“(1) Subject to the following provisions of this section, in any case where— (a) any person engages in any conduct for the purpose of evading any duty of excise, and (b) his conduct involves dishonesty (whether or not such as to give rise to any criminal liability), that person shall be liable to a penalty of an amount equal to the amount of duty evaded or, as the case may be, sought to be evaded. … (4) Where a person is liable to a penalty under this section— (a) the Commissioners or, on appeal, an appeal tribunal may reduce the penalty to such amount (including nil) as they think proper; and (b) an appeal tribunal, on an appeal relating to a penalty reduced by the Commissioners under this subsection, may cancel the whole or any part of the reduction made by the Commissioners. (5) Neither of the following matters shall be a matter which the Commissioners or any appeal tribunal shall be entitled to take into account in exercising their powers under subsection (4) above, that is to say— (a) the insufficiency of the funds available to any person for paying any duty of excise or for paying the amount of the penalty; (b) the fact that there has, in the case in question or in that case taken with any other cases, been no or no significant loss of duty. …”
“(1) In any case where— (a) a person engages in any conduct for the purpose of evading any relevant tax or duty, and (b) his conduct involves dishonesty (whether or not such as to give rise to any criminal liability), that person is liable to a penalty of an amount equal to the amount of the tax or duty evaded or, as the case may be, sought to be evaded. …”
“In determining whether the prosecution has proved that the defendant was acting dishonestly, a jury must first of all decide whether according to the ordinary standards of reasonable and honest people what was done was dishonest. If it was not dishonest by those standards, that is the end of the matter and the prosecution fails. If it was dishonest by those standards, then the jury must consider whether the defendant himself must have realised that what he was doing was by those standards dishonest. In most cases, where the actions are obviously dishonest by ordinary standards, there will be no doubt about it. It will be obvious that the defendant himself knew that he was acting dishonestly. It is dishonest for a defendant to act in a way which he knows ordinary people consider to be dishonest, even if he asserts or genuinely believes that he is morally justified in acting as he did.”
“… liability for dishonest assistance requires a dishonest state of mind on the part of the person who assists in a breach of trust. Such a state of mind may consist in knowledge that the transaction is one in which he cannot honestly participate (for example, a misappropriation of other people's money), or it may consist in suspicion combined with a conscious decision not to make inquiries which might result in knowledge … Although a dishonest state of mind is a subjective mental state, the standard by which the law determines whether it is dishonest is objective. If by ordinary standards a defendant's mental state would be characterised as dishonest, it is irrelevant that the defendant judges by different standards.”