“This document contains a summary of the findings of fact and reasons for the decision. A party wishing to appeal against this decision must apply within 28 days of the date of release of this decision to the Tribunal for full written findings and reasons. When these have been prepared, the Tribunal will send them to the parties and may publish them on its website and either party will have 56 days in which to appeal. The parties are referred to “Guidance to accompany a Decision from the First-tier Tribunal (Tax Chamber)” which accompanies and forms part of this decision notice.”
“We apologise for not meeting the deadlines set by the tribunal to respond back. This was due to ill health of our client’s father. Also, there was a lot of documents to study, calculate and the old accountant was not forth coming. We are in a position now to come to the date of the tribunal and provide all the evidence to demonstrate that there had not been an accurate assessment.”
“I assure you that the delays, ill health of my father, the injury I vfaced as a result of car accident, were beyond my control. Also, my father lost his job in September 2014 and we were under severe financial pressure in repaying the mortgage and other loans. We apologise for not meeting the deadlines set by the tribunal to respond back. However, we are now in a position to come to the date of the tribunal and provide all the evidence to demonstrate there had not been an accurate assessment.”
“We strongly believe that the figures submitted by the previous accountant are incorrect. We had taken extension in regards to this but due to the previous accountants personal health problems he was unable to compile the documents. We were in the process of calculating all their previous years’ taxes from a lot of documents provided by our client and the previous accountant, which due to ill health of our client’s father was hindered.”
“(3) Unless each party agrees that it is unnecessary, the decision notice must – (a) include a summary of the findings of fact and reasons for the decision; or (b) be accompanied by full written findings of fact and reasons for the decision. (4) If the Tribunal provides no findings and reasons, or summary findings and reasons only, in or with the decision notice, a party to the proceedings may apply for full written findings and reasons, and must do so before making an application for permission to appeal under rule 39 (application for permission to appeal). (5) An application under paragraph (4) must be made in writing and be sent or delivered to the Tribunal so that it is received within 28 days after the date that the Tribunal sent or otherwise provided the decision notice under paragraph (2) to the party making the application.”
“The overriding objective of these Rules is to enable the Tribunal to deal with cases fairly and justly.”
“[34] … Applications for extensions of time limits of various kinds are commonplace and the approach to be adopted is well established. As a general rule, when a court or tribunal is asked to extend a relevant time limit, the court or tribunal asks itself the following questions: (1) what is the purpose of the time limit? (2) how long was the delay? (3) is there a good explanation for the delay? (4) what will be the consequences for the parties of an extension of time? and (5) what will be the consequences for the parties of a refusal to extend time. The court or tribunal then makes its decision in the light of the answers to those questions. … [37] In my judgment, the approach of considering the overriding objective and all the circumstances of the case, including the matters listed inCPR r 3.9 , is the correct approach to adopt in relation to an application to extend time pursuant to section 83G(6) of VATA. The general comments in the above cases will also be found helpful in many other cases. Some of the above cases stress the importance of finality in litigation. Those remarks are of particular relevance where the application concerns an intended appeal against a judicial decision. The particular comments about finality in litigation are not directly applicable where the application concerns an intended appeal against a determination by HMRC, where there has been no judicial decision as to the position. Nonetheless, those comments stress the desirability of not re-opening matters after a lengthy interval where one or both parties were entitled to assume that matters had been finally fixed and settled and that point applies to an appeal against a determination by HMRC as it does to appeals against a judicial decision. [38] As I have indicated, the FTT in the present case adopted the approach of considering all the circumstances including the matters specifically mentioned inCPR 3.9 . It was not said that there was any error of principle in that approach. In my judgment, the FTT adopted the correct approach.”
“The exercise of a discretion to allow a late appeal is a matter of material import, since it gives the tribunal a jurisdiction it would not otherwise have. Time limits imposed by law should generally be respected. In the context of an appeal right which must be exercised within 30 days from the date of the document notifying the decision, a delay of more than three months cannot be described as anything but serious and significant. We note, although judgment was given only after we had heard this appeal, that in Secretary of State for the Home Department v SS (Congo) and others[2015] EWCA Civ 387 the Court of Appeal, at [105], has similarly described exceeding a time limit of 28 days for applying to that court for permission to appeal by 24 days as significant, and a delay of more than three months as serious. Although each case must be considered in its own context, we can find nothing in this case which would alter our finding in this respect. As the court in SS (Congo) observed, one universal factor in this respect is the desirability of finality in litigation, a factor that is present in this case: see Data Select at [37] above. We are also mindful of the comments of Sir Stephen Oliver, sitting in the First-tier Tribunal, in Ogedegbe v Revenue and Customs Commissioners[2009] UKFTT 364 (TC) (discussed in Markland v Revenue and Customs Commissioners[2011] UKFTT 559 (TC) and by this tribunal in O’Flaherty v Revenue and Customs Commissioners[2013] UKUT 161 (TCC) ) that permission to appeal out of time should only be granted exceptionally, meaning that it should be the exception rather than the rule and not granted routinely.”