“The application that came before me on28 January 2015 was an application to amend the grounds of appeal. In the absence of some clear abuse of the Tribunal's process, a party ought generally to be allowed to argue its appeal on whatever grounds it wishes. I did not consider it appropriate to consider the merits of the new arguments which the Appellant wished to put forward, beyond a cursory consideration to ensure that they did not amount to such an abuse. I accordingly gave permission for the grounds of appeal to be amended to include them. I indicated that HMRC were at liberty to apply to the Tribunal to strike them out if they considered they were entitled to do so pursuant to the Tribunal's procedure rules (on the basis of there being "no reasonable prospect" of the new grounds succeeding). HMRC have chosen to make such an application, and the only question before me is therefore whether that application should be considered before the substantive hearing of the appeal or should effectively be subsumed as part of the full hearing. 2 As the purpose of an application such as this is to reduce the length of the substantive hearing (and the costs of preparing for it) by eliminating arguments that are perceived to have no reasonable prospect of success (either because of total lack of evidential support or, more commonly, because of inherent fundamental legal flaw), I would generally wish to consider whether the extra time spent in separately considering the application is likely to outweigh the possible saving of time at the eventual hearing. I consider it is also appropriate that, as a general proposition, applications are considered when they are made and only deferred if there is good reason to do so. Also, unreasonable conduct of an appeal carries a risk in costs.”
“(2) The Tribunal must strike out the whole or a part of the proceedings if the Tribunal— (a) does not have jurisdiction in relation to the proceedings or that part of them; and (b) does not exercise its power under rule 5(3)(k)(i) (transfer to another court or tribunal) in relation to the proceedings or that part of them. (3) The Tribunal may strike out the whole or a part of the proceedings if— … (c) the Tribunal considers there is no reasonable prospect of the appellant's case, or part of it, succeeding. (4) The Tribunal may not strike out the whole or a part of the proceedings under paragraphs (2) or (3)(b) or (c) without first giving the appellant an opportunity to make representations in relation to the proposed striking out.”
“In our view, the FTT does not have jurisdiction to give effect to any legitimate expectation which Mr Noor may be able to establish in relation to any credit for input tax. We are of the view that Mr Mantle [HMRC counsel] is correct in his submission that the right of appeal given by s 83(1)(c) is an appeal in respect of a person's right to credit for input tax under the VAT legislation. Within the rubric 'VAT legislation' it may be right to include any provision which, directly or indirectly, has an impact on the amount of credit due but we do not need to decide the point. Thus, if HMRC have power (whether as part of their care and management powers or some other statutory power) to enter into an agreement with a taxpayer and that agreement, according to its terms, results in an entitlement to a different amount of credit for input tax than would have resulted in the absence of the agreement, the amount ascertained in accordance with the agreement may be one arising 'under the VAT legislation' as we are using that phrase. In contrast, a person may claim a right based on legitimate expectation which goes behind his entitlement ascertained in accordance with the VAT legislation (in that sense); in such a case, the legitimate expectation is a matter for remedy by judicial review in the Administrative Court; the FTT has no jurisdiction to determine the disputed issue in the context of an appeal under s 83. As Mr Mantle puts it, the jurisdiction of the FTT is appellate (ie on appeal from a refusal of HMRC to allow a claim). The FTT has no general supervisory jurisdiction over the decisions of HMRC. That does not mean that under s 83(1)(c) the FTT cannot examine the exercise of a discretion, given to HMRC under primary or subordinate VAT legislation relating to the entitlement to input tax credit, and adjudicate on whether the discretion had been exercised reasonably (see eg Best Buys Supplies Ltd v Customs and Excise Comrs[2011] UKUT 497 (TCC) at [48]–[53],[2012] STC 885 at [48] –[53]—a discretion under reg 29(2) of the VAT Regulations). Although that jurisdiction can be described as supervisory, it relates to the exercise of a discretion which the legislation clearly confers on HMRC. That is to be contrasted with the case of an ultra vires contract or a claim based on legitimate expectation where HMRC are acting altogether outside their powers.”
