“Member States which, at1 January 1991 , were granting exemptions with deductibility of the VAT paid at the preceding stage or applying reduced rates lower than the minimum laid down in Article 99 may continue to grant those exemptions or apply those reduced rates. The exemptions and reduced rates referred to in the first paragraph must be in accordance with Community law and must have been adopted for clearly defined social reasons and for the benefit of the final consumer.”
“Group 3—Books, etc Item No 1 Books, booklets, brochures, pamphlets and leaflets. 2 Newspapers, journals and periodicals. 3 Children's picture books and painting books. 4 Music (printed, duplicated or manuscript). 5 Maps, charts and topographical plans. 6 Covers, cases and other articles supplied with items 1 to 5 and not separately accounted for. Notes (1) Items 1 to 6— (a) do not include plans or drawings for industrial, architectural, engineering, commercial or similar purposes; but (b) include the supply of the services described in paragraph 1(1) of Schedule 4 in respect of goods comprised in the items. (2) Items 1 to 6 do not include goods in circumstances where— (a) the supply of the goods is connected with a supply of services, and (b) those connected supplies are made by different suppliers. (3) For the purposes of Note (2) a supply of goods is connected with a supply of services if, had those two supplies been made by a single supplier— (a) they would have been treated as a single supply of services, and (b) that single supply would have been a taxable supply (other than a zero-rated supply) or an exempt supply.”
“1(1) Any transfer of the whole property in goods is a supply of goods; but, subject to sub-paragraph (2) below, the transfer— (a) of any undivided share of the property, or (b) of the possession of goods, is a supply of services.”
“Electronically-supplied services 9— (1) Where— ( a ) a supply of services consisting of the provision of electronically supplied services to a relevant business person would otherwise be treated as made in the United Kingdom, and ( b ) the services are to any extent effectively used and enjoyed in a country which is not a member State, the supply is to be treated to that extent as made in that country. (2) Where— ( a ) a supply of services consisting of the provision of electronically supplied services to a relevant business person would otherwise be treated as made in a country which is not a member State, and ( b ) the services are to any extent effectively used and enjoyed in the United Kingdom, the supply is to be treated to that extent as made in the United Kingdom. (3) Examples of what are electronically supplied services for the purposes of this Schedule include— ( a ) website supply, web-hosting and distance maintenance of programmes and equipment, ( b ) the supply of software and the updating of software, ( c ) the supply of images, text and information, and the making available of databases, ( d ) the supply of music, films and games (including games of chance and gambling games), ( e ) the supply of political, cultural, artistic, sporting, scientific, educational or entertainment broadcasts (including broadcasts of events), and ( f ) the supply of distance teaching. (4) But where the supplier of a service and the supplier's customer communicate via electronic mail, this does not of itself mean that the service provided is an electronically supplied service for the purposes of this Schedule.”
“1. The supply to the Royal National Institute for the Blind, the National Listening Library or other similar charities of— (a) magnetic tape specially adapted for the recording and reproduction of speech for the blind or severely handicapped; (b) apparatus designed or specially adapted for the making on a magnetic tape, by way of the transfer of recorded speech from another magnetic tape, of a recording described in paragraph (f) below; (c) apparatus designed or specially adapted for transfer to magnetic tapes of a recording made by apparatus described in paragraph (b) above; (d) apparatus for re-winding magnetic tape described in paragraph (f) below; (e) apparatus designed or specially adapted for the reproduction from recorded magnetic tape of speech for the blind or severely handicapped which is not available for use otherwise than by the blind or severely handicapped; (f) magnetic tape upon which has been recorded speech for the blind or severely handicapped, such recording being suitable for reproduction only in the apparatus mentioned in paragraph (e) above; (g) apparatus solely for the making on a magnetic tape of a sound recording which is for use by the blind or severely handicapped; (h) parts and accessories (other than a magnetic tape for use with apparatus described in paragraph (g) above) for goods comprised in paragraphs (a) to (g) above; (i) the supply of a service of repair or maintenance of any goods comprised in paragraphs (a) to (h) above. 2. The supply to a charity of— (a) wireless receiving sets; or (b) apparatus solely for the making and reproduction of a sound recording on a magnetic tape permanently contained in a cassette, being goods solely for gratuitous loan to the blind. Note: The supply mentioned in items 1 and 2 includes the letting on hire of goods comprised in the items.”
