Hodges v Revenue & Customs [2015] UKFTT 227 (TC)

FTT-Tax
Hodges v Revenue & Customs
[2015] UKFTT 227 (TC) · 2015-05-28
[37]In Khan v HMR C [2006] EWCA Civ 89 , Carnwath LJ (as he had then become) said, at [69] “The position on an appeal against a "best of judgment" assessment is well-established. The burden lies on the taxpayer to establish the correct amount of tax due:
"The element of guess-work and the almost unavoidable inaccuracy in a properly made best of judgment assessment, as the cases have established, do not serve to displace the validity of the assessments, which are prima facie right and remain right until the taxpayer shows that they are wrong and also shows positively what corrections should be made in order to make the assessments right or more nearly right." ( Bi-Flex Caribbean Ltd v Board of Inland Revenue (1990) 63 TC 515, 522-3 PC per Lord Lowry). That was confirmed by this court, after a detailed review of the authorities, in Customs and Excise Commissioners v Pegasus Birds Ltd [2004] STC 1509 ; [2004] EWCA Civ 1015 . We also cautioned against allowing such an appeal routinely to become an investigation of the bona fides or rationality of the "best of judgment" assessment made by Customs: "
The tribunal should remember that its primary task is to find the correct amount of tax, so far as possible on the material properly available to it, the burden resting on the taxpayer. In all but very exceptional cases, that should be the focus of the hearing, and the Tribunal should not allow it to be diverted into an attack on the Commissioners' exercise of judgment at the time of the assessment." (para 38(i)) It should be noted that this burden of proof does not change merely because allegations of fraud may be involved (see e.g. Brady v Group Lotus Car Companies plc [1987] STC 635, 642 per Mustill LJ).” 38. With regard to the VATA Penalties s 60(7) VATA provides that: … the burden of proof as to the matters specified in subsection (1) (a) and (b) above shall lie upon the Commissioners. 39. Although there is no specific statutory provision comparable with s 60(7) in relation to penalties under schedule 24 it is well established that in penalty cases, such as the present (where the penalty is criminal for European Convention on Human Rights purposes), the burden of proof that the determination of the penalty was correct is on HMRC. However, notwithstanding the allegation of dishonesty against Mr Hodges in the present case the standard of proof is the civil standard (see Re B [2009] 1 AC 1 ). 40. As Lady Hale, giving the judgment of the Supreme Court in Re S-B (Children) [2010] 1 AC 678 said, at [34]:[34]“… there is no necessary connection between the seriousness of an allegation and the improbability that it has taken place. The test is the balance of probabilities, nothing more and nothing less. ” Summary of Submissions41. For HMRC, Mr Haley contends, that as a result of the failure to include details of the scaffolding seen on the street sweep in its VAT returns, not only was there an under-declaration of VAT by ASL, and therefore inaccuracies in its VAT returns, but that this was attributable to the dishonest and deliberate conduct of Mr Hodges who concealed it from HMRC and as such should be liable to the VATA and Schedule 24 Penalties.42. However, Mr Haley, who did not quite concede that the quantum of the penalties should be reduced or that suppression only occurred in relation to residential customers, accepted that the “best of judgment” assessments of the under-declaration of VAT, on which the penalties are based, were “unrefined” and were we to find that there were undeclared sales, but not to the extent assessed, the amount can be varied. On the basis of the evidence that 85% of ASL’s customers were other businesses and one of the nine apparently “undeclared” sightings of ASL scaffolding was when it had been used by a friend of Mr Hodges, Mr Haley suggests that the under-declaration could be recalculated by application of the following formula: Declared Gross Sales (VAT Inclusive) x 15% (declared residential sales) x 8 (sales uplift) x VAT fraction. eg £401,915.42 x 15% = £60,287.31 x 8 = £482,298.5 x VAT fraction [1] This produces a reduction from the assessed VAT under-declaration of £529,536 to £70,250. Although Mr Hodges could be liable to penalties equal to the amount under-declared Mr Haley accepted that a 30% reduction for mitigation/disclosure was appropriate for both the VATA Penalties and Schedule 24 Penalties in view of Mr Hodges’ attendance at meetings and production of records, albeit