“Whether there is a supply of goods or services for consideration for the purposes of article 2 and whether that supply constitutes economic activity within article 9 are separate questions. A supply for consideration is a necessary but not sufficient condition for an economic activity. It is therefore logically the first question to address. It requires a legal relationship between the supplier and the recipient, pursuant to which there is reciprocal performance whereby the goods or services are supplied in return for the consideration provided by the recipient: see, for example, the judgment in Borsele at [24]. That is what is meant by “a direct link” between the supply of the goods or services and the consideration provided by the recipient: see Borsele at [26] and contrast Apple and Pear Development Council v Customs and Excise Comrs. There is no need for the consideration to be equal in value to the goods or services. It is simply the price at which the goods or services are supplied. This requirement was satisfied in both Finland and Borsele. Satisfaction of the test for a supply for consideration under article 2 does not give rise to a presumption or general rule that the supply constitutes an economic activity. However, as Mr Puzey for HMRC pointed out, the Advocate General remarked in her Opinion in Borsele at [49], “the same outcomes may often be expected”.”
“Whether article 9 is satisfied requires a wide-ranging, not a narrow, enquiry. All the objective circumstances in which the goods or services are supplied must be examined: see the judgment in Borsele at [29]. Nonetheless, it is clear from the CJEU authorities that this does not include subjective factors such as whether the supplier is aiming to make a profit. Although a supply “for the purpose of obtaining income” might in other contexts, by the use of the word “purpose”, suggest a subjective test, that is clearly not the case in the context of article 9. It is an entirely objective enquiry.”
“First, the sole activity of the College, in the most general terms, is the provision of educational courses. It is not comparable to the municipality in Borsele for whom the provision of school transport was very much ancillary to its principal activities. Second, the provision of courses to students paying subsidised fees is a significant, albeit minority, part of the College’s total undertaking. Third, the fees paid by such students are significant in amount. Taking the example of the BTEC civil engineering course, the fee was£896 pa in 2007/08. The proportion of the cost of courses assumed by the LSC to be covered by fees was set to rise in the following years. The total fee income from courses run in the new building in 2009/10 was approximately£290,000 , all but a small part of which was represented by subsidised fees. Fourth, the subsidised fees made a significant contribution to the cost of providing courses to the students paying those fees, to the extent of some 25-30%. Fifth, the level of fees was fixed by reference to the cost of the courses. The national base rate for a course, with an adjustment for a more costly course, may not have precisely equalled the cost to the College of providing the course but it was intended to reflect the cost of the course. It was by reference to that rate that the fee was fixed, although generally at a lower level than that assumed by the LSC. Sixth, the fees were not fixed by reference to the means of the students or employers or others paying the fees. The fee was a fixed fee for each course, published each year in the College’s prospectus. It may be the case that the College charged less than it was entitled to, as a response to the prevailing economic circumstances in its local catchment area, but that is a factor that any economic activity must take into account and is not comparable to an individual means-tested basis for fixing fees. Seventh, it is undeniable that there is a market in the provision of further and higher education, whose viability is underpinned by a combination of grant aid and fees. There is no reason to suppose that the College is other than a typical participant in that market or that it provides courses to students paying subsidised fees on anything other than a typical basis, allowing no doubt for some variations between different institutions.”
“The starting point has to be the General Rule [that an activity will be an economic activity where it is “permanent and is carried out in return for remuneration which is received by the person carrying out the activity”]. The General Rule can be displaced by evidence that there was no direct link between the service and the payment or by other evidence which shows that there was no economic activity. I agree with Mr Thomas that, as his various examples show, that evidence can be of varying kinds and involves the FTT when making its factual findings looking widely at the circumstances of the case. As to direct link, the FTT made clear findings of fact about the charges which neither party challenges. Even after deductions were made (save in cases with which we are not concerned) for available grants and donations, the amount of the charge was more than nominal in amount and was directly related to the cost of the activity being provided. In those circumstances, in my judgment, the charges did not prevent the application of the direct link test leading to the result that there was an economic activity in this case. As to other evidence, in [103] of its determination, the FTT referred to a number of factors. It referred to the internal systems of Longridge: it described Longridge as conducting and seriously pursuing its activities on a regular basis and having prudent financial management. It also referred to the scale of its activities, which was substantial, and the fact that it operated in a market where similar services were supplied on a commercial basis. I accept Mr Beal’s argument that none of these matters can rebut the General Rule. On the contrary they support the impression of economic activity. The concessionary charges were also not an indicator against the existence of an economic activity because the economic activity springs from the receipt of income, not profit. That leaves the FTT’s final point in [103] that Longridge’s predominant concern was to further its charitable objectives. That was demonstrated by its considerable use of volunteers …. But economic activity is assessed objectively and so the concern of Longridge, which is its reason for providing the services which it does provide, is not enough to convert what would otherwise be economic activity into an activity of a different kind for VAT purposes. The reduction in costs due to the work of unpaid volunteers would also not lead to that conclusion.”