“All that I need say here is that the Board are charged by statute with the care, management and collection on behalf of the Crown of income tax, corporation tax and capital gains tax. In the exercise of these functions the Board have a wide managerial discretion as to the best means of obtaining for the national exchequer from the taxes committed to their charge the highest net return that is practicable having regard to the staff available to them and the cost of collection.”
“… in the daily discharge of their duties inspectors are constantly required to balance the duty to collect 'every part' of due tax against the duty of good management. This conflict of duties can be resolved only by good managerial decisions, some of which will inevitably mean that not all the tax known to be due will be collected.”
“[21] This discretion enables the commissioners to formulate policy in the interstices of the tax legislation, dealing pragmatically with minor or transitory anomalies, cases of hardship at the margins or cases in which a statutory rule is difficult to formulate or its enactment would take up a disproportionate amount of parliamentary time. The commissioners publish extra-statutory concessions for the guidance of the public and Miss Rose [taxpayer’s counsel] drew attention to some which she said went beyond mere management of the efficient collection of the revenue. I express no view on whether she is right about this, but if she is, it means that the commissioners may have exceeded their powers under s 1 of the 1970 Act. It does not justify construing the power so widely as to enable the commissioners to concede, by extra-statutory concession, an allowance which Parliament could have granted but did not grant, and on grounds not of pragmatism in the collection of tax but of general equity between men and women.”
“… this tribunal does not have any jurisdiction to review the exercise by Customs and Excise of any discretion it may have in its management of the collection and refund of VAT unless such a jurisdiction can be read explicitly in, or by implication into, the statutory wording granting the jurisdiction. Since we have no general jurisdiction to review that exercise by Customs and Excise of its discretion we neither have power to impose our own decision nor to remit to Customs and Excise to take into account factors we consider to have been overlooked.”
“…a taxpayer cannot complain of unfairness, merely because the commissioners decide to perform their statutory duties including their duties … to make an assessment and to enforce a liability to tax. The commissioners may decide to abstain from exercising their powers and performing their duties on grounds of unfairness, but the commissioners themselves must bear in mind that their primary duty is to collect, not to forgive, taxes. And if the commissioners decide to proceed, the court cannot in the absence of exceptional circumstances decide to be unfair that which the commissioners by taking action against the taxpayer have determined to be fair. The commissioners possess unique knowledge of fiscal practices and policy. The commissioners are inhibited from presenting full reasons to the court for their decisions because of the duty of confidentiality owed by the commissioners to each and every taxpayer. The court can only intervene by judicial review to direct the commissioners to abstain from performing their statutory duties or from exercising their statutory powers if the court is satisfied that 'the unfairness' of which the taxpayer complains renders the insistence by the commissioners on performing their duties or exercising their powers an abuse of power by the commissioners.”
“… value added tax is to a large extent a self assessing tax. It is often of great importance that a taxpayer should be able to seek guidance on his position vis-a-vis the Commissioners, so as to be able to comply with the many provisions of the statutes and regulations relating thereto. In our judgment, however, having regard to the authorities to which we have referred, and to the mandatory nature of sections 1 and 2, an estoppel cannot lie against their provisions. Moreover, having regard to the passage from the judgment of Lord Parker CJ quoted above, we have reached the conclusion that an estoppel cannot lie so as to hinder the exercise of a statutory discretion. In our judgment, therefore, no estoppel can lie under the fourth ground of appeal. The third ground of appeal is based on a promissory estoppel. In our judgment, however, the reasoning in the above paragraph applies equally to this ground of appeal, so that no estoppel can lie against the Commissioners. … In our judgment the mandatory provisions of sections 1 and 2 and the discretion vested in the Commissioners bysection 31(1) of the Finance Act 1972 override any question of estoppel in the present case.”
