“100G Registered excise dealers and shippers] [(1) For the purpose of administering, collecting or protecting the revenues derived from duties of excise, the Commissioners may by regulations under this section (in this Act referred to as “registered excise dealers and shippers regulations”)— (a) confer or impose such powers, duties, privileges and liabilities as may be prescribed in the regulations upon any person who is or has been a registered excise dealer and shipper; and (b) impose on persons other than registered excise dealers and shippers, or in respect of any goods of a class or description specified in the regulations, such requirements or restrictions as may by or under the regulations be prescribed with respect to registered excise dealers and shippers or any activities carried on by them. (2) The Commissioners may approve, and enter in a register maintained by them for the purpose, any revenue trader who applies for registration under this section and who appears to them to satisfy such requirements for registration as they may think fit to impose. (3) In the customs and excise Acts “registered excise dealer and shipper” means a revenue trader approved and registered by the Commissioners under this section. (4) The Commissioners may approve and register a person under this section for such periods and subject to such conditions or restrictions as they may think fit or as they may by or under the regulations prescribe. (5) The Commissioners may at any time for reasonable cause revoke or vary the terms of their approval or registration of any person under this section. 100H Registered excise dealers and shippers regulations] [(1) Without prejudice to the generality of section 100G above, registered excise dealers and shippers regulations may, in particular, make provision— (a) regulating the approval and registration of persons as registered excise dealers and shippers and the variation or revocation of any such approval or registration or of any condition or restriction to which such an approval or registration is subject;…”
“5 Registered owners (1) For the purposes of section 100G of the Act, the Commissioners may approve revenue traders who wish to deposit relevant goods that they own in an excise warehouse and register them as registered excise dealers and shippers in accordance with section 100G(2) of the Act. (2) A revenue trader who has been so approved and registered shall be known as a registered owner.”
“…(1) The approval and registration of every registered owner shall be subject to the conditions and restrictions prescribed in a notice published by the Commissioners and not withdrawn by a further notice…”
“From1 November 2014 it becomes a condition of your approval as an excise warehousekeeper, registered owner, duty representative or registered consignor that you must: • objectively assess the risks of alcohol duty fraud within the supply chains in which you operate • put in place reasonable and proportionate checks, in your day to day trading, to identify transactions that may lead to fraud or involve goods on which duty may have been evaded • have procedures in place to take timely and effective mitigating action where a risk of fraud is identified • document the checks you intend to carry out and have appropriate management governance in place to make sure that these are, and continue to be, carried out as intended”
“As a general rule ‘FITTED’ checks should normally focus on: • financial health of the company you intend trading with • identity of the business you intend trading with • terms of any contracts, payment and credit agreements • transport details of the movement of the goods involved whether or not you are directly involved in this • existence/provenance of goods - where goods are said to be duty paid you should normally seek sufficient detail to satisfy yourself of the status of the goods • The Deal, understanding the nature of the transaction itself, including: • how the cost of the goods is built up, for example, whether it includes appropriate taxes, transport etc • why is it being offered • whether it is too good to be true • how the deal compares to the market generally”
“The deal • customer demand for specific brands in other countries exceeds expected levels of consumption there • The goods are to be moved in an unusual supply route that in itself would add significant logistic costs and bring into question the economics of that trade (unless duty was to be evaded) • supplies are offered via unsolicited emails or flyers received out of the blue • goods are offered at incredibly low prices which seem too good to be true • free gifts of similar or other excise goods not fully documented and in themselves would place a question over the deal as a whole • there are other incentives such as contingency discounts which overall make the deal sound too good to be true”
“(4) In relation to any decision as to an ancillary matter, or any decision on the review of such a decision, the powers of an appeal tribunal on an appeal under this section shall be confined to a power, where the tribunal are satisfied that the Commissioners or other person making that decision could not reasonably have arrived at it, to do one or more of the following, that is to say— (a) to direct that the decision, so far as it remains in force, is to cease to have effect from such time as the tribunal may direct; (b) to require the Commissioners to conduct, in accordance with the directions of the tribunal, [a review or further review as appropriate] of the original decision; and (c) in the case of a decision which has already been acted on or taken effect and cannot be remedied by [a review or further review as appropriate], to declare the decision to have been unreasonable and to give directions to the Commissioners as to the steps to be taken for securing that repetitions of the unreasonableness do not occur when comparable circumstances arise in future.”
“…the principal issue before the tribunal was whether the commissioner's decision not to restore Mr Lindsay's car to him was one that they “could not reasonably have arrived at”, within the meaning of those words in section 16(4) of the 1994 Act. Since the coming into force of theHuman Rights Act 1998 , there can be no doubt that if the commissioners are to arrive reasonably at a decision, their decision must comply with the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms , as scheduled to theHuman Rights Act 1998 . Quite apart from this, the commissioners will not arrive reasonably at a decision if they take into account irrelevant matters, or fail to take into account all relevant matters: see Customs and Excise Comrs vJH Corbitt (Numismatists) Ltd[1981] AC 22 , 60 per Lord Lane. It was argued before the tribunal that the commissioner's decision fell at both hurdles. It violated the Convention in that it involved depriving Mr Lindsay of his rights under article 1 of the First Protocol to the Convention to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions in circumstances which were disproportionately harsh… …the deprivation can be justified if it is “to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties”
“The administrative measures or penalties must not go beyond what is strictly necessary for the objectives pursued and a penalty must not be so disproportionate to the gravity of the infringement that it becomes an obstacle to the freedoms enshrined in the Treaty …”
“We conclude that our obligation is to find the facts on the evidence presented to us and to determine, in the light of those facts, whether the relevant decision was reasonable. That, however, does not require us to assess the review decision in the light of events which occurred after it was made unless those events shed light on matters which were relevant to the decision at the time it was taken.”