“Access to The Times and The Sunday Times is more important than the device.”
“People don’t care what device they’re reading on, as long as it feels like The Times .”
“ The Times and The Sunday Times announced the launch of a new combined website and to upgrade of smartphone apps that will follow an edition-based publishing model for the first time. One core edition will be produced each day, on all platforms with updates to the edition published at 9 am, noon and 5 pm on the website and smartphone apps. On weekends the edition updates will be at noon and 6 pm. The move from rolling news to an edition-based model is based on intensive customer research, which showed that readers come to The Times and The Sunday Times at set points of the day and read us primarily for the accuracy of our reporting and the originality of our analysis and comment.”
“Before using the rather excellent Times app as my morning news fix, I was rather concerned that I would not like the “feel” of something that was not a traditional newspaper. That concern lasted all of about five pages, and I have been a convert ever since. I use both iPhone and iPad apps and both are excellent. Sadly, the iPad is useless as kindling for fire lighting.”
“I love the quality of the journalism. The range of articles throughout the various sections of the newspaper means that I always learn something new when reading The Times. The ability to access all this without walking to the shops in the rain is wonderful.”
“21. Therefore, an exemption with refund of the tax paid in respect of those items would extend the scope of the exemption laid down for the supply of the caravans themselves. That would mean that items specifically excluded from exemption by the national legislation would be exempted nevertheless pursuant to art 28(2)(a) of the Sixth Directive. 22. Clearly, such an interpretation of art 28(2)(a) of the Sixth Directive would run counter to that provision's wording and purpose, according to which the scope of the derogation laid down by the provision is restricted to what was expressly covered by the national legislation on1 January 1991 . As the Advocate General observed in paras 15 and 16 of her opinion, art 28(2)(a) of the Sixth Directive can be compared to a 'stand-still' clause, intended to prevent social hardship likely to follow from the abolition of exemptions provided for by the national legislature but not included in the Sixth Directive. Having regard to that purpose, the content of the national legislation in force on1 January 1991 is decisive in ascertaining the scope of the supplies in respect of which the Sixth Directive allows an exemption to be maintained during the transitional period. 23. Furthermore, as the Court has pointed out on a number of occasions, the provisions of the Sixth Directive laying down exceptions to the general principle that VAT is to be levied on all goods or services supplied for consideration by a taxable person are to be interpreted strictly (see, to that effect, Customs and Excise Comrs v Madgett and Baldwin ( trading as Howden Court Hotel ) (Joined cases C-308/96 and C-94/97 )[1998] STC 1189 ,[1998] ECR I-6229 , para 34; EC Commission v France (Case C-384/01 )[2003] ECR I-4395 , para 28; Diagnostiko & Therapeftiko Kentro Athinon-Ygeia AE v Ipourgos Ikonomikon (Joined cases C-394/04 and C-395/04 )[2006] STC 1349 , paras 15 and 16; and Jyske Finans A/S v Skatteministeriet (Case C-280/04 )[2005] All ER (D) 133 (Dec) , para 21). For that reason as well, the exemptions with refund of the tax paid referred to in art 28(2)(a) of the Sixth Directive cannot cover items which were, as at1 January 1991 , excluded from such an exemption by the national legislature.”
“(2) Items 1 to 6 do not include goods in circumstances where— (a) the supply of the goods is connected with a supply of services, and (b) those connected supplies are made by different suppliers. (3) For the purposes of Note (2) a supply of goods is connected with a supply of services if, had those two supplies been made by a single supplier— (a) they would have been treated as a single supply of services, and (b) that single supply would have been a taxable supply (other than a zero-rated supply) or an exempt supply.”
“1(1) Any transfer of the whole property in goods is a supply of goods; but, subject to sub-paragraph (2) below, the transfer— (a) of any undivided share of the property, or (b) of the possession of goods, is a supply of services.”
