“(1) This section applies if a charitable trust has a non-exempt amount for a tax year (see section 540). (2) The exemptions under this Part do not apply, and are treated as never having applied, to so much of any income of the charitable trust for the tax year as is attributed under section 541 to the non-exempt amount. (3) Section 256(4) of TCGA 1992 contains corresponding restrictions which apply in relation to section 256(1) of that Act (gains accruing to charities not to be chargeable gains).”
“(1) A charitable trust has a non-exempt amount for a tax year if it has— (a) non-charitable expenditure for the tax year (amount A), and (b) attributable income and gains for the tax year (amount B). (2) The non-exempt amount for the tax year is— (a) amount A, or (b) if less, amount B.”
“(i) the amount of any of the charitable trust's funds that is invested in the tax year in an investment which is not an approved charitable investment (see section 558)”
“Type 12 - A loan or other investment as to which an officer of Revenue and Customs is satisfied, on a claim, that it is made for the benefit of the charitable trust and not for the avoidance of tax (whether by the trust or any other person).”
“It is the Respondents contention that GL would have received tax relief from the charitable donations made to the Appellant but there appears to be a circular movement of those cash donations passing back to GL by way of a loan, which would suggest the arrangement was for the avoidance of tax.”
“as to which an officer of HMRC is satisfied, on a claim, that it is: (1) made for the benefit of the charitable trust, and (2) not for the avoidance of tax (whether by the trust or any other person).”
“It is the Respondents contention that [Gladstar] would have received tax relief from the charitable donations made to the Appellant but there appears to be a circular movement of those cash donations passing back to [Gladstar] by way of a loan, which would suggest the arrangement was for the avoidance of tax.”
“As the judge rightly recognised the foundation on which the rule must now rest is that findings of fact made by another decision-maker are not to be admitted in a subsequent trial because the decision at that trial is to be made by the judge appointed to hear it (the trial judge), and not another. The trial judge must decide the case for himself on the evidence that he receives, and in the light of the submissions on that evidence made to him. To admit evidence of the findings of fact of another person, however distinguished, and however thorough and competent his examination of the issues may have been, risks the decision being made, at least in part, on evidence other than that which the trial judge has heard and in reliance on the opinion of someone who is neither the relevant decision-maker nor an expert in any relevant discipline, of which decision-making is not one. The opinion of someone who is not the trial judge is, therefore, as a matter of law, irrelevant and not one to which he ought to have regard.”