Cleckheaton Holdings Ltd v Revenue & Customs (VAT - INPUT TAX : Capital items) [2015] UKFTT 686 (TC)

FTT-Tax
Cleckheaton Holdings Ltd v Revenue & Customs (VAT - INPUT TAX : Capital items)
[2015] UKFTT 686 (TC) · 2015-05-18
[49]The issue in JDL was identical to the issue in the present appeal. Namely, whether supplies of Demonstrators were supplies of “capital goods used by the taxable person for the purposes of his business”. Lawrence Collins J considered previous ECJ authorities, in particular Verbond van Nederlandsee Onderneimingen v. Inspecteur der Invoerrechten en Accijnzen [1977] ECR 113 and Régie Dauphinoise-Cabinet A Forest Sarl v. Ministre du Budget [1996] STC 1176 . 50. In Verbond the trader was a trade association which had incurred expenditure on a printer and certain office supplies. The issue was whether they were capital goods for the purposes of the Second Directive. The ECJ said at [12]:
“ 12. The ordinary meaning of the expression and its function in the context of the provisions of the Second Directive indicate that it covers goods used for the purposes of some business activity and distinguishable by their durable nature and their value and such that the acquisition costs are not normally treated as current expenditure but written off over several years. ” 51. In Régie Dauphinoise the trader operated a property management business. In the course of that business it received advances from owners and lessees which it was entitled to invest and retain the interest. The tax authority regarded the interest as exempt income that should be included in the denominator for the partial exemption calculation. The trader maintained that the sums should be excluded under Article 19(2) as “incidental transactions”. 52. The ECJ held that the interest was not an incidental transaction and therefore not to be excluded from the calculation of deductible input tax. At [21] and [22] it stated: “ 21. The purpose of excluding incidental financial transactions from the denominator of the fraction used to calculate the deductible proportion in accordance with Article 19 of the Sixth Directive is to comply with the objective of complete neutrality guaranteed by the common system of VAT. As the Advocate General has observed at point 39 of his Opinion, if all receipts from a taxable person' s financial transactions linked to a taxable activity were to be included in that denominator, even where the creation of such receipts did not entail the use of goods or services subject to VAT or, at least, entailed only their very limited use, calculation of the deduction would be distorted. 22. However, placements by property management companies are the consequence of advances to them by co-owners and lessees for whom they manage their properties. With the consent of their clients, those companies are able to place these monies for their own account with financial institutions. That is why, as the Court has pointed out at paragraph 18 of this judgment, the receipt of interest from those placements constitutes the direct, permanent and necessary extension of the taxable activity of property management companies. Such placements cannot therefore be characterized as incidental financial transactions within the meaning of Article 19(2) of the Sixth Directive. To take them into account in order to calculate the deductible proportion would not be such as to affect the neutrality of the system of value added tax. ”
(emphasis added) 53. HMCE submitted in JDL that capital goods could not include goods which were the same or similar to other goods supplied by a trader. That submission was rejected. A similar submission that capital goods must be distinguishable by their durable nature and value from the trader’s trading stock was also rejected. Those submissions were plainly too wide and they are not repeated in those terms by Mr Puzey. 54. In the light of the authorities Lawrence Collins J held that Verbond was not to be treated as laying down an all-embracing test for the meaning of the term “capital goods”. He concluded at [41]:[41]“ 41. Whether or not a particular item is a capital good for a trader is essentially a question for the Tribunal to decide on the facts of the particular case. The essential facts on which the Tribunal relied in coming to its conclusion that the ex-demonstrators were capital goods were these: the demonstrators were not acquired for the purpose of being sold, but for the purpose of being used by JDL for the purpose of carrying on its taxable activities and at the end of their life as demonstrators or courtesy cars were sold off; they were of substantial durability and value compared with other articles used in the management and day to day running of the business, and were depreciated in the management accounts. In my judgment the Tribunal asked itself the right questions and was entitled to come to its conclusion on the evidence before it. ” 55. We now turn to a number of decisions of the Court of Justice since JDL. EDM v Fazenda Pública [2005] STC 66 concerned the exclusion of incidental financial transactions. EDM was a holding company and its main activity was the business of mineral prospecting and exploitation. It also carried out financial transactions involving loans to subsidiaries, indeed the income from those transactions was greater than that generated by the main activity. At [75] the Court recognised that the purpose of excluding such transactions from the calculation under Article 19 was “to avoid such transactions distorting that calculation and to thus meet the objective of neutrality guaranteed by the common system of VAT”. At [76] and [80] it stated:[76]“ 76. As the Court held at paragraph 21 of the judgment in Régie Dauphinoise, if all receipts from a taxable person's financial transactions linked to a taxable activity were to be included in that denominator, even where the creation of such receipts did not entail the use of goods or services subject to VAT, or at least entailed only their very limited use, calculation of the deduction would be distorted. … 80. … in calculating the deductible proportion referred to in Articles 17 and 19 of the Sixth Directive, those transactions are to be regarded as incidental transactions within the meaning of the second sentence of Article 19(2) thereof in so far as they involve only very limited use of assets or services subject to VAT; although the scale of the income generated by financial transactions within the scope of the Sixth Directive may be an indication that those transactions should not be regarded as incidental within the meaning of that provision, the fact that income greater than that produced by the activity stated by the undertaking concerned to be its main activity is generated by such transactions does not suffice to preclude their classification as 'incidental transactions' ” 56. There are two decisions of the ECJ which Mr Puzey submits put the judgment in JDL in a new light. These are Nordania Finans A/S v Skatteministeriet [2008] STC 3314 and NCC Construction Danmark A/S v Skatteministeriet [2010] STC 532 . 57. Nordania operated a business involving sales of cars on hire purchase which were subject to VAT. It also had a business involving the provision of financial services which was exempt from VAT. When Nordania entered into a hire purchase agreement with a customer the agreements would typically be for 36 months. Monthly payments would be made, together with a final payment on sale of the vehicle at the end of the agreement. The sale value at the end of the agreement was taken into account when setting the monthly rental payments. In 1998 Nordania leased 4,500 vehicles and it seems that during the course of that year 600 vehicles reached the end of lease agreements and were sold, either to the lessee or to a third party. 58. For the purposes of its partial exemption calculation Nordania took into account turnover from the taxable sale of vehicles at the end of the hire agreements. The Danish tax authorities considered that the vehicles were capital goods for the purposes of Article 19(2) and should be excluded from the calculation. 59. The Court of Justice made reference to the Explanatory Memorandum to the Sixth Directive and to Régie Dauphinoise as follows:[22]“ 22. The objective of Article 19(2) is apparent from the Explanatory Memorandum to the proposal for the Sixth Directive, which was submitted by the Commission of the European Communities to the Council of the European Communities on 29 June 1973 (see Bulletin of the European Communities, supplement 11/73, p. 19), according to which '[t]he factors mentioned in this paragraph must be excluded from the calculation of the proportion lest, being unrepresentative of the taxable person's business activity, they should deprive the amount of any real significance. Such is the case with sales of capital items and real estate and financial transactions which are only ancillary operations, that is to say are only of secondary importance in relation to the total turnover of the business. These factors are only excluded if they are not part of the usual business activity of the taxable person '.[23]In that regard, the Court has already held that the purpose of excluding incidental financial transactions from the denominator of the fraction used to calculate the deductible proportion in accordance with Article 19 of the Sixth Directive is to comply with the objective of complete neutrality guaranteed by the common system of VAT. If all receipts from a taxable person's financial transactions linked to a taxable activity were to be included in that denominator, even where the creation of such receipts did not entail the use of goods or services subject to VAT or, at least, entailed only their very limited use, calculation of the deduction would be distorted (Case C-306/94 Régie Dauphinoise [1996] ECR I-3695 , paragraph 21).