headed man would not do.”
“(1) …an officer of the Board authorised by the Board for the purposes of this section may make a determination imposing a penalty under any provision of the Taxes Acts and setting it at such amount as, in his opinion, is correct or appropriate. (2)-(3) … (4) After the notice of a determination under this section has been served the determination shall not be altered except in accordance with this section or on appeal. (5) If it is discovered by an officer of the Board authorised by the Board for the purposes of this section that the amount of a penalty determined under this section is or has become insufficient the officer may make a determination in a further amount so that the penalty is set at the amount which, in his opinion, is correct or appropriate.”
“neglecting many things including my family, my other business interests and the tax investigations that were going on in my life…the legal battle with the council completely took over my life, to such an extent that the crisis left me with no mental powers to give consideration to any other issue. I appreciate that this is wrong, but the fight with the council seriously affected my health and undermined my entire life.”
“(A1) Paragraph 10 provides for reductions in penalties (a) Under paragraph 1 where a person discloses an inaccuracy which involves a domestic matter… (1) A person discloses an inaccuracy…by (a) telling HMRC about it, (b) giving HMRC reasonable help in quantifying the inaccuracy and (c) allowing HMRC access to records for the purpose of ensuring that the inaccuracy is fully corrected…. (2) Disclosure (a) is "unprompted" if made at a time when the person making it has no reason to believe that HMRC have discovered or are about to discover the inaccuracy[, the supply of false information or withholding of information, or the under-assessment]1, and (b) otherwise, is "prompted". (3) In relation to disclosure "quality" includes timing, nature and extent.” (a) Under paragraph 1 where a person discloses an inaccuracy which involves a domestic matter… (a) telling HMRC about it, (b) giving HMRC reasonable help in quantifying the inaccuracy and (c) allowing HMRC access to records for the purpose of ensuring that the inaccuracy is fully corrected…. (a) is "unprompted" if made at a time when the person making it has no reason to believe that HMRC have discovered or are about to discover the inaccuracy[, the supply of false information or withholding of information, or the under-assessment]1, and (b) otherwise, is "prompted". (3) In relation to disclosure "quality" includes timing, nature and extent.”
“An appeal under this Part of this Schedule shall be treated in the same way as an appeal against an assessment to the tax concerned (including by the application of any provision about bringing the appeal by notice to HMRC, about HMRC review of the decision or about determination of the appeal by the First-tier Tribunal or Upper Tribunal).”
“(a) to the same extent as HMRC (which may mean applying the same percentage reduction as HMRC to a different starting point), or (b) to a different extent, but only if the1 tribunal thinks that HMRC's decision in respect of the application of paragraph 11 was flawed.”
“…for there to be a deliberate inaccuracy in a document within the meaning of [TMA] section 118(7) here will have to be demonstrated an intention to mislead the Revenue on the part of the taxpayer as to the truth of the relevant statement.”
“a person entrusted with a discretion must, so to speak, direct himself properly in law. He must call his own attention to the matters which he is bound to consider. He must exclude from his consideration matters which are irrelevant to what he has to consider. If he does not obey those rules, he may truly be said, and often is said, to be acting 'unreasonably'. Similarly, there may be something so absurd that no sensible person could ever dream that it lay within the powers of the authority.”
“A public body will err in law if it acts in breach of fundamental human rights; misinterprets a statute, or any other legal document, or a rule of common law; frustrates the purpose of a statute or otherwise acts for an improper purpose; takes a decision on the basis of secondary legislation, or any other act or order, which is itself ultra vires; takes legally irrelevant considerations into account, or fails to take relevant considerations into account; admits inadmissible evidence, rejects admissible and relevant evidence, or takes a decision on no evidence or on the basis of a material mistake of fact; misdirects itself as to the burden of proof; fails to follow the proper procedure required by law; fetters its discretion or improperly delegates the decision; fails to fulfil an express or implied duty to give reasons; acts arbitrarily or discriminately; or otherwise abuses its power.”
“101. I appreciate that care must be taken in deriving principles based on cases dealing with different legislation. However I can see nothing in schedule 55 which evidences any intention that the phrase “special circumstances” should be given a narrow meaning. 102. It is clear that, in enacting paragraph 16 of Schedule 55, Parliament intended to give HMRC and, if HMRC’s decision is flawed, the Tribunal a wide discretion to reduce a penalty where there are circumstances which, in their view, make it right to do so. The only restriction is that the circumstances must be “special”
“The right approach for the Tribunal is to look at all the relevant circumstances and consider whether, in the particular case in question those circumstances are special. I see no reason to limit this to circumstances which...operate on the particular taxpayer in question as opposed to those which could affect a larger number of taxpayers. It is up to HMRC or, where relevant, the Tribunal to decide based on all of the facts of the particular case whether the circumstances in question are, in that case, special.”