“[74] We are, however, troubled by Sales J's [in Oxfam v RCC[2010] STC 686 ] reliance on the public benefit which he identified at [70]. He considered that it was desirable for the VAT Tribunal to hear all matters relevant to determination of a question under s 83 (here the amount of input tax to be credited to a taxpayer) because (a) it was a specialist tribunal and (b) it would avoid the cost, delay and potential injustice and confusion associated with proliferation of proceedings and would ensure that all issues were resolved on one occasion: 'It seems plausible to suppose that Parliament would have had these public benefits in mind when legislating in the wide terms of s 83.' By that we understand him to imply that not only did Parliament have those benefits in mind but that it should be taken as implementing a statutory regime which gave effect to those benefits rather than reject them: otherwise, there would have been no purpose in making the point. [75] We are in full agreement with Sales J that two factors which he identified indicate that it would have been desirable for the VAT Tribunal to have the wide jurisdiction which he held to exist. But we do not agree with his speculation about what Parliament intended. Sales J did not restrict his interpretation to para (c) of s 83(1). His approach to the 'ordinary and natural' meaning of s 83 applies to all its paragraphs; there is no hint in his reasoning that it turned somehow on the particular wording of para (c). [76] That approach, in effect if not name, would have been to give to the VAT Tribunal a power of judicial review in relation to the matters covered by s 83(1). Although not exhaustive of all areas in which HMRC is amenable to judicial review in relation to VAT, it would have conferred a very extensive judicial review jurisdiction. It would have done so, moreover, without any of the procedural safeguards, in particular the filter of permission to bring judicial review, and time-limits to which ordinary applications for judicial review in the Administrative Court are subject.”
“[37] Miss McCarthy [taxpayer’s counsel] relied on what Judge Bishopp said in [ Prince v RCC[2012] SFTD 786 ] at [23]: 'The position here is very different. The tribunal is not being asked, as in [ Oxfam v Revenue and Customs Comrs[2010] STC 686 ], to determine how much tax is due—that has already been agreed—but whether HMRC should be required to exercise their discretion not to collect the tax. That is not a tax dispute at all, but a matter governed by public or administrative law, and precisely the kind of issue which must be determined by judicial review. Nothing in the legislation could be construed as conferring any jurisdiction to determine such an issue on this tribunal, nor do I see any basis on which an argument of legitimate expectation that a statutory duty (as HMRC's obligation to collect tax which is due is) will, or should, be waived could properly be regarded as the province of a tribunal whose task is to determine the amount of tax which is due: in that, there is a clear distinction to be drawn between this case and Oxfam .' [38] The point made by Judge Bishopp in that passage is that a challenge to a decision to collect tax lawfully due is a matter for judicial review and cannot be brought by way of a statutory appeal to the Tribunal. By saying that the proper province of the Tribunal is to determine 'tax disputes', that is to say the amount of tax due, he is not saying that the Tribunal has jurisdiction in all such disputes, irrespective of whether provision for a statutory appeal is made.”
“[41] In our judgment an application to strike out in the FTT under r 8(3)(c) should be considered in a similar way to an application underCPR 3.4 in civil proceedings (whilst recognising that there is no equivalent jurisdiction in the FTT Rules to summary judgment under Pt 24). The tribunal must consider whether there is a realistic, as opposed to a fanciful (in the sense of it being entirely without substance), prospect of succeeding on the issue at a full hearing, see Swain v Hillman[2001] 1 All ER 91 and Three Rivers[2000] 3 All ER 1 at [95],[2003] 2 AC 1 per Lord Hope of Craighead. A 'realistic' prospect of success is one that carries some degree of conviction and not one that is merely arguable, see ED & F Man Liquid Products Ltd v Patel[2003] EWCA Civ 472 , [2003] 24 LS Gaz R 37. The tribunal must avoid conducting a 'mini-trial'. As Lord Hope observed in Three Rivers , the strike-out procedure is to deal with cases that are not fit for a full hearing at all.”
