“I am delighted to send you a formal offer of employment for the position of Marketing Director with QlikTech UK Ltd, which we sincerely hope you will give your utmost consideration. I am also enclosing a draft of the employee contract and a word version of our digital Employee Handbook for your perusal. Please also accept this as official confirmation that QlikTech are pleased to apply for 15,000 stock options as part of your package. This application is subject to board approval and does not form any part of any contractual terms and conditions of employment.”
“29 Assessment where loss of tax discovered (1) If an officer of the Board or the Board discover, as regards any person (the taxpayer) and a year of assessment-- (a) that any income which ought to have been assessed to income tax, or chargeable gains which ought to have been assessed to capital gains tax, have not been assessed, or (b) that an assessment to tax is or has become insufficient, or … the officer or, as the case may be, the Board may, subject to subsections (2) and (3) below, make an assessment in the amount, or the further amount, which ought in his or their opinion to be charged in order to make good to the Crown the loss of tax. (3) Where the taxpayer has made and delivered a return under section 8 of this Act in respect of the relevant year of assessment, he shall not be assessed under subsection (1) above-- (a) in respect of the year of assessment mentioned in that subsection; and (b) in the same capacity as that in which he made and delivered the return, unless one of the two conditions mentioned below is fulfilled. (4) The first condition is that the situation mentioned in subsection (1) above was brought about carelessly or deliberately by the taxpayer or a person acting on his behalf. (5) The second condition is that at the time when an officer of the Board-- (a) ceased to be entitled to give notice of his intention to enquire into the taxpayer’s return under section 8 … of this Act in respect of the relevant year of assessment; or … the officer could not have been reasonably expected, on the basis of the information made available to him before that time, to be aware of the situation mentioned in subsection (1) above. (6) For the purposes of subsection (5) above, information is made available to an officer of the Board if-- (a) it is contained in the taxpayer’s return under section 8 … of this Act in respect of the relevant year of assessment (the return), or in any accounts, statements or documents accompanying the return; … (d) it is information the existence of which, and the relevance of which as regards the situation mentioned in subsection (1) above-- (i) could reasonably be expected to be inferred by an officer of the Board from information falling within paragraphs (a) to (c) above; or (ii) are notified in writing by the taxpayer to an officer of the Board. (7) In subsection (6) above-- (a) any reference to the taxpayer’s return under section 8 … of this Act in respect of the relevant year of assessment includes-- (i) a reference to any return of his under that section for either of the two immediately preceding chargeable periods; and ... (b) any reference in paragraph[.] … (d) to the taxpayer includes a reference to a person acting on his behalf. (8) An objection to the making of an assessment under this section on the ground that neither of the two conditions mentioned above is fulfilled shall not be made otherwise than on an appeal against the assessment. (9) Any reference in this section to the relevant year of assessment is a reference to-- (a) in the case of the situation mentioned in paragraph (a) or (b) of subsection (1) above, the year of assessment mentioned in that subsection; … …”
“(1) In the Tax Acts and the Gains Tax Acts, any reference (however expressed) to a person being assessed to tax, or being charged to tax by an assessment, shall be construed as including a reference to his being so assessed, or being so charged— (a) by a self-assessment under section 9 … of the Management Act,”
“The test to be applied, in my view, is to consider what a reasonable taxpayer, exercising reasonable diligence in the completion and submission of the return, would have done”
“ By reason of his employment - It seems to me that the words ‘by reason of’ are far wider than the word ‘therefrom’ in the 1970 Act. They are deliberately designed to close the gap in taxability which was left by the House of Lords in Hochstrasser v Mayes . The words cover cases where the fact of employment is the causa sine qua non of the fringe benefits, that is, where the employee would not have received fringe benefits unless he had been an employee. The fact of employment must be one of the causes of the benefit being provided, but it need not be the sole cause, or even the dominant cause. It is sufficient if the employment was an operative cause - in the sense that it was a condition of the benefit being granted. In this case the fact of the father being employed by I.C.I. was a condition of the student being eligible for an award. There were other conditions also, such as that the student had sufficient educational attainments and had a place at a University. But still, if the father’s employment was one of the conditions, that is sufficient. If two students at a university were talking to one another - both of equal attainments in equal need - and the one asked the other ‘Why do you get this scholarship and not me?’, he would say ‘Because my father is employed by I.C.I.’. That is enough. The scholarship was provided for the son ‘by reason of the father’s employment’.”
