King & Ors v Revenue and Customs (INCOME TAX/CORPORATION TAX : Partnership) [2016] UKFTT 409 (TC)

FTT-Tax
King & Ors v Revenue and Customs (INCOME TAX/CORPORATION TAX : Partnership)
[2016] UKFTT 409 (TC) · 2016-06-02
[15]“… He [Henderson J] also observed (again, in my view, entirely correctly), at paras 115-116: "115. There is a venerable principle of tax law to the general effect that there is a public interest in taxpayers paying the correct amount of tax, and it is one of the duties of the Commissioners in exercise of their statutory functions to have regard to that public interest. 59. Judge Bishopp in the Tax and Chancery Chamber of Upper Tribunal observed in Colin Moore v HMRC [2011] UKUT 239 , at [15]: “There can, I think, be no doubt that any taxpayer completing a self-assessment return has a duty to take care when doing so: the obligation upon him is plainly to submit an accurate return.” 60. In R (oao De Silva) v HMRC [2016] EWCA Civ 40 , Gloster LJ included an explanation of the relevant provisions in the Appendix to the Judgment in which she set out “certain of the relevant statutory provisions and an analysis of their effect” (see at [25]). Paragraph 4 of the Appendix deals with “Returns”: “[4] Returnsa. Administratively both the partnership itself and the individual partners are obliged to make tax returns to the Revenue in relation to each tax year. At the relevant times a partnership was required to complete a partnership return pursuant to s 12AA of the TMA. Section 12AB(1) of the TMA provided that every tax return made by a partnership "shall include a statement (a partnership statement)" showing, among other things: i the amount of income or loss sustained by the partnership for the period covered by that re-turn (i.e. on a composite basis); s 12AB(1)(a); and ii the amount of such income or loss attributable to each partner; s 12AB(1)(b).b. Section 12AB(2) and (3) allowed for amendments to be made to a partnership statement, and where they were made s 12AB(4) provided for corresponding amendments to be made to the self-assessment returns of the partners made under s 9 of the TMA.c. The partnership statement was logically followed by the submission of each individual partner's tax return pursuant to s 8 of the TMA. The individual partner was required to include the relevant share of the partnership profits or losses allocated to him as shown in the partnership statement in his own tax return: s 8(1B) of the TMA…” 61. In HMRC v Vaines [2016] UKUT 2 (TCC) , the Upper Tribunal (Judge Gammie QC and Judge Powell) observed that: “23. At the same time new sections 8 and 9 TMA provided for returns to include a self-assessment and a new section 12AA TMA made provision for a partnership return to facilitate the establishment of the amounts that individual partners should include in their self-assessment. 24. Although section 111 ICTA has been rewritten to a number of sections in Part 9 of ITTOIA, the basic approach adopted by section 111 is still evident from those provisions of Part 9: in particular, the actual trade is the trade carried on by the partners collectively (s.111(2)), the profits of the actual trade are then shared among the partners according to their interest for the period (s.111(3)) and the concept of a "deemed trade or profession" (now the "notional trade or profession") is then introduced for the purposes of assessing each partner to tax in respect of his share by reference to the correct basis period (s.111(4)). 25. Prior to self-assessment, the basis periods for the assessment of partnership profits depended upon whether the entry or departure of any partner was treated as a cessation of the partnership trade or its dis-continuance. The determination of the basis period for the assessment of the partnership's profits on partners generally depended upon that determination. Following the introduction of self-assessment, however, each partner is assessed to tax on their share of the profits by reference to the basis period determined according to their notional trade. It is, however, as the language of the Act recognises, a notional trade only for the purposes of assessment. The actual trade remains that of the partners collectively and it is the profits of that collective trade that must be computed before being allocated or shared among partners to provide each partner's share of the profit that is the profit of their notional trades for the purposes of their self-assessment. … It is the profits of the trade carried on collectively that has always been recognised as the subject matter of computation and charge. That has not changed with the introduction of self-assessment. It is in the context of the partnership trade conducted collectively that Mr Vaines must justify the deduction of his payment.” 