“Miss Whiteman did not yield up possession as she had agreed, so the owners brought proceedings in the Canterbury County Court for possession and other relief. Pleadings were exchanged, and the case came on for trial in May 1977 with both sides legally represented. The learned judge took what has turned out to be an unfortunate course. Instead of finding the facts, which should have presented no difficulty and taken little time, he allowed a preliminary point of law to be taken, whether Case 10 applies to a case where there are joint owners one only of which requires the house as a residence. So the case has reached this House on hypothetical facts, the correctness of which remain to be tried. I, with others of your Lordships, have often protested against the practice of allowing preliminary points to be taken, since this course frequently adds to the difficulties of courts of appeal and tends to increase the cost and time of legal proceedings. If this practice cannot be confined to cases where the facts are complicated and the legal issue short and easily decided, cases outside this guiding principle should at least be exceptional.”
“Preliminary points of law are too often treacherous short cuts. Their price can be, as here, delay, anxiety, and expense.”
“[6] … it is important to appreciate that our decision is reached without the benefit of full argument in opposition to HMRC's appeal. We have done our best, with the help of Mr Mantle's [HMRC’s counsel’s] submissions, to identify the points which could be made in favour of Mr Noor and to deal with them in this decision. But that is no substitute for independent argument. Our decision may not, therefore, be as persuasive as it might otherwise be, although as a matter of precedent it will be binding on the FTT. … [96] … It has been difficult for us to deal with the legal issue of jurisdiction in the absence of legal representation for Mr Noor. It is even more difficult for us to deal with the appeal on the facts. We have had full written and oral submissions from Mr Mantle on this aspect of the case. We have not, in the absence of argument, found anything with which we positively disagree. …”
“It would in my opinion be a very strange use of language to describe the respondent's behaviour in relation to this litigation as an abuse or misuse by him of the process of the court. He did not select the procedure to be adopted. He is merely seeking to defend proceedings brought against him by the appellants. In so doing he is seeking only to exercise the ordinary right of any individual to defend an action against him on the ground that he is not liable for the whole sum claimed by the plaintiff. Moreover, he puts forward his defence as a matter of right, whereas in an application for judicial review, success would require an exercise of the court's discretion in his favour.”
“This is yet another appeal concerning the relationship between public law and private law proceedings. The difficult and important point it raises is whether a taxpayer can invoke a public law defence to a claim by the collector of taxes underPart VI of the Taxes Management Act 1970 - the Part concerned with the collection and recovery of tax. ..[Is] the defendant to collection proceedings of this kind entitled to raise a public law defence which puts in issue the legality of directions underlying the assessment”
“94. For the reasons which I have just given, I think that the question is whether the claim has no real prospect of succeeding at trial and that it has to be answered having regard to the overriding objective of dealing with the case justly. But the point which is of crucial importance lies in the answer to the further question that then needs to be asked, which is - what is to be the scope of that inquiry? 95. I would approach that further question in this way. The method by which issues of fact are tried in our courts is well settled. After the normal processes of discovery and interrogatories have been completed, the parties are allowed to lead their evidence so that the trial judge can determine where the truth lies in the light of that evidence. To that rule there are some well-recognised exceptions. For example, it may be clear as a matter of law at the outset that even if a party were to succeed in proving all the facts that he offers to prove he will not be entitled to the remedy that he seeks. In that event a trial of the facts would be a waste of time and money, and it is proper that the action should be taken out of court as soon as possible. In other cases it may be possible to say with confidence before trial that the factual basis for the claim is fanciful because it is entirely without substance. It may be clear beyond question that the statement of facts is contradicted by all the documents or other material on which it is based. The simpler the case the easier it is likely to be take that view and resort to what is properly called summary judgment. But more complex cases are unlikely to be capable of being resolved in that way without conducting a mini-trial on the documents without discovery and without oral evidence. As Lord Woolf said in Swain v Hillman, at p 95, that is not the object of the rule. It is designed to deal with cases that are not fit for trial at all.”
