"The firm played an active role in this mobile telephone carousel and money-laundering operations linked to First Curacao International Bank (FCIB) which placed the UK tax revenue at risk in 2006. The report concluded: “The company has been conspicuous since the beginning of 2003 for carrying out bogus and carousel transactions…. The company is a "missing trader."” 101. Mr Jaffar could not recollect when he had first dealt with Allimpex. He recalled meeting two representatives from Allimpex. Mr Jaffar did not ask how many employees worked for Allimpex nor did he ask for references or how long Allimpex had been trading. Mr Jaffar checked that Allimpex had a bank account, were incorporated and were registered for VAT. 102. Mr Jaffar accepted that he had no evidence to refute Mr Reardon's evidence in respect of Allimpex. EU customer – Elandour 103. Elandour was the appellant's EU customer in Deals 3 and 5. 104. Elandour was registered for VAT in France in October 2005 and was deregistered in May 2008. 105. According to three reports provided to HMRC by the French tax authorities, the French tax authorities planned an audit of Elandour because of its "non-compliant behaviour and suspect transaction [which HMRC had reported]."
"The Appellant instructs its Freight Forwarders to conduct 100% external box checks on all deliveries. This means that the Freight Forwarders ensure that the correct number of boxes are available and check the model, number, and the condition of the boxes, for example to ensure that there is no damage to the boxes, that seals have not been tampered with etc."
"Normally no goods are stored on site at Whitehurst Farm although occasionally stock for DVB has to be stored short-term (overnight)." 129. The report also refers to a previous visit made to a warehouse in Cheadle and refers to a conversation with Mr Peter Sellers who, apparently, confirmed that the warehouse unit was not being used to store commodities subject to onward supply. 130. The second visit report was dated28 November 2005 . This report stated: "
"5. The Defendant's role was to transport mobile phones to the continent on behalf of the various companies identified by the Prosecution, and to carry out or purported to carry out inspections. He did not otherwise control or operate any aspect of the fraud. 6. There was always a cargo of phones and on no occasion did any of the Defendant's vehicles travel without any goods. If the actual load did not correspond with the invoice goods, this was not a feature known to him. It is accepted that the Defendant purported to complete partial and full inspections of loads and supplied reports suggesting that such inspections had been completed. In fact, though, these inspections were never properly carried out and the precise nature of the goods, in terms model numbers and the like, was not known or appreciated by the Defendant." 140. We regard this as significant evidence, albeit the we recognise that it is hearsay evidence. Nonetheless, we considered that weight could be attributed to those aspects of the plea put forward on behalf of Mr Sellers in so far as it incriminated him. It clearly indicated that A1 Logistics did not properly inspect the goods passing through its hands and that any inspection report produced by it was likely to be worthless. 141. Mr Parker said that in the prosecution of Mr Sellers it had been part of the Crown's case that the supply of the Serenes could not have taken place. He accepted in cross-examination that although the crux of the criminal investigation was that Serenes and other types of mobile phones were not available in the quantities purportedly traded by Future (and, therefore, by other companies) it begged the question of what was actually being transported: was it phones or not? Mr Parker could not confirm whether phones were being transported or not. Mr Parker also said that whenever the compliance officers visited A1 Logistics there were no phones found on the premises. 142. When the contradictions in his evidence relating to inspections referred to in paragraphs 125 and 126 above were put to Mr Jaffar in cross-examination he insisted that, in relation to the inspection carried out by A1 Logistics, there had been a 10% open box inspection. He said that this was what he had agreed with Mr Lee Sellers, the owner of A1 Logistics. 143. Exhibited to Mr Jaffar's witness statements was the appellant's instruction to A1 Logistics to inspect various consignments of mobile phones, including 200 Samsung Serenes in relation to Deal 1. In fact the inspection instruction requested an inspection into many other consignments of mobile phones, totalling over 9,000 units. The document, which was dated "07/03/2006 " read as follows: "
