“It is not open to him [Mr Race] to attempt to establish that he held the goods for his own personal use and not for a commercial purpose and at the same time maintain that the goods were acquired in another Member State. In my judgment, but subject to one point to which I will come, there is no room for further fact-finding on the question of whether seized goods were duty paid or not once the Schedule 3 procedure had determined that point.”
“It is also important to appreciate, at the outset, that the principle of proportionality in EU law is neither expressed nor applied in the same way as the principle of proportionality under the European Convention on Human Rights. Although there is some common ground, the four-stage analysis of proportionality which was explained in Bank Mellat v Her Majesty's Treasury (No 2)[2013] UKSC 39 ;[2014] AC 700 , paras 20 and 72-76, in relation to the justification under domestic law (in particular, under theHuman Rights Act 1998 ) of interferences with fundamental rights, is not applicable to proportionality in EU law.”
“33. Proportionality as a general principle of EU law involves a consideration of two questions: first, whether the measure in question is suitable or appropriate to achieve the objective pursued; and secondly, whether the measure is necessary to achieve that objective, or whether it could be attained by a less onerous method. There is some debate as to whether there is a third question, sometimes referred to as proportionality stricto sensu: namely, whether the burden imposed by the measure is disproportionate to the benefits secured. In practice, the court usually omits this question from its formulation of the proportionality principle. Where the question has been argued, however, the court has often included it in its formulation and addressed it separately, as in R v Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, Ex p Fedesa (Case C-331/88 )[1990] ECR I-4023 . 34. Apart from the questions which need to be addressed, the other critical aspect of the principle of proportionality is the intensity with which it is applied. In that regard, the court has been influenced by a wide range of factors, and the intensity with which the principle has been applied has varied accordingly. It is possible to distinguish certain broad categories of case. It is however important to avoid an excessively schematic approach, since the jurisprudence indicates that the principle of proportionality is flexible in its application. The court's case law applying the principle in one context cannot necessarily be treated as a reliable guide to how the principle will be applied in another context: it is necessary to examine how in practice the court has applied the principle in the particular context in question. 35. Subject to that caveat, however, it may be helpful to describe the court's general approach in relation to three types of case: the review of EU measures, the review of national measures relying upon derogations from general EU rights, and the review of national measures implementing EU law. 36. … 37. … 38. Where member states adopt measures implementing EU legislation, they are generally contributing towards the integration of the internal market, rather than seeking to limit it in their national interests. In general, therefore, proportionality functions in that context as a conventional public law principle. On the other hand, where member states rely on reservations or derogations in EU legislation in order to introduce measures restricting fundamental freedoms, proportionality is generally applied more strictly, subject to the qualifications which we have mentioned.”
“The requirements of rationality and proportionality, as applied to decisions engaging the human rights of applicants, inevitably overlap. The classic formulation of the test is to be found in the advice of the Privy Council, delivered by Lord Clyde, in De Freitas v Permanent Secretary of Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, Lands and Housing[1999] 1 AC 69 at 80. But this decision, although it was a milestone in the development of the law, is now more important for the way in which it has been adapted and applied in the subsequent case-law, notably R (Daly) v Secretary of State for the Home Department[2001] 2 AC 532 (in particular the speech of Lord Steyn), R v Shayler[2003] 1 AC 247 at paras 57-59 (Lord Hope of Craighead), Huang v Secretary of State for the Home Department[2007] 2 AC 167 at para 19 (Lord Bingham of Cornhill) and R (Quila) v Secretary of State for the Home Department[2012] 1 AC 621 at para 45. Their effect can be sufficiently summarised for present purposes by saying that the question depends on an exacting analysis of the factual case advanced in defence of the measure, in order to determine (i) whether its objective is sufficiently important to justify the limitation of a fundamental right; (ii) whether it is rationally connected to the objective; (iii) whether a less intrusive measure could have been used; and (iv) whether, having regard to these matters and to the severity of the consequences, a fair balance has been struck between the rights of the individual and the interests of the community. These four requirements are logically separate, but in practice they inevitably overlap because the same facts are likely to be relevant to more than one of them. Before us, the only issue about them concerned (iii), since it was suggested that a measure would be disproportionate if any more limited measure was capable of achieving the objective. For my part, I agree with the view expressed in this case by Maurice Kay LJ that this debate is sterile in the normal case where the effectiveness of the measure and the degree of interference are not absolute values but questions of degree, inversely related to each other. The question is whether a less intrusive measure could have been used without unacceptably compromising the objective. Lord Reed, whose judgment I have had the advantage of seeing in draft, takes a different view on the application of the test, but there is nothing in his formulation of the concept of proportionality (see his paras 68-76) which I would disagree with.”