“An appeal where this Tribunal has no jurisdiction must be struck out. It is not open to the Tribunal, having concluded that there is an arguable case on jurisdiction, to refuse to strike out the appeal: it must resolve the issue. It must decide whether there is jurisdiction or not and, in the latter case, the appeal must be struck out.”
“[37] The question of raising public law points by way of defence to collection proceedings was touched on in the judgments of the Court of Appeal in IRC v Aken[1990] STC 497 . In the judgments of Fox and Parker LJJ a challenge on public law grounds otherwise than in the context of an appeal was recognised as a theoretical possibility, but nothing in those judgments suggested that the General Commissioners could take account of matters of public law, as to the impropriety of the exercise of a discretion by the Revenue. [38] Mr McDonnell's [taxpayer’s counsel’s] principal reliance was on Pawlowski (Collector of Taxes) v Dunnington[1999] STC 550 . Those were collection proceedings. A company had failed to deduct PAYE tax when paying the respondent his salary. The company had been assessed for the tax which it should have deducted, but it did not pay. The Revenue then directed that the tax should be recovered from the respondent, acting under a power exercisable where the Board was of the opinion that the employee had received his emoluments knowing that the employer had wilfully failed to deduct the amount of tax which it was liable to deduct. There was no right of appeal for the employee against such a direction. The employee, the respondent, denied that he had received the payments with the necessary knowledge. The issue in the Court of Appeal was whether the respondent could rely on such a point by way of defence to collection proceedings. The Court of Appeal, following Wandsworth London Borough Council v Winder[1985] AC 461 , held that the direction could have been challenged by the respondent by judicial review, but that the respondent was also entitled to raise the same point by way of defence in the collection proceedings. The issue would be whether the Board had material on which it was entitled to be satisfied that he had received the payments with the necessary knowledge. [39] None of these cases seem to me to provide any basis for the suggestion that the line of cases from Aspin v Estill (Inspector of Taxes)[1987] STC 723 to Steibelt (Inspector of Taxes) v Paling[1999] STC 594 is no longer binding on me in holding that it is not open to General Commissioners to entertain a challenge to an assessment on grounds of public law, that the Revenue were acting unreasonably (in a Wednesbury sense) in raising the assessment at all. In my judgment those cases are unaffected by Pawlowski (Collector of Taxes) v Dunnington[1999] STC 550 and Wandsworth London Borough Council v Winder[1985] AC 461 . Accordingly the commissioners were wrong to consider that they could either substitute their own view of the right way to exercise the discretion whether or not to raise an assessment under s 30(1), or to review the Revenue's decision on the grounds that it was unreasonable in the Wednesbury sense. The former is not open to anyone. The latter is only open to the Administrative Court.”
“[26] Mr Woolf [taxpayer’s counsel], following on this issue, submitted that, where it is shown that any aspect of the assessment is vitiated under the Rahman ( 2 ) tests, the [VAT Tribunal] has no discretion; it must set it aside. However, this approach takes no account of the development of modern principles of administrative law, under which the traditional distinctions between 'void' and 'voidable' have largely been eroded (see eg De Smith, Woolf and Jowell: Judicial Review (5th edn) para 5-048). There is no general rule that a decision arrived at in breach of administrative law principles is of no effect; the consequences of the breach must be looked at in the context of the particular statutory scheme (see eg in another context, R v Wicks[1998] AC 92 ). Mr Woolf's submission is not helped by his reference to Pawlowski ( Collector of Taxes ) v Dunnington[1999] STC 550 . In that case, it was held that the validity of a direction making an employee liable to PAYE tax could be challenged in the defence to tax collection proceedings. However, there was no right of appeal against the direction, and the only issue was whether the challenge had to be by judicial review (see[1999] STC 550 at 557).
