“Need information ASAP for May Vat so I can submit Return.”
“Same answer as question 7” and, in relation to the second: “MP could not comment on the payments to central assessments.”
‘In my view, in the context of the civil penalty regime [contained in what was thens 60 of the Value Added Tax Act 1994 ] at least the test for dishonesty is that identified by Lord Nicholls in Tan as reconsidered in Barlow Clowes. The knowledge of the person alleged to be dishonest that has to be established if such an allegation is to be proved is knowledge of the transaction sufficient to render his participation dishonest according to normally acceptable standards of honest conduct. In essence the test is objective – it does not require the person alleged to be dishonest to have known what normally accepted standards of honest conduct were.’
‘Although a dishonest state of mind is a subjective mental state, the standard by which the law determines whether it is dishonest is objective. If by ordinary standards a defendant’s mental state would be characterised as dishonest, it is irrelevant that the defendant judges by different standards.’ 145. While the test for dishonesty is primarily objective, Lord Nicholls has remarked on the subjective element that remains relevant to the test as follows: ‘Honesty, indeed, does have a strong subjective element in that it is a description of a type of conduct assessed in the light of what a person actually knew at the time, as distinct from what a reasonable person would have known or appreciated. Further, honesty and its counterpart, dishonesty, are mostly concerned with advertent conduct, not inadvertent conduct.’ 146. In respect of how this ‘subjective element’ is to be taken into account by the court, Lord Nicholls’ guidance is: ‘Likewise, when called upon to decide whether a person was acting honestly, a court will look at all the circumstances known to the third party at the time. The court will also have regard to personal attributes of the third party such as his experience and intelligence, and the reason why he acted as he did.’ 147. A s 61 penalty is predicated on a s 60 penalty being imposable on the body corporate in the first place. Section 60(1) of VATA provides: ‘(1) (a) for the purpose of evading VAT, a person does any act or omits to take any action, and (b) his conduct involves dishonesty …’ 148. It is clear from the statutory wording under sub-s 60(1)(a) that the conduct involving dishonesty is not restricted to the commission of an action, but includes an omission to act. The statutory wording in this regard accords with case law authority on the meaning of dishonesty, as Lord Nicholls in Royal Brunei stated at p106: ‘Nor does an honest person in such a case deliberately close his eyes and ears, or deliberately not ask questions, lest he learn something he would rather not know, and then proceed regardless.’
“… it is respectfully submitted that the provision in Art 4 should be construed more narrowly in a way that is consistent with its context. The context is the repeal by FA 2007 of the penalty provisions in sections 60 and 61 and their replacement, in part, by a new penalty regime applicable to taxes generally in Schedule 24 to that Act. Paragraph 1 of Schedule 24 makes provision for penalties in respect of inaccurate documents and (more pertinently for the purposes of this submission), under paragraph 2 of that Schedule, provision is made for a penalty to be imposed in cases where (in summary) an assessment is issued which understates a person’s tax liability and that person fails to take reasonable steps to notify HMRC of the under-assessment. Section 97 of FA 2007 conferred power on the Treasury to make secondary legislation including transitional arrangements for these new provisions and Art 4 was enacted pursuant to that power. Art 4 preserves, in a limited way, the effect of the old penalty and liability provisions but excludes from their remit conduct which is otherwise addressed in the superseding provisions in paragraphs 1 and 2 of Schedule 24. 5. The important thing to note about the conduct addressed in paragraph 2 of Schedule 24 is that it is specifically described as a failure “to take reasonable steps to notify HMRC” of an under-assessment. Consequently the condition in Art 4 under which the old provisions are to continue having effect for conduct “which does not relate to ... a failure to notify” should, it is submitted, be read (consistently with paragraph 2 of Schedule 24) as meaning that this exclusionary clause should only be applied to conduct that is carried out specifically and directly to bring about the failure to notify and should not extend to other conduct that can indirectly be tied to that failure by means of general association or cause and effect. In case it might be thought that such an interpretation would render the exclusionary provision in Art 4 nugatory, it should be noted that not all incidences of dishonest failure to notify will be preceded or accompanied by other dishonest conduct. For example, in a hypothetical case, a VAT registered trader could have made an honest mistake as a result of which an inaccurate return is rendered, and an assessment is raised by HMRC under section 73 of VATA to correct the mistake but the assessment understates the actual amount due. Having received the under-assessment, the trader then, and only then, indulges in dishonest conduct by deliberately failing to notify HMRC. It is submitted that this stand-alone instance of dishonest conduct would, pursuant to the exclusionary clause in Art 4, be an example of a case where there is conduct that relates to a failure to notify an under-assessment and therefore not liable to form the basis of penalties etc. under sections 60 and 61. On the other hand, other dishonest conduct such as deliberately failing to submit returns in order to evade VAT, even where such conduct is accompanied by or associated with a subsequent failure to notify, would fall within the scope of the old provisions and not be excluded by Art 4. 6. Moreover, it should be noted that “the other conduct” for each of the affected accounting periods in this case occurred in each instance before and separately from the failure to notify conduct. It is submitted that this constitutes a good reason why the Tribunal should, for the purposes of applying Art 4, consider the instances of the different categories of conduct as separate and distinguishable from each other. 7. The approach to applying Art 4 which is set out in the above paragraphs is consistent with the judgment of the First-tier Tribunal in the case of Mr Terence Walker and Mrs Dawn Walker UKFTT 375 (TC) The full reference is[2013] UKFTT 375 (TC) which, in paragraph 15 of its decision, rejected the Appellant’s submission that “where there is also an under-assessment the grounds are conflated and all the failures should be regarded as a failure to correct under-assessments”