after requests and, if applied, the penalties would be reduced from £394,694 to £49,17543. Miss Ross Martin’s primary case, on behalf of Mr Hodges, is that HMRC have, on the evidence, failed to establish that he was dishonest or that any inaccuracy in ASL’s VAT returns was deliberate and concealed; at worst she submits that Mr Hodges was careless. Although she did not suggest a reduction in excess of 30% for mitigation/disclosure Miss Ross Martin did submit that the health and marital issues faced by Mr Hodges amount to special circumstances under which the Schedule 24 Penalties should be reduced.44. She also questions the sampling technique of HMRC and the way in which the sample was extrapolated to produce sales figures of over £4 million for ASL over the period in which the street sweeps were undertaken which she submits is wholly unrealistic for such a one man operation as there would not be sufficient days in the year to erect and dismantle enough scaffolding to achieve such a return.45. Although Miss Ross Martin, in our view quite correctly, accepted that “best of judgment” assessments were not reached “dishonestly or vindictively or capriciously” nor were they a “spurious estimate or guess in which all elements of judgment are missing” or “wholly unreasonable”- she described them as “naïve”- she did propose alternative methods of calculation.46. The first, based on the number of “undeclared” ASL sign boards identified in HMRC’s street sweep (nine) compared with the assumed number of residential jobs undertaken (15% of the total) with the ratio applied over the VAT periods concerned arrives at a figure for of £1,801 in respect of the under-declared VAT.47. The alternative method estimates the number of jobs that would be possible to erect and dismantle scaffolding based on the working days each year. This assumes that the average gross value of a job (calculated on the basis of the total value of the work declared by Mr Hodges divided by the jobs undertaken) is £797, that for an average job it takes two days to load, erect and dismantle scaffolding and therefore the average sales per man per day is £399. It also assumes that there are 20 working days per month. On this basis, after taking account of the days actually worked, Miss Ross Martin calculates that the maximum sales potential on “free days” amounts to £77,440 which, applying the appropriate VAT fraction amounts to a VAT under-declaration of £11,153. Discussion48. In the present case as ASL’s scaffolding was seen at ten addresses during HMRC’s street sweep and only one of these included by Mr Hodges in its business records from which its VAT returns were prepared we have no hesitation in finding that there was an under-declaration of VAT by ASL which, given it supplied its services to other businesses under the CIS scheme and supplied invoices as a matter of course to its commercial clients, was in relation to services provided to its residential customers and resulted in the submission of inaccurate VAT returns to HMRC. The question therefore that arises is whether such an inaccuracy in its VAT returns was, in relation to the VATA Penalties, attributable to the dishonest conduct of Mr Hodges and, in respect of the Schedule 24 Penalties, whether the inaccuracy was deliberate and concealed, deliberate but not concealed, careless or innocent.49. Although Miss Ross Martin referred us to Stuttart and another (trading as de Wynns Coffee House v Customs and Excise Commissioners [2000] STC 342 and R v Ghosh [1982] 2 All ER 689 with regard to dishonesty, we gratefully adopt the following approach of the Tribunal (Judge Cannan and Mr Davison) at [8] of Hussein v HMRC [2014] UKFTT 307 (TC) in relation to s 60 VATA:
“The test in relation to dishonesty is objective. Did the appellant have knowledge sufficient to render his conduct dishonest according to normally acceptable standards of honest behaviour? On the facts of this case the question is simply whether the appellant deliberately understated his takings in order to evade VAT.” 50. Other than the instance where ASL’s scaffolding had been used by his friend, which we accept, Mr Hodges was unable to provide any satisfactory explanation for it being seen at the other locations which were not reflected in the sales records. In the absence of any such explanation we do not accept that the failure to record and account for VAT at the addresses where ASL’s scaffolding was seen can be due to his failure to take reasonable care or as the result of an innocent mistake, rather we find that omission to be deliberate and the consequent under-declaration of VAT to be attributable to the dishonest conduct of Mr Hodges. We also find the inaccuracy in the VAT returns of ASL not only to be deliberate but deliberate and concealed by virtue of it not having been recorded in the documents provided to HMRC by Mr Hodges and ASL. 51. We also find the disclosure of inaccuracy in the VAT returns to have been prompted, as defined by paragraph 9(2) of schedule 24, in that it was discovered by HMRC on an examination of ASL’s records. It therefore follows that we find Mr Hodges to be liable to the VATA Penalties and Schedule 24 Penalties. 