“[28] Mr Macdonald's [taxpayer’s counsel’s] other point is that the withdrawal of approval by the letter of30 July 2004 was invalid as a matter of public law and that this is a point which can be taken on appeal to the special commissioners. There is no express provision for such an appeal. In the30 July 1994 letter it was said that there was no right of appeal, but that the withdrawal of approval could be challenged by judicial review if that was done promptly. In my judgment that was a correct statement of the position. Mr Macdonald relied on the principle stated generally in Wandsworth London BC v Winder[1984] 3 All ER 976 ,[1985] 1 AC 461 and applied in the context of claims for income tax in Pawlowski (Collector of Taxes) v Dunnington[1999] STC 550 . In Pawlowski the claim for recovery of tax against Mr Dunnington was on the basis that his employer had made payments of emoluments to him without making the statutorily required deductions of pay as you earn tax, and the claim against him was on the basis that the Board of Inland Revenue had concluded that he had received the payments knowing that the employer had wilfully failed to make these deductions. In the county court the judge considered that the issue was whether the Revenue had shown that the employee had indeed known of the employer's wilful failure to make the deductions and he dismissed the claim on that basis. [29] The Court of Appeal, on an appeal by the Collector of Taxes, held that this was the wrong test but that it was open to the defendant to challenge by way of defence the legality of the Board of Inland Revenue's conclusion on public law grounds. That is, as it seems to me, very different from saying that the point sought to be taken in this case can be raised on a statutory appeal where no provision to that effect exists among those which allow taxpayers to appeal to the special commissioners. [30] There are statutory provisions allowing appeals to the special commissioners, now the Tax Chamber of the First-tier Tribunal, in respect of decisions by the Board of Revenue as distinct from assessments to tax made by an Inspector of Taxes. Miss Simler [HMRC’s counsel] cited to us ss 741 and 754 of ICTA 1988 as well as para 16(2) in Pt III of Sch 27 to ICTA 1988. She accepted that there may be cases in which such jurisdiction arises by necessary implication. In the present case there is no express provision and, she contended, no basis for implication. [31] I will not decide either way, even if I could on this appeal, whether in principle the analogy of Pawlowski v Dunnington could be applied in defence to a claim for payment of tax under an assessment under s 591C. However I agree with the special commissioner and, so far as he said anything about it with the judge, that the point is not open to be taken on this statutory appeal.”
“[132] Mr Firth [taxpayer’s counsel] argued that for the FTT to assess principles of public law would not amount to an abuse of process. He said that there was plainly no disadvantage for HMRC, Mr Lobler, the public or the tribunal in asking the UT to determine a question of public law in this forum. He relied on the decisions in Wandsworth London BC v Winder[1984] 3 All ER 976 ,[1985] AC 461 and Pawlowski (Collector of Taxes) v Dunnington[1999] STC 550 where the Court of Appeal adopted the following formulation from Trustees of the Dennis Rye Pension Fund v Sheffield City Council[1997] 4 All ER 747 at 755 ,[1998] 1 WLR 840 at 849 : 'If the choice has no significant disadvantages for the parties, the public or the court, then it should not normally be regarded as constituting abuse.' [133] However, Dennis Rye was a completely different case, not one in which the UT was asked on an appeal from the FTT, a body without judicial review jurisdiction, to exercise public law jurisdiction. I have no doubt that the Administrative Court is the appropriate forum in the first instance. There has been no order for the UT to hear judicial review proceedings concurrently with the appeal.”