“In that regard, it should be noted, first, that the municipality of Borsele recovers, through the contributions that it receives, only a small part of the costs incurred. The contributions at issue in the main proceedings are not payable by each user and were paid by only a third of the users, with the result that they account for only 3% of the overall transport costs, the balance being financed by public funds. Such a difference between the operating costs and the sums received in return for the services offered suggests that the parental contribution must be regarded more as a fee than as consideration (see, by analogy, judgment of29 October 2009 in Commission v Finland, C-246/08, EU:C:2009:671, paragraph 50). It therefore follows from that lack of symmetry that there is no genuine link between the amount paid and the services supplied. Hence, it does not appear that the link between the transport service provided by the municipality in question and the payment to be made by parents is sufficiently direct for that payment to be regarded as consideration for that service and, accordingly, for that service to be regarded as an economic activity within the meaning of Article 9(1) of the VAT Directive (see, by analogy, judgment of29 October 2009 in Commission v Finland, C-246/08, EU:C:2009:671, paragraph 51). It should be noted, second, that the conditions under which the services at issue in the main proceedings are supplied are different from those under which passenger transport services are usually provided, since the municipality of Borsele, as the Advocate General observed in point 64 of her Opinion, does not offer services on the general passenger transport market, but rather appears to be a beneficiary and final consumer of transport services which it acquires from transport undertakings with which it deals and which it makes available to parents of pupils as part of its public service activities.”
“Although this part payment represents a portion of the fees, its amount is not calculated solely on the basis of those fees, but also depends upon the recipient’s income and assets. Thus, it is the level of the latter – and not, for example, the number of hours worked by the public offices or the complexity of the case concerned – which determines the portion of the fees for which the recipient remains responsible. It follows that the part payment made to the public offices by recipients of legal aid services depends only in part on the actual value of the services provided – the more modest the recipient’s income and assets, the less strong the link with that value will be. As the Advocate General has observed in points 50 and 51 of his Opinion, that finding is borne out by the fact that, according to the data provided by the Finnish Government in the present proceedings, the part payments made in 2007 by recipients of legal aid services provided by the public offices (which relate to only one third of all the services provided by public offices) amounted to EUR 1.9 million, whilst the gross operating costs of those offices were EUR 24.5 million. Even if those data also include legal aid services provided other than in court proceedings, such a difference suggests that the part payment borne by recipients must be regarded more as a fee, receipt of which does not, per se, mean that a given activity is economic in nature, than as consideration in the strict sense.”
“(a) to promote for the benefit of the public the conservation, protection and improvement of the physical and natural environment (by providing the biological diversity, (b) to promote humane behaviour towards animals by providing care, protection, treatment and security for animals which are in need of care and protection by reason of poor circumstances or ill usage and to educate the public in matters pertaining to animal welfare in general and the prevention of cruelty and suffering among animals.”
“I examined the drawing and the plans provided. The dinosaur exhibit appeared to show a woodland walk with dinosaur exbibits peeking out from the trees. This did not appear to me to be a building in the accepted sense of the word. The lion enclosure included some structures but also a great deal of fenced area within which the animals could roam freely, calling into question whether the projects qualified as “buildings”.”
“As will be seen, “consideration” in article 2 means only some value given to the supplier in return for the goods or services by the person to whom they are supplied. It is this amount on which VAT is payable. It need not be full value or indeed bear any particular relation to the value of the goods or services supplied. By contrast, “remuneration” has a broader meaning, and may be said to encapsulate the concept of carrying on an economic activity “for the purposes of obtaining income therefrom on a continuing basis”
“2018 started with a very busy schedule with the development work on our largely unutilised woodland area turning it into the brilliant attraction which is now World of Dinosaurs. Not only was this one of our first projects ever to be finished on time, but this also bought continued success through the remainder of the year with our visitor numbers increasing by 20.5% compared to 2017 and our best financial year to date. This is a huge credit to everyone involved in this project and our entire team.”
“2019 continued to be successful mainly due to continued development work for improved welfare of our animals and the visitor experience including our brand new Lion Pride Lands. … Work has completed on our brand new Lion Pride Lands. This new habitat consists of a high quality landscaped enclosure with state of the art inside dens, multiple glass viewing and a pride rock for our lions to relax.”
“In our view, the word 'building' connotes an enclosure of sorts. It will enclose a volume of space or provide a place within which persons or things can be accommodated. All the structures which, in ordinary speech would undoubtedly be regarded as buildings have this characteristic in common: for example a house, a factory, a warehouse, an amphitheatre. A building will usually have walls and, although not invariably, a roof. All these structures enclose a volume of space and provide a place within which something can be accommodated and by any view must be regarded as “buildings”.”
“A bridge does not enclose a volume of space or provide a place within which anything can be accommodated. Its purpose is purely and simply to be a means of access from one side of something to another. Some celebrated bridges do include buildings but these are normally buildings which are erected onto the bridge and do not alter the nature of the bridge itself.”
“The word “building” is not defined in the statute and various tribunals have taken different approaches, but certain common threads can be drawn. The New Oxford Dictionary definition of a building contains the word “a structure with a roof and walls…”