“NTJ makes its supplies of tax advisory services from a fixed establishment in the UK. These supplies have been over the VAT registration threshold and NTJ should thus have registered for VAT in the UK. Please provide a schedule of all income received by NTJ from UK client, giving values and the dates of invoicing/payment, from the instigation of these arrangements in order that the correct date of registration can be confirmed. VAT is due from NTJ for all supplies it made from the time that it should have been registered, even if it has not charged its clients VAT. Failure to tell HMRC that it should be registered for VAT may also lead to a belated notification penalty under section 67 of the VAT Act (as applied at the relevant time). Having regard to Sections 67(8) and 70 of the Act, which deal respectively with “reasonable excuse” and “mitigation”, I invite you to make any representations to me that you may feel appropriate. If NTJ is still actively trading above the current VAT threshold of£77,000 (or intends to trade in the future and would like an ongoing registration) I would ask you to register for VAT from the correct date as soon as possible. You can register for VAT on the HMRC website, where the process is fully explained. If NTJ is currently not trading, please provide the schedule of income as soon as possible and I will raise an assessment for the tax due without administratively registering NTJ. Please let me know if you intend to retrospectively charge VAT on supplies to your clients. If NTJ has not voluntarily registered for VAT and has not provided a schedule of income as requested within one month of the date of this letter, I will take steps to register and/or assess NTJ on best judgement.”
“The reference to para (b) of sub-s (1) had been in the 1983 [VAT] Act from the beginning. Section 40(3), to my mind, suggests that Parliament contemplated that a supply, referred to in s 40(1)(b), would be one in which the commissioners had already determined the amount of tax payable; in other words, that it would be a supply which had taken place.”
“I accept that a decision by the Commissioners is a pre-requisite for the right of appeal, see Marks & Spencer plc v Commissioners of Customs and Excise (No. 2) [1997] V&DR 344. What constitutes a decision is however inevitably a matter of fact and degree.”
“…in order for the Tribunal to have jurisdiction there must be an issue between the parties which has been sufficiently crystallised to constitute a decision falling within one of the paragraphs of section 83. Such decision will normally be in writing and be clearly expressed as a decision subject to appeal whether or not the word decision is used. Where a determination is not expressed as an appealable decision it may nevertheless constitute such a decision in the light of its contents and the surrounding circumstances.”
“If you disagree with this decision you can ask for a review by an independent HMRC Officer by writing to the address above within 30 days of the date of this letter. Or you can appeal to the Tribunal Service within 30 days of this letter. If you opt for a review, you can still appeal to the tribunal after the review has finished.”
“… it is said that the assessment was not notified to the taxpayer company as the statute requires it to be (see s 46 and Sch 7,para 4 of the Value Added Tax Act 1983 ), and that the assessment is thus flawed. The chairman found that there was no proper notification, but he also held that the result was that the assessment was simply unenforceable unless and until it was notified properly. The point has very little, if any, merit since the taxpayer company plainly got the assessment through their own solicitors, but it is a point which exists and had to be met, and has to be met by me. I conclude that on the facts the chairman was correct and he was correct in his conclusions. The matter could be and indeed, in my judgment, has been rectified by notification now. There has been formal notification in accordance with the 1983 Act so that any irregularity is cured, and the taxpayer company can no longer have the protection, in my judgment, of that argument.”