“if by the last day on which a taxable person is required …… to furnish a return ….. HMRC have not received that return, or have received that return but have not received the amount of VAT shown on the return ….”.
“(a) an insufficiency of funds to pay any VAT is not a reasonable excuse; and (b) where reliance is placed on any person to perform any task, neither the fact of that reliance nor any dilatoriness or inaccuracy on the part of the person relied upon is a reasonable excuse”.
“What is clear is that there was a muddle and a bona fide mistake was made. We all make mistakes. This was not a blameworthy one. But the Act does not provide shelter for mistakes, only for reasonable excuses. We cannot say that this confusion was a reasonable excuse. Thus the default cannot be ignored….”
“The test contained in the statute is not whether the tax payer has an honest and genuine belief but whether there is a reasonable excuse.”
“……. the VAT default surcharge regime penalises only the failure to deliver a return and to make payment of the tax owed by the due date ….. It is to be noted that the penalty does not increase as time goes by; the penalty is for failure to do something by a due date, not a penalty for continuing failure to put right the original default …..”.
“In our judgment there is nothing in the VAT default surcharge which leads us to the conclusion that its architecture is fatally flawed. There are however some aspects of it which may lead to the conclusion that, on the facts of a particular case, the penalty is disproportionate. But in assessing whether the penalty in any particular case is disproportionate, the Tribunal must be astute not to substitute its own view of what is fair for the penalty which Parliament has imposed”.
“We agree with the tribunal in Total Technology that the default surcharge regime, viewed as a whole, is a rational scheme. The penalties are financial penalties calculated by reference to the amount of tax unpaid at the due date. Although the penalties may vary with the liability of the taxable person for the relevant VAT period, and increase commensurately with an increase in such liability ( and consequently, such default) the penalties are not entirely open ended. The maximum liability for a fifth or subsequent period of default is 15% of the amount unpaid. In common with the Upper Tribunal in Total Technology, we consider that the use of the amount unpaid as the objective factor by which the amount of the surcharge varies is not a flaw in the system; to the contrary, the achievement of the aim of fiscal neutrality depends on the timely payment of the amount due, and that criterion is therefore an appropriate, if not the most appropriate factor.”
“Although the absence of a maximum penalty means that the possibility of a proper challenge on the basis of proportionality cannot be ruled out, we cannot ourselves readily identify common characteristics of a case where such a challenge to a default surcharge would be likely to succeed”
“Although payment was only delayed by one day, we accept that that the scheme of the default surcharge regime is to impose a penalty for failing to pay VAT on time, and not to penalise further for any subsequent delay in payment. That, as we have described, is entirely consistent with the fiscal neutrality aim of the directive. It would not be possible therefore, in our view, for the fact that the payment was only one day late, to render an otherwise proportionate penalty disproportionate.”