[24]By adopting the provisions of Article 19(2) of the Sixth Directive, the Community legislature thus intended to exclude from the calculation of the proportion the turnover attributable to a sale of goods where that sale is of an unusual nature in relation to the normal activities of the taxable person concerned and does not therefore require the use of goods or services for mixed use in a way that is proportionate to the turnover which it generates . As the Advocate General stated in point 68 of his Opinion, the inclusion of that turnover in the calculation of the deductible proportion would distort the resultant figure in the sense that it would no longer reflect the division of use of goods or services for mixed use as between taxable and exempt activities respectively. ” (emphasis added)60. Importantly, both the Advocate General and the Court referred to Verbond. Both found that the interpretation of the term capital goods in Verbond did not give an answer to the issue in Nordania.61. At [61] and [62] the Advocate General stated:
“ 61. …although under the criteria set out by the court in [Verbond], vehicles purchased by an undertaking in order to carry on its economic activities may be capital goods within the meaning of art 19 of the Sixth Directive, it cannot be inferred from those criteria that such vehicles are to be so categorised if the sale thereof at the end of the leasing contracts forms an integral part of the taxable person’s regular activity . That is why I take the view that the interpretation of the concept of capital goods given by the court in the [Verbond] judgment does not enable an answer to be given to the question referred … ” 62. The Court found that the interpretation of capital goods in Verbond was not relevant for the purpose of answering the question referred. At [29] it stated: “ 29. To exclude generally from the calculation of the deductible proportion goods which are used for the purposes of a business activity and are indeed distinguishable by their durable nature and their value, such that the acquisition costs are not normally treated as current expenditure but are written off over several years, without taking account of the fact that the sale of those goods, at the end of the leasing contracts, is an integral part of the normal activity of the taxable person , would run directly counter to the objective of neutrality of the common system of VAT. … 31. The interpretation given by the Court in [Verbond] is not therefore relevant for the purpose of answering the question referred for a preliminary ruling in the present case. ”
(emphasis added) 63. Mr Puzey also relied on the decision of the Court of Justice in NCC. The trader carried on a building and contracting business. Its principal business was construction projects on behalf of other parties but it also constructed some buildings on its own account which it would then sell. Sales on its own account were approximately 5% of total turnover. Under Danish law supplies as a contractor to third parties were taxable and supplies of real estate were exempt. A trader was also required to account for VAT on work done constructing buildings for sale on its own behalf as if it the work done was being undertaken for a third party (described as a “self supply”). 64. The first and second questions for the ECJ were (1) whether for the purposes of Article 19(2) the sale of buildings constructed by NCC for sale on its own account were “incidental real estate transactions” and (2) whether it was appropriate to assess the extent to which that activity, viewed separately, entailed use of goods and services on which VAT was payable. 65. In answering the first question the Court again referred to the Explanatory Memorandum to the Sixth Directive and followed Régie Dauphinoise and EDM. At 31 it stated:[30]“ 31. In that regard, as is apparent from the case-law of the Court in which it took that objective as its basis, an economic activity cannot be classified as 'incidental' for the purposes of Article 19(2) of the Sixth Directive if it constitutes the direct, permanent and necessary extension of the business (Case C-306/94 Régie Dauphinoise [1996] ECR I-3695 , paragraph 22), or if it entails a significant use of goods and services subject to VAT (Case C-77/01 EDM [2004] ECR I-4295 , paragraph 76). ” 66. The Advocate General had pointed out at [82] of his opinion that on the facts the exempt activity and the taxable activity derived from the same transaction and it would be artificial to exclude turnover from the exempt activity. At [35] the Court answered the first question as follows:
“ 35. …the sale, in the case of a building business, of buildings constructed on its own account cannot be classified as an 'incidental real estate transaction' within the meaning of that provision, where that activity constitutes the direct, permanent and necessary extension of its business. In those circumstances, it is not necessary, in this case, to assess to what extent that sales activity, viewed separately, entails a use of goods and services on which VAT is payable. ” 67. The third question in NCC was whether it was consistent with the principle of fiscal neutrality for a building business, which is required to pay VAT on self supplies, not to be able to fully deduct the VAT relating to the general costs incurred thereby because the turnover from the sale of such buildings was exempt from VAT. 68. The Court held that the result was consistent with fiscal neutrality. At [44] it stated that the principle of fiscal neutrality required “ that different types of economic operators in comparable situations be treated in the same way in order to avoid any distortion of competition within the internal market… ”
. The Danish legislature wished to put building businesses like NCC on the same footing as building developers who could not deduct VAT on supplies from third party traders because the eventual supply of real estate was exempt. 69. Ms Brown submitted that the focus in cases such as Régie Dauphinoise and EDM in identifying income as “incidental” for these purposes was to look at the use they made of mixed use inputs. If that use was not commensurate with the income then the income should be excluded from the calculation because otherwise it would distort the calculation. She submitted that we must consider how Demonstrators were used in the business and sold and that we should recognise that they do not consume input tax in a way proportionate to the turnover generated. As such they should be treated as capital goods. 70. Nordania was directly concerned with the meaning of capital goods, and Ms Brown submitted that it too established that capital goods were excluded from the computation because they do not use input tax on mixed use goods in a way proportionate to turnover. The facts of Nordania are very different from JDL and the present appeal. However she submitted that the principles applied were the same as had been applied in cases prior to JDL. In Nordania there was a single transaction which was the disposal of a car and it would have been irrational to distinguish for the purposes of Article 19(2) between the monthly payments and the final payment. It was clear that Nordania was not using the cars in their business as such, they were selling them. 71. It is right that the facts of Nordania are very different to the present appeal, but we are concerned with the principles which emerge from the Court’s judgment. It seems clear to us that Nordania, as a matter of principle, established that Verbond does not define capital goods for the purposes of Article 19(2). The test as to what are capital goods involves consideration of whether the turnover in question is an integral part of the normal activity of the taxable person and whether the turnover is of an unusual nature when compared to the normal activities of the taxable person. We accept that to some extent this will involve consideration of how the supply uses mixed use inputs and also the factors identified in Verbond. 72. In JDL Lawrence Collins J expressly acknowledged that Verbond did not lay down an all-embracing test as to the meaning of the term capital goods. However it is clear that the characteristics he considered to be relevant did not include whether the transactions were an integral part of the trader’s normal activity. At [38] he stated:[38]“ 38. There is no general definition of "capital goods" for the purposes of the Sixth Directive or the United Kingdom VAT legislation. The Verbond ruling was not concerned with the meaning of capital goods in the present context, and the Tribunal, correctly, did not treat the Verbond ruling as laying down an all-embracing test for the meaning of the expression "capital goods" irrespective of the context in which the expression was used. I accept that the purpose of Art. 19(2) of the Sixth Directive, and of Reg. 101(3) of the 1995 Regulation, is to prevent distortion, but that does not mean that the expression "capital goods" is used in a special and unusual sense. In my judgment the Tribunal was right to derive from the Verbond ruling that relevant characteristics of capital goods were their value and purpose relative to other goods used in the management and day to day running of the business, and their accounting treatment. ” 73. We agree that there is no reason to consider that the expression “capital goods” is used in a special or unusual sense. It seems to us that it represents a broad approach to identifying supplies that should be excluded from the partial exemption calculation in Article 17(5). Having said that in our view the law has moved on, or at least been clarified by the ECJ, since JDL was decided. In particular in identifying capital goods it is important to consider the extent to which a transaction is an integral part of the normal activity of the trader and the extent to which the transaction is unusual in the sense that it does not use inputs in a way which is proportionate to the turnover generated. 