“The essence of Mr. Aaronson’s submission is that the words ‘by reason of’ in s 61 are merely a synonymous alternative for the word ‘from’ as construed in that case and that they must be given the same meaning, so that the question to be asked (and one which the Commissioners, as a finding of fact, answered in the negative) is simply ‘was the child’s scholarship a remuneration or reward for the father’s services?’ He points out that the original charge to Schedule E in the 1842 Act was on salaries etc. ‘accruing by reason of’ an office or employment and that the fasciculus of sections with which this appeal is concerned is headed ‘Benefits derived by company directors and others from their employment’. Thus, the argument runs, unless it can be said - and the question is one of fact for the Commissioners - that the benefit under consideration is provided, in effect, as part of the consideration for the rendering of the employees’ services, it is not a benefit arising from or provided by ‘reason of’ the employment. Whilst I see the attraction of an argument which attributes to the legislature an admirable consistency in the expression of its intention, I find myself unable to accept Mr. Aaronson’s submissions on this point. Accepting once more that the subject is not to be taxed except by clear words, the words must, nevertheless, be construed in the context of the provisions in which they appear and of the intention patently discernible on the face of those provisions, from the words used. As it seems to me, the obvious intention of this legislation - presumably in an attempt to produce fairness between taxpayers - is to impose tax on the value of those otherwise untaxed advantages which the employee enjoys because he is employed, advantages which may not even accrue to him directly but which, because of their receipt by a member of his household, benefit him by relieving him of an expense which he might otherwise expect to bear out of his own resources. These are, in many cases, by definition, benefits which could not in any ordinary sense be attributed to a reward for the employee’s services - for instance the use of a car for the private purposes of a member of the employee’s family or an interest-free loan to one of his relatives - and to restrict the operation of the section in the way suggested by Mr. Aaronson would, in my judgment, virtually deprive it of any operation at all in the case of benefits other than those provided to the employee himself. Speaking only for myself I do not in the case of this legislation, find the philosophical distinction between a ‘ causa causans ’ and a ‘ causa sine qua non ’ helpful. I see no reason why a benefit ‘derived’ from the employment (to use the words of the chapter title) necessarily has to be invested with an intention on the part of the employer to remunerate the employee for the performance of his duties. One is directed to see whether the benefit is provided by reason of the employment and in the context of these provisions that, in my judgment, involves no more than asking the question ‘what is it that enables the person concerned to enjoy the benefit?’ without the necessity for too sophisticated an analysis of the operative reasons why that person may have been prompted to apply for the benefit or to avail himself of it.”
“ The second condition is that he should have realised a gain within the meaning of the section by the exercise of that right. Again, there is really no dispute that the exercise of the right produced a gain within the meaning of s 186(3).”
“After the notice of any such assessment has been served on the person assessed, the assessment shall not be altered except in accordance with the express provisions of the Taxes Acts.”
“Subject as follows (and to any provision contained in Chapters 2 to 4A) those Chapters apply to securities, or an interest in securities, acquired by a person where the right or opportunity to acquire the securities or interest is available by reason of an employment of that person or any other person.”
“ If on a claim made to the Board it appears to their satisfaction that a person has been assessed to tax more than once for the same cause and for the same chargeable period, they shall direct the whole, or such part of any assessment as appears to be an overcharge, to be vacated, and thereupon the same shall be vacated accordingly.”
“In any event, the present case is not, in my judgement, one in which the relevant statutory provisions place a double taxation burden on the taxpayers’ shoulders. I have been referred to ss 31 and 154 of theCapital Gains Tax Act 1979 . Section 31(1) provides as follows: ‘There shall be excluded from the consideration for a disposal of assets taken into account in the computation under this Chapter of the gain accruing on that disposal any money or money’s worth charged to income tax as income of, or taken into account as a receipt in computing income or profits or gains or losses of, the person making the disposal for the purposes of the Income Tax Acts.’ Section 154 provides: ‘Any assessment to income tax or decision on a claim under the Income Tax Acts, and any decision on an appeal under the Income Tax Acts against such an assessment or decision, shall be conclusive so far as under Chapter II of Part II of this Act, or any other provision of this Act, liability to tax depends on the provisions of the Income Tax Acts.’ It is clear, therefore, that once an income tax assessment has been made in respect of a particular sum and has become final, that sum cannot be made the subject of a capital gains tax assessment against the person subject to the income tax assessment. In the present case the capital gains tax assessment has already been made and has become final. The income tax assessments have not yet become final and may never become final. Section 31 does not yet, in my view, bite. But suppose the hearing before the Commissioners had continued and the Commissioners had dismissed the appeals and confirmed the income tax assessments. The position would then have been reached that s 31 would apply and would require the conclusion that the capital gains tax assessment ought not to have been made. In those circumstances, the taxpayers would, in my judgement, be liable to pay under the income tax assessments but would have two possible avenues for relief against the earlier capital gains tax assessment.Section 32(1) of the Taxes Management Act 1970 , provides: ‘If on a claim made to the Board it appears to their satisfaction that a person has been assessed to tax more than once for the same cause and for the same chargeable period, they shall direct the whole, or such part of any assessment as appears to be an overcharge, to be vacated, and thereupon the same shall be vacated accordingly.’ I have been told that this provision was intended to provide relief against double taxation. It would enable Mr. Coren, on whom the capital gains tax assessment was made, to reclaim the whole capital gains tax in the event that the income tax assessment on him and Mrs. Coren together was confirmed.”