52. Given that the quantum of the penalties is dependent on the amount of VAT evaded (VATA Penalties) and potential lost revenue (Schedule 24 Penalties) it is necessary to consider the “best of judgment” assessments. As is clear from Pegasus Birds and Khan our primary task is “to find the correct amount of tax, so far as possible on the material properly available” with the burden resting on the taxpayer. 53. Having considered the calculations submitted by the parties, both original and revised in the light of the evidence of Mr Hodges at the hearing, if HMRC’s revised “sales uplift” of £482,298.50 (as suggested by Mr Haley) is applied to Miss Ross Martin’s average sales per man per day of £399 (from her alternative “free days” calculation) the total number of working days at 1,209 is more than the 1,152 actual working days during the period under review. For Mr Hodges to have generated such additional turnover he would either have had double the amount charged to his customers or increase his work force. Given our finding of fact that Mr Hodges operated as a one man band in a competitive market, we do not consider that the correct amount of tax can be found by the application of the revised calculation suggested by Mr Haley as this, like the “unrefined” original assessment, relies on an uplift based on the very small street sweep sample. 54. However, we have found that there was an under-declaration of VAT by Mr Hodges as a result of his failure to account for work undertaken for all residential customers and consider Mr Hodges assertion that any cash received from ASL’s private customers would be banked and not retained by him to meet business or personal expenses unrealistic notwithstanding the production of several bank statements showing that ASL had an overdraft and regular small cash withdrawals being made. In the circumstances we consider that Miss Ross Martin’s alternative “free days” calculation (which we have appended to the decision) provides the corrections to the original assessment on which the penalties were based to make it, as Carnwath LJ said in Khan v HMRC , referring to Lord Lowry in Bi-Flex Caribbean Ltd v Board of Inland Revenue , “more nearly right”. 55. We therefore find that there was an under-declaration of VAT of £11,153 being £2,718 for the VAT periods 12/06 to 12/08 and £8,435 for the 03/09 to 03/11 VAT periods. 56. Although the total amount of the penalties could be equal to the “VAT evaded” (the VATA Penalties) or 100% of the “potential lost revenue” (Schedule 24 Penalties) HMRC accept that these should be reduced by 30% as a result of the co-operation of Mr Hodges with HMRC. As we did not hear any specific argument on mitigation or reductions for disclosure we also accept that a 30% reduction is appropriate in the circumstances. 57. As it was raised by Miss Ross Martin, we also consider whether there should be any further reduction in the Schedule 24 Penalties for “special circumstances” under paragraph 11 of the schedule. It is clear from paragraph 17(3) of the schedule that we may only substitute our decision for that of HMRC if we think HMRC’s decision was “flawed” in a judicial review sense. 58. In the present case Mr Haley confirmed that HMRC had not considered whether a reduction should be made for “special circumstances”
. A failure of HMRC to consider whether a reduction for special circumstances, albeit under the similarly worded paragraph 9 to schedule 56 of the Finance Act 2009 in relation to PAYE penalties, was considered by the Tribunal (Judge Redston and Mr Speller FCA) in Bluu Solutions Ltd v HMRC [2015] UKFTT 95 (TC) , at [145]:
“We considered a number of other cases which considered these special circumstances provisions, or the similar paragraphs in other penalty statutes. In Hardy v HMRC [2011] UKFTT 592 (TC) and Rodney Warren & Co v HMRC [2012] UKFTT 57 (TC) HMRC never considered the special circumstances provisions, so the tribunals found that the decision was “flawed.”