“In interpreting an Act of Parliament it is proper, and indeed necessary, to have regard to the state of affairs existing, and known by Parliament to be existing, at the time. It is a fair presumption that Parliament's policy or intention is directed to that state of affairs. Leaving aside cases of omission by inadvertence, this being not such a case when a new state of affairs, or a fresh set of facts bearing on policy, comes into existence, the courts have to consider whether they fall within the parliamentary intention. They may be held to do so if they fall within the same genus of facts as those to which the expressed policy has been formulated. They may also be held to do so if there can be detected a clear purpose in the legislation which can only be fulfilled if the extension is made. How liberally these principles may be applied must depend on the nature of the enactment, and the strictness or otherwise of the words in which it has been expressed. The courts should be less willing to extend expressed meanings if it is clear that the Act in question was designed to be restrictive or circumscribed in its operation rather than liberal or permissive. They will be much less willing to do so where the new subject matter is different in kind or dimension from that for which the legislation was passed. In any event there is one course which the courts cannot take under the law of this country: they cannot fill gaps; they cannot by asking the question, 'What would Parliament have done in this current case, not being one in contemplation, if the facts had been before it?', attempt themselves to supply the answer, if the answer is not to be found in the terms of the Act itself.” (Emphasis added)
“This determination [i.e. the determination of the UK that zero rating should apply to caravans but not to their contents] under national law should, in principle, be strictly observed and, according to the clear wording of Article 28(2)(a) of the Sixth Directive [the forerunner of Article 110 PVD], not be extended, as the United Kingdom Government and the Commission rightly observe; it would at most be permissible to restrict the scope of the exemption. This is because Article 28(2)(a) of the Sixth Directive is a kind of stand-still clause. The provision was already contained in the original version of the directive and at that time permitted the maintenance, on a transitional basis, of exemptions existing on31 December 1975 . It was intended to prevent the immediate abolition of exemptions not included in the directive from leading to social hardship.” (Emphasis added)
“Finally, although it must be conceded that the Court has accepted that tax exemptions for the principal element of a composite supply may be extended to ancillary supplies connected with it, nevertheless, as the United Kingdom Government rightly submits, those cases concerned exemptions under art 13 of the Sixth Directive, and therefore exemptions enshrined in the scheme of the directive and in the application of which the right of deduction is excluded. In contrast, the national exceptions under art 28 lie outside the harmonised framework. They are not directed at the same objectives as the exemptions provided for in the directive itself and differ in form from those exemptions. Consequently, in those cases it is necessary to take particular care that the exceptions are not extended .” (Emphasis added)
“22. As the Advocate General observed in paras 15 and 16 of her opinion, art 28(2)(a) of the Sixth Directive can be compared to a 'stand-still' clause, intended to prevent social hardship likely to follow from the abolition of exemptions provided for by the national legislature but not included in the Sixth Directive. Having regard to that purpose, the content of the national legislation in force on1 January 1991 is decisive in ascertaining the scope of the supplies in respect of which the Sixth Directive allows an exemption to be maintained during the transitional period. 23. Furthermore, as the Court has pointed out on a number of occasions, the provisions of the Sixth Directive laying down exceptions to the general principle that VAT is to be levied on all goods or services supplied for consideration by a taxable person are to be interpreted strictly (see, to that effect, Customs and Excise Comrs v Madgett and Baldwin ( trading as Howden Court Hotel ) (Joined cases C-308/96 and C-94/97 )[1998] STC 1189 ,[1998] ECR I-6229 , para 34; EC Commission v France (Case C-384/01 )[2003] ECR I-4395 , para 28; Diagnostiko & Therapeftiko Kentro Athinon-Ygeia AE v Ipourgos Ikonomikon (Joined cases C-394/04 and C-395/04 )[2006] STC 1349 , paras 15 and 16; and Jyske Finans A/S v Skatteministeriet (Case C-280/04 )[2005] All ER (D) 133 (Dec) , para 21). For that reason as well, the exemptions with refund of the tax paid referred to in art 28(2)(a) of the Sixth Directive cannot cover items which were, as at1 January 1991 , excluded from such an exemption by the national legislature.”
