“On the facts of this particular case and taking into account the overriding objective, we do not consider that any useful purpose would be achieved by prolonging matters by ordering that the information notice be complied with before any Tribunal proceedings are entered into. We do not consider that the information is therefore reasonably required, in context, for the purpose of checking (prior to any appeal to this Tribunal) the appellants' tax position or their explanations as to what they consider to be their tax position. Whilst it will often be desirable for matters to be resolved without recourse to the Tribunal, the appellants in this case have effectively demonstrated that they do not wish to facilitate an early resolution to the disputes.”
“[71] I am in little doubt that the Notices interfere with the privacy and confidentiality rights the Claimants have in respect of their business documents so that art 8 is engaged by these facts. The interference is however at a relatively low level because although confidential, it is not suggested that the material is personal, privileged or commercially sensitive. Further, HMRC (and the ATO) are restricted in their use and disclosure of such documents—HMRC may only use the documents in connection with their statutory tax collection, management and enforcement functions and may not disclose information held in connection with their functions save as expressly provided for by theCommissioners for Revenue and Customs Act 2005 . Furthermore, if measures are taken against taxpayers by reference to documents so obtained (because they have failed to pay tax in accordance with their obligations to do so), they have the right of legal challenge at that stage. [72] Moreover art 8 expressly envisages that interference with the right to respect for privacy might be necessary in a democratic society in the interest of the economic well-being of the country, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. So to the extent that Sch 36 notices interfere with rights of privacy, such interference will be justified where the notice is issued according to law, in pursuit of a legitimate aim, and necessary in a democratic society for protecting the taxation system and revenue…. In addition to a person's right to maintain privacy and confidentiality of business documents there is a public interest in the prompt, fair and complete collection of tax revenue which falls well within art 8(2) as ample ground on which the right to respect for private correspondence might in a proper case be abrogated. Parliament has recognised these competing interests in the Sch 36 scheme and has in the provision of adequate and effective safeguards against oppressive action by HMRC struck the balance appropriately so that a notice issued in accordance with Sch 36 will be a proportionate interference. Moreover, I am satisfied on the material that has been placed before me that the Notices were issued according to law, in pursuit of a legitimate aim, and were necessary in a democratic society for protecting the taxation system and the revenue.”
“Finally, HMRC may not use their Sch 36 powers for a fishing expedition—whether for their own or the purposes of another revenue authority. A broadly drafted request will not be valid if in reality HMRC are saying 'can we have all available documents because they form so large a class of documents that we are bound to find something useful'. What is required is that the request is genuinely directed to the purpose for which the notice may be given, namely to secure the production of documents reasonably required for carrying out an investigation or enquiry of any kind into another taxpayer's tax position. It is no objection however, to the issue of a third party notice that it seeks disclosure of 'conjectural' documents; in other words documents that might not exist.”
“The Tribunal takes the view that Information Notices should be expressed in clear terms and that it should be a straightforward matter for both parties to know whether an Information Notice has been complied with. That is why HMRC guidance states that the Information Notice should request facts and not opinion. In this case, the built-in assumptions on which the requests for information were based made it impossible for the parties to know whether the Notice had been complied with because the accuracy of the assumptions was disputed by the Appellant. In those circumstances, I have concluded that it would be fair and just to set aside the request for “information” in the Information Notice. I do so under paragraph 32 (3) (c) of Schedule 36 to theFinance Act 2008 because, in my view, information that it is impossible to supply cannot be “reasonably required” by HMRC. It is unnecessary for the Tribunal to make any order in respect of the request for documents in the Information Notice, which the Tribunal is satisfied has been complied with by the Appellant in any event.”