“14. As regards HMRC’s reliance on rule 8(3)(c), the Tribunal accepts that if the notice of appeal sets out no grounds of appeal with any reasonable prospect of succeeding, the Appellant risks a successful strike out application being made by HMRC. However, in cases involving unrepresented appellants, it can occur that the notice of appeal fails to disclose any arguable grounds of appeal, even though there is potential merit in the appeal. 15. In Aleena Electronics Limited v Revenue and Customs[2011] UKFTT 608 (TC) , it was said at [60]: ‘It is the ethos of the Tribunal system and certainly that of the Tax Chamber of the First-tier Tribunal that a taxpayer can bring an appeal to a tax-expert Tribunal without the expense of instructing representatives. The Tribunal hearing a substantive appeal will be expert: it will know the law and will take the legal points at the hearing that an unrepresented appellant may not. Where the Appellant is unrepresented the Tribunal panel will take on a more inquisitorial role and will ask witnesses questions which an unrepresented Appellant may not think to ask.’ 16. Default paper cases and simple basic cases in particular may involve an unrepresented appellant who wishes to exercise the right of appeal to the Tribunal against a decision that the appellant considers to be harsh and unfair, even though the appellant has no knowledge of the law and is incapable of articulating a legally arguable ground of appeal. It is possible for the Tribunal in such a case to hear the appellant’s account of the facts and to consider this together with all of the evidence presented by the parties, and for the Tribunal to satisfy itself as to the facts, and to determine for itself whether the HMRC decision is in accordance with the facts and the law. In such a case, even if it should turn out that the appeal was hopeless, the unrepresented appellant at least has the satisfaction of knowing that his or her case has been considered by an independent judicial body. Furthermore, the appeal may not turn out to be hopeless, and it may ultimately be allowed in whole or in part. In the case of an unrepresented appellant, failure of a notice of appeal to state an arguable ground of appeal should therefore not in every case necessarily lead automatically to a strike out application being granted” 16. A strikeout application engages the overriding objective of the tribunal as set out in Rule 2 of the FTT Rules. Rule 2(4) provides that it is not just the Tribunal itself which must have the objective in mind in all it does: the parties must co-operate with the Tribunal generally and specifically must help the Tribunal to further the overriding objective. 17. In relation to a strike out application it seems to me that the following parts of the overriding objective are particularly in point: (1) dealing with the case in ways which are proportionate to the anticipated costs and the resources of the parties (Rule 2(2)(b)) (2) ensuring, so far as practicable, that the parties are able to participate fully in the proceedings (Rule 2(2)(d) (3) avoiding delay, so far as compatible with proper consideration of the issues (Rule 2(2)(e) 18. In order that this tribunal can achieve the overriding objective it is incumbent on HMRC to prepare its strike out application with care and with attention to the facts of the particular case as they are disclosed. Failure to do so would be one indication to the Tribunal that HMRC’s conduct in bringing the strike out application was unreasonable. 19. Where as here they rely on a single case, Race (they do of course lay much stress on HMRC v Jones and Jones[2011] EWCA Civ 824 (“ Jones & Jones ”) but that case relates only to a restoration appeal which this is not) HMRC must ensure that there is an overwhelming case that the propositions of law for which Race stands will inevitably have the effect that, if applied to the particular facts of the case in question, the appeals will fail. 20. When considering its case for a strike out HMRC, which will be aware of all decisions of this tribunal, must always take into account relevant decisions of the tribunal both in relation to the general attitude of the tribunal and in relation to particular arguments that have been found not to have to rely on the proposition that Race stands for. 21. Obviously such decisions are not binding, but HMRC should also know that one judge will generally follow a fully reasoned decision of another judge at the same level of the judicial hierarchy unless they think it clearly wrong. There are a number of such decisions referred to in my strike out decision, including Garland , which I consider that HMRC should have taken into account. 22. As I have said HMRC must always consider the evidence in the particular case as it appears in the papers they have. The evidence which I did have consisted of a bundle prepared by HMRC which contained (among other things): (1) The appeal by the appellant and two pieces of correspondence from him to HMRC following up from HMRC’s “pre-assessment” and their assessments. (2) Extracts from the Notebook of Mr M Robinson, the Border Force officer who interviewed Mr Hill at Hull, together with copies of forms BOR156 and BOR162 showing Mr Hill’s signature. (3) The letters issued by HMRC starting with the “pre-assessment” letter (as HMRC call it) and culminating in a review conclusions letter. (4) The notices of assessment and other associated documents. 23. In relation to the application to strike out the appeal against the assessment of duty it was plain to me that the appellant would have a non-fanciful argument that the decision of Judge Charles Hellier in John Patrick Lewis v HMRC & anor[2015] UKFTT 640 (TC) (“ JP Lewis ”) could apply. This was not only because of Mr Hill’s evidence in his correspondence with HMRC but also because of the entries in the Border Force officer’s notebook. It was apparent from that notebook that the Border Force officer's sole concern was whether some of the hand rolling tobacco (“HRT”) the appellant had brought back from Belgium was free gifts for others especially his mother or was for sale. Mr Hill apparently passed the “roll your own” test set him. The appellant’s evidence was that he was told that had the Border Force officer been able to contact Mr Hill’s mother then the appellant would have been allowed to take all his HRT: something which did in fact happen to his friend who was travelling with him and who assisted him in the appeal hearing. 24. In JP Lewis Judge Hellier held that because it seemed that Mr Lewis’s own goods were seized with those intended for others as being “mixed in” with dutiable goods “ we cannot conclude that the tribunal would have to assume that the goods were not for Mr Lewis’s own use” so that Jones & Jones and Race did not preclude a “private use” defence to the duty and penalty assessment. 25. This failure of HMRC to recognise the possibility of an argument on the basis of JP Lewis was in my view unreasonable in the context of an application for strike out of the appeal against the duty assessment. 26. It is also equally unreasonable to fail to recognise that a JP Lewis argument would also affect the penalty as it would change the amount of potential lost revenue on which the penalty was calculated. 27. It might also give the appellant an argument that he had a reasonable excuse for his actions. 28. Thus on the basis of the JP Lewis point alone I consider that HMRC “ acted unreasonably in bringing … the proceedings” in terms of Rule 10(1)(b) of the FTT Rules. 29. But I also consider that it was unreasonable in terms of Rule 10(1)(b) for HMRC not to consider, in relation to the penalty, that in Race the observations by Warren J about penalties was obiter , and that if they had not fully appreciated that (though they should) they would have been left in no doubt by the decision in van Driessche v HMRC[2016] UKFTT 441 (TC) (“ van Driessche ”) (Judge Ann Redston and Julian Stafford) that this Tribunal would be likely to consider that, even ignoring JP Lewis , a “for own use” argument might succeed in displacing a penalty. 30. In my summary decision I also suggested that Warren J’s remarks about the tribunal’s ability to take into account procedural issues relating to the assessment to duty had been ignored by HMRC. This was a minor factor in my decision. It may even be that HMRC did take this into account (as I know they have in other similar cases) but if they did it was not apparent from the notice of application. 31. That notice was also a factor, albeit a minor one also, in my decision. A strike out application is an important matter, a nuclear option. There should be a clear and logical account of the facts and reasons for HMRC’s having put their finger on the nuclear button. The notice of application in this case was the antithesis of that. Paragraphs [138] to [149] and an Appendix of more than four pages of my decision on the application were devoted to the shortcomings of the application which I described as “disgracefully slipshod”, “incompetently prepared” and in the summary decision on costs “appallingly badly drafted”