“- Extensive text message conversations between Mr Ahmed and the user of mobile telephone numbers attributed to variations of the contact ‘Ian’ (i.e. Ian, Ian.2, Ian.16) concerning the ongoing trade in significant quantities of alcoholic beverages (apparent articulated lorry loads of consignments of mixed beers and wines) including requests for purchase prices etc - Further text message communications between Mr Ahmed and ‘Ian’ demonstrates that the former is taking instructions from the latter in respect of the registration of businesses in preparation for trade in the alcohol sector (including Zamco Ltd). ‘Ian’ directs Shakil Ahmed in respect of what documentation is required to trade alcohol products, what communications should be sent to suppliers on the continent to make their activities appear legitimate and what Due Diligence they have to be seen to conduct on trading partners in order to the satisfy the current Alcohol Regulations enforced by HMRC. - The content of one text message received from the contact ‘Ian’. On02/02/2016 was simply ‘Ian Richard Tuppen22/02/1961 ’. Enquiries have established that an Ian Richard Tuppen with the same date of birth was arrested by HMRC in 2015 as part of Operation Bash, an ongoing criminal investigation concerning the fraudulent evasion of excise duty on alcohol, specifically related to diversion fraud. Further names saved with the contacts list of [Mr Ahmed’s phone] are known to the Operation Bash investigation team as members of the same organised criminal group (OCG) as Ian Tuppen. - Also present within the data from [Mr Ahmed’s phone] was a number of text messages providing UK postcodes which were accompanied by either a token numbers or a password and often by a 5 figure amount. It is suspected that these are the locations of previous cash collections undertaken by Shakil Ahmed in the furtherance of his exploits within the illicit alcohol market as token numbers and/or passwords are a favoured method of identification used by OCGs to ensure that a commodity, in this case cash, is passed to the correct individual or group at an illicit handover. - Further text messages recovered from [Mr Ahmed’s phone] provide usernames and passwords for ‘pretty good privacy’ (PGP) communication profiles. PGP is a secure communication platform, the use of which is favoured by OCGs when the making arrangements for illicit handovers due to the high level of encryption that the service offers. - In September of 2015 a series of text messages were exchanged between Shakil Ahmed and the user of telephone number [X] regarding an alleged unpaid debt of£40k owed to Mr Ahmed. The content of the message, received by Shakil Ahmed from the third party, was ‘So you were gonna sell the Vodka in your off sales, I will (make) the licencing board aware of what you are uptoo, and customs, the very least that will happen is you would get investigated. I have been down here 3 days, you will get 12.5k dropped at your off sales this afternoon and, that’s it.’ This is again indicative of Mr Ahmed’s ongoing involvement in alcohol fraud. - In a text message sent to the device on08/01/2016 the content is seen to be ‘1.34 -11 = 1.23*90000 = 110.700€’. This is clearly a rate of exchange to be offered for the transfer of£90k GBP to Euro. Open source research indicates that the GBP/Euro spot rate on08/01/2016 was between€1.32 and€1.34 and therefore the rate offered by Mr Ahmed was significantly lower than that which could have been easily obtained from legitimate foreign exchange providers. This suggests that the transaction concerned the transfer of criminal property, likely for the purchase of consignments of illicit alcohol, which could not be converted via the traditional channels due to the origins of the funds and the purpose of the exchange.”
“Mohammed Zaman did not give the impression he fully understood the regime he was trading in. He was vague in his answers and dd not present a knowledge of his deals I would expect from an individual in control of all aspects of his business. He required prompting from the visiting officers and occasional guidance from his accountant. Taking his history of interest in MTIC type trading and his displayed lack of knowledge it is possible he may not be the controlling mind behind the trading activities.”
“Mohammed Zaman still did not give the impression he fully understood the regime he was trading in. He was vague in his answers, allowing the agent to speak, and did not present a knowledge of his deals I would expect from an individual in control of all aspects of his business. Taking his history of interest in MTIC type trading and his displayed lack of knowledge it is possible he may not be the controlling mind behind the trading activities.”
“Although set out in this way, there will be many cases, in fact it is likely to be common, where a taxpayer subject to a penalty will want to make an appeal under more than one of the heads of appeal available. In many cases taxpayers will be unrepresented, and will not make any distinction, based on para 15, in the nature of the appeal that is made. In such cases, in the interests of fairness and justice the tribunal should be slow to exclude any avenue of appeal available to an appellant purely on the technical nature of the appeal that has been made. Issues of liability and amount will often go hand in hand and should normally be considered in that way by the tribunal. Accordingly, if a tribunal affirms the decision of HMRC that a penalty is payable, it should normally go on to consider the amount of that penalty, including any decision regarding the existence or effect of any special circumstances, and also any decision whether or not to suspend the penalty and any conditions of any such suspension.”
“It may be convenient to encapsulate this conclusion by stating that, for there to be a deliberate inaccuracy in a document within the meaning of section 118(7) there will have to be demonstrated an intention to mislead the Revenue on the part of the taxpayer as to the truth of the relevant statement or, perhaps, (although it need not be decided on this appeal) recklessness as to whether it would do so.”
“5.3 The Appellant’s position throughout the enquiry was that Zamco carried on the business of buying and selling beers and wines. However, Zamco provided no evidence that the supplies took place outwith the United Kingdom. Substantial amounts of cash were deposited in Zamco’s bank accounts in the United Kingdom. Those cash deposits were all in sterling. They did not correspond to any of the invoices which the Appellant exhibited to Officer Begg. 5.4 In those circumstances, on the balance of probabilities, Zamco was making supplies of goods on which it should have charged VAT …”