"CUSTOMER NAME: GSM INTER TRADE LTD TYPE OF STOCK: SAMSUNG SERENE QUANTITY: 200 PCS WAREHOUSE ADDRESS: A1 LOGISTICS AND FREIGHT LTD WHITEHURST FARM …. NO. OF PALLETS: 1 PALLET BAY LOCATION: BG 4 ORIGIN OF STOCK: CENTRAL EUROPEAN …. LEVEL OF INSPECTION: 0% 10% * 50% 100% STOCK COUNT: 0% 10% 50% 100%* APPROXIMATE WEIGHT: 200 KGS INSPECTION CARRIED OUT BY: A1 LOGISTICS & FREIGHT LTD" *Figures in bold emphasised in original. 146. Contrary to the instruction given by Mr Jaffar dated 07/03/06, there was no report on the condition of the goods. Mr Jaffar explained that once the freight forwarder had carried out the inspection and there was nothing negative in the report, he took this to mean that the goods were in good condition. 147. The inspection report from A1 Logistics referred to above did not appear to have been faxed to the appellant as there were no fax marks or legends on the report. Mr Jaffar accepted that the inspection report had probably been mailed to him. 148. Mr Jaffar accepted that he received payment in respect of Deal 1 and made a payment to his supplier on7 March 2006 i.e. the same date on which he sent the inspection instruction to A1 Logistics. 149. Mr Jaffar was unable to explain to our satisfaction how the inspection report from A1 Logistics was dated before the inspection instruction was sent by Mr Jaffar. 150. Mr Jaffar accepted that he did not have the A1 Logistics report before he authorised the dispatch of the consignment of 200 Serenes. Aquarius 151. Mr Jaffar started using Aquarius as a freight forwarder on the recommendation of Infinity and was the freight forwarder in the majority of Infinity’s transactions in the period April 2006 to June 2006. 152. Aquarius was registered for VAT with effect from1 October 2005 and was deregistered on30 April 2009 . As part of the application to register Aquarius for VAT, Aquarius provided a letter from M Bathia Accountancy from an address in Leicester dated11 October 2005 to the manager of the Habib Bank. M Bathia was the Company Secretary of both Infinity and Infinity Distribution from17 September 2004 to1 December 2005 . We infer that there was a connection between Infinity and Aquarius. 153. HMRC officers made a number of visits to Aquarius' premises. In a visit on16 February 2006 , officers confirmed that there were no high value goods in the warehouse. 154. In a visit on9 March 2006 , although paperwork was produced for a number of consignments of mobile phones, no goods were seen when the warehouse was inspected. 155. In a visit on22 March 2006 , HMRC officers inspected the warehouse and saw nine boxes containing 960 boxes of Accuchet Active Test Strips. The director of Aquarius, Mr Parekh, stated that he was expecting a delivery of 4,500 mobile phones, model not specified, on behalf of Future. 156. In a further visit on7 June 2006 , HMRC officers inspected the premises to see if there were any consignments of goods and observed only a couple of pallets of food-related products. There were no mobile phones on the premises. 157. Thus, on four occasions between 16 February and7 June 2006 , no mobile phones were observed by HMRC officers inspecting Aquarius' premises. The date of the final visit on 7 June was important because in the months of May and June 2006, according to the documentation held by HMRC, Aquarius was the freight forwarder for over£134 million of Infinity's phones. On7 June 2006 Aquarius was purportedly the freight forwarder for six separate deals of Infinity. These deals, at least on paper, involved 9,090 mobile phones with a value of over£3.6 million . According to the paperwork, Aquarius actually dealt with numerous consignments of Infinity's phones every day from5 June 2006 to9 June 2006 . Nonetheless, on7 June 2006 no evidence of mobile phones was to be seen in Aquarius' warehouse. 158. Mr Jaffar told us that he had visited Aquarius' premises but his visit was confined to Aquarius' office and he had not gone into the warehouse. 159. The appellant sent two instructions to Aquarius dated25 April 2006 requesting inspection of two consignments of Serenes (1,716 units and 1,100 units). The instructions as to inspection were in the same terms as the instruction to A1 Logistics set out in paragraph 143 above. 160. Mr Jaffar's exhibits included two inspection reports from Aquarius. They were both dated26 April 2006 . The first report related to a consignment of 1,716 Serenes and the other related to 1,100 Serenes. Both reports were in identical form. The report for 1,716 Serenes read as follows: "
"Boston Freight operates from a farm close the frontier with France, and appears to offer logistics services to traders involved in the mobile phone and CPU industry. The representative of Boston Freight has also claimed that as there are no storage facilities at its premises, the goods remain in the vans which have arrived from the UK, before being onward shipped. The Belgian VAT authorities suspect that the goods, which on some occasions may not exist, are in fact immediately returned to the UK in the same vans…. The Belgian VAT authorities also strongly suspect that a number of the traders using Boston Freight's services are involved in VAT carousel fraud." 167. The report of the Belgian tax authorities noted the appellant, amongst many others, as one of the UK consignors. 168. As part of Operation Inertia, prosecutions were brought against Mr Marshall Boston, the owner of Boston Freight, and Mr Paul Smith, an employee of Boston Freight. Mr Marshall Boston pleaded guilty to the charge of VAT fraud under theVAT Act 1994 and was sentenced to 2 years imprisonment and was disqualified as a company director for five years. The date of Mr Boston's conviction was12 June 2012 . Mr Boston's subsequent appeal against his conviction was dismissed. 169. Mr Paul Smith pleaded guilty to the charge of being knowingly concerned in the fraudulent evasion of VAT. The date of his conviction was14 November 2011 . Mr Smith was sentenced to 1 year’s imprisonment, suspended for two years. Mr Smith was also sentenced to 240 hours of community service. 170. In relation to Mr Paul Smith, Mr Parker's unchallenged evidence was that Mr Smith's part in the fraud was that he facilitated the fraud by stamping up the requisite paperwork that enable traders to present to HMRC that the transactions had taken place. AFI Logistique 171. AFI Logistique ("
