“Subject to section 84, an appeal shall lie to a tribunal with respect to any of the following matters— (a) the registration or cancellation of registration of any person under this Act; (k) the refusal of an application such as is mentioned in section 43B(1) or (2); (ka) the giving of a notice under section 43C(1) or (3 )”
“ We do, however, accept that ultimately the FTT only has such jurisdiction that Parliament has through the relevant statutory provisions conferred on it and there can be anomalies where certain decisions can possibly through oversight fall through the net. There can be other situations where it is clear from the legislation that Parliament did not intend there to be a right of appeal, and in those circumstances it is not for this Tribunal to “fill in the gaps” by giving a strained construction to clear language regardless as to whether the failure to give an appeal right appears to be an oversight or not. Ms Choudhury referred us tosection 83 of the Value Added Tax Act 1994 , which in a similar fashion to paragraph 35 of Schedule 10 FA 2003 sets out a list of decisions (lengthy in that case) in respect of which an appeal can lie, the clear scheme of the legislation being that if the decision does not come within any of the specified categories no appeal lies. Ms Choudhury referred us to observations of the VAT and Duties Tribunal in Olympia Technology Ltd v Revenue and Customs Commissioners (No.3) VTD 19784) as follows: “The tribunal is not in the position of an umpire in a game of cricket to whom a bowler appeals for a catch. The tribunal exists to adjudicate on a dispute following a ruling or determination by Customs … in order for the tribunal to have jurisdiction there must be an issue between the parties which has been sufficiently crystallised to constitute a decision falling within one of the paragraphs of section 83.”
“ It is clear that the tribunal had in mind both cases where the absence of an appeal right might properly be regarded as an oversight (and thus aptly described as an anomaly), and those cases, which we accept exist, where there can be discerned the intention of Parliament that no such right should be available. In neither case, however, was it suggested that any perceived gap could be filled judicially. We accept that there are cases where no right of appeal will arise. But that does not resolve the question whether in any particular case there is or is not such a right. That will depend on the construction of the statute as well as the particular facts and circumstances.”
“ Our starting point is that we accept Mr Thomas's submission that we should not give paragraph 35(1) (b) a narrow construction and that it should be construed against the underlying philosophy that the FTT is the body in whom Parliament has vested the jurisdiction to deal with disputes between the taxpayer and HMRC as to the correct amount of tax to be paid.”
“Novelty is no bar to the section having wider application than may have been assumed in practice to date.”