“There is also, in our judgment, a distinction between the policy behind, or the reason for, the inclusion of a particular provision in the legislative scheme and the purpose of that provision. Parliament might wish to achieve a particular result as a general matter, and legislate for that reason or in pursuit of that policy. But if the statutory language adopted by Parliament displays a narrower, or more focused, purpose than the more general underlying policy or reason, it is no part of an exercise in purposive construction to give effect to a perceived wider outcome than can properly be borne by the statutory language.”
“ Again, however, our view is that this does not imply a constraint on the applicability of fiscal neutrality principles in the way HMRC argue. The Court [of Appeal in Sub One ] accepted … [at [60]] that the starting point is that it is for the UK to determine the correct border line between standard-rated and zero-rated supplies according to social policy reasons and that, on the basis of the cases including Rank , the principle of fiscal neutrality cannot be relied upon as depriving the UK of its discretion in this respect. However, the Court also endorsed the view that it does not follow that the UK can draw the line in such a way as to discriminate between objectively similar supplies and, as in Rank , it cannot distinguish between supplies which are the same from the point of view of the consumer. The Court of Appeal regarded this view on the applicability of fiscal neutrality as in accordance with Marks & Spencer and not affected by the Finanzamt decision. In the circumstances of the case, the Court of Appeal was not called upon to determine where such a line should be drawn, as it was clear that the supplies in question fell within the same category. It seems to us that this simply leaves open the question as to where the correct line is to be drawn in particular cases.”
“to grant all Member States, the possibility to apply the same VAT rates to electronically supplied publications as Member States currently apply to printed publications, which include reduced, super reduced and zero rates.”
“According to Council Directive 2006/112/EC of28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax… electronically supplied services including electronically supplied publications… have to be taxed at the standard VAT rate (minimum 15%). On the other hand, Member States have the option to tax publications on any means of physical support at a reduced VAT rate (minimum 5%) and some Member States were granted the possibility to continue to apply VAT rates lower than the current minimum of 5% (super reduced rates) including exemptions with the deductibility of the VAT paid at the preceding stage (so-called zero rates) to certain printed publications.”
“[32] According to settled case law, the principle of fiscal neutrality precludes treating similar goods and supplies of services, which are thus in competition with each other, differently for VAT purposes (see, inter alia, European Commission v France (Finland intervening) (Case C-481/98 )[2001] STC 919 ,[2001] ECR I-3369 , para 22; Kingscrest Associates Ltd v Customs and Excise Comrs (Case C-498/03 )[2005] STC 1547 ,[2005] ECR I-4427 , paras 41 and 54; Marks & Spencer plc v Revenue and Customs Comrs (Case C-309/06 ) [2008] S TC 1408 ,[2008] ECR I-2283 , para 47, and European Commission v Netherlands (Case C-41/09 ) (3 March 2011 , unreported), para 66). … [37] By these questions, the referring courts seek, essentially to know whether or not, where there is a difference in the treatment of two games of chance as regards the grant of a VAT exemption ..., the principle of fiscal neutrality must be interpreted as meaning that account must be taken of the fact that those two games fell into different licensing categories and were subject to different legal regimes relating to control and regulation. … 43. In order to determine whether two supplies of services are similar within the meaning of the case law cited in that paragraph, account must be taken of the point of view of a typical consumer (see, by analogy, Card Protection Plan Ltd v Customs and Excise Comrs (Case C-349/96 )[1999] STC 270 ,[1999] ECR I-973 , para 29), avoiding artificial distinctions based on insignificant differences (see, to that effect, European Commission v Germany (Case C-109/02 )[2006] STC 1587 ,[2003] ECR I-12691 , paras 22 and 23). 44. Two supplies of services are therefore similar where they have similar characteristics and meet the same needs from the point of view of consumers, the test being whether their use is comparable, and where the differences between them do not have a significant influence on the decision of the average consumer to use one such service or the other (see, to that effect, European Commission v France (Finland intervening) (Case C-481/98 )[2001] STC 919 ,[2001] ECR I-3369 , para 27, and, by analogy, FG Roders BV v Inspecteur der Invoerrechten en Accijnzen, Amsterdam (Joined cases C-367/93 to C-377/93)[1995] ECR I-2229 , para 27, and European Commission v France (Case C-302/00 )[2002] ECR I-2055 , para 23). 47. In addition, it follows from that judgment, and from paras 29 and 30 thereof in particular, that the differences between public houses/bars and amusement arcades on the one hand, and licensed casinos on the other, as regards the setting in which games of chance are available, in particular the accessibility in terms of location and opening times and the atmosphere, are of no relevance to the question of the comparability of such games. … 58. In the light of the foregoing considerations, the answer to the second question inCase C-260/10 is that, in order to assess whether, in the light of the principle of fiscal neutrality, two types of slot machine are similar and require the same treatment for VAT purposes it must be established whether the use of those types of machine is comparable from the point of view of the average consumer and meets the same needs of that consumer, and the matters to be taken into account in that connection are, inter alia, the minimum and maximum permitted stakes and prizes and the chances of winning.”