"Mr Lee contacted me on or around20 February 2006 and informed me that A1 Logistics were no longer going to offer insurance of the goods that they were storing and transporting. Mr Lee informed me that there had been a change in the law. This meant that I had to try to arrange my insurance for the Appellant to cover the deals that I was undertaking. This resulted in a delay in the goods stored at the A1 Logistics warehouse being shipped to their destination." 181. Mr Jaffar attempted to explain the discrepancy as follows: Mr Rowell : That completely contradicts everything you just told us doesn't it? Mr Jaffar : No, the difference – can I speak? The difference between what you are saying because this is what I have been saying, too many years have passed. This is on 17 February, it is Friday. And Friday most of mobile phone companies is by 12 o'clock they are closed so most of the discussion is happening by phones and confirmation is happening by fax later time. On Friday you will see even with your documents there are several invoices and several purchase orders do not meet because the date is Friday and Monday. When it come to Friday and Monday most of companies mobile phone companies do not trade for many different reasons. That is why when you spoke with me I told you normally what I do is what I do, but when I read this 17 February Mrs Potter, that is why I asked to see the date on the agenda. Mr Rowell : Mr Jaffar, can you now help us from your own recollection… as to when this alleged conversation with Mr Sellers took place. Was it on 7 or 8 March, which was the first version of your evidence, or was it on or around 20 February, which is what you have put in this witness statement? When if either of them, is true? Mr Jaffar : Regarding for the – I don't know. I know the standard way how I work but now I don't know what to say. But this is how I work. I don't ship without payment. If it is Friday, Sunday, Monday, the date on the documents might be changed three days because you mentioned three days and she mentions three days here. Now, as I said, too many years pass. You are asking me something in 2006 and you are asking me today. Maybe I make my mistake in my last witness statement but too many years pass. I don't return back to documents. I don't fix that. I don't fix things. If I do something like this I will arrange it from long time but I don't do that. Mr Rowell : Mr Jaffar, you also just told us that it would have taken around 10 days to arrange new insurance? Mr Jaffar : Yes Mr Rowell : If your paragraph 10 here is correct, you would have had time to ensure Deal 1, wouldn't you? Mr Jaffar : Under stress, no. 182. We did not consider Mr Jaffar's evidence to be convincing and we considered that in this respect his evidence was not truthful. 183. As regards Deals 2 – 6, these transactions were insured through a broker called Martinez & Partners and the policy of insurance commenced on24 April 2006 . The policy of insurance contained certain "
"In respect of all road vehicle movements: 1. Vehicles are double-manned and or security escorted or 2. The cargo hold of the vehicle is to be equipped with an electronic locking system, which can only be opened by the operations centre of the Haulier. In such cases vehicles can circulate with a one-person crew on condition that the electronic locking system is active during the whole transit…." 184. Mr Rowell put to Mr Jaffar in cross-examination that the goods were shipped to AFI Logistics and that they were not the operations centre of the haulier i.e. that the second condition had not been complied with. It did not seem to us clear how this condition was meant to operate but it seemed certainly possible that it was intended to mean that the electronic locking system could be operated remotely by the operations centre of the haulier and did not mean that the goods had to be delivered to that operations centre. 185. The CMRs made no mention of vehicles being double manned and the Euro Tunnel tickets indicated that the crossing was made by only one person. Therefore, the first condition referred to above had not been satisfied. However, in the light of our uncertainty concerning the manner in which the electronic locking system could be opened, we did not consider that Mr Rowell had been successful in his attempt to establish that Mr Jaffar had ignored Aquarius' non-compliance with the insurance conditions because either no goods or low-value goods were being transported. In fact, on25 April 2006 Mr Jaffar had faxed these conditions to Aquarius and the director of Aquarius had signed and returned a declaration confirming that "all shipments, transits and conveyancers will be carried in accordance with the above terms and conditions."