74. On the facts of Nordania, the ECJ considered that the vehicles were not capital goods. The trader was selling cars, and that was all it was doing. Ms Brown acknowledges that the Court in Nordania had said that Verbond was not the relevant test. However she submitted that did not mean that the High Court in JDL had got it wrong. She submitted that even in the light of Nordania the result would have been the same in JDL. The focus had correctly been on whether there was a distortion between turnover on the sale of Demonstrators and use of mixed use inputs in achieving those sales. 75. We must deal with the facts of the present case. We are not concerned with what might have happened if HMRC’s appeal in JDL had been allowed on the basis that the VAT Tribunal had applied the wrong test. We must consider whether the Demonstrators are capital goods for the purposes of Article 19(2). The relevant test is not simply whether inclusion of the turnover would give rise to distortion because sales of Demonstrators do not use inputs in the same way as taxable sales. It remains necessary for us to take some meaning from the term “capital goods” just as the ECJ did in Nordania. Our focus must be on what is meant by capital goods in the context of Article 19(2) and in that regard we must follow the judgments of the ECJ. 76. Ms Brown relied upon the principle of fiscal neutrality, indeed it lay at the heart of her submissions. She submitted that fiscal neutrality has two aspects:(1) Ensuring that the deduction mechanism operates to relieve a trader entirely of the burden of VAT paid in the course of his economic activities making taxable supplies, and(2) Ensuring that supplies of goods or services which are similar and therefore in competition with each other are not treated differently for VAT purposes. 77. It is clear and we accept that fiscal neutrality operates in these two distinct senses – See NCC at [27] and [39] to [44] and also for example Finanzamt Steglitz v Ines Zimmermann C-147/11 at [46] to [49]. 78. The deduction system is the means by which a trader is relieved of the burden of VAT in relation to his taxable transactions. We accept that fiscal neutrality requires a fair and reasonable apportionment of inputs to taxable outputs. Article 19(2) and the standard method during the relevant part of the Claim Period adopt turnover as a proxy for use. 79. Ms Brown submitted that the effect of the input tax block was to put businesses which were subject to the input tax block into the position of a final consumer. Sales of Demonstrators were treated as exempt from VAT so as to avoid a double charge to tax. That was the reasoning in Commission v Italy. We would add that the reasoning in Commission v Italy also involved treating the supplies as exempt rather than outside the scope of VAT so as to engage the restrictions on input tax credit in Articles 17 and 19. 80. In written submissions following the hearing Ms Brown summarised the issue before us in the following terms:
“… the starting point for determining the question of whether demonstrator cars are capital goods is to identify whether they are goods the use and sale of which consumes input tax in the same way as the Appellant’s stock of new and used cars. At the heart of this question will be to determine whether for the whole of the period of ownership the demonstrator cars were to be resold (that being the nature of the normal activities of the Appellant’s business) or whether they were for use within the business and by the business by way of its own consumption (even when after use as a demonstrator they are then sold)”. 81. For the reasons given above we do not consider that the issue is simply whether or not the asset in question uses inputs in a way not proportionate to its eventual sales value. That is not the starting point. It seems to us that the starting point is identifying whether the Demonstrators are capital goods having regard to the meaning given to that term in the authorities in the context in which it is used, namely Article 19(2). 82. Ms Brown submitted that the Sixth Directive provided two mechanisms to ensure the neutrality of the deduction system where turnover does not represent an appropriate proxy for the use of mixed use inputs. Firstly Article 19(2) expressly removes from the calculation two types of turnover where the assumed proxy does not hold true in the form of capital goods and certain incidental transactions. Secondly where a turnover calculation does not result in an appropriate proxy for use, Member States can adopt an alternative solution based on use. In our view those methods are only alternatives in the sense that in the end only one method will be used. More broadly, they are both part of the same mechanism which is designed to fairly apportion mixed use input tax between taxable supplies and exempt supplies. 83. We accept Mr Puzey’s submission that the starting point is that a turnover based calculation will be employed and turnover in relation to capital goods will be excluded. At that stage consideration must be given to whether the Demonstrators are capital goods. If they are not, but the turnover based calculation does not produce a fair and reasonable apportionment then a special method may be employed. Detailed comparative analysis of use is reserved to the next stage which in this appeal is the issue of quantum. 