“Import duties … may be ... remitted in situations … resulting from circumstances in which no deception or obvious negligence may be attributed to the person concerned. The situations in which this provision may be applied and the procedures to be followed to that end shall be defined in accordance with the committee procedure. Repayment or remission may be made subject to special conditions.”
“(2)(b) so much of any decision by HMRC that a person is liable to any duty of excise, or as to the amount of his liability, as is contained in any assessment under section 12 above;”
“the powers of an appeal tribunal on an appeal under this section shall also include power to quash or vary any decision and power to substitute their own decision for any decision quashed on appeal.”
“By its second question, the referring court asks, in essence, whether, where goods are seized on their introduction into the territory of the Community and simultaneously or subsequently destroyed by the competent authorities, the excise duty on those goods is deemed 'to have been placed under a suspension arrangement', for the purposes of the first sub-paragraph of arts 5(2) and 6(1)(c) of the Excise Duty Directive (EC Directive 92/12), read in conjunction with arts 84(1)(a) and 98 of the Customs Code, and art 867a of the Implementing Regulation, with the result that the obligation to pay excise duty on them is not incurred or is extinguished.” (2) The final reasoning given on this second question is as follows: “83. Finally, as regards the question whether the extinction of the customs debt under point (d) of the first paragraph of art 233 of the Customs Code affects whether the excise duty incurred on those goods is extinguished, the Excise Duty Directive does not contain any express provision concerning the extinction of the excise duty in the case of unlawful importation of goods. 84. In those circumstances, given the similarities between customs duties and excise duties in that they arise from the importation of goods into the Community and their subsequent distribution through the economic channels of the member states, and in order to ensure a coherent interpretation of the Community legislation at issue, it must be found that excise duty is extinguished in the same way as customs duty. 85. Consequently, as is apparent from para 50 above, in order to lead to the extinction of the excise duty, the seizure or the confiscation of the goods must take place before those goods go beyond the area in which the first customs office inside the customs territory of the Community is situated. 86. Therefore, the answer to the second question is that the third sub-paragraph of arts 5(1) and 6(1) of the Excise Duty Directive must be interpreted as meaning that goods seized by the local customs and tax authorities on their introduction into the territory of the Community and simultaneously or subsequently destroyed by those authorities, without having left their possession, must be regarded as not having been imported into the Community, with the result that the chargeable event for excise duty on them does not occur. Where goods are seized after their unlawful introduction into that territory, namely once they have gone beyond the area in which the first customs office inside that territory is situated, and simultaneously or subsequently destroyed by those authorities, without having left their possession, the excise duty on them is not to be deemed 'to have been placed under a suspension arrangement' for the purposes of the first sub-paragraph of arts 5(2) and 6(1)(c) of the Excise Duty Directive, read in conjunction with arts 84(1)(a) and 98 of the Customs Code, and art 867a of the Implementing Regulation, with the result that the chargeable event for excise duty on those goods occurs and, consequently, the excise duty on them becomes chargeable.”
“[90] None the less, since the parties have argued the point, I should state my conclusions briefly. The argument in my judgment largely missed the point. There is plainly authority in the ECJ's decision in Elmeka that European law principles can be used to require a national authority to act so as to fulfil a taxpayer's legitimate expectations, even where the exemption from the payment of the tax in question would be unlawful. Moreover, the Lindsay decision, to which I have already referred, demonstrates that European law and ECHR principles may in some circumstances be applicable to VAT questions determined by tribunals. [91] In my judgment, however, the question is really what these principles are relevant to. The FTT in this case was given a confined jurisdiction bys 16(4) of the Finance Act 1994 'where the tribunal are satisfied that [HMRC] could not reasonably have arrived at [their decision on review]' broadly to (a) direct that the decision is to cease to have effect; (b) require HMRC a further review of the original decision; or (c) to declare the decision to have been unreasonable. Section 16(5) allows the tribunal to quash or vary any decision and to substitute its own decision. [92] The appeal to the FTT is, therefore, all about the decision made on review unders 15 of the Finance Act 1994 , in relation to the decision made originally by the HMRC under s 14(1)(bc) 'as to whether any person is entitled to any drawback of excise duty by virtue of regulations undersection 2 of the Finance (No. 2) Act 1992 …' As the Upper Tribunal made clear in Noor , the FTT has no jurisdiction to give effect to any legitimate expectation that the taxpayer may have, because its jurisdiction is statutory. In that case, the FTT was limited to deciding the amount of any input tax that Mr Noor was entitled to under the VAT legislation. In this case, the FTT was limited to quashing the decision not to pay the drawback claimed or substituting its own decision, or declaring that decision to be unreasonable and sending it back to the HMRC for a new decision to be made. [93] Had the FTT thought that the decision on review was one that it was 'satisfied that [HMRC] could not reasonably have arrived at', it could presumably have said so even relying on principles of EU law. But it is very hard to see how it could rationally have formed that view when it had already decided that the duty paid condition under the legislation was not satisfied, so that there was no statutory jurisdiction for HMRC to decide to make the drawback payments claimed. [94] Properly analysed, what the FTT was doing was reviewing the entitlement of HMRC to withdraw its supposed high level policy decision or practice. It found that Europlus (i) had a legitimate expectation that it would receive the drawback, and (ii) that the denial of duty was in conflict with the EU principles of legal certainty and proportionality, and in violation of Europlus's rights under A1P1. [95] These findings all target the supposed withdrawal of the policy or practice without notice, not HMRC's decision on review 'as to whether [Europlus was] entitled to … drawback of excise duty by virtue of regulations unders 2 of the Finance (No 2) Act 1992 …' To challenge the withdrawal of the policy, Europlus needed, in my judgment to bring either (i) judicial review proceedings aimed at the decision to withdraw the supposed policy or practice without notice, or (ii) proceedings for compensation for breach of EU law under the principles and pre-conditions set out in Francovich v Italian Republic, Bonifaci v Italian Republic (Joined cases C-6/90 and C-9/90)[1992] IRLR 84 ,[1991] ECR I-5357 , or (iii) proceedings for compensation for breach of A1P1 or any other part of the ECHR. I should not be taken as suggesting that any such proceedings would have been successful. But what the FTT could not do, certainly once it was established that the duty paid condition was not satisfied and the drawback could not be paid under the applicable EU and domestic legislation, was to allow what is in effect a claim for damages or compensation for the withdrawal of the supposed policy or practice without notice, under the guise of a statutory appeal under ss 16(4) and (5) of theFinance Act 1994 . The conclusion that this is what the FTT was really doing is made good by two passages at the end of the decision as follows: (i) Paragraph [120] said: '[o]ur conclusion is accordingly that the action by HMRC did breach the Appellant's human rights, and that the consequence is that the Appellant's legitimate expectation, that it should have received the refund of duty, should be satisfied and that the entire duty reclaimed should be paid'. (ii) Paragraph [122] included this: '[this case] has been decided by reference to the entire way in which HMRC modified, on a high policy basis, the whole way in which duty drawback claims should be made and evidenced, and it was the way in which that was done that has offended both European principles of certainty and proportionality and the Appellant's human rights'. [96] In short, the FTT lost sight of the fact that the jurisdiction to review and provide remedies for HMRC's conduct in withdrawing policies unreasonably lies elsewhere. [97] Accordingly, in the circumstances of this case, I would hold that the FTT was wrong to consider that it had jurisdiction to decide upon breaches of general principles of EU law, certainly so far as those breaches were in respect of a supposed policy or practice that was entirely distinct from the entitlement to drawback that was the sole subject of the statutory appeal.”