62. In Morgan and Self v HMRC [2009] SFTD 160 (“ Morgan and Self ”) the Tribunal (Dr Nuala Brice) was concerned with the tax treatment of certain payments, by a firm of chartered accountants to partners who were asked to withdraw from the firm made in addition to their share of the profits. 63. Summarising HMRC’s arguments Dr Brice said, at [6]:[6]“… The Revenue's primary argument was that the further payments were payments of profits and so were chargeable to income tax and were not deductible by the firm. Alternatively they argued that, because the firm had made a partnership return under the 1970 Act, which included a partnership statement showing the amounts of the further payments as being income accruing to each partner, it followed that each partner was obliged to include the same amount as income in his or her personal return and that was the amount upon which each partner was chargeable to tax. ” 64. Having dismissed the appeal on the basis of HMRC’s primary argument and because it had been argued before her, although it was not necessary for her to do so, Dr Brice nevertheless briefly expressed her views in relation to the alternative argument. She said: “[69] Section 8(1) of the 1970 Act provides that, if so required, an individual must deliver a return together with such statements as relate to the information in the return. In my view a partnership statement will relate to the information contained in the return of an individual who carries on a profession in partnership. Section 8(1B) provides that the return of a partner must include any amount shown in the partnership statement as equal to his share of income. There is therefore a statutory obligation for a partner to include in his return whatever amount is shown in the partnership statement as equal to his share of the income of the partnership. This accords with the scheme of the legislation and enables the Revenue to ensure that the amounts in the partnership return are consistent with the amounts returned by the individual partners. [70] However, the question then arises as to what happens if the partnership and the partner do not agree about the nature of payments made. In these appeals the firm was of the view that the payments were profits and therefore income but the appellants disagreed. A case could arise where a firm was of the view that payments were not income but the individual partner thought that they were. How are such matters to be resolved? If a disagreement were to arise outside the context of the tax legislation then no doubt it could be resolved by the dispute resolution machinery in the partnership agreement. However, if the disagreement fundamentally affects a tax liability then the Revenue will also have a view and it seems that the appropriate forum for resolving the dispute should be the tax appeal procedure. The statutory provisions in the 1970 Act assume that the partnership return is right unless corrected by the Revenue (in which case the Revenue can also correct the individual partner's return). However, there is no provision which deals with the case where an individual partner takes the view that the partnership return and partnership statement is wrong. If, in such a case, the partner does complete his return including as his income the amount shown in the partnership statement he cannot also declare that the return is correct and complete to the best of his knowledge as he would be of the view that the amount returned was too high or too low.[71][71] A somewhat similar problem arose in Suther land [ Re Sutherland & Partner’s Appeal [1994] STC 387] where a partnership of six general practitioners appealed against a partnership assessment. Before the appeal was heard the partnership divided between five doctors on the one hand and a single doctor on the other. The General Commissioners determined the assessment and the single doctor required them to state a case for the opinion of the High Court. The question then arose as to whether one partner had the right of appeal against the determination of the General Commissioners under section 31 of the 1970 Act and also having regard to section 56 of the same Act which provided that only an appellant could ask for a stated case. The Court of Appeal held that legislation should be interpreted so as to give effect to Parliament's presumed intention. Having regard to the procedural code in the 1970 Act it was clear that it was the intention of Parliament that one jointly assessed taxpayer should have a right of appeal. At 391f Sir Donald Nicholls VC said that the statutory provisions did not slot neatly into place. "On the one hand, the statutory scheme for appeals is not geared to cases where a single assessment is made on more than one person and the taxpayers disagree about what should be done. On the other hand, Parliament cannot be taken to have intended that in such a case one of the persons assessed should have no right of appeal … (At 391) Legislation is to be interpreted so as to give effect to Parliament's presumed intention, so long as this is clear, provided always the language of the statute fairly admits of the interpretation in question. Here, having carefully considered the procedural code for tax appeals set out in Part IV of the [1970 Act] we are of the clear view that Parliament must have intended that one jointly assessed taxpayer shall have a right of appeal even if the other person or persons named in the assessment do not wish to appeal. Accordingly, section 31 is to be construed as enabling any person assessed to tax to bring an appeal in respect of the assessment, whether he has been assessed alone or jointly with others."