84. The UK domestic legislation in what is now regulation 102 makes provision for special methods of input tax apportionment to be used. Regulation 102 excludes from any special method “the value of a supply” of capital goods. It is easy to see that including capital goods in a turnover based calculation would tend to distort input tax recovery and therefore fiscal neutrality. It is less easy to see why capital goods should not be included in a use based special method where they do use mixed use inputs. It is notable that regulation 102 refers to excluding the “value” attributable to capital goods from the calculation. Whether anything turns on that was not the subject of submissions. In any event the point remains that if the Demonstrators do not use inputs in the same way as new cars purchased for sale then if they are not capital goods a special method can be used to apportion input tax to them. The appropriate proxy for use of inputs by the Demonstrators if they are not capital goods would be a matter to be considered in determining quantum pursuant to the second ground of appeal. 85. We turn now to consider whether the Demonstrators were capital goods for the purposes of Article 19(2) on the facts as found. 86. The Demonstrators were purchased for use in the business with a view to selling them as used cars. The point was not specifically covered in Mr Smith’s evidence but we infer that the reasons for seeking to keep the mileage of Demonstrators as low as possible include ensuring that the Demonstrator has the appearance and feel of a new vehicle as well as maximising the value of the vehicle on resale. The Demonstrators were actually used for relatively short periods of time prior to sale. 87. The Appellant was in business selling both new and used vehicles. As such, the Demonstrators were goods of the same type and value as those sold in the ordinary course of the Appellant’s trading activities. 88. There is no evidence as to how the Demonstrators were treated for accounting purposes, in particular whether they were treated as fixed assets and depreciated in the management accounts. We accept that the economic circumstances in the period 1973 to 1987 involved periods of generally high inflation and the need to depreciate in the management accounts may not have existed. We therefore attach no significance to the absence of such evidence. 89. We do not accept on the facts that there is a complete disconnect between use of mixed use overheads and turnover from the sale of Demonstrators. The Demonstrators occupied space on the premises and sales transactions would require processing in exactly the same way as a new or used car being sold by the Appellant. We are not satisfied that mixed use inputs are not used at all in making sales of Demonstrators. . 90. The fact that 70% of Demonstrators were sold without marketing would reduce the extent to which sales of Demonstrators used inputs. However in our view that is not a very significant factor in determining whether they are capital goods. 91. The regularity with which Demonstrators were bought and sold at two to six month intervals is an indicator that such sales are part of the Appellant’s normal trading activity. 92. Ms Brown submitted that the very reason input tax had been blocked on the purchase of Demonstrators was because they were not purchased for the purpose of being sold. As such Demonstrators clearly had a different character to cars purchased for resale as new. The cost of running the Demonstrators was a cost component of the taxable supplies made by the Appellant. 93. We accept that Demonstrators were different in character to new car purchased for sale, but only to the extent that they were used in the business for a short period of time prior to sale. We do not consider that the existence of the input tax block means that the Demonstrators were sold otherwise than as an integral part of the Appellant’s normal activities or that the transactions are otherwise unusual. 94. In the light of all the evidence we are satisfied that the purchase and sale of a Demonstrator is just as much a part of the trading activity of the Appellant as the purchase and sale of new and used cars. Sales of Demonstrators are integral to that activity. It would be distortive to exclude such turnover from the partial exemption calculation, although we accept that a special method might be required to properly reflect the use those sales make of inputs. In our view fiscal neutrality is maintained because it will still be necessary to identify the extent to which sales of the Demonstrators use the mixed use inputs. 95. Mr Puzey invited us to find that the sale of Demonstrators was a direct, permanent and necessary extension of the taxable activity of selling new cars. We do so, but recognising that this formulation is relevant in the context of incidental transactions and it does not appear to be relevant in the context of capital goods. 96. In relation to the second aspect of fiscal neutrality, Ms Brown submitted that all taxpayers subject to the input tax block should be treated equally. HMRC’s assessment in the present case had the effect that motor traders were treated differently to other businesses subject to the input tax block. In her words they were subject to “an additional restriction on their recovery of input tax over and above non motor traders purely because of the nature of their business”