“It was clear your goods did not reach their intended destination and that the lack of due diligence and action to ensure they were handled and delivered correctly to an authorised destination in unacceptable. The fact that the attitude to your procedures did not change when you were made aware of the fraud and seizure presented an ongoing risk to the duty suspended regime”
“Information relating to FITTED due diligence checks has been provided…This information should be reviewed with consideration to your commercial knowledge of this business (i.e. Delvistin)…The report review and risk assessment form in Section 8 should then be completed to finalise your due diligence checks.”
“Notice 196, section 10 “The Due Diligence Condition” require that businesses apply a FITTED approach to due diligence checks. This approach requires businesses to take a risk based approach to FITTED checks and therefore makes all checks bespoke to the trading relationship in question. Businesses must therefore consider their own internal procedures and commercial considerations in light of any due diligence information gathered on their behalf. A risk assessment based on the due diligence information available must then be made by the business to ensure any relevant risks have been mitigated and that information is consistent with the commercial information available only to them. This section of our report provides a summary of all information pertaining to FITTED due diligence checks in order to support and further enhance any of your own internal controls.”
“It follows from the conclusion of the Tribunal that the Commissioners had failed to have regard to the possibility of seeking relevant financial information from the company that the Tribunal found that the Commissioners had misdirected themselves in law. This finding by the Tribunal has not been subsequently challenged by the Commissioners. The Tribunal went on to consider, however, what the position would have been had a reasonable body of Commissioners asked for and been given and had taken into account the material financial information which was available as at10 January 1992 . In this context the Tribunal referred to the following passage in the judgment of Sir John Donaldson M R in Commissioners of Customs and Excise v. Secretary of State for Social Services, ex parte Wellcome Foundation Ltd.[1987] 1 WLR 1166 at 1175: “The jurisdiction of the courts to entertain applications for judicial review is a supervisory jurisdiction of an essentially practical nature designed to protect the citizen from breaches by decision makers of their public law duties. That there will be such a breach if the decision maker takes account of irrelevant matters or fails to take account of relevant matters, in the sense that his decision is affected thereby, is not in doubt. But, if his decision is not affected thereby, there is no reason why the jurisdiction should be exercised and every reason why it should not.”
“where it is shown that, had the additional material been taken into account, the decision would inevitably have been the same, a Tribunal can dismiss an appeal.”
“ On the basis of the information detailed above, I agree there was reasonable cause for the revocation of Rurkee Trading Company Ltd’s approval. I believe the decision was legally correct and therefore should be upheld.”
“50. First, the tribunal should be aware of the purpose of the regulatory regime and the business environment within which it operates and ensure that its decision-making takes account of that issue. It is well known that there continues to be a high-risk of excise fraud in the alcohol sector and the regulatory regime established pursuant to WOWGR and the relevant guidance in EN 196 is designed to minimise such fraud, particularly fraud in the supply chain. In particular, EN 196 highlights the risk of a trader receiving goods that have been smuggled or diverted into the UK, noting that a key feature of the smuggling or diversion of alcohol to the UK market is the ability to source a product where the excise duty has been suspended. Another common fraud is committed by non-UK suppliers who have made a legitimate delivery of duty suspended goods to a registered owner in the UK subsequently using the same documentation for another delivery which purports to be sent to the same registered owner but, in reality, is destined to be diverted and “slaughtered” with the result that dutiable goods on which excise duty has not been paid unfairly compete with the legitimate market. 51. The due diligence condition introduced in November 2014 was clearly designed to address the problem of fraud in the supply chain and is therefore a crucial tool in tackling excise duty fraud. As Ms Mannion submitted, the regulatory regime is structured so that registered owners, who have the privilege of holding excise duty goods in an excise warehouse, are given the responsibility for assessing the risk of fraud in the supply chain. EN 196 gives registered owners detailed guidance as to how they might undertake proper due diligence on their suppliers, which we have set out in some detail at [14] to [17] above. 52. As the failure to carry out proper due diligence, taking account of this guidance, 40 can result in a high risk of excise duty fraud in the supply chain, it is no surprise that EN 196 clearly states that serious cases of failure can result in the revocation of a registered owner’s approval under WOWGR. 53. Clearly, however, there will be a spectrum of circumstances which HMRC will have to consider in each case when deciding whether revocation is the appropriate course. The guidance in EN 196 on this issue, which we reproduce at [19] above, takes account of that principle. In particular, the guidance makes it clear that a business whose procedures are found to be inadequate will in appropriate circumstances be given guidance as to how to improve those procedures and given the opportunity to demonstrate that improvements have been made. In our view, that would be a particularly appropriate course in cases where there is no evidence of the registered owner being implicated in any actual fraud and where there is evidence that the registered owner is both able and willing to make the necessary improvements. 54. Clearly, a decision to revoke registration should not be taken lightly and such a decision must be proportionate in all the circumstances. Section 100 G (5) CEMA provides that an approval may only be revoked where there is “reasonable cause”