“1. (1) A penalty is payable by a person ("P") where P fails to make or deliver a return, or to deliver any other document, specified in the Table below on or before the filing date. (2) Paragraphs 2 to 13 set out— (a) the circumstances in which a penalty is payable, and (b) subject to paragraphs 14 to 17, the amount of the penalty. (3) If P's failure falls within more than one paragraph of this Schedule, P is liable to a penalty under each of those paragraphs (but this is subject to paragraph 17(3)). (4) In this Schedule— "filing date", in relation to a return or other document, means the date by which it is required to be made or delivered to HMRC; "penalty date", in relation to a return or other document, means the date on which a penalty is first payable for failing to make or deliver it (that is to say, the day after the filing date). (5) In the provisions of this Schedule which follow the Table— (a) any reference to a return includes a reference to any other document specified in the Table, and (b) any reference to making a return includes a reference to delivering a return or to delivering any such document. Tax to which payment relates Return or other document 1 Income tax or capital gains tax (a) Return under section 8(1)(a) of TMA 1970 (b) Accounts, statement or document required under section 8(1)(b) of TMA 1970 2. Paragraphs 3 to 6 apply in the case of a return falling within any of items 1 to 5 and 7 to 13 in the Table… 5. (1) P is liable to a penalty under this paragraph if (and only if) P's failure continues after the end of the period of 6 months beginning with the penalty date. (2) The penalty under this paragraph is the greater of (a) 5% of any liability to tax which would have been shown in the return in question, and (b)£300 . 6. (1) P is liable to a penalty under this paragraph if (and only if) P's failure continues after the end of the period of 12 months beginning with the penalty date. (2) Where, by failing to make the return, P deliberately withholds information which would enable or assist HMRC to assess P's liability to tax, the penalty under this paragraph is determined in accordance with sub-paragraphs (3) and (4). (3) If the withholding of the information is deliberate and concealed, the penalty is the greater of (a) the relevant percentage of any liability to tax which would have been shown in the return in question, and (b)£300 . (3A) For the purposes of sub-paragraph (3)(a), the relevant percentage is (a) for the withholding of category 1 information, 100%... (4) If the withholding of the information is deliberate but not concealed, the penalty is the greater of (a) the relevant percentage of any liability to tax which would have been shown in the return in question, and (b)£300 . (4A) For the purposes of sub-paragraph (4)(a), the relevant percentage is (a) for the withholding of category 1 information, 70%... 14. (A1) In this paragraph, "relevant information" means information which has been withheld by a failure to make a return. (1) Paragraph 15 provides for reductions in the penalty under paragraph 6(3) or (4) where P discloses relevant information that involves a domestic matter… (1B) Sub-paragraph (2) applies where (a) P is liable to a penalty under paragraph 6(3) or (4) and P discloses relevant information that involves a domestic matter… (2) P discloses relevant information by (a) telling HMRC about it, (b) giving HMRC reasonable help in quantifying any tax unpaid by reason of its having been withheld, and (c) allowing HMRC access to records for the purpose of checking how much tax is so unpaid. (1) P is liable to a penalty under this paragraph if (and only if) P's failure continues after the end of the period of 12 months beginning with the penalty date. (2) Where, by failing to make the return, P deliberately withholds information which would enable or assist HMRC to assess P's liability to tax, the penalty under this paragraph is determined in accordance with sub-paragraphs (3) and (4). (3) If the withholding of the information is deliberate and concealed, the penalty is the greater of (a) the relevant percentage of any liability to tax which would have been shown in the return in question, and (b) 300. (3A) For the purposes of sub-paragraph (3)(a), the relevant percentage is (a) for the withholding of category 1 information, 100%... (4) If the withholding of the information is deliberate but not concealed, the penalty is the greater of (a) the relevant percentage] of any liability to tax which would have been shown in the return in question, and (b) 300. (4A) For the purposes of sub-paragraph (4)(a), the relevant percentage is (a) for the withholding of category 1 information, 70%... … 24. (1) References to a liability to tax which would have been shown in a return are references to the amount which, if a complete and accurate return had been delivered on the filing date, would have been shown to be due or payable by the taxpayer in respect of the tax concerned for the period to which the return relates. (2) In the case of a penalty which is assessed at a time before P makes the return to which the penalty relates (a) HMRC is to determine the amount mentioned in sub-paragraph (1) to the best of HMRC's information and belief, and (b) if P subsequently makes a return, the penalty must be re-assessed by reference to the amount of tax shown to be due and payable in that return (but subject to any amendments or corrections to the return)… 27.