“8. On29 July 2024 Mr Benson filed a separate Notice of Appeal in respect of the VAT NOR as requested and included the same Grounds of appeal as were filed in respect of the PAYE/NICs decision….. 9. However, the FTT wrongly appears to have assumed, despite the contents of the Grounds of appeal, that the Appeal was only against the VAT NOR imposed on Peckham. In fact the appeal was made against both the VAT NOR imposed on Peckham and Mr Benson. Accordingly should there be any question about this, Mr Benson invites the FTT to find that the Appeal is also in respect of the VAT NOR and is also in respect of Mr Benson as well as Peckham….. 10. …, as Mr Benson is jointly and severally liable on precisely the same basis, and the Respondents’ position is that the same arguments apply both to Peckham and Mr Benson, it is in the interests of justice to permit Mr Benson to be substituted. In the alternative, the FTT is invited to add him as party to the proceedings for the reasons set out above.”
“(2) If they think it necessary for the protection of the revenue, the Commissioners may require a taxable person, as a condition of his supplying or being supplied with goods or services under a taxable supply, to give security, or further security, for the payment of any VAT that is or may become due from— (a) the taxable person, or (b) any person by or to whom relevant goods or services are supplied.”
“3.— Taxable persons and registration. A person is a taxable person for the purposes of this Act while he is, or is required to be, registered under this Act.”
“85.— Settling appeals by agreement. (1) Subject to the provisions of this section, where a person gives notice of appeal under section 83 and, before the appeal is determined by a tribunal, HMRC and the appellant come to an agreement (whether in writing or otherwise) under the terms of which the decision under appeal is to be treated— (a) as upheld without variation, or (b) as varied in a particular manner, or (c) as discharged or cancelled, the like consequences shall ensue for all purposes as would have ensued if, at the time when the agreement was come to, a tribunal had determined the appeal in accordance with the terms of the agreement. (2) Subsection (1) above shall not apply where, within 30 days from the date when the agreement was come to, the appellant gives notice in writing to HMRC that he desires to repudiate or resile for the agreement. (3) Where an agreement is not in writing— (a) the preceding provisions of this section shall not apply unless the fact that an agreement was come to, and the terms agreed, are confirmed by notice in writing given by HMRC to the appellant or by the appellant to HMRC, and (b) references in those provisions to the time when the agreement was come to shall be construed as references to the time of the giving of that notice of confirmation. (4) Where— (a) a person who has given a notice of appeal notifies HMRC, whether orally or in writing, that he desires not to proceed with the appeal; and (b) 30 days have elapsed since the giving of the notification without HMRC giving to the appellant notice in writing indicating that they are unwilling that the appeal should be treated as withdrawn, the preceding provisions of this section shall have effect as if, at the date of the appellant’s notification, the appellant and HMRC had come to an agreement, orally or in writing, as the case may be, that the decision under appeal should be upheld without variation. (5) References in this section to an agreement being come to with an appellant and the giving of notice or notification to or by an appellant include references to an agreement being come to with, and the giving of notice or notification to or by, a person acting on behalf of the appellant in relation to the appeal.”
“[12] It is submitted before me by the taxpayer that s 49, when properly construed, confers upon the General Commissioners, on reference to them of an application to an inspector for permission to lodge an appeal out of time, a wider discretion than that which the Inspector himself had. That discretion is not confined, as the Inspector's discretion is confined, to determining whether there was a reasonable excuse for the failure to lodge the appeal within time but would also embrace such considerations as the lack of any prejudice to the Commissioners as a result of failing to lodge an appeal in time, and demonstrable injustice to the taxpayer if such an appeal is not permitted to be lodged out of time. [13] I accept that submission. It seems to me that this is a proper construction of the Act. It is apparent from sub-s (1) of s 49 that it contemplates two stages, the first stage being an application to the Inspector who can, if he can discern a reasonable excuse, properly allow an appeal to be lodged out of time thus saving the necessity of reference to General Commissioners for that permission to be granted; but that if he does not find that there was reasonable excuse, the second stage then arises, which is a reference of the application by the Inspector to the General Commissioners for them to determine. [14] The section does not purport to guide the General Commissioners in any way as to how that discretion to permit appeals to be lodged out of time should be exercised. It seems to me, therefore, to follow that the General Commissioner's discretion is at large and they can consider the sort of matters which I have referred to which an Inspector of Taxes had no power to take into account.”
“When the [First-tier Tribunal] FTT is considering an applications for permission to appeal out of time, therefore, it must be remembered that the starting point is that permission should not be granted unless the FTT is satisfied on balance that it should be. In considering that question, we consider the FTT can usefully follow the three-stage process set out in Denton: (1) Establish the length of the delay. If it was very short (which would, in the absence of unusual circumstances, equate to the breach being "neither serious nor significant"), then the FTT "is unlikely to need to spend much time on the second and third stages" - though this should not be taken to mean that applications can be granted for very short delays without even moving on to a consideration of those stages. (2) The reason (or reasons) why the default occurred should be established. (3) The FTT can then move onto its evaluation of "all the circumstances of the case". This will involve a balancing exercise which will essentially assess the merits of the reason(s) given for the delay and the prejudice which would be caused to both parties by granting or refusing permission.” absence of unusual circumstances, equate to the breach being "neither serious nor significant"), then the FTT "is unlikely to need to spend much time on the second and third stages" - though this should not be taken to mean that applications can be granted for very short delays without even moving on to a of the case". This will involve a balancing exercise which will essentially assess the merits of the reason(s) given for the delay and the prejudice which would be caused to both parties by granting or refusing permission.”
“Since taking over the operation, we have done our best to keep the business operating through extremely challenging circumstances. Our main lender has continued to lend to Peckham Levels Limited to ensure the business remained solvent. When I took over, the business had an approximate net current assets balance of -£500k . Due to difficult trading conditions, this balance has largely remained unchanged. In mid 2023, our lender confirmed that they were no longer willing to put money into the business, putting the business at risk of insolvency. … However, given the challenging circumstances the business is currently in, neither myself nor Peckham Levels Ltd are in a financial position to pay any security to the HMRC. I want to assure you again that my focus is on a structured solution with regards to all creditors including HMRC.”
“HMRCʼs appealable decisions generally include a statement of the relevant appeal rights in reasonably plain English and it is not a complicated process to notify an appeal to the FTT, even for a litigant in person.”
“…the purpose of the time limit is to bring finality, and that is a matter of public interest, both from the point of view of the taxpayer in question and that of the wider body of taxpayers.”
“Compliance with time limits is very important; time limits for appeals with NORs are particularly important because NORs are there to protect revenues. NORs are intended to prevent companies continuing to trade without paying over the tax they collect on HMRC’s behalf (in this case, PAYE and NIC). 113. Where a company’s response to a NOR is to cease trading, then time may not be quite so much of the essence. But that is not the situation that existed here.”