“SUBJECT: A letter from OOIL Charman Mr C.C.Tung Dear Colleagues, On July 24, we announced that OOIL’s majority shareholder has changed to COSCO SHIPPING Holdings, a significant milestone as we approach the end of the transaction process. This is an exciting time for OOIL as we look to the future. We remain convinced that this transaction is an essential step to ensure the long-term viability and competitiveness of the company in a rapidly changing industry. And we are confident that COSCO SHIPPING is the right platform for this next step in the company’s journey. As we move toward the close and I will step down from my role as Chairman after 22 years, the Tung family wishes to express its appreciation for the long corporate journey we have had together by making a special discretionary payment to colleagues directly employed by OOIL and its subsidiaries, according to certain terms and conditions. Whether through good or challenging times, it is you, our people, united as a team under the OOIL banner and the “Take it Personally” spirit, who have continued to deliver. This special discretionary payment will be funded by the Tung family, and distributed through OOIL, as payment agent, as a bonus. Details of this special discretionary payment by the Tung family will be further communicated through CADM. As OOIL embarks on our next steps with a strong and supportive shareholder as well as unprecedented opportunities to leverage economies of scale, I am confident that OOIL will continue to go from strength to strength. With warmest regards, CC Tung OOIL Chairman”
“(1) The amount of employment income which is charged to tax under this Part for any particular tax year is as follows. (2) In the case of general earnings, the amount charged is the net taxable earning from and employment in that year. …” (2) ITEPA Section 62: “Earnings (1) This section explains what is meant by “earnings” in the employment income Parts. (2) In those Parts “earnings”, in relation to an employment means: (a) any salary, wages or fee, (b) any gratuity or other profit or incidental benefit of any kind obtained by an employee if it is money or money’s worth, or (c) anything else that constitutes an emolument of the employment. …” (a) any salary, wages or fee, (b) any gratuity or other profit or incidental benefit of any kind obtained by an employee if it is money or money’s worth, or (c) anything else that constitutes an emolument of the employment. …” (3) ITEPA Section 201: “Employment-related benefits (1) This Chapter applies to employment-related benefits. (2) In this Chapter: “benefit” means a benefit or facility of any kind; “employment-related benefit” means a benefit, other than an excluded benefit, which is provided in a tax year (a) for an employee … by reason of employment … (3) A benefit provided by an employer is to be regarded as provided by reason of employment unless [provisions not applicable]” “benefit” means a benefit or facility of any kind; “employment-related benefit” means a benefit, other than an excluded benefit, which is provided in a tax year (a) for an employee … by reason of employment … (4) ITEPA Section 209: “Meaning of ‘persons providing benefit”
“It seems to me that the words “by reason of” are far wider than the word “therefrom” in the 1970 Act. They are deliberately designed to close the gap in taxability which was left by the House of Lords in Hochstrasser v Mayes. The words cover cases where the fact of employment is the causa sine qua non of the fringe benefits, that is, where the employee would not have received the fringe benefits unless he had been an employee. The fact of employment must be one of the causes of the benefit being provided, but it need not be the sole cause, or even the dominant cause. It is sufficient if the employment was an operative cause – in the sense that it was a condition of the benefit being granted. …”
“Whether a benefit provided at the cost of a third party is provided by reason of employment must depend on a variety of circumstances including the source of the benefit, the relationship, right and expectations of the employer, the employee and the third party respectively.”
“71. What we take from Wicks v Firth is that the phrase “by reason of employment” is to be given its ordinary meaning and must be considered in the circumstances of the particular case. We note also that the employment need not be the sole reason: it is enough that the employment was a condition of a benefit being granted. 72. The question which has to be decided in this case is whether the requirements of section 471(1) are satisfied in the circumstances of this case. In other words, whether on the facts of the case, the opportunity to acquire the 2007 Option was available by reason of the employment of Mr Noble.”
“78. … in our opinion the FTT has erred in law. It has failed to properly apply the guidance given in Wicks v Firth. In particular it has not applied the guidance in respect of how to approach matters where there is more than one cause. It has not properly applied the guidance of Denning MR that the fact of employment need not be the sole cause or even dominant cause, and that it is sufficient that the employment was a condition of the benefit granted.”