Leasing Polski LLC Gdansk v The Director of Border Revenue (EXCISE DUTY RESTORATION OF VEHICLE (see also EXCISE APPEAL) : Commercial vehicle) [2016] UKFTT 217 (TC)
FTT-Tax
Leasing Polski LLC Gdansk v The Director of Border Revenue (EXCISE DUTY RESTORATION OF VEHICLE (see also EXCISE APPEAL) : Commercial vehicle)
(a) and (b) of section 8 above; Discussion and Conclusion
[15]In written submissions on behalf of Leasing Polski, Alicja Felska-Pela (a Polish attorney at law) contends that by terminating the lease under §23(c) Leasing Polski has done everything that can be reasonably expected to ensure that it leases vehicles to legitimate companies for a legitimate purpose and therefore the Vehicle should be restored either with no fee or alternatively for a reduced fee.[16]However, as is clear from s 16(4) of the Finance Act 1994 the issue before me is not whether the Vehicle should be restored to Leasing Polski without a fee or with a reduced fee but whether, having regard to the facts, the decision taken by Border Force to restore the Vehicle for a £5,000 fee is proportionate and one that could reasonably have been reached. It is not sufficient that I might have reached a different conclusion.[17]As Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers MR (as he then was) said in Lindsay v Commissioners of Customs and Excise [2002] STC 508 at [40]:
“… the Commissioners will not arrive reasonably at a decision if they take into account irrelevant matters, or fail to take into account all relevant matters.”
[18]Although, having regard to the circumstances I consider the decision to restore the Vehicle for a fee to be proportionate, Officer Brenton does not appear to have had a copy of the general terms and conditions of Leasing Polski’s lease agreement when he made the decision and therefore, although clearly relevant, could not have taken these into account. In John Dee Ltd v Commissioners of Customs and Excise [1995] STC 941 the Court of Appeal held that in cases, such as the present, where because of a failure to take some relevant material into account, a decision could not have reasonably reached the Tribunal could, nevertheless, dismiss the appeal if the decision would inevitably have been the same had account been taken of the additional material.[19]Having regard to all the circumstances of this case I am satisfied that had Officer Brenton been aware of the general terms and conditions of Leasing Polski’s lease agreement (in particular §23 (c)) when he made the decision to restore the Vehicle for a fee, as these terms and conditions were not sufficient to prevent two previous seizures of vehicles owned by Leasing Polski in 2014 (or two seizures before then), his decision to restore the Vehicle for a fee would inevitably have been the same.[20]As such the appeal cannot succeed and is therefore dismissed. Right to apply for permission to appeal[21]This document contains full findings of fact and reasons for the decision. Any party dissatisfied with this decision has a right to apply for permission to appeal against it pursuant to Rule 39 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Tax Chamber) Rules 2009. The application must be received by this Tribunal not later than 56 days after this decision is sent to that party. The parties are referred to “Guidance to accompany a Decision from the First-tier Tribunal (Tax Chamber)” which accompanies and forms part of this decision notice. JOHN BROOKS TRIBUNAL JUDGE RELEASE DATE: 29 MARCH 2016