[72][72] The statutory provisions relevant to this appeal do not slot easily into place either. At first sight they do not appear to deal with the case where a partnership and an individual partner disagree about the nature of payments made to the individual partner, which nature affects the tax liability of the individual partner . At the relevant time in Sutherland section 31 provided that an appeal might be brought against an assessment to tax and so the language of the statute fairly admitted of the interpretation given by the Court of Appeal. It is not so easy to identify how the language of the current version of section 31 could fairly be interpreted so as to give a partner a right of appeal where he disagrees with the partnership statement as, if the Revenue are right, there will be no assessment or amendment of a self-assessment to appeal.[73][73] I have therefore re-examined the provisions of section 8 and 9 of the 1970 Act in the light of these difficulties. Section 8(1) begins by stating the purpose of the whole section which is to establish the amount to which the individual is chargeable to tax and the amount payable by him by way of tax . It seems to me to be implicit in these provisions that what must be established is the right amount upon which the individual is chargeable to tax and the right amount of tax payable by him, no less but also no more. If that is right then the whole section must be interpreted in the light of that purpose. Section 8(1)(a) then goes on to provide that the return must contain 'such information as may reasonably be required in pursuance of the notice'; the notice of course is the notice requiring the return. Section 8(1)(b) finally contains the provision which, with s 8(1B), requires the production of the partnership statement and the inclusion in the return of the amount shown in it as equal to the individual's share of the income of the partnership. [74] Although the provisions of s 8(1)(b) and 8(1B) impose a clear statutory obligation to provide the partnership statement with the return, and to include the amounts in it in the return, those subsections have to be read within the context of the whole of s 8 which includes s 8(1)(a). It seems to me that the language of s 8(1)(a) fairly admits of the interpretation that the totality of the information referred to must ensure that the return is complete and so must include any additional information needed to supplement the partnership statement in order to comply with the purposes of the section which is to establish the right amount of tax. This would be the case both if the individual thought that the amount in the partnership statement was too high (as in this appeal) or too low, that is, if it under-stated what the individual thought was the right amount. This interpretation is also consistent with s 8(2) because the provision of the additional information would then enable the individual to declare that the return was correct and complete. The same interpretation would then carry through into s 9. Under s 9(1) the self-assessment of the individual would be on the basis of the complete information in the return including both the partnership statement and any supplementary information. [75] It seems to me that this interpretation would also be consistent with the whole scheme of the legislation as the Revenue would be provided with the partnership statement but would also be provided with any supplementary information needed to support a claim that the partnership statement either overstated or understated the profits paid to the individual partner. If the Revenue were not satisfied that the partnership statement was wrong they could amend the self-assessment of the individual partner this giving the individual partner a right of appeal. [74] I have reached these views with some hesitation and it is with some relief that I recall that I do not have to decide this issue. However, if the appellants had succeeded on the first issue, and if they were not chargeable to tax on the amount shown in the partnership statement, it does not seem right that they should become chargeable just because of the contents of a partnership statement which had been shown to be wrong.” 65. In Phillips v HMRC [2009] UKFTT 335 (TC) the Tribunal (Judge Mosedale) referring to Morgan and Self held, at [112], that:
“… any partner has the right to appeal assessments against him in relation to his liability to tax on his partnership share is, I think, consistent with the views expressed in Morgan & Self ” 66. However, in Gibbs v HMRC [2013] UKFTT 236 (TC) Judge Mosedale subsequently considered, contrary to the view that she had expressed in Phillips , that: “[55] … there is no right of appeal for a partner to appeal a consequential amendment under s 28B(4) or s 30B(2). While this might superficially appear surprising, it would be consistent with the scheme of the TMA. Section 111 taxes each partner in accordance with his share of the partnership profits. Each partner must declare his share of the profits as disclosed on the partnership return. The partners' liability is driven entirely by the partnership return. Amendments to that return automatically are carried on to the partners' returns (s28B(4) and s 30B(2)). If a partner were allowed an individual appeal against his own return, this might lead to a situation of over or under taxation of the partnership profits as a whole as there is a risk that a different partnership profit figure would be used for different partners' tax returns. 56. It seems to me that a proper interpretation of s 31 and one that is consistent with logic is that only the partnership returns can be appealed. But as I said in Phillips , any partner can bring the appeal. The effect of succeeding in the appeal would be a reduction in the partnerships’ taxable profits and this would flow through to benefit all partners under s 50(9).” 67. In MCashback Software 6 LLP v HMRC [2013] UKFTT 679 the Tribunal (Judge Cannan), whose focus was on the issue of appeal rights in the case of a consequential amendment to an individual’s tax return under s 28B(4) TMA (finding that there were none), characterised the second issue in Morgan and Self (at [56]) as: “…whether individual partners could challenge on appeal the contents of a partnership return and in particular the partnership statement. HMRC contended they could not. The remedy of an individual partner was to raise the matter in the partnership.” 68. He continued, at [57]: “The Tribunal Judge expressed the view that section 31 TMA 1970 would not naturally be construed so as to give an individual partner a right of appeal against a partnership return which had not been amended by HMRC. However she said that the individual partner could make an individual return under section 8 effectively adjusting the partnership statement so that the income or gains returned by the individual were seen by that individual to be correct. HMRC could then open an enquiry into the individual return of the partner and the partner could appeal any amendment, even if it were an amendment so as to ensure consistency with the partnership statement .” 69. Following Morgan and Self , HMRC published guidance on the inclusion of partnership profit allocations in partners’ tax returns in their Enquiry Manual at EM7025. This stated: Following the Morgan and Self cases, we take the view that partners should normally resolve between themselves any dispute about the allocation of profits. But, in exceptional cases, where there is a genuine disagreement that cannot be resolved between the partners, individual partners should • enter, as their share of partnership profits, the amount they consider to be correct and advise us that they have done so by making an entry in the white space notes section of the return to show • advise us that they have done so by making an entry in the white space notes section of the return to show • the profits as allocated in the partnership statement, • a deduction (or addition) of the disputed amount, and • an explanation about why they think the profit allocated to them in the partnership statement is wrong. If the individual partner does this, then we would not automatically regard the personal return as incorrect if profits, as declared by the individual, were a "net" amount after deducting the disputed amount. But each case will turn on its facts. If there is a discrepancy between profits as allocated by the partnership and profits as returned by the partner, you may need to open enquiries into the returns in order to establish the correct position in respect of both partnership and partner's returns. Normal culpability considerations will apply. Discussion and Conclusion 70. For the appellants, Mr Bremner contends that the tax adjustment, the add back to the accounts by the Designated Members, was incorrect as a matter of tax law and that as a result the self-assessments in the individual tax returns were correct and therefore complied with the requirements of s 8 TMA. He relies on the obiter observations of the Special Commissioner in Morgan and Self at [69] to [74] (see, paragraph 64, above) and notes that this accords with the guidance contained in HMRC’s Enquiry Manual, EM 7025. 