“[59] The test in Kittel is simple and should not be over-refined. It embraces not only those who know of the connection but those who “should have known”
“… I can do no better than repeat the words of Christopher Clarke J in Red12 v HMRC[2009] EWHC 2563 : ‘[109] Examining individual transactions on their merits does not, however, require them to be regarded in isolation without regard to their attendant circumstances and context. Nor does it require the tribunal to ignore compelling similarities between one transaction and another or preclude the drawing of inferences, where appropriate, from a pattern of transactions of which the individual transaction in question forms part, as to its true nature e.g. that it is part of a fraudulent scheme. The character of an individual transaction may be discerned from material other than the bare facts of the transaction itself, including circumstantial and "similar fact" evidence. That is not to alter its character by reference to earlier or later transactions but to discern it. [110] To look only at the purchase in respect of which input tax was sought to be deducted would be wholly artificial. A sale of 1,000 mobile telephones may be entirely regular, or entirely regular so far as the taxpayer is (or ought to be) aware. If so, the fact that there is fraud somewhere else in the chain cannot disentitle the taxpayer to a return of input tax. The same transaction may be viewed differently if it is the fourth in line of a chain of transactions all of which have identical percentage mark ups, made by a trader who has practically no capital as part of a huge and unexplained turnover with no left over stock, and mirrored by over 40 other similar chains in all of which the taxpayer has participated and in each of which there has been a defaulting trader. A tribunal could legitimately think it unlikely that the fact that all 46 of the transactions in issue can be traced to tax losses to HMRC is a result of innocent coincidence. Similarly, three suspicious involvements may pale into insignificance if the trader has been obviously honest in thousands. [111] Further in determining what it was that the taxpayer knew or ought to have known the tribunal is entitled to look at the totality of the deals effected by the taxpayer (and their characteristics), and at what the taxpayer did or omitted to do, and what it could have done, together with the surrounding circumstances in respect of all of them.’” ‘[109] Examining individual transactions on their merits does not, however, require them to be regarded in isolation without regard to their attendant circumstances and context. Nor does it require the tribunal to ignore compelling similarities between one transaction and another or preclude the drawing of inferences, where appropriate, from a pattern of transactions of which the individual transaction in question forms part, as to its true nature e.g. that it is part of a fraudulent scheme. The character of an individual transaction may be discerned from material other than the bare facts of the transaction itself, including circumstantial and "similar fact" evidence. That is not to alter its character by reference to earlier or later transactions but to discern it. [110] To look only at the purchase in respect of which input tax was sought to be deducted would be wholly artificial. A sale of 1,000 mobile telephones may be entirely regular, or entirely regular so far as the taxpayer is (or ought to be) aware. If so, the fact that there is fraud somewhere else in the chain cannot disentitle the taxpayer to a return of input tax. The same transaction may be viewed differently if it is the fourth in line of a chain of transactions all of which have identical percentage mark ups, made by a trader who has practically no capital as part of a huge and unexplained turnover with no left over stock, and mirrored by over 40 other similar chains in all of which the taxpayer has participated and in each of which there has been a defaulting trader. A tribunal could legitimately think it unlikely that the fact that all 46 of the transactions in issue can be traced to tax losses to HMRC is a result of innocent coincidence. Similarly, three suspicious involvements may pale into insignificance if the trader has been obviously honest in thousands. [111] Further in determining what it was that the taxpayer knew or ought to have known the tribunal is entitled to look at the totality of the deals effected by the taxpayer (and their characteristics), and at what the taxpayer did or omitted to do, and what it could have done, together with the surrounding circumstances in respect of all of them.’”
