“37. Parliament has not chosen to identify some legal principle defining the limitations on the scope and subject-matter of an enquiry and consequently an appeal. In those circumstances, I think it would be wrong for the court to attempt to do so. Any statement of principle is likely to condemn both taxpayer and the Revenue to too rigid a straitjacket. It might prevent a taxpayer from advancing a legitimate factual or legal argument which had hitherto escaped him or deprive, on the other hand, the public of the tax to which it is entitled. 38. With those nebulous observations, I would leave it to the Commissioners and now the First-Tier Tribunal to identify the subject-matter of the enquiry and thus the subject-matter of the conclusions. In doing so, the First-Tier Tribunal will have to balance the need to preserve the statutory protection for the taxpayer afforded by notification that the Inspector has completed his enquiries and the need to ensure that the public are not wrongly deprived of contributions to the fisc.”
“i) The scope and subject matter of an appeal are defined by the conclusions stated in the closure notice and by the amendments required to give effect to those conclusions. ii) What matters are the conclusions set out in the closure notice, not the process of reasoning by which HMRC reached those conclusions. iii) The closure notice must be read in context in order properly to understand its meaning. iv) Subject always to the requirements of fairness and proper case management, HMRC can advance new arguments before the FTT to support the conclusions set out in the closure notice.”
“As you will be aware from correspondence, there are other arguments as to the possible tax consequences. These are not properly part of the closure notice as these are not our conclusion, but we thought it proper to note that the legal issues involved may go down these routes depending on the arguments you raise and depending on the direction taken by the Tribunal.”
“117 The alternative is that it is for the First-tier Tribunal to decide what the subject matter of the closure notice happens to be; that the circumstances may demonstrate that the subject matter is slightly broader than the particular conclusion and adjustments addressed in the closure notice and that it is open to HMRC to mount different arguments in any appeal, even for instance occasioning greater adjustments to the taxable profits, provided of course that the different arguments all deal with the same identified or obvious subject matter.” 24. Mr Hickey-Baird drew our attention to a letter from Officer De Sio to Mr Ives’ advisers dated2 May 2017 . This is a very long letter in which Officer De Sio reviews all the factors she has considered in reaching her conclusion about Mr Ives’ dealings with the properties. She stresses that her view is that the transactions are trading, but her letter contains the following passages: “The quality of occupation would only be of issue if the property disposals were to be accepted as capital investments. My view, considering that there are indicators of badges of trade present, is that the property disposals should be treated as trading ventures, therefore even if Mr Ives, did move into any of the properties in question, that particular residence would be incidental because of the trading position. Should it be found by the Tax Tribunal that the properties were purchased as capital investments, HM Revenue and Customs will be putting forward arguments based on the information held that on the balance of probabilities, the properties were either not lived in, or that any residence should be viewed as temporary occupation. It should also be noted that TCGA 1992 s224 (3) denies principle private residence relief where a dwelling is acquired wholly or partly for the purposes of realising a gain on its disposal. I have noted the tax cases presented by inTax, which are in support of Mr Ives’ intentions, quality of residence and lack of importance of formally notifying ones change of address when another property is owned. HMRC accepts each case should be considered on its individual merit and facts surrounding the particular situation. However in the case of Mr Ives, it is difficult to see how the properties could have been intended as his main residence when he actively sought council tax deductions on each property, on the grounds that they were either uninhabitable, or, simply declared as unoccupied. Yet in stark contrast, despite not living at 27 Fullbrooks, Mr Ives refrained from seeking any discounts at that property.”