71. Ms Nathan, for HMRC who does not accept that the appellants’ individual returns comply with s 8 TMA, submits that the issue of whether BTG’s returns were GAAP compliant is not justiciable in this appeal as it is by the members of the LLP rather than the LLP itself. She says that their proper course for challenging the correctness or otherwise of the LLP adjustment is by way of an appeal by BTG against the s 28B(1) TMA partnership closure notice, or if the members cannot agree whether to appeal by way of civil proceedings against the LLP. 72. Turning first to s 8 TMA (which is set out at paragraph 51, above), as Dr Brice observed, at [73] of Morgan & Self : “It seems to me to be implicit in these provisions that what must be established is the right amount upon which the individual is chargeable to tax and the right amount of tax payable by him, no less but also no more. If that is right then the whole section must be interpreted in the light of that purpose.” 73. However, save for one exception, s 8 TMA does not provide any guidance on what information may “reasonably be required” by HMRC for this purpose. That exception is contained in s 8(1B) TMA which requires a person who carries on a trade in partnership to include in his or her return “each amount which, in any relevant statement, is stated to be equal to his share of any income, loss, tax, credit or charge for the period in respect of which the statement is made” with the “relevant statement” being the partnership statement made in accordance with s 12AB TMA setting out the partnership profits and the amount allocated to each partner (s 8(1C) TMA). 74. Relying on Colin Moore Ms Nathan submits that not only is a partner obliged to include the figure of the share of the partnership profit allocated on his or her return as stated in the partnership statement but that it has to be recorded in the correct box on that return and that a failure to do so would amount to non-compliance with the strict statutory requirements of s 8(1B) TMA. However, although the Upper Tribunal in Colin Moore did refer to the “correct” figure being included in a taxpayer’s return it did not address the question that arises here which is what is the correct figure? Is it that provided by the appellants in their individual returns or BTG in the partnership return and, as such Colin Moore is of little, if any, assistance in the present case. 75. Ms Nathan, who contends that the “correct” figure is that declared in the partnership statement says that provided an individual enters this figure in the correct box of his or her individual tax return it will be “correct and complete” and the individual would therefore be able to make the declaration required by s 8(2) TMA. She submits that such an interpretation is to be preferred to that in Morgan & Self as it recognises that Parliament could not have intended there to be tension between the two obligations it imposes at s 8(1B) TMA and s 8(2) TMA. This is because s 8(2) TMA applies to everyone required to deliver a tax return and must be consistent to all individuals. Moreover, she says, it would be contrary to the intention of Parliament if s 8(2) TMA were to take precedence over s 8(1B) TMA as it was clearly intended that tax assessments on the partners must flow directly from the partnership return and (as was the situation prior to the introduction of self-assessment) that 100% of reported profits would be assessed (see Vaines, at paragraph 61, above). 76. With regard to the obiter observations in Morgan & Self , which as a decision of this Tribunal is not binding, Ms Nathan submits that because Dr Brice gave precedence to s 8(2) TMA over 8(1B) TMA it was wrongly decided and in any event should not be followed as it was concerned with the nature of particular payments and not the computation of partnership profits or allocation between the partners. 77. Mr Bremner, however, questions the interpretation of s 8(2) TMA advanced by Ms Nathan which he says cannot be correct. He illustrated his submission by way of an example where an individual knew that a partnership statement was incorrect because it contained a negligent or careless understatement of a liability to tax. In such circumstances not only is the person who gave the partnership return to HMRC, the designated partner, liable to a penalty under paragraph 1 of schedule 24 to the Finance Act 2007 calculated by reference to the potential lost revenue but, as a result of the application of paragraph 20 of that schedule, where the inaccuracy affects the amount of tax payable by a partner, the partner is also liable to a penalty. The only way that such a partner could protect himself from a penalty, Mr Bremner says, would be to include a higher figure in his personal return – something that HMRC’s construction of s 8 TMA does not permit. Mr Bremner contends that similar difficulties would also arise if, as in this case, the partnership statement overstates a liability. 