“… The Tribunal should remember that its primary task is to find the correct amount of tax, so far as possible on the material properly available to it, the burden resting on the taxpayer. In all but very exceptional cases, that should be the focus of the hearing, and the Tribunal should not allow it to be diverted into an attack on the Commissioners' exercise of judgment at the time of the assessment…”
“69. …The position on an appeal against a "best of judgment" assessment is well-established. The burden lies on the taxpayer to establish the correct amount of tax due: ‘The element of guess-work and the almost unavoidable inaccuracy in a properly made best of judgment assessment, as the cases have established, do not serve to displace the validity of the assessments, which are prima facie right and remain right until the taxpayer shows that they are wrong and also shows positively what corrections should be made in order to make the assessments right or more nearly right." (Bi-Flex Caribbean Ltd v Board of Inland Revenue (1990) 63 TC 515, 522-3 PC per Lord 10 Lowry).”
“(1) The penalty payable under paragraph 1 is— (a) for careless action, 30% of the potential lost revenue, (b) for deliberate but not concealed action, 70% of the potential lost revenue, and (c) for deliberate and concealed action, 100% of the potential lost revenue.”
“9 (1) A person discloses an inaccuracy or a failure to disclose an underassessment by— (a) telling HMRC about it, (b) giving HMRC reasonable help in quantifying the inaccuracy or under-assessment, and (c) allowing HMRC access to records for the purpose of ensuring that the inaccuracy or under-assessment is fully corrected. (2) Disclosure— (a) is “unprompted” if made at a time when the person making it has no reason to believe that HMRC have discovered or are about to discover the inaccuracy or under-assessment, and (b) otherwise, is “prompted”. (3) In relation to disclosure “quality” includes timing, nature and extent. 10 (1) Where a person who would otherwise be liable to a 30% penalty has made an unprompted disclosure, HMRC shall reduce the 30% to a percentage (which may be 0%) which reflects the quality of the disclosure. (2) Where a person who would otherwise be liable to a 30% penalty has made a prompted disclosure, HMRC shall reduce the 30% to a percentage, not below 15%, which reflects the quality of the disclosure. (3) Where a person who would otherwise be liable to a 70% penalty has made an unprompted disclosure, HMRC shall reduce the 70% to a percentage, not below 20%, which reflects the quality of the disclosure. (4) Where a person who would otherwise be liable to a 70% penalty has made a prompted disclosure, HMRC shall reduce the 70% to a percentage, not below 35%, which reflects the quality of the disclosure. ( 5) Where a person who would otherwise be liable to a 100% penalty has made an unprompted disclosure, HMRC shall reduce the 100% to a percentage, not below 30%, which reflects the quality of the disclosure. (6) Where a person who would otherwise be liable to a 100% penalty has made a prompted disclosure, HMRC shall reduce the 100% to a percentage, not below 50%, which reflects the quality of the disclosure.”
“…I would say that I am dependent on qualified accountants to do what is necessary and, unless there is evidence to suggest that I had in any way resisted the payment of such amounts as needed to be on returns, which I did not, I would humbly submit that I cannot have deliberately avoided VAT”
“Where a penalty under paragraph 1 is payable by a company for a deliberate inaccuracy which was attributable to an officer of the company, the officer is liable to pay such portion of the penalty (which may be 100%) as HMRC may specify by written notice to the officer.”