“But, so far as the discovery point is concerned, once the Inspector comes to the conclusion that, on the facts which he has discovered, Mr. Jonas has additional income beyond that which he has so far declared to the Inspector, then the usual presumption of continuity will apply. The situation will be presumed to go on until there is some change in the situation, the onus of proof of which is clearly on the taxpayer.”
“I have referred to the judgment [of Woolf J] in some detail, because there are dangers in taking Woolf J's analysis of the concept of "best judgment" out of context. The … Tribunal should not treat an assessment as invalid merely because they disagree as to how the judgment should have been exercised. A much stronger finding is required: for example, that the assessment has been reached "dishonestly or vindictively or capriciously"; or is a "spurious estimate or guess in which all elements of judgment are missing"; or is "wholly unreasonable". In substance those tests are indistinguishable from the familiar Wednesbury principles […] Short of such a finding, there is no justification for setting aside the assessment.”
“The statutory words ‘to the best of their judgment' are used in a context where the taxpayers' records may be incomplete, so that a fully informed assessment is unlikely to be possible. Thus the word 'best', rather than implying a higher than normal standard, is a recognition that the result may necessarily involve an element of guesswork. It means simply 'to the best of (their) judgment on the information available’.”
“In our view this quotation expresses no legal principle. It seems to us that it would be quite wrong as a matter of law to say that because X happened in Year A it must be assumed that it happened in the prior year. An officer is not bound by law and 5 in the absence of some change to make or to be treated as making a discovery in relation to last year merely because he makes one for this year. This tribunal is not bound to conclude that what happened this year will happen next year. It seems to us that Walton J is instead expressing a commonsense view of what the evidence will show. In practice it will generally be reasonable and sensible to conclude that if there was a pattern of behaviour this year then the same behaviour will have been followed last year. Sometimes however that will not be a proper inference: there will be occasions when the behaviour related to a one off situation, perhaps a particular disposal, or particular expenses; in those circumstances continuity is unlikely to be present. In the circumstances of Jonas v Bamford there had been undeclared income in a particular year: it was not unreasonable to conclude that the same habit of concealing income had been followed in previous years.”
“The meaning of ‘concealed’ is also not defined in Schedule 24. The Oxford English Dictionary (‘OED’) states that ‘conceal’ as an intransitive verb means: ‘To keep (information, intentions, feelings, etc.) from the knowledge of others; to keep secret from … others; to refrain from disclosing or divulging.’ We noted that Mr Leach immediately told Mr Wishman that he had destroyed all the records: this was not something HMRC discovered subsequently, so he did not ‘refrain from disclosing or divulging’ what he had done. However, ‘conceal’ has a slightly different meaning when it is used transitively (ie so that the verb has an object); it is then defined as: ‘To hide (a person or thing); to put or keep out of sight or notice. Also: to prevent from being visible.’ The statutory context here is Sch 24, para 3, which says: ‘an inaccuracy in a document is … “deliberate and concealed” if the inaccuracy is deliberate on P's part and P makes arrangements to conceal it.’ An inaccuracy is therefore ‘concealed’ if the person makes arrangements to conceal ‘it’, ie the inaccuracy, so this is a transitive usage. The question is therefore whether Mr Leach prevented the inaccuracy from being visible?”