“72. The approach to proportionality adopted in our domestic case law under the Human Rights Act has not generally mirrored that of the Strasbourg court. In accordance with the analytical approach to legal reasoning characteristic of the common law, a more clearly structured approach has generally been adopted, derived from case law under Commonwealth constitutions and Bills of Rights, including in particular the Canadian Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms of 1982. The three-limb test set out by Lord Clyde in De Freitas v Permanent Secretary of Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, Lands and Housing[1999] 1 AC 69 , 80 has been influential: "whether: (i) the legislative objective is sufficiently important to justify limiting a fundamental right; (ii) the measures designed to meet the legislative objective are rationally connected to it; and (iii) the means used to impair the right or freedom are no more than is necessary to accomplish the objective." De Freitas was a Privy Council case concerned with fundamental rights under the constitution of Antigua and Barbuda, and the dictum drew on South African, Canadian and Zimbabwean authority. The three criteria have however an affinity to those formulated by the Strasbourg court in cases concerned with the requirement under articles 8 to 11 that an interference with the protected right should be necessary in a democratic society (eg Jersild v Denmark (1994) Publications of the ECtHR Series A No 298, para 31), provided the third limb of the test is understood as permitting the primary decision-maker an area within which its judgment will be respected. 73. The De Freitas formulation has been applied by the House of Lords and the Supreme Court as a test of proportionality in a number of cases under the Human Rights Act. It was however observed in Huang v Secretary of State for the Home Department[2007] UKHL 11 ;[2007] 2 AC 167 , para 19 that the formulation was derived from the judgment of Dickson CJ in R v Oakes[1986] 1 SCR 103 , and that a further element mentioned in that judgment was the need to balance the interests of society with those of individuals and groups. That, it was said, was an aspect which should never be overlooked or discounted. That this aspect constituted a fourth criterion was noted by Lord Wilson, with whom Lord Phillips and Lord Clarke agreed, in R (Aguilar Quila) v Secretary of State for the Home Department[2011] UKSC 45 ;[2012] 1 AC 621 , para 45. 74. The judgment of Dickson CJ in Oakes provides the clearest and most influential judicial analysis of proportionality within the common law tradition of legal reasoning. Its attraction as a heuristic tool is that, by breaking down an assessment of proportionality into distinct elements, it can clarify different aspects of such an assessment, and make value judgments more explicit. The approach adopted in Oakes can be summarised by saying that it is necessary to determine (1) whether the objective of the measure is sufficiently important to justify the limitation of a protected right, (2) whether the measure is rationally connected to the objective, (3) whether a less intrusive measure could have been used without unacceptably compromising the achievement of the objective, and (4) whether, balancing the severity of the measure's effects on the rights of the persons to whom it applies against the importance of the objective, to the extent that the measure will contribute to its achievement, the former outweighs the latter. The first three of these are the criteria listed by Lord Clyde in De Freitas, and the fourth reflects the additional observation made in Huang. I have formulated the fourth criterion in greater detail than Lord Sumption, but there is no difference of substance. In essence, the question at step four is whether the impact of the rights infringement is disproportionate to the likely benefit of the impugned measure. 75. In relation to the third of these criteria, Dickson CJ made clear in R v Edwards Books and Art Ltd[1986] 2 SCR 713 , 781-782 that the limitation of the protected right must be "one that it was reasonable for the legislature to impose", and that the courts were "not called upon to substitute judicial opinions for legislative ones as to the place at which to draw a precise line". This approach is unavoidable, if there is to be any real prospect of a limitation on rights being justified: as Blackmun J once observed, a judge would be unimaginative indeed if he could not come up with something a little less drastic or a little less restrictive in almost any situation, and thereby enable himself to vote to strike legislation down ( Illinois Elections Bd v Socialist Workers Party (1979) 440 US 173 , 188-189); especially, one might add, if he is unaware of the relevant practicalities and indifferent to considerations of cost. To allow the legislature a margin of appreciation is also essential if a federal system such as that of Canada, or a devolved system such as that of the United Kingdom, is to work, since a strict application of a "least restrictive means" test would allow only one legislative response to an objective that involved limiting a protected right. 76. In relation to the fourth criterion, there is a meaningful distinction to be drawn (as was explained by McLachlin CJ in Alberta v Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony[2009] 2 SCR 567 , para 76) between the question whether a particular objective is in principle sufficiently important to justify limiting a particular right (step one), and the question whether, having determined that no less drastic means of achieving the objective are available, the impact of the rights infringement is disproportionate to the likely benefits of the impugned measure (step four).”
