“It may very well be, as has been convincingly argued (Watt, "The Danger and Deceit of the Rule in Henderson v. Henderson : A new approach to successive civil actions arising from the same factual matter," 19 Civil Justice Quarterly , (July 2000), page 287), that what is now taken to be the rule in Henderson v. Henderson , has diverged from the ruling which Wigram V.-C. made, which was addressed to res judicata. But Henderson v. Henderson abuse of process, as now understood, although separate and distinct from cause of action estoppel and issue estoppel, has much in common with them. The underlying public interest is the same: that there should be finality in litigation and that a party should not be twice vexed in the same matter. This public interest is reinforced by the current emphasis on efficiency and economy in the conduct of litigation, in the interests of the parties and the public as a whole. The bringing of a claim or the raising of a defence in later proceedings may, without more, amount to abuse if the court is satisfied (the onus being on the party alleging abuse) that the claim or defence should have been raised in the earlier proceedings if it was to be raised at all. I would not accept that it is necessary, before abuse may be found, to identify any additional element such as a collateral attack on a previous decision or some dishonesty, but where those elements are present the later proceedings will be much more obviously abusive, and there will rarely be a finding of abuse unless the later proceeding involves what the court regards as unjust harassment of a party. It is, however, wrong to hold that because a matter could have been raised in early proceedings it should have been, so as to render the raising of it in later proceedings necessarily abusive. That is to adopt too dogmatic an approach to what should in my opinion be a broad, merits-based judgment which takes account of the public and private interests involved and also takes account of all the facts of the case, focusing attention on the crucial question whether, in all the circumstances, a party is misusing or abusing the process of the court by seeking to raise before it the issue which could have been raised before. As one cannot comprehensively list all possible forms of abuse, so one cannot formulate any hard and fast rule to determine whether, on given facts, abuse is to be found or not. Thus while I would accept that lack of funds would not ordinarily excuse a failure to raise in earlier proceedings an issue which could and should have been raised then, I would not regard it as necessarily irrelevant, particularly if it appears that the lack of funds has been caused by the party against whom it is sought to claim. While the result may often be the same, it is in my view preferable to ask whether in all the circumstances a party's conduct is an abuse than to ask whether the conduct is an abuse and then, if it is, to ask whether the abuse is excused or justified by special circumstances. Properly applied, and whatever the legitimacy of its descent, the rule has in my view a valuable part to play in protecting the interests of justice.” 22. It is clear from these decisions that there should be finality in litigation and that neither party, once an issue has been determined between them, should be able to challenge the outcome of that issue in subsequent proceedings or re-litigate that issue leading potentially to a different outcome. This raises the issue, in the present case, of whether the grounds of appeal relied upon by Meridian have been determined as a result of the application of s 85 VATA. 23. In our judgment the effect of the legislation in this case is that once Meridian had withdrawn its original appeal that appeal was deemed, by virtue of s 85(4) VATA, to have been settled by agreement. Accordingly, in accordance with s 85(1) the decision of HMRC that was under appeal is to be treated “as upheld without variation” for “all purposes” as if the Tribunal had determined the appeal. 24. Therefore, on18 April 2011 , as a result of withdrawing its appeal there was in effect a binding Tribunal determination that Meridian’s claims for input tax for 04/06 and 05/06 was incorrect as it was overstated and had no right to deduct input tax attributable to the transactions for which its recovery had been denied on the basis that it knew or should have known that these transaction were connected to fraud. This therefore disposes of the issue of whether the 04/06 and 05/06 returns are correct and, as such, Meridian is estopped from advancing the same arguments in the present appeal. In addition we find that it would be an abuse of process were it to be allowed to do so. 25. Section 63(1) VATA provides that where a return is made which understates a person’s liability to VAT or overstates his entitlement to a VAT credit, the person concerned shall be liable to a penalty equal to 15 per cent of the VAT which would have been lost if the inaccuracy had not been discovered provided it exceeds the threshold in s 63(2) VATA and there is no reasonable excuse or furnishing of information with regard to the inaccuracy when there was no reason to believe enquires were being made under s 63(10)(a) and (b) VATA respectively. 26. As no evidence was adduced by Meridian that it had a reasonable excuse or had furnished of information in regard to the inaccuracy, we find that the misdeclaration penalties were correctly imposed in accordance with the legislation. Given that that it is either estopped from advancing the arguments and grounds of appeal raised in its withdrawn appeal or alternatively that it would be an abuse of process if it was permitted to do so as the issues raised have been determined in accordance with s 85 VATA, we find that there is no reasonable prospect of Meridian’s appeal against the misdeclaration penalties succeeding. 27. Turning to the question of “fairness” which was raised by Meridian in its Notice of Appeal it must be remembered that this Tribunal, the Tax Chamber of the First-tier Tribunal, was created by statute and unlike the High Court it does not have an inherent jurisdiction, rather its jurisdiction is defined and limited by legislation. This is clear from decisions of the higher courts and Tribunals whose decisions are binding on the Tribunal, eg in the decision of the Tax and Chancery Chamber of the Upper Tribunal in HMRC v Hok Ltd[2012] UKUT 363 (TC) in which the judges (Warren J and Judge Bishopp) said, at [56]: “… the First-tier Tribunal has only that jurisdiction which has been conferred on it by statute, and can go no further, …It is impossible to read the legislation in a way which extends its jurisdiction to include—whatever one chooses to call it—a power to override a statute or supervise HMRC’s conduct.”