“60. Moreover, while the principle of fiscal neutrality in VAT may explain the relationship between the explicit exemptions for both direct investment and the management of joint investment funds, I do not accept that it can extend the scope of an express exemption in the absence of clear wording to that effect. As the German government observed at the hearing, it is not a fundamental principle or a rule of primary law which can condition the validity of an exemption but a principle of interpretation, to be applied concurrently with—and as a limitation on—the principle of strict interpretation of exemptions. It is clear from the case law that activities which are to some extent comparable and thus to some extent in competition may be treated differently for VAT purposes where the difference in treatment is explicitly provided for. Moreover, if all activities partly in competition with each other had to receive the same VAT treatment, the final result would be—since practically every activity overlaps to some extent with another—to eliminate all differences in VAT treatment entirely. That would (presumably) lead to the elimination of all exemptions, since the VAT system exists only to tax transactions.”
“45. Lastly, it must be stated that that conclusion is not called into question by the principle of fiscal neutrality. As the Advocate General stated at point 60 of her opinion, that principle cannot extend the scope of an exemption in the absence of clear wording to that effect. That principle is not a rule of primary law which can condition the validity of an exemption, but a principle of interpretation, to be applied concurrently with the principle of strict interpretation of exemptions.”
“[64] The Respondents [HMRC] seek to extend those comments in the Deutsche Bank case to the national legislation here. However, I accept Miss Whipple [counsel for the tax payers]'s submission that the case was concerned with a 'black letter line' setting the boundaries of an exemption to be found in the Directive itself. The exemption had to be construed strictly and fiscal neutrality principles could not flex those boundaries. Here we are not concerned with such boundaries. We are concerned with a differentiation in treatment between traders supplying similar goods within the same national exemption category. The Appellant submits that if an exemption is in principle permitted in national law by the VAT Directive it must be applied consistently with the principle of fiscal neutrality. I think that Miss Whipple's submission in this respect is supported by the authorities cited in para 60 of the Appellant's skeleton argument, i.e. Christoph-Dornier-Stiftung für Klinische Psychologie v Finanzamt Gießen (Case C-45/01 )[2005] STC 228 ,[2003] ECR I-12911 , para 42) and CopyGene A/S v Skatteministeriet (Case C-262/08 )[2010] STC 1799 ,[2010] ECR I-5053 , para 64.”
“49. In Marks & Spencer , the issue before the Court of Justice concerned the claim for recovery of VAT wrongly accounted for on chocolate covered teacakes, which had over time been wrongly treated as biscuits (and thus as standard-rated supplies), but which should, under the domestic provisions, have been zero-rated. It was held (at [20] – [28]) that, first, Article 28(2) of the Sixth Directive [the predecessor of Article 110 PVD] did not provide a directly enforceable Community law right to have the supplies taxed at a zero rate. Community law did not require Member States to maintain exemptions with refund, and it was for the Member State alone to decide whether or not to retain a particular piece of legislation. Article 28(2) could be compared to a “stand-still” clause intended to prevent social hardship likely to follow from the abolition of exemptions provided for by the national legislature but not included in the Directive. It was pursuant to national law that the taxpayer could claim the exemption with refund of the tax paid at the preceding stage. 50. The Court held, secondly, at [32] – [36], that the maintenance of exemptions or of reduced rates of VAT is permissible only in so far as it complies with the principles governing the common system of VAT, including that of fiscal neutrality. Those principles may be relied upon by a taxable person against a national provision, or the application thereof, which fails to have regard to those principles.”