“… an appeal shall lie to the tribunal with respect to … an assessment ... or the amount of … an assessment”
“the FTT does not have jurisdiction to give effect to any legitimate expectation which Mr Noor may be able to establish in relation to any credit for input tax”
“ In our view, the FTT does not have jurisdiction to give effect to any legitimate expectation which Mr Noor may be able to establish in relation to any credit for input tax. We are of the view that Mr Mantle [HMRC’s counsel] is correct in his submission that the right of appeal given by s 83(1)(c) is an appeal in respect of a person's right to credit for input tax under the VAT legislation. Within the rubric 'VAT legislation' it may be right to include any provision which, directly or indirectly, has an impact on the amount of credit due but we do not need to decide the point. Thus, if HMRC have power (whether as part of their care and management powers or some other statutory power) to enter into an agreement with a taxpayer and that agreement, according to its terms, results in an entitlement to a different amount of credit for input tax than would have resulted in the absence of the agreement, the amount ascertained in accordance with the agreement may be one arising 'under the VAT legislation' as we are using that phrase. In contrast, a person may claim a right based on legitimate expectation which goes behind his entitlement ascertained in accordance with the VAT legislation (in that sense); in such a case, the legitimate expectation is a matter for remedy by judicial review in the Administrative Court; the FTT has no jurisdiction to determine the disputed issue in the context of an appeal under s 83. As Mr Mantle puts it, the jurisdiction of the FTT is appellate (ie on appeal from a refusal of HMRC to allow a claim). The FTT has no general supervisory jurisdiction over the decisions of HMRC. That does not mean that under s 83(1)(c) the FTT cannot examine the exercise of a discretion, given to HMRC under primary or subordinate VAT legislation relating to the entitlement to input tax credit, and adjudicate on whether the discretion had been exercised reasonably (see eg Best Buys Supplies Ltd v Customs and Excise Comrs[2011] UKUT 497 (TCC) at [48]–[53],[2012] STC 885 at [48] –[53]—a discretion under reg 29(2) of the VAT Regulations). Although that jurisdiction can be described as supervisory, it relates to the exercise of a discretion which the legislation clearly confers on HMRC. That is to be contrasted with the case of an ultra vires contract or a claim based on legitimate expectation where HMRC are acting altogether outside their powers.”
“[90] We can put this point in a slightly different way. The amount of input tax (or of any other VAT which can be treated as input tax) which may be credited to a person is, prima facie, to be determined in accordance with the statutory provisions. If the taxpayer has a legitimate expectation to be credited with input tax of a different amount, he may be given a remedy by the appropriate court or tribunal to reflect that legitimate expectation in financial terms. But that right does not affect what is 'input tax' (or what can be counted or treated under the legislation as input tax eg under s 24 or reg 111) or what can be 'credited' for input tax in accordance with the statutory provisions. The financial adjustment sits outside the amount of 'input tax which may be credited' to a person. The FTT has no jurisdiction to effect that financial adjustment since its jurisdiction under s 83(1)(c) relates only to 'input tax which may be credited' to a person. [91] Our conclusion, in the light of this discussion, is that the FTT has no jurisdiction over Mr Noor's claim to a credit in respect of VAT on the invoices. In so concluding, we disagree with and depart from the decision of Sales J. We have dealt already with the concerns which we have about his reliance on the position in relation to the contract issue and with the difficulty expressed in[2010] STC 686 at [77]. We wish to say something more, however, about his principal reason for deciding as he did, namely his perception of the 'ordinary meaning of the language' of s 83(1)(c) … [92] For our part, we consider that the ordinary meaning of the language used in the context of the VATA 1994 as a whole is that it is concerned with the right to a credit arising under the terms of the VAT legislation (including, on one view, HMRC's care and management powers). We have already given our main reason for reaching that conclusion in our analysis of what is meant by 'input tax' and 'credit' in s 83(1)(c). Further support for our conclusion is found when it is remembered that s 83(1) concerns appeals, that is to say appeals against decisions of HMRC. That makes perfectly good sense in the context of a decision concerning the matters listed in the paragraphs of s 83(1), and in particular concerning a decision in respect of a person's entitlement to an input tax credit under the VAT legislation. In the absence of an appealable decision, there is nothing to appeal and s 83 does not come into play.”