78. In response Ms Nathan suggests that a partner who believed the partnership profit to have been understated first course of action should be to seek, through the partnership, to amend the partnership return or arrange for a successor to be appointed as the nominated partner if he or she is not acting in the interests of the partnership. However, as this would take time the partner could either: (1) put the s 8(1B) TMA figure in box 7 (share of partnership’s profits) in his return; (2) put the s 8(1B) TMA figure in the correct box of his return (box 7) and notes in the “white box” his belief that the profits are understated; (3) put the s 8(1B) TMA figure in the correct box of his return (box 7) and notes in the “white box” his belief that the profits are understated. Additionally, the partner includes the additional income he believes to be missing from the partnership account in the “other income” box of his return; (4) put the higher figure he believes to be correct in box 7 of his return and puts the partnership figure and explanation in the “white box” and includes the additional income as “other income” in the box in his return; or (5) put the higher figure he believes to be correct in box 7 of his return and omit the s 8(1B) TMA figure entirely. 79. In the first three of the above options, Ms Nathan says, HMRC would regard the partner’s return as correct in law at the time of filing enabling him to make the s 8(2) TMA declaration. However, he could be liable to a penalty if he opted for (1) or (2) above in respect of an error in the partnership statement that affected the amount of tax payable him. Although he could also be liable to a penalty in (3) because of the incorrect partnership return as any amendment should not lead to additional tax being due there would be no potential lost revenue on which it could be calculated and accordingly no penalty would be due. With regard to options (4) and (5), HMRC would regard the return as incorrect as the s 8(1B) TMA has not been included in box 7 and as such a s 8(2) TMA declaration could not be made. The partner would be protected from potential penalties, however, in option (4) because of the entry in the “other income” box but not option (5) where the additional amount has not been included in the return. 80. However, as Mr Bremner submits, such an approach would lead to a partner, who seeks to avoid a liability to a penalty (as in option (3), above) including part of his share of the partnership profit in the “other income” box of his return. This would appear to be inconsistent with Ms Nathan’s submission that the correct figure must be included in the correct box in a tax return and it is difficult to reconcile, if I were to accept Ms Nathan’s argument, how an individual, in circumstances described in option (3) knowing that his individual return is incorrect, could make the declaration required by s 8(2) TMA. 81. Clearly, as Dr Brice observed at [72] in Morgan and Self , the statutory provisions “do not slot easily into place” and do not appear to deal with the case where a partnership and individual partner disagree. However, albeit obiter and “with some hesitation”, Dr Brice did consider the issue arising in this appeal, ie whether partners are entitled to declare different profit share figures on their individual tax returns to those declared on the partnership tax return where they believe that shown on the partnership return is incorrect. 82. Although a first instance decision of the First-tier Tribunal is not binding in the way that a decision of the Upper Tribunal or Court of Appeal would be it would, nevertheless, be expected to be followed by the First-tier Tribunal in another similar case unless considered clearly wrong. In HMRC v Abdul Noor [2013] UKUT 71 (TCC) the Tax and Chancery Chamber of the Upper Tribunal, in relation to the effect of a decision of one High Court Judge on another (but equally applicable in the case of any persuasive authority or court of tribunal of first instance), said, at [82]: “… although the decisions were not binding on him in the way that a decision of the Court of Appeal would be binding, the decision of a High Court Judge ought to be followed by another [High Court] judge unless that judge thinks that the earlier decision was clearly wrong”
