‘(1) P is liable to a penalty, in relation to each tax, of an amount determined by reference to-- (a) the number of defaults that P has made during the tax year (see sub-paragraphs (2) and (3)), and (b) the amount of that tax comprised in the total of those defaults (see sub-paragraphs (4) to (7)). (2) For the purposes of this paragraph, P makes a default when P fails to make one of the following payments (or to pay an amount comprising two or more of those payments) in full on or before the date on which it becomes due and payable-- (a) a payment under PAYE regulations; (b) a payment of earnings-related contributions within the meaning of theSocial Security (Contributions) Regulations 2001 (SI 2001/1004); (3) But the first failure during a tax year to make one of those payments (or to pay an amount comprising two or more of those payments) does not count as a default for that tax year. (4) If P makes 1, 2 or 3 defaults during the tax year, the amount of the penalty is 1% of the amount of the tax comprised in the total of those defaults. (5) If P makes 4, 5 or 6 defaults during the tax year, the amount of the penalty is 2% of the amount of the tax comprised in the total of those defaults. (6) If P makes 7, 8 or 9 defaults during the tax year, the amount of the penalty is 3% of the amount of the tax comprised in the total of those defaults. (7) If P makes 10 or more defaults during the tax year, the amount of the penalty is 4% of the amount of the tax comprised in the total of those defaults. (8) For the purposes of this paragraph-- (a) the amount of a tax comprised in a default is the amount of that tax comprised in the payment which P fails to make; (b) a default counts for the purposes of sub-paragraphs (4) to (7) even if it is remedied before the end of the tax year. (9) The Treasury may by order made by statutory instrument make such amendments to sub-paragraph (2) as they think fit in consequence of any amendment, revocation or re-enactment of the regulations mentioned in that sub-paragraph.’
‘(1) If HMRC think it right because of special circumstances, they may reduce a penalty under any paragraph of this Schedule. (2) In sub-paragraph (1) "special circumstances" does not include-- (a) ability to pay, or (b) the fact that a potential loss of revenue from one taxpayer is balanced by a potential over-payment by another. (3) In sub-paragraph (1) the reference to reducing a penalty includes a reference to-- (a) staying a penalty, and (b) agreeing a compromise in relation to proceedings for a penalty.’
‘(1) This paragraph applies if-- (a) P fails to pay an amount of tax when it becomes due and payable, (b) P makes a request to HMRC that payment of the amount of tax be deferred, and (c) HMRC agrees that payment of that amount may be deferred for a period ("the deferral period"). (2) If P would (apart from this sub-paragraph) become liable, between the date on which P makes the request and the end of the deferral period, to a penalty under any paragraph of this Schedule for failing to pay that amount, P is not liable to that penalty. (3) But if-- (a) P breaks the agreement (see sub-paragraph (4)), and (b) HMRC serves on P a notice specifying any penalty to which P would become liable apart from sub-paragraph (2), P becomes liable, at the date of the notice, to that penalty. (4) P breaks an agreement if-- (a) P fails to pay the amount of tax in question when the deferral period ends, or (b) the deferral is subject to P complying with a condition (including a condition that part of the amount be paid during the deferral period) and P fails to comply with it. (5) If the agreement mentioned in sub-paragraph (1)(c) is varied at any time by a further agreement between P and HMRC, this paragraph applies from that time to the agreement as varied.’
‘11(1) Where P is liable for a penalty under any paragraph of this Schedule HMRC must-- (a) assess the penalty, (b) notify P, and (c) state in the notice the period in respect of which the penalty is assessed.’
‘15(1) On an appeal under paragraph 13(1) that is notified to the tribunal, the tribunal may affirm or cancel HMRC’s decision. (2) On an appeal under paragraph 13(2) that is notified to the tribunal, the tribunal may-- (a) affirm HMRC’s decision, or (b) substitute for HMRC’s decision another decision that HMRC had power to make. (3) If the tribunal substitutes its decision for HMRC’s, the tribunal may rely on paragraph 9-- (a) to the same extent as HMRC (which may mean applying the same percentage reduction as HMRC to a different starting point), or (b) to a different extent, but only if the tribunal thinks that HMRC’s decision in respect of the application of paragraph 9 was flawed. (4) In sub-paragraph (3)(b) “flawed” means flawed when considered in the light of the principles applicable in proceedings for judicial review. (5) In this paragraph “tribunal” means the First-tier Tribunal or Upper Tribunal (as appropriate by virtue of paragraph 14(1)).’
