“To the Respondents’ knowledge, no formal appeal has been lodged either with HMRC or the Tribunal in respect of the assessment at 2a or the penalty notice at 2b. It is clear however that both of these are in dispute. The parties wish the Tribunal to treat the assessment at 2a and the penalty notice at 2b as having been notified and dealt with as part of the existing appeal. Absent of any formal notice of appeal being given against these decisions, should the Appellant: • now make an appeal against those decisions and • apply for permission to appeal out of time and • ask that the appeal against those decision be joined and dealt with as part of the existing appeal then the Respondents would not object to any of these applications.”
“[10] The term 'best of their judgment' is derived from s 73(1) of the 1994 Act: 'Where a person has failed to make any returns required under this Act … or to keep any documents and afford the facilities necessary to verify such returns or where it appears to the Commissioners that such returns are incomplete or incorrect, they may assess the amount of VAT due from him to the best of their judgment and notify it to him.' (Emphasis added.) It should be noted that the shorthand 'best judgment', as used in some of the cases, may be misleading, if it is taken to imply a higher standard than usual. The statutory words 'to the best of their judgment' are used in a context where the taxpayers' records may be incomplete, so that a fully informed assessment is unlikely to be possible. Thus the word 'best', rather than implying a higher than normal standard, is a recognition that the result may necessarily involve an element of guesswork. It means simply 'to the best of (their) judgment on the information available' (see Argosy Co Ltd v IRC[1971] 1 WLR 514 at 517 per Lord Donovan).”
“[16] In Rahman (1) , I drew attention to phrases used by Woolf J in the leading case under this Act ( Van Boeckel v Customs and Excise Comrs[1981] STC 290 ) and in previous authorities in other tax contexts, to explain the effect of the 'best of their judgment' requirement (see[1998] STC 826 at 835): 'The passages I have italicised show that the tribunal should not treat an assessment as invalid merely because it disagrees as to how the judgment should have been exercised. A much stronger finding is required; for example, that the assessment has been reached “dishonestly or vindictively or capriciously”; or is a “spurious estimate or guess in which all elements of judgment are missing”; or is “wholly unreasonable”.”
“At the risk of stating the obvious, the power conferred by s 73(1) can be exercised only for the purposes for which it is given; that is to say it can be exercised only for the purposes of assessing the amount of VAT due to the best of the Commissioners' judgment. To purport to assess an amount of VAT due from a taxable person which is not the amount due to the best of the Commissioners' judgment is an improper exercise of the power. That is not in dispute. The issue raised by this appeal is whether, in the exercise of the s 73(1) power, more is required of the Commissioners than an honest and genuine attempt to make a reasoned assessment of the VAT payable, on the basis of the material then available to them. Is it enough, as the judge held, that the officer through whom the Commissioners act in making the assessment 'does his honest best'; or is there some objective standard against which the assessment must be measured so that, if the officer fails to attain that standard, there has been no proper exercise of the power to assess and the assessment must be treated as if it had not been made?”
“In para 44 of my judgment in Rahman (No 2) I suggested that, in cases where the tribunal had material before them from which they could see why the Commissioners made the assessment that they did and it was not apparent on the face of that material that the power to assess had not been exercised in accordance with the 'best of judgment' requirement, the tribunal would be well advised to concentrate on the question 'what amount of tax is properly due from the taxpayer?'; taking the material before them as a whole and applying their own judgment …'.”
“[11] The principles established in Van Boeckel and Rahman 1 indicate that the FTT's jurisdiction when considering whether an assessment was raised to the best of the commissioners' judgment is akin to a supervisory, judicial review type jurisdiction. The FTT does not have a true appellate function in that it cannot set aside the assessment on the basis that it disagrees with the commissioners' decision to make the assessment. The circumstances in which the FTT can decide that the assessment was not raised to the best of the commissioners' judgment, and therefore should not have been made at all, are very limited, essentially being restricted to cases where the commissioners have acted perversely or in bad faith. Carnwath J in Rahman 1 indicated that this 'kind of case is likely to be extremely rare' and that in the normal case 'it should be assumed that the Commissioners have made an honest and genuine attempt to reach a fair assessment': see page 836 of the judgment.”
“Further to my letter dated15 February 2012 , I am writing to advise you that the assessment has been mis-calculated and under states the amount of additional tax due from you. As a result I intend to raise a further assessment which is two years after the end of prescribed accounting period. I refer to Section 73(6)(b) of the VAT Act.”
“(6) An assessment under subsection (1), (2) or (3) above of an amount of VAT due for any prescribed accounting period must be made within the time limits provided for in section 77 and shall not be made after the later of the following— (a) 2 years after the end of the prescribed accounting period; or (b) one year after evidence of facts, sufficient in the opinion of the Commissioners to justify the making of the assessment, comes to their knowledge, but (subject to that section) where further such evidence comes to the Commissioners' knowledge after the making of an assessment under subsection (1), (2) or (3) above, another assessment may be made under that subsection, in addition to any earlier assessment.”
“In the majority of cases under this section the course of conduct adopted by the taxpayer will be such that the necessary mental element of dishonesty can be readily inferred.”