“Lack of knowledge of the specific mechanics of a VAT fraud affords no basis for any argument that the decision of either tribunal was wrong in law: what is required is simply participation with knowledge in a transaction ‘connected with fraudulent evasion of VAT’…”
“However, in my judgment, the holding of Moses LJ does not mean that the trader has to have the means of knowing how the fraud that actually took place occurred. He has simply to know, or have the means of knowing, that fraud has occurred, or will occur, at some point in some transaction to which his transaction is connected. The participant does not need to know how the fraud was carried out in order to have this knowledge. This is apparent from [56] and [61] of Kittel cited above. Paragraph 61 of Kittel formulates the requirement of knowledge as knowledge on the part of the trader that “by his purchase he was participating in a transaction connected with fraudulent evasion of VAT”
“42. … The question is whether it means (i) a deliberate statement which is (in fact) inaccurate or (ii) a statement which, when made, was deliberately inaccurate. If (ii) is correct, it would need to be shown that the maker of the statement knew it to be inaccurate or (perhaps) that he was reckless rather than merely careless or mistaken as to its accuracy. 43. We have no hesitation in concluding that the second of those interpretations is to be preferred, for the following reasons. First, it is the natural meaning of the phrase “deliberate inaccuracy”
“... the inaccuracy was not deliberate and the conditions were not satisfied for HMRC to be able to issue the PLN to Mrs Bachra. Accordingly, Mrs Bachra’s appeal is allowed.”
“Mr Powar stated that [the Company’s] opening hours are 9-5 but that it is a delivery based business. The customer calls the 017…69 number which is re-directed to Mr Powar’s mobile [number …] . Mr Powar takes their order if he has the products requested and delivers it to them the following day, sometimes the same day. The customer does not know the prices until they call when Mr Powar will calculate the price in his head while he is on the phone. The price will depend on what Mr Powar has paid for the stock and what he thinks the customer will pay for it. He stated his mark up is approximately 15%. … Mr Powar confirmed that he has no stock record and does not undertake stock checks. I advised that he should keep a stock record and undertake regular stock checks and keep a record of them in future. Mr Powar had begun to keep a notebook as a cash book on the advice of Mr Sibbering but this was only started on22 July 2015 .”
“Please be advised that we [ie HMRC] require you to show that you have made adequate checks to address the risks identified, that you have considered the data within those checks, and come to a reasoned decision based on the evidence you have collected as to whether or not you should trade with a company. We also require that these checks are reviewed regularly to take account of any changes within companies and we require you to keep a full audit trail of your checks and reasoned decisions.”
“… The offending took place in the wider context of the large-scale movement of smuggled, that is, non-duty paid, alcoholic drinks, mainly wines and beers onto the open market through outlets which have been generically described as cash and carries – the so called grey market in such goods. Inherent in that trade is the evasion of very substantial quantities of excise duty; but none of you is said to have been involved in that side of the business. The fraud which you carried out in effect provided a service to those involved in the wider activity while at the same time generating a second source of unlawful profit by cheating the public revenue of the VAT properly payable on the transactions between the companies which you ran, whether they were genuine transactions or, as seems now to be broadly accepted, mainly paper transactions the purpose of which was, in the words of Sarah Macdonald, the officer of HMRC who acted as the Officer in the Case “to clean the stock and make it look like it has been purchased legitimately” from the first company in the chain. The nineteen companies listed in count 1 were the vehicles for carrying out the fraud. The first purported supply in each chain would be made by a company which issued a VAT invoice to the purchasing company, the next in the chain, but never accounted for the VAT to the revenue and thereafter disappeared without trace – hence the term, “missing trader”
“… [Safina] is due to submit its 2015/16 accounts APE 30/11/15 on or before 20/08/16 and these will need to be analysed to show the financial health of the company as well as the growth and solidity of Safina … . These accounts are late as noted.”
“… and subsequently signed the Indemnity for Crystal City & Cash Ltd.”
“… compiled from information from a number of sources any inaccuracies within that information should be drawn to the attention of the party publishing said information. No liability is accepted by HYDRA Ltd for any damage or harm however caused to any party following the actions of the reports recipient. Any and all trading activity undertaken by the reports recipient is purely a commercial decision for that party and HYDRA Ltd accepts no liability for any losses of any nature that may be incurred. Within this document is a detailed appraisal of the company you requested Hydra to undertake Due Diligence on. It is your responsibility to ensure that you act in accordance with your own due diligence policy and requirements set down by HMRC. You must now objectively consider any risks you identify in the content of the report or the accompanying documents.”