“It is clear that the question whether or not there has been an adventure in the nature of trade depends on all the facts and circumstances of each particular case and depends on the interaction between the various factors that are present in any given case. The most that I have been able to detect from the reading of the authorities is that there are certain features or badges which may point to one conclusion rather than another. In relation to transactions such as this, that is to say a one-off deal with a view to making a capital profit, there do seem to be certain things which the authorities show have been looked at. For convenience I will refer to them in a moment. But I would emphasise that the factors I am going to refer to are in no sense a comprehensive list of all relevant matters, nor is any one of them so far as I can see decisive in all cases. The most they can do is provide common sense guidance to the conclusion which is appropriate. The matters which are apparently treated as a badge of trading are as follows: (1) That the transaction in question was a one-off transaction. Although a one off transaction is in law capable of being an adventure in the nature of trade, obviously the lack of repetition is a pointer which indicates there might not here be trade but something else. (2) Is the transaction in question in some way related to the trade which the taxpayer otherwise carries on? For example, a one-off purchase of silver cutlery by a general dealer is much more likely to be a trade transaction than such a purchase by a retired colonel. (3) The nature of the subject matter may be a valuable pointer. Was the transaction in a commodity of a kind which is normally the subject matter of trade and which can only be turned to advantage by realisation, such as referred to in the passage that the chairman quoted from Reinhold? For example, a large bulk of whisky or toilet paper is essentially a subject matter of trade, not of enjoyment. (4) In some cases attention has been paid to the way in which the transaction was carried through: was it carried through in a way typical of the trade in a commodity of that nature? (5) What was the source of finance of the transaction? If the money was borrowed that is some pointer towards an intention to buy the item with a view to its resale in the short term; a fair pointer towards trade. (6) Was the item which was purchased resold as it stood or was work done on it or relating to it for the purposes of resale? For example, the purchase of second-hand machinery which was repaired or improved before resale. If there was such work done, that is again a pointer towards the transaction being in the nature of trade. (7) Was the item purchased resold in one lot as it was bought, or was it broken down into saleable lots? If it was broken down it is again some indication that it was a trading transaction, the purchase being with a view to resale at profit by doing something in relation to the object bought. (8) What were the purchasers' intentions as to resale at the time of purchase? If there was an intention to hold the object indefinitely, albeit with an intention to make a capital profit at the end of the day, that is a pointer towards a pure investment as opposed to a trading deal. On the other hand, if before the contract of purchase is made a contract for resale is already in place, that is a very strong pointer towards a trading deal rather than an investment. Similarly, an intention to resell in the short term rather than the long term is some indication against concluding that the transaction was by way of investment rather than by way of a deal. However, as far as I can see, this is in no sense decisive by itself. (9) Did the item purchased either provide enjoyment for the purchaser (for example, a picture) or pride of possession or produce income pending resale? If it did, then that may indicate an intention to buy either for personal satisfaction or to invest for income yield, rather than do a deal purely for the purpose of making a profit on the turn. I will consider in a moment the question whether, if there is no income produced or pride of purchase pending resale, that is a strong pointer in favour of it being a trade rather than an investment. I emphasise again that the matters I have mentioned are not a comprehensive list and no single item is in any way decisive. I believe that in order to reach a proper factual assessment in each case it is necessary to stand back, having looked at those matters, and look at the whole picture and ask the question (and for this purpose it is no bad thing to go back to the words of the statute) was this an adventure in the nature of trade? In some cases perhaps more homely language might be appropriate by asking the question, was the taxpayer investing the money or was he doing a deal?”
“The classic exposition of the meaning of 'residence' is to be found in the speech of Viscount Cave LC in Levene v IRC[1928] AC 217 –223, where he said: 'My Lords, the word “reside” is a familiar English word and is defined in the Oxford English Dictionary as meaning “to dwell permanently or for a considerable time, to have one's settled or usual abode, to live in or at a particular place.”
“54. The Court of Appeal case of Goodwin v Curtis and later cases have established that to determine whether a property qualifies as a principal private residence, the following factors must be considered. • Whether the property was actually occupied as a residence. • The nature, quality, length and circumstances of a taxpayer’s occupation of the property. • Whether the occupation was intended to be permanent or merely temporary. • Whether there was a degree of continuity or some expectation of continuity to turn mere occupation into residence. The need for permanence or continuity should not be overstated as it is only one of the factors to be taken into account in weighing up all of the evidence. 55. The question of when occupation becomes residence is one of fact and degree for the Tribunal to decide and the word ‘reside’ and ‘residence’ are ordinary words of the English language to be interpreted as such. Residence is usually defined as ‘the dwelling in which a person habitually lives; in other words, his or her home.’ The test of residence is considered to be one of quality rather than quantity. 56. Periods of occupation during, or in readiness for renovation are distinguishable from periods of living in a property, as the former would lack the necessary quality to turn mere occupation into residence, in the absence of a lack of a firm and settled intention to do so. 57. There must be sufficient documentary or other evidence to support a claim that the property was occupied as the taxpayer’s only or main residence.”
“When I met Gary he was complaining his mortgage had gone up and how financially pushed this was going to cause him to be. I told him I was an estate agent and suggested that I would be able to find him a buyer easily for his house in Ringmer Avenue. Gary did not want to market the house as he was planning to live there but admitted it was going to financially stretch him. I said to Gary if I could introduce someone who will pay close to£2 million would he consider selling it and Gary said he thought he would have to. I took a buyer round to the house who I thought would be interested in it and a sale was agreed. We did not market the house openly. It was I who suggested selling it in the first place and it wasn’t until we managed to find a buyer who made an offer that Gary could not refuse that the sale was agreed. I do not believe it was ever Gary’s intention to sell the house.”