"I refer to the request for the above account to be closed and confirm that this has been actioned." 201. It seemed to us that this wording left it ambiguous as to the source of the request for the account to be closed. Mr Jaffar suggested to us that the initiative for the account to be closed had come from the Bank of Scotland. If so, the form of words used in the letter of31 January 2007 seemed to us somewhat unusual. 202. Furthermore, Mr Jaffar produced the appellant’s bank statements in respect of an account with Alliance & Leicester Commercial Bank for the period1 December 2005 –11 December 2006 . The debits and credits to this account were relatively small in contrast to those in respect of the Bank of Scotland account. 203. In the light of the above, we felt unable to accept Mr Jaffar's evidence that he had opened the appellant's account with FCIB because the appellant's UK bank accounts were being closed. At all times material to this appeal the appellant appeared to have two UK bank accounts and used one of them (the Bank of Scotland current account) to make substantial trading payments to Future and Infinity. The evidence of Mr Stone 204. Mr Stone is a senior HMRC officer who has been employed by HMRC and its predecessors since 1974. From 2001 he has been closely involved in HMRC's strategy in combating MTIC fraud. Mr Stone has given evidence in many MTIC-related appeals and has considerable experience of MTIC fraud. 205. In his second witness statement Mr Stone's evidence was that the transactions in this appeal formed part of and were connected to supply chains leading to traders that have defaulted on their liability to account for VAT on the supply of the goods in question. From his experience in dealing with MTIC fraud his view was that the deals in question were part of supply chains which had the hallmarks of supply chains contrived for the purposes of defrauding the public revenue through MTIC fraud. 206. Mr Stone did not, in his evidence, allege that the appellant knew or should have known that its transactions were connected with MTIC fraud. In Mr Stone's view, the connection between the appellant's transactions and MTIC fraud was significant in the context of this appeal. In his experience of MTIC fraud transactions the perpetrators often used dummy or non-existent goods because this greatly reduced the cost to them of setting up fraudulent transactions and they would try to cover their tracks by supplying their customers with false details about dummy or non-existent goods. The link between the appellant’s transactions and MTIC fraud explained why the goods recorded on the appellant’s purchase invoices were not what it was, in fact, supplied with. 207. Mr Stone had extracted from HMRC's records purported sales of Serenes. He had found 286 separate transaction chains involving the purported sale of 144,655 Serenes with a net value of£174,252,735 . Mr Stone did not believe that the list was exhaustive. The evidence of Mr Jaffar 208. We have already indicated that in relation to the question of insurance in respect of Deal 1, we did not regard Mr Jaffar as being truthful. In the light of the evidence just summarised, we felt unable to accept Mr Jaffar's evidence that he opened the appellant's FCIB account because the appellant's UK bank accounts were being closed. In addition we consider that he was untruthful about whether he traded through the Bank of Scotland account. Throughout his two-day cross-examination we considered that Mr Jaffar's answers were frequently inconsistent and evasive. We therefore had considerable reservations about the reliability of Mr Jaffar's evidence. The legislation 209.Section 4 of the Value Added Tax Act 1994 ("
"(1) VAT shall be charged on any supply of goods or services made in the United Kingdom, where it is a taxable supply made by a taxable person in the course or furtherance of any business carried on by him. (2) A taxable supply is a supply of goods or services made in the United Kingdom other than an exempt supply." 210. Sections 24 – 26Value Added Tax Act 1994 ("
"VAT on the supply to him of any goods or services … being (in each case) goods or services used or to be used for the purpose of any business carried on or to be carried on by him." 211. Section 24(6)(a) VATA provides that regulations may provide for VAT: "to be treated as input tax only if and to the extent that the charge to VAT is evidenced and quantified by reference to such documents or other information as may be specified in the regulations or the Commissioners may direct either generally or in particular cases or classes of cases." 212. Section 24(6)(a) gives effect to Article 18 of the Sixth Directive, which refers to the documentary requirements which must be satisfied in order to exercise a right to deduct. 213. Section 25(2) of VATA provides: "
"a registered person providing a VAT invoice … shall state thereon the following particulars – a description sufficient to identify the goods or services supplied." 216. Regulation 29(2) of the Regulations provides: "
