“As I was driving into the car park on the left-hand side [the] first thing I saw was all these cars basically top executive cars like Porsches, Aston Martins, basically it's a lot – Mercedes, a lot of very, very expensive cars which really – what hit hard was they all had number plates like TAP 1, TAP 2, TAP 3, TAP 4, so I could assume there's some high – executive people who actually had these cars. I was like, you know, thinking – that was a "wow" in itself basically. So anyway – so we drove to the car – it was round the back. Went into the gate, where we parked, it’s near enough the gateside, and I could also see more car parking space for their, if I can remember, the other people that worked for them. Both sides' car parks, basically, on a gravel ground. So when I went in there I had to press on a buzzer and a security gentleman came in and I remember him taking my passport for ID and then taking us up some stairs. And then there was another code you have to put in basically to get in. Anyway he told us to wait in the seated area so he could get us our badges. There was like a sofa on the right-hand side, there was a table and something else on the right, I can't really remember – I remember one thing: when I sat on the sofa and looked opposite I could just see accolades everywhere of letters from people like Iain Duncan Smith, Chris Tarrant. There was something regarding a donation towards Crime Stoppers. A lot of this was to do with donations, something to do with the Mayor of Kingston, a lot of things requiring donations. So I'm thinking to myself: wow, this gentlemen – I know of Nasir but everybody knows of Nasir Khan, even like celebrity status, you know.”
“After Chris Frazer came in and took us out for through another door which goes out of this room, and all I could see on the right was like big, long offices, like, say, 34 people walking around in the office on the right-hand side of it. It went on for quite a long time. It's quite a long office. Chris took us into an office on the left which was an amazing office. I have never seen one like it. It was a really big office and – it was like an – it was an executive room. I think it was the room of Mr Khan. It could have been the room of Mr Khan. It was one of them special VIP kind of offices which is probably twice the size of this room [used by the Tribunal]. And that's basically – that was like, you know, quite surprising to me. I was actually quite nervous. I was quite nervous being there, and excited, because I'm actually now in a place which – you know what I mean, Mr Khan, you know, I can brag about this when I get – you know what I mean, I can tell people, you know, I been there, you know. What I did like about it is that as you go out – you go back out the office, they've got a beautiful area where – for their workers where they got, like, sofas and like a pool table. Basically it's a nice area for the workers, you know, very beautiful room. So I knew he looks after the workers basically, you know, he's got a nice area for them.” 28. Office Allen agreed that TAP’s premises gave the appearance of a “fairly professional set up” and that she was aware of the reputation of Nasir Khan who she described as having “a fairly high profile.”. 29. During the course of the meeting Chris Frazer explained to Mr Sharif that the TAP group were looking to “partner” companies on the basis that the company concerned would act as broker in the export of mobile telephones to overseas customers specified by TAP. He said that there would not be any risk of MTIC fraud as TAP would be importing the goods itself or sourcing it directly from manufacturers. TAP expected its brokers to purchase the goods on credit and transfer it “ship on hold” pending payment from the customer. 30. Documentation packs which would include customer details, the maximum at which goods could be sold, freight forwarder details and instructions relating to the payment would be provided to the company by TAP, which would also insure the stock and pay freight forwarding charges. Mr Frazer also explained that all payments were to be made through the FCIB. 31. Mr Sharif said that he had “a very fruitful discussion” with Mr Frazer and they “discussed the problems and dangers associated with these industries, notably MTIC fraud” and it was explained that “TAP were going to be the importers then we would be absolutely safe from this type of fraud because of the due diligence undertaken by TAP”
“[51] … traders who take every precaution which could reasonably be required of them to ensure that their transactions are not connected with fraud, be it the fraudulent evasion of VAT or other fraud, must be able to rely on the legality of those transactions without the risk of losing the right to deduct the input VAT. [52] It follows that, where a recipient of a supply of goods is a taxable person who did not and could not know that the transaction concerned was connected with a fraud committed by the seller, Article 17 of the Sixth Directive must be interpreted as meaning that it precludes a rule of national law under which the fact that the contract of sale is void, by reason of a civil law provision which renders that contract incurably void as contrary to public policy for unlawful basis of the contract attributable to the seller, causes that taxable person to lose the right to deduct the VAT he has paid. It is irrelevant in this respect whether the fact that the contract is void is due to fraudulent evasion of VAT or to other fraud.” … [56]. … a taxable person who knew or should have known that, by his purchase, he was taking part in a transaction connected with fraudulent evasion of VAT must, for the purposes of the Sixth Directive, be regarded as a participant in that fraud, irrespective of whether or not he profited by the resale of the goods. [57] That is because in such a situation the taxable person aids the perpetrators of the fraud and becomes their accomplice. [58] In addition such an interpretation, by making it more difficult to carry out fraudulent transactions, is apt to prevent them. [59] Therefore, it is for the referring court to refuse entitlement to the right to deduct where it is ascertained, having regard to objective factors, that the taxable person knew or should have known that, by his purchase, he was participating in a transaction connected with fraudulent evasion of VAT, and do so even where the transaction in question meets the objective criteria which form the basis of the concept of “supply of goods effected by a taxable person acting as such” and “economic activity”. … [61] … where it is ascertained, having regard to objective factors, that the supply is to a taxable person who knew or should have known that, by his purchase, he was participating in a transaction connected with the fraudulent evasion of VAT, it is for the national court to refuse that taxable person entitlement to the right to deduct.”
“[59] The test in Kittel is simple and should not be over-refined. It embraces not only those who know of the connection but those who “should have known”