“In general a party is required to challenge in cross-examination the evidence of any witness of the opposing party if he wishes to submit to the court that the evidence should not be accepted on that point. The rule applies in civil cases as it does in criminal. In general the CPR does not alter that position. This rule serves the important function of giving the witness the opportunity of explaining any contradiction or alleged problem with his evidence. If a party has decided not to cross-examine on a particular important point, he will be in difficulty in submitting that the evidence should be rejected. Thus where, during trial, a witness has not been challenged as inaccurate, it was not appropriate for that evidence to then be challenged in closing speeches.”
“90. My third comment concerns the extent to which my freedom to make findings of fact is inhibited by the way in which Mr Rahme's witnesses were, or were not cross-examined. Every counsel should know the general rule that it is not open to counsel to invite the court to reject the evidence of a witness as deliberately untrue when the witness was not challenged in that way. It was not suggested to Mr Haddad in cross-examination that he was giving evidence which was deliberately untrue but yet I was invited by counsel to reject his evidence on that basis. The need for cross-examination which specifically challenges the truthfulness of the witness' account is clearly established and is described in Phipson on Evidence, 16th ed., at para. 12-12 and is the subject of a very helpful consideration in the judgment of the Court of Appeal (delivered by Jacob LJ) in Markem Corp v Zipher Ltd[2005] RPC 761 at [50] – [61], discussing the decision of the House of Lords in Browne v Dunn (1894) 6 R 67 and the Australian case of Allied Pastoral Holdings v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1983) 44 ALR 607 . Whilst this approach may be open to some very limited exceptions, there is no possible exception relevant in the present case. In view of the failure to put to Mr Haddad that his evidence was a concoction, it is not open to me to consider that possibility. It would be completely unfair to Mr Haddad to make such a finding against him. Similarly, it would be completely unfair to him even to hint at what I might have thought if my hands had not been tied in this respect by the failure to challenge his evidence in this respect. I will therefore proceed on the basis that Mr Haddad's evidence was honestly given. If it was honestly given, then so far as Mr Haddad's own observations of events are concerned, there is no room for me to hold that he was mistaken although, as I have earlier pointed out, it does not necessarily follow that I am obliged to accept all the matters of detail spoken to by Mr Haddad, on which he might not have been reliable. Nor am I obliged to accept the truth of what Mr Rahme told Mr Haddad in view of my concerns about Mr Rahme's truthfulness.”
“With regards to the property disposals, De Sio explained that she was still considering whether the property disposal should be treated as trading venture, if that would be the case then the fact he lived at the properties had no relevance. Mr Ives was confused with this comment and he informed De Sio that as far as he was aware if he lived in the property then it was his residence and not a business, Mr Ives believed it was unfair to tax him on profits made on the sale of his own home when all he was trying to do was better himself.”
“In our view, a deliberate inaccuracy occurs when a taxpayer knowingly provides HMRC with a document that contains an error with the intention that HMRC should rely upon it as an accurate document. This is a subjective test. The question is not whether a reasonable taxpayer might have made the same error or even whether this taxpayer failed to take all reasonable steps to ensure that the return was accurate. It is a question of the knowledge and intention of the particular taxpayer at the time.”
“However, we consider that the term “deliberate inaccuracy on a person’s part” can extend beyond this. Our view is that, depending on the precise circumstances, an inaccuracy may also be held to be deliberate where it is found that the person consciously or intentionally chose not to find out the correct position, in particular, where the circumstances are such that the person knew that he should do so. A person 15 cannot simply escape liability by claiming complete ignorance where the person clearly knew that he should have taken steps to ascertain the position. We view the case where a person makes such a conscious choice not to take such steps with the result that an inaccuracy occurs, as no less of a “deliberate inaccuracy” on that person’s part than making the inaccuracy with full knowledge of the inaccuracy.”
“We emphasise two points made in the foregoing extracts. Firstly the test is a subjective one. It is for HMRC to establish, on the balance of probabilities, that these appellants submitted their tax returns to HMRC for the year of enquiry (and for the previous years under assessment) knowing them to be incorrect and intending HMRC to rely on them as being correct; and secondly the finding of deliberate behaviour is tantamount to finding that the appellants have behaved fraudulently, i.e. dishonestly. Although, therefore, the standard of proof is the balance of probabilities, we will require extremely cogent evidence if we are to find that the appellants have acted dishonestly. It is for HMRC to provide that evidence. And they have not been able to cross examine the appellants on their behaviour by dint of the fact that they opposed the application by the appellants that they should be allowed to adduce oral evidence, and we have dismissed that application.”