"The following shall be subject to value added tax: 1. The supply of goods or services effected for consideration within the territory of the country by a taxable person acting as such; …" 219. Article 5(1) of the Sixth Directive provides: "
"Origin and scope of the right to deduct – 1. The right to deduct shall arise at the time when the deductible tax becomes chargeable. 2. In so far as the goods and services are used for the purposes of his taxable transactions, the taxable person shall be entitled to deduct from the tax which he is liable to pay: (a) value added tax due or paid within the territory of the country in respect of goods or services supplied or to be supplied to him by another taxable person; …" 221. Article 18 of the Sixth Directive sets out rules governing the exercise of the right to deduct input tax and provides: "
"3(a) Every taxable person shall ensure that an invoice is issued, either by himself or by his customer, or in his name and on his behalf, by a third party, in respect of goods or services which he has supplied or rendered to another taxable person or to a non-taxable legal person. Every taxable person shall also ensure that an invoice is issued, either by himself or by his customer or, in his name and on his behalf, by a third party, in respect of the supplies of goods referred to in Article 28b(B)(1) and in respect of goods supplied under the conditions laid down in Article 28c(A). Every taxable person shall ensure that an invoice is issued, either by himself or by his customer or, in his name and on his behalf, by a third party, in respect of any payment on account made to him before any supplies of goods referred to in the first subparagraph and in respect of any payment on account made to him by another taxable person or non-taxable legal person before the provision of services is completed … Member States may impose on taxable persons an obligation to issue an invoice in respect of goods or services … which they have supplied or rendered on their territory." 223. Article 22(3)(b) of the Sixth Directive specifies the details which Member States may require a taxable person to include on an invoice for a supply that he makes.
"Member States may impose other obligations which they deem necessary for the correct collection of the tax and for the prevention of evasion, subject to the requirement of equal treatment for domestic transactions and transactions carried out between Member States by taxable persons and provided that such obligations do not, in trade between Member States, give rise to formalities connected with the crossing of frontiers."
"13. It must be inferred from the changes made to the above-mentioned provisions that the right to deduct may be exercised only in respect of taxes actually due, that is to say, the taxes corresponding to a transaction subject to value added tax or paid in so far as they were due. … 18. … It follows that that right cannot be exercised in respect of tax which does not correspond to a given transaction, either because that tax is higher than that legally due or because the transaction in question is not subject to value added tax . " 226. Thus in Genius Holdings the Court limited the exercise of the right to deduct taxes to an actual taxable supply of goods and services. HMRC argued that, in this appeal, either no supply of goods had been made or the supply consisted of different goods from those recorded on the invoices. 227. We were also referred to the decisions of the CJEU which concerned the extent to which the laws of Member States could prescribe criteria for a valid tax invoice. Thus, in Lea Jorion (née Jeunehomme v Belgian State) C – 123/97 a car dealer was denied a deduction in respect of invoices which contained numerous irregularities, including false addresses and inaccurate description of the vehicles concerned. The invoices did not comply with the national law of Belgium as to the minimum information that a valid tax invoice should contain in order to enable the taxpayer to exercise its right to deduct input tax. The CJEU said: "14. In order to be entitled to deduct the value-added tax payable or paid in respect of goods delivered or to be delivered or services supplied or to be supplied by another taxable person, a taxable person must hold an invoice drawn up in accordance with Article 22 ( 3 ) of the Sixth Directive ( Article 18 ( 1 ) ( a ) ). Under that provision, the invoice must state clearly the price exclusive of tax and the corresponding tax at each rate as well as any exemptions ( subparagraph ( b ) ) and the Member States are to determine the criteria for considering whether a document serves as an invoice ( subparagraph ( c ) ). 15 . Furthermore, Article 22 ( 8 ) of the Sixth Directive provides that "... Member States may impose other obligations which they deem necessary for the correct levying and collection of the tax and for the prevention of fraud "