. It was submitted that this difference in treatment was not justified. 97. Ms Brown used as a comparator the findings of the F-tT in General Motors UK Limited v Commissioners for Revenue & Customs [2013] UKFTT 443 (TC) . That case concerned the treatment of self supplies by a car manufacturer. The principles involved are not relevant for present purposes. However Ms Brown relied on evidence accepted by the F-tT which described fleet purchasers purchasing in excess of 5,000 cars for use in their businesses. She submitted that an eventual sale by such fleet purchasers would be exempt because input tax would have been blocked on the purchase but there would be no doubt that the cars were capital goods and therefore excluded from the partial exemption calculation. In those circumstances Ms Brown submitted that the Appellant was suffering unequal treatment if Demonstrators were not also treated as capital goods. 98. We have no evidence as to the use of fleet cars by businesses but we take notice of the fact that large businesses do operate fleets of vehicles where cars are necessary for employees in the performance of their duties and also as “perk” cars. We do not accept Ms Brown’s submission that the different treatment for partial exemption purposes amounts to unequal treatment and a breach of fiscal neutrality. The Appellant and motor traders generally make use of Demonstrators in their businesses for short periods of time. The Demonstrators will be sold when they are no longer required for that use. Those sales simply form part of the normal trading activity of a motor dealer which buys and sells new and used cars. Fleet purchasers in our view are not comparable to motor traders in this regard. There is no evidence as to how long fleet purchasers might use vehicles, but in any event they are not in the business of selling cars. In the circumstances we are not satisfied that there is any breach of the principle of fiscal neutrality. 99. We have concluded above that JDL must now be considered in the light of subsequent decisions of the Court of Justice. Even if we are wrong and JDL is binding upon us we would find that the facts of the present appeal are materially different to those in JDL. In JDL it was significant that the Demonstrators were depreciated in the accounts. In the present case for the reasons we have given the accounting treatment is neutral. 100. Further, in JDL some Demonstrators could be held for more than a year whereas in the present appeal they are held for between 2 and 6 months. Ms Brown submitted that those vehicles in JDL would not have been the subject of the output tax repayment claim because there would have been no profit margin on such sales. We do not consider that fact was irrelevant in JDL. The output tax reclaim in JDL would have related to cars on which there was a profit margin, but the input tax restriction would presumably have been calculated by reference to turnover on the sale of all Demonstrators. There is no suggestion that the court or the VAT Tribunal in JDL was only considering the capital goods argument by reference to those vehicles on which a profit was made. 101. In our view therefore JDL can be distinguished on its facts and for the reasons given above we are entitled to find that the Demonstrators were not capital goods. Conclusion 102. In all the circumstances we find that the Demonstrators were not capital goods for the purposes of Article 19(2). The preliminary issue is therefore answered in favour of the Respondents. The result is that we must dismiss the first ground of appeal. The parties should now seek to agree directions for the future conduct of the appeal and inform the Tribunal of the position within 60 days from the date of this decision. 104. This document contains full findings of fact and reasons for the preliminary decision. Any party dissatisfied with this preliminary decision has a right to apply for permission to appeal against it pursuant to Rule 39 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Tax Chamber) Rules 2009. The application must be received by this Tribunal not later than 56 days after this decision is sent to that party. The parties are referred to “Guidance to accompany a Decision from the First-tier Tribunal (Tax Chamber)” which accompanies and forms part of this decision notice. JONATHAN CANNAN TRIBUNAL JUDGE RELEASE DATE: 22 DECEMBER 2015