As Lord Goddard CJ put it in Huddersfield Police Authority v Watson [1947] KB 842, at 848: “I can only say for myself that I think the modern practice, and the modern view of the subject, is that a judge of first instance, though he would always follow the decision of another judge of first instance, unless he is convinced the judgment is wrong, would follow it as a matter of judicial comity.” 83. Therefore, despite clearly being obiter , the observations of Dr Brice on s 8 TMA in Morgan and Self were made after hearing argument on the issue from experienced leading counsel on both sides and, as such, should not be dismissed lightly. Rather, having carefully considered what she said, particularly at [74], I would adopt her reasoning and agree that the purpose of s 8 TMA is to establish the right amount of tax. 84. It is therefore necessary to ascertain what the right amount of tax is in this case. 85. Section 25 ITTOIA provides that a profits of a trade (which by virtue of s 24 ITTOIA includes a profession) must comply with the Companies Act 2006 and be GAAP compliant which, in the opinion of the auditors Deloitte LLP, the Accounts in this case did (see paragraph 8, above). Therefore, given the weight of evidence before me that there was no basis for the adjustment to the Accounts made by BTG, it must follow that the “correct” figure from which to establish the right amount of tax is as recorded in each appellant’s return. 86. Although Mr King, Mr Hodgson, Mr Abercromby, Mr Coyle and Ms Crowe did include the figure shown in the partnership statement on their individual returns in addition to the “right” figure derived from the accounts, the individual returns filed by the other appellants did not and therefore cannot be regarded as correct and complete. However, given the duty on the Tribunal on an appeal against an amendment to a return made by a closure notice under s 28A TMA is to determine the correct amount of tax due (see Tower MCashback LLP1 at paragraph 58, above), in the absence of any other reason, this should not restrict their right of appeal. 87. However, Ms Nathan says that such another reason exists. She contends that the amendments to the appellants’ 2011-12 tax returns, because they implement an adjustment to a partnership return, are essentially “consequential amendments” with the same effect as an amendment under s 28B(4) TMA and any right of appeal should be construed accordingly. 88. It is clear from Gibbs and MCashback Software LLP 6 that there is no right of appeal under s 31 TMA against consequential amendments under s 28B(4) TMA. However, I do not accept Ms Nathan’s argument that s 31 TMA should be interpreted in such a way so as to impose a limitation on a partners right of appeal following an amendment to his or her return made by a s 28A TMA closure notice. Despite any apparent similarity to a consequential amendment made under s 28B(4) TMA, an amendment made by a closure notice under s 28A TMA is clearly and obviously within s 31(1)(b) TMA. As such I agree with Mr Bremner who submits that as the amendments against which the appellants have appealed were made by closure notices issued under s 28A TMA the appellants have an unlimited right of appeal under s 31(1)(b) TMA 89. As the Vice-Chancellor observed in the passage in Sutherland to which Dr Brice referred at [71] in Morgan and Self , albeit in relation to a period before the advent of self-assessment and closure notices, Parliament cannot be taken to have intended that in such a case the persons assessed, such as the appellants in the present case, should have no right of appeal. Given that legislation is to be interpreted so as to give effect to Parliament’s presumed intention and the language of the statute “fairly admits” such an interpretation it is not necessary to consider arguments based on Article 1 Protocol 1 to the European Convention on Human Rights. 90. Accordingly, for the reasons above, the appeals against the amendments to the appellants’ returns made by the closure notices under s 28A TMA are allowed. Discovery Assessments 91. In relation to the discovery assessments issued by HMRC, under s 29 TMA, on Ms Crowe, Mr Fairchild and Mr Bard in respect of their 2010-11 returns, to the extent that it is necessary to do so, in order to determine this issue Ms Crowe’s appeal against the discovery assessment is allowed. However, as the other appeals against the discovery assessments remain open the parties may, if they are unable to resolve the issues between them, make an application to the Tribunal to do so provided that any such application is made within 60 days of the release of this decision. Right to Apply for Permission to Appeal 92. This document contains full findings of fact and reasons for the decision. Any party dissatisfied with this decision has a right to apply for permission to appeal against it pursuant to Rule 39 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Tax Chamber) Rules 2009. The application must be received by this Tribunal not later than 56 days after this decision is sent to that party. The parties are referred to “Guidance to accompany a Decision from the First-tier Tribunal (Tax Chamber)” which accompanies and forms part of this decision notice. JOHN BROOKS TRIBUNAL JUDGE RELEASE DATE: 14 June 2016

Cited in 2 later judgments