"Identification of the taxable transaction is clearly of great practical importance for determining what provisions are applicable. It is evident that, when mentioned, the taxable transaction must be defined correctly in accordance with the categories in the directive, since a different qualification may trigger the application of different provisions of the directive and possibly different tax rates. Definitions which are not accurate in that regard may prejudice the application of the directive and distort competition. ... My view is... that the applicable version of the Sixth Directive allows Member States to require suppliers to indicate their name and address and to identify accurately the nature of the supply, on any invoice used for VAT purposes, and thus to refuse the recipient a right to deduct if those particulars are absent or materially incorrect." 230. In Jeunehomme Advocate General Slynn (ECJ 31.05.1988 C-123/87) explained, in a well-known passage, that the burden of proof in the case of an invalid invoice fell on the taxpayer: "
" At no time do the commissioners have any burden to prove anything before the tribunal. Neither its case nor any aspect of the matter, factually or evidentially, carries any burden imposed on the commissioners. It is throughout, in my judgment, up to the taxpayer company, if it can, to attack the assessment in whole or in part ." 234. Finally, in relation to the burden of proof in respect of the exercise of HMRC's discretion under Regulation 29 (2) of the Regulations, we will also referred to decision the VAT and Duties Tribunal in Elite Designs International Ltd v Commrs Customs & Excise LON/99/635 where the tribunal stated at paragraph [31]: "
"It is accepted that the [Mr Sellers] purported to complete partial and full inspections of loads and supplied reports suggesting that such inspections had been completed. In fact, though, these inspections were never properly carried out and the precise nature of the goods, in terms model numbers and the like, was not known or appreciated by the [Mr Sellers]." 268. Furthermore, A1 Logistics did not appear to store goods at its premises (other than, perhaps, overnight) which seems an extraordinary state of affairs for a freight forwarder. 269. Also, we were not satisfied with Mr Jaffar's evidence in relation to A1 Logistics' inspections. We have noted the contradiction in his evidence in relation to inspections at paragraphs 125 and 126. We have also noted that Mr Jaffar was unable to explain how the A1 Logistics inspection was carried out almost 3 weeks before Mr Jaffar requested an inspection. 270. We have, therefore, concluded that the A1 Logistics inspection reports lend no support to the appellant's case that it did buy the Serenes as recorded in the documentation for Deal 1. 271. As regards the inspection reports produced by Aquarius in relation to Deals 2 – 6, there was evidently a link between Aquarius and Infinity and Infinity Distribution (see the evidence in relation to Mr Bathia). Mr Jaffar used Aquarius on the recommendation of the fraudulent contra-trader Infinity. Moreover, Infinity used Aquarius in the majority of its transactions. We think it unlikely that a fraudster such as Infinity would have used a reputable freight forwarder when it was engaged in fraud on such a substantial scale. 272. On a number of visits by HMRC officers there was no evidence of mobile phones on Aquarius' premises. This was true even in a period when Aquarius, according to the documentation, was supposed to be dealing in very substantial quantities of mobile phones (e.g. on7 June 2006 ). 273. We recognise that there was no evidence of any criminal convictions of officers or employees of Aquarius. However, in the circumstances, we did not think that the inspection reports produced by Aquarius could be relied upon to indicate that the appellant in fact acquired Serenes from Infinity. (d) The customers' freight forwarders 274. In addition, we have taken into account, as part of the background factual matrix, the evidence obtained from the German (in relation to Allimpex) and French (in relation to Elandour) tax authorities that the appellant's customers appear to be involved in fraud. Furthermore, the freight forwarders of the appellant's customers also appear to have been convicted fraudsters or associated with convicted fraudsters. Boston Freight's owner and one of its employees were convicted of VAT fraud and seem to operate from farm buildings with a leaky roof (which, conveniently, resulted in some of their documentation being destroyed). The company secretary and operations manager of AFI had been convicted of VAT fraud. If there was something amiss with the purported shipments of Serenes in relation to the appeals transactions, these two players were unlikely to blow the whistle. (e) The FCIB evidence of circular payments 275. In addition to the above, we have taken into account the evidence of Mr Reardon in relation to the payments by various parties through FCIB accounts. 