“Where a person is liable to a penalty under section 60 … the Commissioners or, on appeal, a tribunal may reduce the penalty to such amount (including nil) as they think proper.”
“The flexibility built into the preponderance of probability standard in respect of the seriousness of the allegation does not mean that where a serious allegation is in issue the standard of proof is higher. It means only that the inherent probability or improbability of an event is itself a matter to be taken into account when weighing the probabilities and deciding, whether, on balance the event occurred.”
“It would need more cogent evidence to satisfy one that the creature seen walking in Regent’s Park was more likely than not to have been a lioness than to be satisfied to the same standard of probability that it was an Alsatian. On this basis, cogent evidence is generally required to satisfy a civil tribunal that a person has been fraudulent or behaved in some other reprehensible manner.”
“ However, the point is that there comes a time when the person who is concerned to send in the firm’s VAT return, or his own if he is an individual, and the cheque for the amount owing, knows that the time has finally come when he must pay by the 31 st of the month, or soon afterwards, anyway, and, if that person deliberately does not send in the VAT return, and the money, at the time when he takes the decision, quite deliberately, not to send in the return, because he does not want to pay, he is, in law, evading the tax.”
“..It is common ground that the relevant test is that set out in R v Dealy . This establishes a bipartite test with HMRC having to prove to the requisite standard [1] (a) evasion and (b) dishonesty. In relation to dishonesty, the first question is whether objectively and judged by the standard of ordinary reasonable people, what the taxpayer did was dishonest. If the Tribunal considers this to be established then the second question whether the tax payer might have thought, quite honestly, that he had a perfect right to do as he did.”
“Take for example a man who comes from a country where public transport is free. On his first day here he travels on a bus. He gets off without paying. He never had any intention of paying. His mind is clearly honest: but is conduct judged objectively by what he has done, is dishonest…. Parliament cannot have intended to catch dishonest conduct in that sense, that is to say conduct to which no moral obloquy could possibly attach.”
“19. Other than the declaration that the child was under the age of 14 made by the person placing the order we have no evidence before us as to who was to wear the clothing. However, this is not the relevant question. The relevant question is “were the articles designed as clothing or footwear for young children?”
“17. As to the appellant’s submission that on its proper construction in its context the phrase ‘young children’ does not mean children below a certain age but children of whatever age who have not reached puberty, I have already recorded how the tribunal rejected, and in my view rightly rejected, a similar argument put before it on behalf of the appellant. It is in my judgement impossible to reconcile the argument with the ordinary meaning of the words used in item 1 of Group 16 in Schedule 18 of the 1994 Act. Those words clearly contrast young children and older persons. The distinction drawn is one of age and not the stage of physical development reached by the relevant person, which stage different children reach at different ages.”