(1) This paragraph applies for the construction of this Schedule. (2) The withholding of information by P is (a) "deliberate and concealed" if P deliberately withholds the information and makes arrangements to conceal the fact that the information has been withheld, and (b) "deliberate but not concealed" if P deliberately withholds the information but does not make arrangements to conceal the fact that the information has been withheld.” (2) Paragraphs 2 to 13 set out— (a) the circumstances in which a penalty is payable, and (b) subject to paragraphs 14 to 17, the amount of the penalty. (3) If P's failure falls within more than one paragraph of this Schedule, P is liable to a penalty under each of those paragraphs (but this is subject to paragraph 17(3)). (4) In this Schedule— "filing date", in relation to a return or other document, means the date by which it is required to be made or delivered to HMRC; "penalty date", in relation to a return or other document, means the date on which a penalty is first payable for failing to make or deliver it (that is to say, the day after the filing date). (5) In the provisions of this Schedule which follow the Table— (a) any reference to a return includes a reference to any other document specified in the Table, and (b) any reference to making a return includes a reference to delivering a return or to delivering any such document. Tax to which payment relates Return or other document 1 Income tax or capital gains tax (a) Return under section 8(1)(a) of TMA 1970 (b) Accounts, statement or document required under section 8(1)(b) of TMA 1970 (2) The penalty under this paragraph is the greater of (a) 5% of any liability to tax which would have been shown in the return in question, and (b)£300 . (2) Where, by failing to make the return, P deliberately withholds information which would enable or assist HMRC to assess P's liability to tax, the penalty under this paragraph is determined in accordance with sub-paragraphs (3) and (4). (3) If the withholding of the information is deliberate and concealed, the penalty is the greater of (a) the relevant percentage of any liability to tax which would have been shown in the return in question, and (b)£300 . (3A) For the purposes of sub-paragraph (3)(a), the relevant percentage is (a) for the withholding of category 1 information, 100%... (4) If the withholding of the information is deliberate but not concealed, the penalty is the greater of (a) the relevant percentage of any liability to tax which would have been shown in the return in question, and (b)£300 . (4A) For the purposes of sub-paragraph (4)(a), the relevant percentage is (a) for the withholding of category 1 information, 70%... (1) Paragraph 15 provides for reductions in the penalty under paragraph 6(3) or (4) where P discloses relevant information that involves a domestic matter… (1B) Sub-paragraph (2) applies where (a) P is liable to a penalty under paragraph 6(3) or (4) and P discloses relevant information that involves a domestic matter… (2) P discloses relevant information by (a) telling HMRC about it, (b) giving HMRC reasonable help in quantifying any tax unpaid by reason of its having been withheld, and (c) allowing HMRC access to records for the purpose of checking how much tax is so unpaid. (2) Where, by failing to make the return, P deliberately withholds information which would enable or assist HMRC to assess P's liability to tax, the penalty under this paragraph is determined in accordance with sub-paragraphs (3) and (4). (3) If the withholding of the information is deliberate and concealed, the penalty is the greater of (a) the relevant percentage of any liability to tax which would have been shown in the return in question, and (b) 300. (3A) For the purposes of sub-paragraph (3)(a), the relevant percentage is (a) for the withholding of category 1 information, 100%... (4) If the withholding of the information is deliberate but not concealed, the penalty is the greater of (a) the relevant percentage] of any liability to tax which would have been shown in the return in question, and (b) 300. (4A) For the purposes of sub-paragraph (4)(a), the relevant percentage is (a) for the withholding of category 1 information, 70%... (2) In the case of a penalty which is assessed at a time before P makes the return to which the penalty relates (a) HMRC is to determine the amount mentioned in sub-paragraph (1) to the best of HMRC's information and belief, and (b) if P subsequently makes a return, the penalty must be re-assessed by reference to the amount of tax shown to be due and payable in that return (but subject to any amendments or corrections to the return)… (a) "deliberate and concealed" if P deliberately withholds the information and makes arrangements to conceal the fact that the information has been withheld, and (b) "deliberate but not concealed" if P deliberately withholds the information but does not make arrangements to conceal the fact that the information has been withheld.”