276. It was plain from Mr Reardon's evidence that, in relation to Deals 2 – 6, the funds paid in respect of these transactions were being recycled in a circular fashion through various FCIB bank accounts. It seemed to us this was entirely inconsistent with legitimate arm's-length trading. HMRC, in leading this evidence, did not suggest that the appellant was aware of the circularity of the payment changes. HMRC did, however, submit that Mr Reardon's evidence in relation to the FCIB circular payments indicated that the appellant's transactions were part of an overall scheme to defraud the Exchequer and that, therefore, the ordinary commercial documentation of invoices, purchase orders and inspection reports did not correctly identify the true nature of the transaction or the goods being bought and sold. We accept that submission and we find that the FCIB evidence supports the conclusion that the appellant did not purchase the Serenes as shown on the documentation relating to Deals 2 – 6. (f) The price for the Serenes paid by the appellant 277. In addition, the appellant paid£1,350 per unit for all the Serenes which it purported to buy in the six transactions under appeal. As an initial point, we simply observe that it is slightly strange that in transactions concluded over a month apart and all of which had different invoice dates (Deal 1 followed by Deals 2 – 6) that the price of the Serenes should have remained constant. Be that as it may, we could see no justification for the appellant paying that price when it was possible to buy a Serene from a Bang & Olufsen retailer for£800 in the UK and€1,100 in the Eurozone or from a Samsung customer for€1,000 (approximately£692 ). 278. Mr Jaffar argued that this differential in price (which neither Mr Bishop nor Mr Hjannung could account for) could be explained by the fact that the grey market was responding to demand from non-European customers visiting Europe as tourists. Whilst we accept Mr Jaffar's evidence that a lot of non-Europeans visit Europe as tourists, there was no evidence that they spent part of their holiday buying Serenes. Nor was there any credible evidence that the grey market was supplying customers in their home (i.e. non-European) markets. Instead, the evidence of Mr Bishop and Mr Hjannung was that the supply of Serenes exceeded demand. 279. Furthermore, we note that Mr Jaffar had not researched the retail price of the Serenes. It seemed odd, indeed it beggared belief, that he agreed to buy (wholesale) almost£5million worth of Serenes (the price including VAT) when he appeared to have no clue as to the European retail price of those goods. 280. For these reasons, we considered that the price paid by the appellant for the Serenes lent weight to the conclusion that the appellant's deals were not genuine commercial transactions and that this, therefore, supported the view that it was more likely than not that Serenes had not been supplied in these transactions. 281. We accepted the evidence of Mr Stone concerning the link between the appealed deals and MTIC fraud as providing a reason why Serenes were not supplied under the appealed deals. (g) Conclusion on Issue (b) 282. Taking account of all these factors, and looking at the evidence in the round, we consider that it was more likely than not that the Serenes shown on the invoices issued by Future and Infinity to the appellant in relation to Deals 1 to 6 were not supplied to the appellant. Accordingly, we conclude that these invoices did not meet the requirements of Regulation 14 (1 (g) and/or Regulation 14 (1) (h) of the Regulations. Were any goods supplied to the appellant in the disputed deals? 283. The appellant's main argument under this heading was that if, contrary to its main contention that it had received a supply of Serenes as described in the invoices, no Serenes had been supplied it had received a supply of counterfeit Serenes. 284. The evidence of Mr Bishop and Mr Hjannung was that they were not aware of any counterfeiting of Serenes. 285. In our view, it is highly unlikely that the appellant acquired counterfeit Serenes in the deals under appeal. 286. If large quantities of counterfeit Serenes were in circulation we consider that it would have been highly likely that Samsung and/or Bang & Olufsen would have been aware of that fact. Secondly, there would have been very little incentive for counterfeiters to produce fake Serenes because the handset was not popular with consumers and was a commercial disappointment. The Serenes were aimed at a small high-end segment of the mobile phone market and they were not products that were aimed at the mass market. 