“VAT is of course a tax derived from EU Directives which stipulate in detail the persons on whom and the activities for which the tax is to be imposed by the Member States. This ensures that the application of the tax is the same in all EU Member States. The EU Directives require Member States to take all legislative and administrative measures appropriate for ensuring collection of all the VAT due in their respective territories (see Dyrektor Izby Skarbowej w Biaymstoku v Profaktor Kulesza, Frankowski, Jówiak, Orowski (Case C-188/09 )[2010] ECR I-7639 (“ Profaktor ”)), at [21].”
“134. The latitude to be accorded by the judicial branch of government to the Executive and Legislative branches varies with the context: see the speech of Lord Nicholls in A v Secretary of State for the Home Dep t; X v Secretary of State for the Home Dept[2004] UKHL 56 at [80],[2005] 2 AC 68 at [80] : “80 … the courts will accord to Parliament and ministers, as the primary decision-makers, an appropriate degree of latitude. The latitude will vary according to the subject matter under consideration, the importance of the human right in question and the extent of the encroachment upon that right.” 135. The right engaged in the present case is less important than Human Rights Convention rights under, for example, arts 2, 3 and 5. In this connection, it is pertinent to recall what the European Court of Human Rights said in James v UK (Application 8793/79)(1986) 8 EHRR 123 , para 42 of the judgment: “42 … the object and purpose of Article 1 (P1-1) … is primarily to guard against the arbitrary confiscation of property.”
“The doctrine of proportionality is relevant to the penalties but not to the duty itself.”
“63 Having regard to these considerations, I would not have been prepared to condemn the Commissioners' policy had it been one that was applied to those who were using their cars for commercial smuggling, giving that phrase the meaning that it naturally bears of smuggling goods in order to sell them at a profit. Those who deliberately use their cars to further fraudulent commercial ventures in the knowledge that if they are caught their cars will be rendered liable to forfeiture cannot reasonably be heard to complain if they lose those vehicles. Nor does it seem to me that, in such circumstances, the value of the car used need be taken into consideration. Those circumstances will normally take the case beyond the threshold where that factor can carry significant weight in the balance. Cases of exceptional hardship must always, of course, be given due consideration. 64 The Commissioners' policy does not, however, draw a distinction between the commercial smuggler and the driver importing goods for social distribution to family or friends in circumstances where there is no attempt to make a profit. Of course even in such a case the scale of importation, or other circumstances, may be such as to justify forfeiture of the car. But where the importation is not for the purpose of making a profit, I consider that the principle of proportionality requires that each case should be considered on its particular facts, which will include the scale of importation, whether it is a 'first offence', whether there was an attempt at concealment or dissimulation, the value of the vehicle and the degree of hardship that will be caused by forfeiture. There is open to the Commissioners a wide range of lesser sanctions that will enable them to impose a sanction that is proportionate where forfeiture of the vehicle is not justified.”