We agree with that approach.” We also agree that such an approach must be correct. As the Tribunal observed in Bluu , at [126]: “If HMRC have failed to consider para 9 at all, so that they make no decision on special circumstances, they have failed to exercise their discretion. Although para 6(3)(b) gives the tribunal the jurisdiction to make a new decision on special circumstances only if “HMRC’s decision in respect of the application of paragraph 9” was flawed, it seems to us that the tribunal must also have jurisdiction to make a decision where HMRC have failed to exercise their discretion, so that they have made no decision about the application of para 9.” 59. Although it would seem from Bluu that Mr Haley could himself have considered whether a special circumstances reduction was appropriate, he did not do so and, as such, it is open to us to consider this issue. However, given that despite his health and matrimonial difficulties Mr Hodges remained actively involved in his business, we are unable to find that there should be any further reduction in the Schedule 24 Penalties because of special circumstances. Decision 60. For the above reasons although we dismiss the appeal on the basis of the evidence before us we find that the under-declaration of VAT in the best of judgment assessment should be reduced to the sums stated in paragraph 56 above and penalties reduced accordingly. 61. We therefore confirm the penalties in the following amounts: (1) the VATA Penalties in the sum of £1,902; and (2) the Schedule 24 Penalties in the sum of £5,905. Right to apply for Permission to Appeal 62. This document contains full findings of fact and reasons for the decision. Any party dissatisfied with this decision has a right to apply for permission to appeal against it pursuant to Rule 39 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Tax Chamber) Rules 2009. The application must be received by this Tribunal not later than 56 days after this decision is sent to that party. The parties are referred to “Guidance to accompany a Decision from the First-tier Tribunal (Tax Chamber)” which accompanies and forms part of this decision notice. JOHN BROOKS TRIBUNAL JUDGE RELEASE DATE: 28 May 2015 Appendix “Free Days” calculation of penalties Aqua Scaffolding Ltd Estimate of the value of the number of jobs that would be possible to erect and Strike down based on working days per year. Assumptions: Average gross job value - £797 Days to load, erect and strike an average job – 2 Therefore average sales per man per day - £399 Number of working days per month22, less holidays 2 – 20* Days off ill – unknown A B C D E F G H I J K 12/06 17239.73 22 784 44 60 16 5,120 7/47 762.55 03/07 20943.69 26 806 52 60 8 2,560 7/47 381.28 06/07 26845 34 790 68 60 -8 (2,560) 7/47 (381.28) 09/07 24432.96 31 788 62 60 -2 (640) 7/47 (95.32) 12/07 26482.26 33 802 66 60 -6 (1,920) 7/47 (285.96) 03/08 29741.17 37 804 74 60 -14 (4,480) 7/47 (667.23) 1 06/08 24892.25 31 803 62 60 -2 (640) 7/47 (95.32) 3 09/08 19493.97 24 812 48 60 12 3,840 7/47 571.91 1 12/08 16797 21 800 42 60 18 5,760 7/47 857.87 12/08 8398.57 10 840 20 60 40 12,800 3/23 1,669.57 03/09 11678.35 15 779 30 60 30 9,600 3/23 1,252.17 06/09 11376.95 14 813 28 60 32 10,240 3/23 1,335.65 1 09/09 20815 26 801 52 60 8 2,560 3/23 333.91 1 12/09 39646.25 50 793 100 60 -40 (12,800) 3/23 (1,669.57) 1 03/10 8401.25 11 764 22 60 38 12,160 7/47 1,811.06 06/10 29714.64 37 803 74 60 -14 (4,480) 7/47 (667.23) 9/10 31754.38 40 794 80 126 46 14,720 7/47 2,192.34 1 + 1 friend 12/10 11691.25 15 779 30 104 74 23,680 7/47 3,526.81 03/11 21570.75 27 799 54 60 6 1,920 1/6 320.00 401915.42 504 15152 1008 1152 242 77,440 11,153.23 ** * Average value per job 797.4512 A – VAT period B – Value declared (including VAT) C – Number of jobs D – Value per job E – Estimated number days worked F – Working days per VAT quarter G – Free days H – Max sales potential on free days I – VAT fraction J – Total possible VAT underdeclaration* K – Street Sweep sightings * Assumes that taxpayer did work every working day and no days lost for sickness, childminding or bad weather etc ** Had subcontractor working with him in the quarters 9/10 and 12/10 [1] 1 / 6 for VAT period 03/11 and 7 / 47 for VAT periods 12/01 to 12/06

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