287. In any event, Mr Bishop's evidence was that the design of the Serenes was very different from that of a typical mobile phone. It seems highly improbable that counterfeiters would have gone to the effort and expense of counterfeiting such a specialised product which was, in any event, manufactured in relatively limited numbers and which was not in high demand from consumers. 288. We should add that there was no real evidence adduced by Mr Jaffar that the Serenes had been counterfeited. It may well be that other models of Samsung mobile phones have been counterfeited but there was no evidence that Serenes were the subject of counterfeiting. 289. For these reasons, we consider that it is more likely than not that the appellant did not acquire counterfeit Serenes in any of its six appealed transactions. 290. The only other evidence which appeared to support the possibility that the appellant may have been supplied with goods other than genuine Serenes came in the plea of mitigation of Mr Lee Sellers. In that plea, Mr Sellers' representatives indicated that mobile phones had always been supplied. However, the plea went on to admit that no proper inspection had been undertaken and "the precise nature of the goods, in terms model numbers and the like, was not known or appreciated by the [Mr Sellers]." 291. It seems to us odd (and indeed contradictory) for Mr Sellers' representatives to assert that there was always a cargo of mobile phones when they go on to admit that Mr Sellers did not know or appreciate the precise nature of the goods. Whilst we are prepared to accept and give weight to those parts of Mr Sellers' plea of mitigation which serve to incriminate him (on the basis that he was unlikely to overstate incriminating material) we do not consider it appropriate to give weight to the material in Mr Sellers' plea which was exculpatory. 292. Besides the plea of Mr Sellers (and discounting, as we have done, the possible supply of counterfeit Serenes), there was no evidence that anything other than Serenes was supplied to the appellant. At no point did Mr Jaffar attempt to argue that different types of mobile phones or, indeed, different types of products had been supplied to the appellant. His case was that it was Serenes (or possibly counterfeit Serenes) that were supplied. In any event, the burden of proof would have been upon the appellant to demonstrate exactly what was supplied if it was not Serenes or counterfeit Serenes and that burden has not been discharged. 293. We do not consider that the making of payments and receipt of payments by the appellant for the deals under appeal can be relied upon as evidence that goods of some kind were supplied to the appellant. Similarly, the absence of complaints from customers cannot likewise be relied upon. On the evidence, we consider that the deals in question were part of a scheme of MTIC fraud, using contra-trading to disguise the fraud, and were not part of legitimate arm's-length commerce. This conclusion remains distinct from the question whether the appellant knew or should have known that its transactions were connected with VAT fraud, a question on which we express no views. 294. As noted, we accepted the evidence of Mr Stone concerning the link between the appealed deals and MTIC fraud as providing a reason why no goods were supplied under the appealed deals. 295. Accordingly, because we have found that neither Serenes nor counterfeit Serenes were supplied to the appellant, we find that on the balance of probabilities no goods were supplied to the appellant. The exercise of HMRC's discretion under Regulation 29 (2) of the Regulations 296. In the light of our conclusion that the appellant received no supply of goods, the payments made by the appellant to its suppliers (Future and Infinity) could not constitute input tax. In our view, therefore, the HMRC's discretion under Regulation 29 (2) of the Regulations does not apply for the following reasons. 297. Mr Rowell submitted that HMRC's discretion under Regulation 29 (2) was subject to an important limitation viz that the transaction in question in respect of which an input deduction was claimed last actually had taken place. We agree. 298. In John Reisdorf v Finanzamt Koln-West [1996] EUECJ C-85/95 the CJEU held: 31. The answer to the national court's questions must therefore be that Article 18(1)(a) and Article 22(3) of the Sixth Directive permit the Member States to regard as an invoice not only the original but also any other document serving as an invoice that fulfils the criteria determined by the Member States themselves, and confer on them the power to require production of the original invoice in order to establish the right to deduct input tax, as well as the power, where a taxable person no longer holds the original, to admit other evidence that the transaction in respect of which the deduction is claimed actually took place. " (Emphasis added)
"32. The proviso to regulation 29(2) speaks of "other documentary evidence of the charge to VAT"
“…The invoice does not itself create an entitlement to input tax but it evidences such an entitlement…”