‘to confirm or cancel the penalty, or substitute for HMRC’s decision another decision, but only one that HMRC had the power to make. The Tribunal can only rely upon the “special circumstances” provision in paragraph 9 to a different extent than that applied by HMRC if it thinks that HMRC’s decision in that respect was flawed. Applying judicial review principles, the Tribunal must consider whether HMRC acted in a way that no reasonable body of commissioners could have acted, or whether they took into account some irrelevant matter or disregarded something to which they should have given weight. The Tribunal should also consider whether HMRC have erred on a point of law.’
“the failure does not count as a default for the purposes of paragraph 6...”
‘(1) If P satisfies HMRC or (on appeal) the First-tier Tribunal or Upper Tribunal that there is a reasonable excuse for a failure to make a payment- (a) liability to a penalty under any paragraph of this Schedule does not arise in relation to that failure, and (b) the failure does not count as a default for the purposes of paragraph 6 (2) For the purposes of sub-paragraph (1)-- (a) an insufficiency of funds is not a reasonable excuse unless attributable to events outside P's control, (b) where P relies on any other person to do anything, that is not a reasonable excuse unless P took reasonable care to avoid the failure, and (c) where P had a reasonable excuse for the failure but the excuse has ceased, P is to be treated as having continued to have the excuse if the failure is remedied without unreasonable delay after the excuse ceased.’
‘(1) the legislation became operative with a commencement date of6 April 2010 , so that the first time penalties could be raised under these rules was after the end of the 2010/11 tax year, given the way that the penalties talk in terms of the number of defaults during the year in question (at [11]); (2) except in the case of special circumstances, the scheme laid down by the statute gives no discretion: the rate of penalty is simply driven by the number of PAYE late payments in the tax year by the employer (at [31]); (3) the scheme of the PAYE legislation requires taxpayers to pay over PAYE on time; the legislation does not require HMRC to issue warnings to individual employers, though it would be expected that a responsible tax authority would issue general material about the new system (at [33]); (4) lack of awareness of the penalty regime is not capable of constituting a special circumstance; in any event, no reasonable employer, aware generally of its responsibilities to make timely payments of PAYE and NICs amounts due, could fail to have seen and taken note of at least some of the information published and provided by HMRC (at [37]); (5) any failure on the part of HMRC to issue warnings to defaulting taxpayers, whether in respect of the imposition of penalties or the fact of late payment, is not of itself capable of amounting either to a reasonable excuse or special circumstances (given that there is no separate penalty for each individual default, and the penalty can only be assessed once the aggregate of the late paid tax comprised in the total of the defaults for a particular tax year has been ascertained) (at [38]-[39]);’
‘PAYE/Class 1 NICs electronic payment deadline Your cleared payment must reach HMRC's bank account no later than the 22 nd of the month following the end of the tax month or quarter to which it relates. PAYE/Class 1 NICs postal payment deadlines .....please ensure your cheque reaches HMRC no later than the 19 th of the month following the end of the tax month or quarter to which it relates.’
‘40. In its initial appeal letter and in its formal notice of appeal, the company referred to the penalty being excessive. It is clearly not excessive on the terms of Schedule 56 itself because the system laid down prescribes the penalties. Nonetheless, whilst no specific argument was addressed to us on proportionality, we have considered whether, in the circumstances of this case, the 4% penalty that was levied on the total of the relevant defaults in the tax year can be said to be disproportionate. 41. The issue of proportionality in this context is one of human rights, and whether, in accordance with the European Convention on Human Rights, Dina Foods Ltd could demonstrate that the imposition of the penalty is an unjustified interference with a possession. According to the settled law, in matters of taxation the State enjoys a wide margin of appreciation, and the European Court of Human Rights will respect the legislature's assessment in such matters unless it is devoid of reasonable foundation. Nevertheless, it has been recognised that not merely must the impairment of the individual's rights be no more than is necessary for the attainment of the public policy objective sought, but it must also not impose an excessive burden on the individual concerned. The test is whether the scheme is not merely harsh but plainly unfair so that, however effectively that unfairness may assist in achieving the social objective, it simply cannot be permitted. 42. Applying this test, whilst any penalty may be perceived as harsh, we do not consider that the levying of the penalty in this case was plainly unfair. It is in our view clear that the scheme of the legislation as a whole, which seeks to provide both an incentive for taxpayers to comply with their payment obligations, and the consequence of penalties should they fail to do so, cannot be described as wholly devoid of reasonable foundation. We have described earlier the graduated level of penalties depending on the number of defaults in a tax year, the fact that the first late payment is not counted as a default, the availability of a reasonable excuse defence and the ability to reduce a penalty in special circumstances. The taxpayer also has the right of an appeal to the Tribunal. Although the size of penalty that has rapidly accrued in the current case may seem harsh, the scheme of the legislation is in our view within the margin of appreciation afforded to the State in this respect. Accordingly we find that no Convention right has been infringed and the appeal cannot succeed on that basis’